## DEFORE THE STATE CORPORATION COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

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#### **DIRECT TESTIMONY**

OF

#### MARK A. RUELLE

#### **WESTAR ENERGY**

#### DOCKET NO. 15-WSEE-115-RTS

I. INTRODUCTION

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2	Q.	PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME AND BUSINESS ADDRESS.
3	A.	Mark A. Ruelle, 818 South Kansas Avenue, Topeka, Kansas 66612.
4	Q.	BY WHOM AND IN WHAT CAPACITY ARE YOU EMPLOYED?
5	A.	Westar Energy, Inc. (Westar), as President and Chief Executive
6		Officer.
7	Q.	PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR EDUCATION AND BUSINESS
8		EXPERIENCE.
9	A.	I hold bachelors and masters degrees in economics. I have worked
10		in the utility industry for 25 years, with the vast majority of that
11		experience with Westar. I started at Westar in 1986, worked in
12		various positions, then resigned in early 1997.
13		Prior to rejoining Westar in 2003, I worked at a Nevada-based

integrated electric, natural gas and water utility.

1		I	n early 2003, I returned to Westar as Executive Vice					
2		Preside	ent and Chief Financial Officer and held that position until					
3		becoming President, and shortly thereafter was named Chief						
4		Executi	ve Officer in 2011.					
5	Q.	HAVE	YOU TESTIFIED BEFORE THIS OR OTHER REGULATORY					
6		BODIES IN THE PAST?						
7	A.	Yes. A few times.						
8		II.	PURPOSE AND SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY					
9	Q.	WHAT	IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY?					
10	A.	My tes	stimony addresses policy considerations relevant to our					
11		application. Specifically, my testimony will:						
12		1.	Share context that I believe will be helpful for the					
13		(	Commission's consideration of this request, as well as share					
14		(	our philosophy toward the issues and influences that bear on					
15		(	our mission to serve the interests of Kansas, our customers					
16		i	and our communities;					
17		2.	Outline the principal reasons a rate adjustment is reasonable					
18		ć	and appropriate and discuss how our proposals in this docket					
19		ć	affect and promote the public interest;					
20		3. I	Describe how we provide electric service for, and how pricing					
21		á	affects, our customers;					
22		4. I	Discuss the merits of various ratemaking methods and					
23		i	approaches the Commission might use to regulate Westar,					

set its prices, and balance the public interest for the long-term benefit of all.

#### Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR TESTIMONY.

Α.

The costs reflected in Westar's rate application in this case reflect costs prudently incurred for Westar to continue providing reliable, efficient service at a reasonable cost to our customers, all in accordance with our public service obligations. The largest portion of our request relates to the costs of completing environmental upgrades at La Cygne Station (La Cygne), a project that was previously subject to predetermination scrutiny by the Commission, and that was successfully managed and timely completed – significantly *under* the preapproved budget.

Our Application also includes significant items at Wolf Creek Generating Station (Wolf Creek) necessary to ensure Kansas' only nuclear station continues to operate safely and reliably for the term of its recently extended license life.

We are proposing a grid resiliency program to significantly benefit our customers from financial, safety and reliability perspectives.

We are proposing changes to our existing rate structures and offering several new rate options for our customers, to better align rates with sound principles of cost causation.

We have worked hard to manage our costs and found creative solutions to minimize costs for environmental projects required by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Kansas Department of Health and Environment. These solutions have saved our customers tens, if not hundreds, of millions of dollars, while ensuring that Kansas remains compliant with environmental regulations and that we can continue to operate power plants that are clean, reliable, cost effective, and important contributors to our Kansas economy.

We have also worked diligently to reduce our financing costs, which is reflected in the lower rate of return we are requesting compared to what the Commission approved in our last application.

As a regulated utility, Westar must recover the costs it prudently incurs to serve our customers. Our Application reflects such costs. It is noteworthy that even with the requested increase – and recent prior increases for necessary infrastructure and compliance – our overall prices remain the lowest of any investorowned utility in Kansas and below average nationwide. Simply put, even considering this request, the majority of our customers can enjoy all the value and convenience that electricity brings to their lives for about \$4.00 a day.

1 2		III. MATTERS FOR CONSIDERATION IN DECIDING THE APPROPRIATE RATE ADJUSTMENT				
3	Q.	AS CEO OF WESTAR, CAN YOU SHARE WITH THE				
4		COMMISSION SOME INSIGHT INTO YOUR PHILOSOPHY				
5		TOWARD UTILITY REGULATION AND WESTAR'S ROLE IN				
6		SUPPORTING KANSAS?				
7	A.	It is my belief, that while the appropriate roles of the Commission, its				
8		Staff, and Westar all necessarily and appropriately differ, we share a				
9		common mission of assuring safe, reliable, efficient, affordable, and				
10		cleaner energy.				
11		This is our only business; being a great utility and asset for				
12		Kansas. This commitment is important because providing reliable				
13		electric service while maintaining reasonable prices and complying				
14		with environmental and other important regulations is essential to				
15		keeping Kansas strong and moving forward. Westar must be able to				
16		provide these things as well as, or better than, other utilities if we are				
17		to keep Kansas from falling behind.				
18		Today, we are moving out of the last known, very expensive,				
19		chapter of federally mandated environmental upgrades. Although				
20		complying with these environmental regulations has resulted in				
21		multiple price increases these past few years, in the long run, the				
22		cost of electricity to our customers remains comparatively favorable,				
23		and the advantages for Kansas and our customers substantial due				

to our diligence in cost-control and project management. We have

maintained strong fuel diversity for our customers by keeping our reliable, low-cost coal plants operating safely – with the hundreds of related jobs and tax base that are important contributors to our economy – and we have done so with resulting utility prices that still compare very favorably, both in the state and across the country.

Also with this Application, we are laying the groundwork for a more resilient grid, suited to today's uncompromising customer demands. We are also creating rate structures for the future to ensure that our customers pay reasonable prices based on their respective energy needs.

I believe strongly in how our industry is organized and regulated in our state. None of us would agree that it is perfect, but it has served our state well and as a result Kansas has avoided the traps so many others have fallen into while trying something different (e.g., volatile prices, shortages and rolling blackouts, protracted litigation, customer revolt, and stranded investment). This model provides the best result for customers and our state; but we need to continue to work constructively together to address these changing circumstances or Westar, our investors, and even our regulators will become less relevant, with our customers and communities the ones caught in the cross hairs of disruption.


#### Q. DESCRIBE THE OVERALL CONTEXT FOR WESTAR'S REVENUE REQUEST.

Energy generation, transmission, distribution, maintenance and customer service is a business demanding incredible size and scale, with single pieces of equipment often costing tens of millions of dollars – or more. Arguably, it is the world's biggest "machine," and almost nothing we do is small. As a result, electric utilities are the most capital-intensive businesses in the world.

Α.

We are nearing the end of an extremely large construction program for government-mandated environmental retrofits at our power plants that reinforces that fact. Moreover, when large capital additions are required, because of their great complexity and scale, they must often be tied with yet other large investments, making the overall investment lumpy. The past half dozen years or so have required an extraordinary amount of capital investment which has, unfortunately, also come with an associated level of significant, yet necessary, price increases to our customers. Figure 1 illustrates this level of capital investment but also foretells a more promising outlook.

Figure 1
Capital Expenditures Moderating After Recent Years' Surge



We expect that both capital demands and the requisite price increases they bring will moderate following the completion of this general case. Though our business will continue to need significant capital; on a *relative* basis those demands appear to be smaller in the future, and accordingly, we look forward to an expected moderation in the rate of change in our prices as well.

- Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH WESTAR
  OPERATES AND THE CHANGING CIRCUMSTANCES THAT
  AFFECT WESTAR'S REQUEST FOR A PRICE INCREASE IN
  THIS CASE.
- A. The last several years have been challenging economically for our country and for Kansas. Finally, we are seeing our economy improve, based on the business activity of our customers. Reliable electric infrastructure is essential to keep our economy moving and competing. Reliable electric infrastructure gives the public

confidence that necessary foundations exist upon which to build. Reliable electric power is one of those things our customers and our communities expect to be able to take for granted, even as they raise their expectations for such reliability. Protecting the reliability and affordability of our electric power infrastructure for the future requires a clear understanding of the changing nature of the industry, customers' changing expectations, and the true costs associated with the undertaking. Perhaps nothing is more important in the Commission's consideration of this Application.

We are also seeing unprecedented interest from customers in installing self-generation at their homes. For these customers, it's not always about the economics of self-generation. Instead, like with many things, it is about customer preference. The number of customers with self-generation on our system, though still relatively small, is increasing quickly – by about 60% from December 2013 through October 2014. The number of solar panel installers in the area is also increasing – from three to 10, in the last year and a half. In a recent survey of Westar customers, 67% of those responding indicated that they were at least somewhat interested in installing rooftop solar at their residences. Neither Westar nor the Commission should ignore these trends and customers' preferences. It is essential that the Commission appreciate the impact that residential customers installing self-generation have on costs for all of Westar's

customers under the current rate structure. That is the reason Westar is proposing two new rate options for customers wishing to install self-generation. I do not think it wise to discourage these trends; instead we must manage through this reality.

Recent events have also emphasized the need for more resilient infrastructure. For example, Hurricane Sandy resulted in more than eight million people without electricity, leaving many without power for weeks. The power outages that resulted from just that one storm caused substantial economic harm and loss of public confidence. The occasional harshness of our own climate (thunderstorms, tornadoes wind and ice) reminds us that Kansas too is not immune to Mother Nature's wrath. For some of our largest customers, a single outage can cause several millions of dollars in economic losses and impact our entire territory. This case is centered on ensuring the continued existence of reliable infrastructure in the future, while addressing changing circumstances in the industry and structuring rates in a way that ensures reasonable prices for all customers.

#### IV. WESTAR'S APPLICATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST

## Q. WHAT ARE THE PRINCIPAL DRIVERS OF WESTAR'S APPLICATION IN THIS CASE?

A. The greatest contributors to the increase in Westar's revenue requirement since the last test year some four years ago are the cost of environmental compliance at La Cygne, a plant operated by KCPL

and 50% owned by Westar; life extension projects at Wolf Creek, Kansas' only nuclear generating station; enhancements to the aging distribution grid, and general cost increases not otherwise offset by cost efficiencies during the last several years.

La Cygne is the last – as far as we can see today – of major investments for plant modifications required to comply with provisions of the Clean Air Act. Unlike the cost of modifications we have already successfully completed at Jeffrey and Lawrence Energy Centers, the Commission did not permit Westar to recover La Cygne costs through an existing environmental rider. Instead, the Commission considered and approved the La Cygne environmental project in a predetermination proceeding that ordered cost recovery for its owners through an abbreviated rate application we filed two years ago, followed by this general rate application.

Westar and Wolf Creek's other owners have successfully secured a license extension from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, but for the plant to contemplate a now 20-year longer life (through 2045) requires significant upgrades and mid-life renewal to enable Wolf Creek's 1,000+ person workforce to safely and successfully operate and maintain this important zero-emission base load resource. Westar witness Mr. Bridson discusses in his direct testimony work being completed at Wolf Creek to ensure the continued safe, reliable operation of this very important plant.

Building on the success of our ReliabiliTree® tree trimming and repair program approved by the Commission in our last general rate application<sup>1</sup>, we are proposing another phase of distribution grid reliability and resiliency improvements. With its proven success, outlined by Mr. Akin in his testimony, we will continue the ReliabiliTree® tree-trimming and repair program. However, we have found that some of our equipment is so old, it is no longer efficient to repair it, and instead we should replace it. So we are now asking for permission to use the same proactive approach the Commission approved for tree-trimming and repairs with the ReliabiliTree® program to most efficiently replace outdated equipment that causes As part of this request, we are asking the power outages. Commission to approve a method of more timely recognizing incremental capital investments in the distribution grid, with an annual rate adjustment mechanism for related expenditures, subject to both dollar investment and time limits.

There is no question that demands on and expectations for our distribution grid are greater today than any time before. While too many throughout the country have waited for the harsh effects of extreme storms to demonstrate the need to modernize distribution

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> ReliabiliTree® is a program we proposed and the Commission approved in our last general rate case (Docket No. 12-WSEE-112-RTS) specifically designed to improve distribution reliability through enhanced vegetation management, follow-up line maintenance and customer education.

grids, Kansans should not have to suffer such consequences before we and our regulators jointly act to better secure its future.

Α.

Because we are facing ever-increasing and sophisticated security threats to the grid and our computing and operating systems – and concomitant regulations from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the North American Electric Reliability Corporation, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and possibly other regulatory agencies in the future – we are asking that the Commission allow us to defer as a regulatory asset costs associated with complying with these regulations, then amortize those costs in rates at the time of a subsequent rate application.

As part of our rate request, we are also asking for a lower rate of return on investment, passing on to our customers the benefits of Westar's recent aggressive refinancing program.

## Q. YOU HAVE DESCRIBED THE PRINCIPAL REASONS FOR THE INCREASE IN REVENUE REQUIREMENT. WHAT HAS WESTAR DONE TO OFFSET THE INCREASE?

First, as I mentioned, we have reduced the requested return for investors in this case from 8.40% approved in our last general rate case to 7.99% today. This reduction is a result of executing a business plan that resulted in improved credit ratings, cooperative capital markets and sound financial execution which capitalized on each. The lower overall rate of return in this case that results from

our	lower in	nterest costs	s, discus	ssed	by Westar w	vitness	Ms. N	North in
her	direct	testimony,	saves	our	customers	about	\$19	million
ann	ually.							

# Q. WHAT ARE SOME WAYS YOU HAVE BEEN ABLE TO AVOID CAPITAL EXPENDITURES, WHILE STILL MEETING YOUR SERVICE AND COMPLIANCE OBLIGATIONS?

A. Our project management has produced very good results when dealing with large, complex, hazardous, and very costly projects.

When confronted with potentially very expensive *water* discharge options required as a result of *air* quality projects at Jeffrey Energy Center (JEC), we developed a first-of-its-kind application to avoid what we estimate to be \$60 million (and also avoiding significant environmental risk) compared to what would otherwise have been required for more costly treatment options.<sup>2</sup> This project, for which we incidentally received our industry's highest award – the EEI Edison Award – will also save annual operating costs over more conventional solutions. Westar witness Mr. Bridson discusses our innovative wetlands solution for wastewater treatment at JEC in his direct testimony.

We have managed our JEC NO<sub>x</sub> compliance projects to avoid as much as a quarter billion dollars (or more) of capital spending.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> One recommended solution which we avoided was "deep well injection." Geological concerns about deep well injection have been exacerbated by the growing prevalence of earthquakes, including in Kansas, where that practice has expanded.

With foresight and a mind toward keeping options open, we did this by managing a very complex set of circumstances over several years. First, after seven years of disagreement and discussion, we negotiated a favorable settlement with the EPA that provided us more cost-effective options rather than mandates to incur costs that didn't make sense for our customers. Then, we managed the Selective Catalytic Reduction (SCR) project for JEC Unit 1 in such a way as to have saved more than \$15 million compared to its budget. Finally, our engineers found a creative solution to maximize customer benefits from the option we negotiated with the EPA. We leveraged to the maximum extent possible the single SCR on JEC Unit 1, and combined it with novel solutions for the other two units to avoid having to construct a much more expensive SCR on one or both of those other units, yet still keeping the plant in compliance with site-wide NO<sub>X</sub> limits and making it cleaner than any of us could have Mr. Bridson also discusses these projects in his imagined. testimony.

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As a co-owner of La Cygne, we have aided KCPL, the project sponsor, in its successful management of that project, now expecting it too to come in tens of millions of dollars below the amount predetermined by the Commission. I am also pleased to report that, notwithstanding its many hazards, that project has also been completed with a remarkable safety record.

We managed two of our major transmission projects – Prairie Wind and Rose Hill-Sooner – to complete them ahead of schedule and nearly \$90 million under budget. Those lower costs for our customers are reflected in our transmission delivery charge.

Q.

Α.

IN ADDITION TO THESE METHODS OF AVOIDING CAPITAL EXPENDITURES, CAN YOU SHARE EXAMPLES OF WHAT YOU HAVE DONE TO MAXIMIZE EFFICIENCY AND SAVE MONEY WITH YOUR OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE EXPENDITURES?

I am proud that our employees continually look for ways to reduce operations and maintenance expenditures – ranging from significant changes in how we operate our business to small changes made on a day-to-day basis that add up for our customers. For example, as Westar witness Mr. Banning explains, we recently renegotiated our contract with the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers so that the pension plan provided to new union employees is similar to the plan we provide to non-union employees. We expect that this change will reduce our costs by \$2 million during the next five years and by up to \$60 million in the long-term.

Continuing the gains we first learned in our power plants, we have now implemented similar predictive maintenance technologies that allow us to identify problems in substations, transformers, and other equipment before that equipment fails. We have avoided

millions of dollars in capital replacement costs as a result of this program. We have also worked to optimize our planned maintenance. Many of our planned maintenance intervals had been set to more frequent suggested intervals than we have learned are necessary. By using more intelligence and analysis, we have been able to responsibly and safely extend these cycles, which has already produced annual savings of over a half million dollars. By reviewing our cycles for inspection of substations and the process that we use to inspect substation breakers, we have saved customers another \$600,000, or so, annually.

One technically simple solution saves millions. We have begun installing trusses instead of replacing power poles, where pole integrity remains acceptable, except for the narrow band near the ground level. This change alone has saved our customers about \$4.5 million annually.

Our negotiations and contracting pay off in administrative areas too. When negotiating with the North American Renewables Registry regarding the rate we would pay to register renewable energy credits (RECs) produced by our wind farms, we were able to negotiate a lower rate, not only for Westar, but for all Kansas utilities that register RECs. The reduction in price that our employees negotiated saved our customers about \$170,000 annually – and other Kansas utilities' customers more still.

These are just a few examples of the work Westar employees
do every day to reduce costs for customers while continuing to
provide them reliable electric service.

## 4 Q. CAN YOU EXPLAIN HOW YOUR INFRASTRUCTURE 5 INVESTMENTS HAVE AFFECTED JOBS IN KANSAS?

A. Utility infrastructure affects employment in three ways. First, there are construction jobs, the easiest to track. Figure 2 below shows peak construction jobs for some of Westar's most recent sponsored projects; well paid jobs with good benefits for hundreds, if not thousands, of pipefitters, electricians, steelworks and machinists at a time when our economy perhaps needed it most.

Figure 2
Westar's Utility Investments Have Also Created Thousands of
Construction Jobs for Skilled Craft

PROJECT	NUMBER OF JOBS
Emporia Energy Center	454
JEC Scrubber	829
LEC Air Quality Project	225
2008 Wind Farms	370
Major Transmission Projects	150
JEC Wetlands Project	45
JEC SCR/SNCR Project	300
La Cygne Environmental Project	943
Post Rock Wind Farm	200
Ironwood Wind Farm	184
Total	3516

Next, there are jobs associated with the utility itself. Today we employee about 2400 people (excluding our share of employees at Wolf Creek and La Cygne); a number that has been relatively stable these past few years, notwithstanding how much additional equipment we operate today. Hundreds of those are at our recently upgraded base load power plants. Finally, and hardest to measure, are the jobs that result as people choose to live and do business in Kansas, in part because of our infrastructure and our competitive

pricing. One part of that choice is reliable, resilient, cost-effective utility service, something we know from our work alongside economic development agencies in Kansas as they work to retain, expand, and recruit jobs for Kansas, such as the recent addition of Mars Chocolate to the Kansas economy.

## Q. YOU MENTIONED CHANGES TO WESTAR'S RATE STRUCTURE. WHY IS RATE STRUCTURE IMPORTANT?

Α.

First, rate structure and design is important to ensure that Westar has a reasonable opportunity to recover its necessary cost of doing business. Second, rate design is necessary to ensure fairness among customers; that is, reasonably apportioning the overall costs to the various categories of customers driving those costs and, thus, avoiding subsidization between customers. Third, we use rate structure to make sure we do not waste resources by encouraging things that do not fundamentally make economic sense. One of the things about a free political economy is that people get to choose how they spend their money, and on what. But if our rates are poorly designed, we can inadvertently encourage them to waste resources. Fourth, and finally, rate design can give customers more choice in the manner in which they purchase and use electricity.

Our customers use our product in vastly different ways, and deserve optional payment plans to choose from, similar to how each of our families' now pay and budget for their cell phone use.

1	However, concomitant with that is that the prices of those things
2	people choose to purchase - or not purchase - should reflect as
3	reasonably as we can their true cost

- Q. WHAT ARE KEY ELEMENTS OF RATE STRUCTURE THAT

  WESTAR PROPOSES IN THIS CASE, AND WHAT ARE THE

  REASONS FOR THEM?
- 7 A. We are proposing several changes to our residential rate structure. Westar witnesses Mr. Overcast, Dr. Faruqui, and Ms. Wilson provide 8 9 more detail on these proposed changes; however, I want to 10 emphasize the fact that our proposals are designed with three main 11 objectives in mind – to give customers more choices in how they 12 purchase and use their electric service, to better match fixed costs 13 and revenues, and better reflect cost causation in our rates to 14 minimize one customer having to subsidize another.
- Q. YOU INDICATED THAT WESTAR IS PROPOSING TO
  STRUCTURE ITS RESIDENTIAL RATES IN A WAY THAT
  BETTER REFLECTS COST CAUSATION. WHAT DOES THAT
  MEAN?
- A. A large percentage of Westar's costs to serve its customers almost two-thirds are fixed, meaning they do not change regardless of the amount of energy consumed. However, most of Westar's fixed costs today are actually recovered through a volumetric energy charge, giving a false impression about what does or does not cause us to

incur costs on their behalf. From our residential customers – for whom the proportion of fixed costs is even higher at almost 75% – we are only recovering about 12% of our costs from fixed charges. The remainder of our fixed costs are recovered through the volumetric energy charge. This type of rate structure can lead to bad consequences like volatile bills (especially high summer bills), tenants in poorly insulated homes subsidizing those in even high-end condos or second homes, and creating incentives for people to intermittently bypass the grid with more costly solutions.

We are proposing to take small gradual steps during a fouryear period to better match revenues with the percentage of our costs that are fixed. While these small changes will not solve the problem entirely, they are a step in the right direction for our customers, and our proposal introduces these changes in a gradual manner, consistent with a ratemaking principle this Commission has embraced for a long time.

We are also proposing two new voluntary rate options for residential customers, both of which give our customers more choice and control over their bills, and also help match cost causation with revenues.

#### Q. ARE YOU PROPOSING CHANGES FOR THE RATES PAID BY CUSTOMERS THAT HAVE DISTRIBUTED GENERATION?

Yes. Unlike many utilities across the nation addressing similar concerns, we do not believe our customers who produce some of their own energy should be assessed special charges or penalties. We do, however, propose that they pay their share of costs for the system they use. We are proposing that our residential customers without self-generation have three options from which they can choose, and that our self-generating customers have two of those same options, but not the third. Dr. Faruqui discusses these three rate options in detail in his direct testimony.

A.

Α.

A change in the law approved by the Kansas legislature in 2014, which we supported, now gives the Commission the authority to allow jurisdictional utilities to propose different rate structures for customers with some of their own generation, and those without it.

## Q. ARE YOU PROPOSING ANY OTHER RATE STRUCTURE CHANGES?

We are proposing changes to our commercial and industrial rate classes to address customer migration issues and ensure that customers with similar energy demands pay similar prices. Westar witness Mr. Wolfram discusses these changes.

Additionally, as Westar witness Mr. Wilson explains, we are proposing a change to the funding mechanism for our economic development rider to better allow Westar to support economic development in a manner consistent with the method used for other

utilities in the state and neighboring states with which Kansascompetes for economic development.

Α.

#### V. IMPACT OF PROPOSED RATE ADJUSTMENT ON CUSTOMER RATES AND THE VALUE OF ELECTRICITY

# Q. GENERALLY, HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE HOW WESTAR AND KANSAS ARE POSITIONED WITH RESPECT TO ELECTRIC UTILITY SERVICE, INFRASTRUCTURE AND PRICING?

By objective measures, things are very favorable. We have navigated the compliance maze of environmental regulations promulgated these past few years without having to shut down our most reliable, stable and low-cost base load coal generation (along the way preserving about 700 well-paying jobs that they entail). We have managed our air quality compliance programs to be less costly than expected. We have increased our generating capacity with 660 MW of new efficient natural gas generation. We have added almost 700 MW of wind generation, which will grow to nearly 1,100 MW by 2016 – a remarkable amount of emission-free renewable energy – with minimal impact on costs to our customer's bills – keeping us in compliance with statutory mandates and giving Kansas a path through future carbon rules under consideration.

The success in these areas has left us and our customers with an *even more diverse* fuel mix, and a dramatically growing portfolio of emission-free resources. We have also improved reliability and remove congestion in the regional transmission system and made significant improvements to our distribution safety and reliability. We have significantly improved (with more work to continue) the resiliency of our distribution grid.

Α.

We have accomplished all of this while keeping prices for our customers the lowest of any major utility in our state, below the national average, and during the past couple of decades, below the rate of inflation, generally.

### Q. TO WHAT DO YOU PRINCIPALLY ATTRIBUTE THESE FAVORABLE CONDITIONS?

It has been a collaborative effort, and for that I am grateful. Key elements include: (1) a consistent, constructive regulatory and legislative policy environment in Kansas; (2) cooperative and frequent engagement between the professionals on the Commission Staff, consumer advocate, and those at Westar; (3) good corporate governance at Westar, with a clear mission and passionate commitment to our public service responsibilities as Kansans; and (4) transparency, open communication and mutual trust.

As I said, it is my belief that while our roles appropriately differ, we share a common *mission* of assuring safe, reliable, efficient, affordable, and cleaner energy. We have listened to and learned from one another, and the results have been good for our state, our customers and Westar. I hope we have also built a stronger mutual

respect and trust. Frankly, I think we have jointly proved some cynics wrong.

#### Q. WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY THAT?

Α.

Cynics might claim that things like pre-approving large projects or having annual riders to track planned expenses would create perverse incentives and limit regulatory oversight. The results have been quite the opposite, and with overwhelming evidence.

For example, under the authority and review of a well-functioning environmental cost recovery rider, we completed key air quality compliance projects on time and under budget, and our engineers developed creative solutions to avoid hundreds of millions of dollars of additional environmental improvements that we could easily have justified under EPA regulations, *but didn't*. Westar also brought several large transmission lines in under the amount expected by the SPP, and ahead of schedule.

Another example is La Cygne. As a co-owner confronted with massive required air quality improvements at the station, in this policy environment, it could have been tempting to forfeit that plant (and its hundreds of jobs) and replace it with a new, more costly, natural gas-fired plant, passing through those higher costs to our customers. Certainly we could have gained friends in the environmental arena by shutting down a coal plant. But instead the owners did the tough analysis, brought that analysis to the

Commission Staff and presented the case to the Commission, and as a result of our joint efforts, we continue to have that important base load resource, fuel diversity, and the jobs that keep it humming. Moreover, even though the cost of this significant retrofit investment was preapproved, that project too will be completed below budget, as Commission Staff is aware as a result of their close and frequent attention to the project.

A third example is our wind contracts. Because of our improving relative financial strength, we have been in a position to be opportunistic as to timing and with whom we contract as our counterparties. As a result, we have added to our generation portfolio some of the lowest cost renewables in the nation.

Because Westar has improved its financial profile, it means we have been able to make decisions with a long-term perspective. The decisions we have made about what to invest in, when, where and how, we can make not from a hurried, forced, or short-term perspective, but more thoughtfully. If you look at the shareholder base we have cultivated, they are not activists looking for a quick buck resulting from our volatility or based on just next quarter's earnings. Instead, our investors are solid, long-term-focused, traditional utility investors, many of whom are themselves our Kansas neighbors, who appreciate what a Kansas utility should be – not a company swinging for the fences, but one that steps up to the plate

consistently, working to get safely on base. As a result, my time as CEO is far more focused on our business and our customers than dealing with activist investors looking for the next "catalyst" that might move our stock price up or down compared to their other investments.

Α.

And as I have mentioned, our improving financial profile has given us the opportunity to refinance hundreds of millions of dollars of outstanding debt to reduce the rate of return and cost of capital in this case, passing the lower costs to our customers.

Some might say "Westar is a boring investment." That may be true, but I hope we continue to work jointly to keep it so, as that is best for our customers and our state.

## Q. HOW ELSE HAS THE SHARED MISSION BETWEEN THE COMMISSION, WESTAR, AND STAFF BENEFITTED KANSAS?


Because I believe we share a common mission – of assuring safe, reliable, efficient, affordable, and cleaner energy – and have worked to achieve this mission in a cooperative and constructive way, Kansas has been able to avoid the acrimony that sometimes occurs, often leaving customers in the cross hairs of disruption and disputes. For example, unlike New York and Hawaii, where electricity prices are 2-3 times what they are in Kansas, our state has not felt compelled to turn the cart upside down and start over. In fact, in one of these states, its largest utility is being taken over. Because our

legislature, regulators and utilities work together to keep our prices moderate and our rates more aligned with costs, we have also avoided the mess that has become associated with heavily subsidized renewable power, and the higher rates, risk of stranded investment, and political fighting that has come along with it.

### Q. CAN YOU PUT THE RECENT HISTORY OF WESTAR'S PRICES FOR ENERGY IN CONTEXT?

A. Figure 3 below shows Westar's average retail price per KWh for electricity over time, compared to the Consumer Price Index, since 1992. It also shows how our prices and capital investment are correlated. The upper black line is just nominal dollars, the lower line is the same price, just adjusted for inflation.

Figure 3
Even as Required Investment Drives Rates, Westar's Prices Remain below the General Rate of Inflation




You can see that for about a decade and a half, during a period of relatively low required reinvestment, our customers enjoyed flat (nominal) to declining (adjusted for inflation) prices. In the past few years, concomitant with a very large capital investment program, due largely to federal environmental mandates, our prices have risen rapidly (in nominal terms) but still remain below the change in the overall consumer cost of living. Or, stated another way, after adjusting for inflation, our rates are still lower than they were more than 20 years ago.

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Figure 4 below shows that as a percent of Kansas household income, the cost of Westar electricity today is just 1.7% of household income, down slightly from two decades ago. Today, even though they use more of it electricity takes a smaller percentage of our customers' incomes.


Figure 4



To put that further in context, for about two-thirds of our residential customers, the daily cost of powering their entire home for 24 hours is about \$4.00, about the same cost it takes to drive their cars for less than one hour, or what it takes to buy a fancy cup of coffee. Further perspective is in Figure 5 below, which shows the relative percentage of household income required for items other than


electricity, even though many of those other things depend on electricity for their value.

Figure 5



Indeed, this is the reason *most* of our customers rarely complain about their electricity costs. There is no question that some of our customers have trouble paying for all of the things it takes for daily living, including their utility bills, and that can be a hardship. But the fact that electricity delivers such value for such a relatively small portion of most of our customers' incomes – together with the fact that the vast majority of high energy users are also high income households may explain why the number of complaints filed by our customers with the Commission has steadily decreased over the last five years, even as our prices have been rising. (Figure 6 below)

Figure 6



Q. WHAT WILL BE THE EFFECT ON CUSTOMER PRICES OF GRANTING YOUR RATE REQUEST?

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
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- A. If the Commission grants our request, for two-thirds of our customers
   the increase would be less than 44 cents per day.
  - Q. HOW DO WESTAR'S RATES, EVEN WITH THIS PROPOSED ADJUSTMENT, COMPARE TO THE RATES OF OTHER ELECTRIC UTILITIES IN THE REGION AND ACROSS THE COUNTRY?
- 9 A. Westar's retail rates are lower than any other jurisdictional utility in
  10 Kansas; and a lot lower than virtually all non-jurisdictional ones, too.
  11 Westar's retail rates are also lower than most other utilities across
  12 the country as is reflected in Figure 7 below, two out of three US
  13 households pay more for their electricity than do Westar's customers.

Figure 7



## Q. DO YOU SEE THE RECENT TREND OF RAPIDILY INCREASING ELECTRICITY PRICES CONTINUING?

A. Fortunately, no. At least not for Westar's customers. While I do not think we can expect a return to flat prices, we have reason to expect more modest increases in the future and fewer rate adjustments. This is largely reflective of more modest capital investments, the principal driver of the increases. But of course, much of that depends on the external policy environment and government mandates affecting our industry and ultimately our customers.

## Q. WHEN DO YOU ANTICIPATE FILING ANOTHER GENERAL RATE APPLICATION?

It has been nearly four years since the last one, and I hope we can avoid the next one for quite some time too. However, that depends on a lot of factors outside our control – such as laws, tax rates, environmental policy, and interest rates – and, importantly, how the Commission balances the competing interests in this present rate request.

#### VI. MERITS OF RATEMAKING USED BY THE COMMISSION

## Q. WHAT CONCERNS YOU MOST ABOUT THIS PRESENT RATE APPLICATION?

A. I am concerned that the very real and present pain of a series of recent price increases these past few years might create a set of circumstances that undoes much of the progress we have jointly made. Indeed, that is a concern of Westar's investors, of which nearly 20,000 are also Kansans.

#### Q. CAN YOU EXPLAIN FURTHER?

Α.

Α.

Investors recognize that the rate setting process inherently involves some uncertainty. That is why companies with constructive, predictable regulation have an advantage in finding good shareholders and willing lenders. When circumstances arise that cause investors to perceive a negative shift in the regulatory sentiments, they do not hide their concerns.

A recent example of those concerns, reflected in Figure 8 below, was the more than \$200 million dollars of Westar shareholder value lost late summer in response to the Commission's order in the

Atmos case – in which they (our shareholders) perceived the Commission as having embraced an uncharacteristically low allowed return for investors – coupled with concerns about the complaint the Commission filed at the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). Investors interpreted those actions as negative signals of change.

Figure 8

Westar Share Price Very Sensitive to KCC Actions



Fortunately, and with a lot of investor hand holding last fall, we have calmed some of those fears and regained most of that ground – for now – by reminding investors of the broader story that demonstrates the cooperative, constructive Kansas regulatory environment I believe (and hope) still exists, the continuation of which would bode well for our customers, shareholders and Kansas. But of course, the outcome of this case is still uncertain.

A responsibility that lies with Westar in this application is to present a compelling case to the Commission for our request, and to share our concerns about the consequences that could befall Kansas if a fair outcome balancing all interests involved does not result.

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
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While it may not seem very intuitive, for investors the income statement starts at the bottom. By that I mean investors are keenly aware of how very large changes in the bottom line can result from relatively small changes in top line revenue. For example, the difference between an allowed ROE of 9.5% vs.10.0% might seem slight to some, but it is very significant for investors who have a multitude of options for their investments. Indeed, for most residential customers it would reflect a difference of less than the cost of a single gallon of gasoline per month. On the other hand, the difference in that ½ of one percent, can signal for investors the difference between a company under either reasonably constructive or relatively challenging regulation, respectively. If investors see the regulatory environment as challenging, they will simply reallocate their capital elsewhere and we risk losing the best terms for investments that are the lifeblood of our capital intensive industry and that enable us to do a good job of providing a critical public service at reasonable rates.

# Q. CAN YOU PROVIDE SOME CONTEXT AROUND THE CURRENT REGULATORY ENVIRONMENTAL AS IT RELATES TO AUTHORIZED ROE?

A. Figure 9 below highlights our concerns, or more appropriately, the concerns of investors who put their capital to work for Kansas utility infrastructure. It shows recent ROE decisions of regulatory commissions for gas and electric utilities across the nation, including the most recent decision by the Commission. Notable is that the Commission's recent decision is well <u>below</u> average, and nearly the lowest of any across the nation.

Figure 9
Recent ROE Decision in Atmos among Lowest in Nation




If a utility were neglecting its public service duties, and the Commission felt the need to make its dissatisfaction known, that might be a legitimate reason for a substandard allowed ROE. Were

that the case, it would be important to make that known so that investors would not erroneously generalize sentiments about the Commission's intentions. However, if the utility were meeting its public service obligations, providing safe, efficient and sufficient service, it would be questionable to investors as to why the Commission would discourage them from supporting our State's utility infrastructure.

It is understandable that in addressing cost pressures regulators might feel the need to squeeze investors' allowed returns, but the data do not bear out that lower authorized returns result in lower prices for customers. Figure 10 below shows a scatter diagram of allowed returns for the last three years across numerous regulatory jurisdictions, corresponding to customer rates. Figure 10 shows there is no correlation suggesting that lower rates result from lower allowed returns. If there were, there would be a discernable trend from the lower left to the upper right on Figure 10. When analyzed statistically, the very small correlation that does exist is actually *negative*, implying that that companies with lower ROEs have higher rates.

Figure 10

Lower Allowed ROE does not correlate with Lower Customer Rates



#### Q. HOW DO INVESTORS VIEW AUTHORIZED ROE FOR WESTAR?

A. Investors clearly perceive the authorized ROE as a key indicator of perceived regulatory balance, particularly when there is little if anything otherwise unique about Westar's regulatory tools and mechanics. The methods, mechanisms and practices of Kansas generally provide little unique advantage for Westar – something Staff has confirmed on multiple occasions.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> See, e.g., Gatewood Direct Testimony, at pp. 7-8, Docket No. 12-WSEE-112-RTS ("Staff is not recommending a specific adjustment to account for any risk reduction associated with Westar's tariff riders because most of Staff's proxy companies have similar mechanisms. Thus, any risk reduction associated with these mechanisms is captured in the market data (stock prices) used in Staff's analysis").

Westar competes for capital on a national – even global – basis. If investors perceive Kansas as being harsh in its treatment of utility shareholders, they will simply take their capital to the next jurisdiction. It is that next state then that would boast a more attractive infrastructure, important for overall economic health and jobs and for moving that state forward.

Α.

It may make us uncomfortable when the market speaks, perhaps in a way that does not square with our own perceptions, preferences, and intuition, but the facts are that investors vote with their feet.

What returns other investors in other industries with different circumstances might earn is irrelevant to Westar's investors. Utility investors look to other utilities similar to Westar – and the risks and rewards they offer – and compare that to what they see in Kansas with Westar.

# Q. WHAT ARE THE CONSEQUENCES TO COMPANIES PERCEIVED BY INVESTORS AS HAVING MORE DIFFICULT REGULATORY CIRCUMSTANCES?

Typically, their stock trades at lower levels, their cost of borrowing is higher, their bond ratings are lower, and they attract more short-term-focused, activist shareholders. As a result, management spends more time and focus trying to calm frayed nerves and satisfy investor demands for quick fixes, with less focus available for making the best

long-term decisions for their customers, communities and their company.

Α.

It is no secret that the number of mid-sized utilities is shrinking. In the past year, four of Westar's peers, comprised of 11 subsidiary companies, have been targeted for acquisition, with a fifth just last month. And while companies being acquired is not necessarily a bad thing, in states and communities already starved of corporate headquarters and the unique and valuable jobs they bring to a community, such events can have a disproportionate impact on the well-being of smaller communities and states with smaller populations. Westar, unfortunately, is one of the few remaining, sizable publicly traded companies still headquartered in Kansas.

When a utility company is acquired, obviously the poles and wires remain. A less obvious "cost" when all this happens is that there is a diminished sense of local interest.

### Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE THE COSTS RELATIVE TO THE REQUESTED RATE OF RETURN IN THIS APPLICATION.

We are requesting an overall rate of return (ROR) of 7.99%. The ROR approved by the Commission in our last case was 8.40%. This reduction in ROR implies a \$19 million reduction in the revenue requirement from what was authorized in the last case. Westar's request of 10% ROE is at the low end of ROEs requested by

vertically integrated utilities across the nation in the last 12 months and right at the average of the ROEs that regulators have authorized to vertically integrated utilities over the same 12 month period. Commission approval of our request would help return Kansas to at least an average authorized ROE.

### Q. WHAT STANDARD SHOULD THE COMMISSION APPLY TO WESTAR'S ROE REQUEST IN THIS CASE?

Α.

The standard for the Commission's decision on ROE for investors, I would hope, would be far higher than whether it would simply be upheld by the courts. Frankly, that is a pretty low standard, as we recognize the courts have affirmed the Commission's broad authority in matters of setting rates.

The standard I hope the Commission considers is one far more important; that is, what is best for the long-term interests and health of Kansas and the electrical infrastructure that drives our economy; a standard that does not leave Westar reduced to short-term decision making simply to meet financial exigencies of a restrictive order, the balance of which might have been tipped too far away from shareholders. An ROE in the middle of the pack, and perhaps yielding a monthly bill apparently a few cents higher than might result from a sub-par allowed ROE, could prove to be cost-effective insurance in keeping the Kansas economy on the right track toward a financially strong future.

Westar's investors do not expect special treatment or a premium ROE, but I do not think they should expect below average treatment either, unless, perhaps our performance in our duties were lacking. It is always important to remember that the charge of this Commission is to fairly balance the interests of both the customers and the shareholders – which I am confident is at the heart of Westar's proposal.

Α.

- Q. WHY SHOULD THE COMMISSION NOT EXPECT WESTAR
  SIMPLY TO FIND WAYS TO CUT CORNERS OR PRODUCE
  WEAKER RETURNS FOR INVESTORS, AS MANY OTHER
  BUSINESSES MIGHT HAVE TO ON OCCASSION?
  - First, cost management is and remains an important and ongoing focus of Westar's management. But central to this entire discussion is the reality that electric utilities like Westar are simply not like other businesses. Regulated electric utilities are a unique institution, a hybrid enterprise with a mission quite unlike any other. Yes, we have special rights, but along with them we also have unique, special, and extraordinarily demanding responsibilities. Unlike most businesses, we do not have the flexibility of saying "no" to a customer wanting service, closing a division, cherry-picking the most profitable customers, curtailing services, shutting down a production shift, or deferring maintenance and investment.

By design, the regulatory and legal framework in which we operate is intended to recognize and respect that electric utilities are essential to our way of life, that our service needs to be continually accessible to all customers willing and able to pay (a "just and reasonable, regulated price"), and that our investments must be with an eye toward the long-term public good, even as we experience short-term pressures. Indeed, those are legal obligations we share together, each in our respective roles.

In a business that must attract huge amounts of capital (that must be recovered over almost unimaginably long depreciable lives compared to any other business<sup>4</sup>) to fulfill its basic mission, no investor would place a bet on such a peculiar set of business conditions and constraints without assurance that there was a reliable, constructive, regulatory framework that appreciates this unique arrangement for what it is. In that sense, good regulation is intended to keep electric utilities moderated from some of the volatility and violence of the market, so they are never tempted nor compelled to make expedient, compromising decisions that impair their ability to serve the public interest, now and long into the future.

It may be appealing on the surface to argue that any price increase by a utility is a risk to a still recovering economy; in fact, the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> For example, as reported in Westar's most recent 10-K, the longest depreciable life for Westar's assets ordered by the Commission is about 80 years – for a component of our generation plant..

far greater risk would be to yield to temptation and push these costs off to another day when seemingly it is less awkward to deal with them, only to find that the costs have now magnified and morphed into a much greater risk for our state and customers.

Α.

Kansas enjoys relatively low rates compared to many places, but that does not mean that Kansans are served by keeping them temporarily artificially low, only to experience unavoidable price, safety or reliability shocks later.

The Commission acts as a surrogate for competition for its regulated utilities to keep utilities disciplined in their management decisions in light of real-world economic conditions. This inherently means that the principles applied to setting rates cannot be artificial and must ensure that rates reflect the true nature of costs, required revenues, and an opportunity to achieve a reasonable return on investment in both the short and long terms.

We manage Westar for the very long term. It is that same long-term context in which I believe the Commission should make its decision in this case.

### Q. HOW SHOULD THE COMMISSION VIEW WESTAR'S RECOVERY OF ITS COSTS AS A REGULATED UTILITY?

As a regulated utility, Westar has the legal obligation to serve all customers willing to pay the just and reasonable regulated rate; meaning we cannot ever refuse a customer. With that comes the

legal right to recover our prudently incurred costs and have the opportunity to earn a reasonable return commensurate with returns earned by investors in other enterprises having similar risks. Moreover, there should be recognition that an authorized return is simply a permission, not a guarantee. The returns for investors are necessarily residual; that is, they are "what's left over" when all the other bills – most of which have been rising – are paid. In a generally rising price environment, the deck is stacked against Westar ever earning that allowed return. Due process requires the Commission to balance the interests of customers with the interests of investors when making decisions regarding Westar's recovery of costs and allowed return.

# Q. DOES THE PRINCIPLE REGARDING RECOVERY OF PRUDENTLY INCURRED COSTS ALSO APPLY IN THE CONTEXT OF EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION?

A. Yes, it does. In previous cases, other parties have suggested that portions of our employee compensation that relate to the financial performance of the company should be disallowed. This position taken by other parties ignores the central principle of utility regulation that I discussed above – that a regulated utility is to be given the opportunity to recover actual costs prudently incurred in connection with providing public service. There is no question that the costs

related to employee compensation we included in our revenue requirement have been prudently incurred and are reasonable.

Q.

In his direct testimony, Westar witness Mr. Banning amply demonstrates the reasonableness of our compensation philosophy and practice. Moreover, our customers enjoy good utility service — in their own opinions — and our rates remain the lowest of any investor owned electric utility in Kansas, notwithstanding that we have had to make extraordinary investments to comply with stringent environmental regulation. Absent evidence that our compensation levels are the result of imprudent practices or that we are otherwise failing our customers or the public in some meaningful manner, there is no sound basis for disallowing costs related to employee compensation.

- GIVEN THE EBB AND FLOW OF UTILITY RESTRUCTURING
  ACROSS THE NATION, AND THE CURRENT INTEREST OF A
  FEW LEGISLATORS IN RESTRUCTURING SOME ELEMENTS
  OF UTILITY REGULATION IN KANSAS, WHAT IS YOUR OPINION
  CONCERNING HOW KANSAS REGULATION WORKS?
- A. No system is perfect; each has its advantages and disadvantages.

  However, as I mentioned earlier, by all measures, how Kansas organizes and regulates its electric utilities works well. Before one tries to "fix" something, I hope they consider very carefully whether it is really "broken" and whether proposed changes might bring about

unintended negative consequences of greater concern. Indeed, in states that have gone down that path, the results are at best mixed, but certainly more volatile for customers.

Because things are working well in Kansas – and for concern about unintended consequences of proposed change – I believe strongly that the way Kansas organizes and regulates its utilities remains best for customers, our state and our investors. We respect the authority and role of the Commission. If the Commission shares those general sentiments, I think it is important that we continue working constructively together to demonstrate its continuing merits, because the harsh truth is, if we don't we will all become less relevant if we fail to show its continuing value.

Having said that, it should not, I believe, give us too much comfort in the *status quo*. Our customers have come to expect certain features in all the things they do. They expect more choice, more control, and the conveniences technology now affords. Together I think we need to pay close attention to customers' expectations, make reasonable adjustments along the way, or quite simply, they will demand something that puts at risk the present industrial organization and regulation of our industry that I think serves Kansas, well.

#### VII. CONCLUSION

### Q. HOW HAS WESTAR ATTEMPTED TO FACILITATE AN OPEN AND TRANSPARENT REGULATORY PROCESS?

Α.

We have endeavored to be proactive in our regulatory affairs by openly sharing our plans and the status of projects with the Commission, the Staff and the public generally. This has taken many forms. For example, in developing our large transmission projects, in addition to the public hearings required by statute, we hold open houses to explain our intentions and to elicit public input. In that same vein, we provide landowners notice of the proposed line routes more broadly than called for in the statutes, even as we know that will subject us to more criticism. We also solicit input from interested environmental and non-governmental organizations. In addition to trying to be a good neighbor and recognizing that utility assets sometimes intrude into people's lives, it also reduces the likelihood of costly and time-consuming dissent and delay.

Before proceeding with new, very significant commitments, such as the La Cygne environmental project, we have initiated or supported predetermination cases. The predetermination process is helpful to sound decision-making because it provides a degree of common understanding and agreement about how best to develop large and expensive projects before we jointly commit investors and customers to them. Such a formal, focused process also provides ex ante information to our customers and to the Commission about

the costs and rate implications of these projects and an opportunity for input, and even objection or protest – before we commit our customers and our company to them. It is a maxim that addressing potential problems or disagreements up front ends up being less costly and less disruptive than dealing with unpleasant surprises later.

In our day-to-day interactions with the Commission and its Staff, whether responding to information requests or initiating communications about our operations and plans, our intent is to be open, direct and forthcoming. I am hopeful that both the reality and the perception of our actions are consistent with that objective. As an example, in our last two rate cases, we kept the amount of confidential information to an absolute minimum and responded to every data request submitted to us. Consistent with that approach, there is only one claim of confidential privilege (related to protecting customer-specific information – not our own) in this application and we have already began the process of responding to Staff data requests.

Recent evidence of our efforts to be transparent and work collaboratively with Staff and the Consumer Advocate is the Joint Application process that resulted in the schedule for this case and a decision regarding the accounting treatment for our investment in La Cygne. We worked with Staff and CURB to address accounting and

scheduling issues involved with both ours and our neighbor's rate cases related to the investment at La Cygne and were able to jointly file an application for approval of both the accounting treatment and rate case schedules.

Α.

# Q. WHAT OBSERVATIONS DO YOU OFFER TO THE COMMISSION AS IT CONSIDERS YOUR APPLICATION AND STAFF'S AND OTHER PARTIES' RESPONSES TO IT?

As the Commission, the Staff and intervening parties examine our filing, I believe it will be evident that our request is transparent, conventional, presented in a forthright manner, and contains little, if anything, that should be characterized as controversial. I believe it will withstand the scrutiny of careful audit and verification as to completeness, accuracy and reasonableness. This should not be taken as an assertion that we have been infallible or that other approaches have no merit. We will readily acknowledge and correct any errors as we or other parties discover them and will be open to considering reasonable alternatives to adjustments we have proposed.

I also believe the Commission will find that our request reflects necessary, but well-managed cost increases consistent with: (a) our continued commitment to being a responsible, basic Kansas utility, (b) our obligation to provide reliable service at a reasonable cost, and

- (c) our mutual responsibility to address evolving customer
   expectations and policy mandates.
- 3 Q. THANK YOU.