BEFORE THE STATE CORPORATION COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION)		
OF ATMOS ENERGY CORPORATION)	Docket No.	
FOR REVIEW AND ADJUSTMENT OF ITS)	26-ATMG	RTS
NATURAL GAS RATES)		

DIRECT TESTIMONY OF DYLAN W. D'ASCENDIS

JULY 25, 2025

SUBMITTED ON BEHALF OF
ATMOS ENERGY CORPORATION

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I. INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE

2	\mathbf{O}	PLEASE	E STATE YOUR	NAME AND	RUSINESS	ADDRES
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- 3 A. My name is Dylan W. D'Ascendis. My business address is 1820 Chapel Ave., W.,
- 4 Suite 300, Cherry Hill, N.J. 08003.

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- 5 Q. BY WHOM ARE YOU EMPLOYED AND IN WHAT CAPACITY?
- 6 A. I am a Partner at ScottMadden, Inc.
- 7 Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE AND
- 8 EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND.
 - A. I have offered expert testimony on behalf of investor-owned utilities before over 40 state regulatory commissions in the United States, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the National Energy Regulator in Canada, the Alberta Utility Commission, one American Arbitration Association panel, and the Superior Court of Rhode Island on issues including, but not limited to, common equity cost rate, rate of return, valuation, capital structure, class cost of service, and rate design.

On behalf of the American Gas Association ("AGA"), I calculate the AGA Gas Index, which serves as the benchmark against which the performance of the American Gas Index Fund ("AGIF") is measured on a monthly basis. The AGA Gas Index and AGIF are a market capitalization-weighted index and mutual fund, respectively, comprised of the common stocks of the publicly traded corporate members of the AGA.

I am a member of the Society of Utility and Regulatory Financial Analysts ("SURFA"). In 2011, I was awarded the professional designation "Certified Rate of Return Analyst" by SURFA, which is based on education, experience, and the successful completion of a comprehensive written examination.

1		I am also a member of the National Association of Certified Valuation		
2		Analysts ("NACVA") and was awarded the professional designation "Certified		
3		Valuation Analyst" by the NACVA in 2015.		
4		I am a graduate of the University of Pennsylvania, where I received a		
5		Bachelor of Arts degree in Economic History. I have also received a Master of		
6		Business Administration with high honors and concentrations in Finance and		
7		International Business from Rutgers University.		
8		The details of my educational background and expert witness appearances		
9		are included in Appendix A.		
10	Q.	WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY IN THIS		
11		PROCEEDING?		
12	A.	The purpose of my testimony is to present evidence and provide a recommendation		
13		regarding Atmos Energy Corporation's Kansas operations ("Atmos Energy" or the		
14		"Company") relative to the appropriate cost of common equity which the Company		
15		should be afforded the opportunity to earn on its jurisdictional rate base.		
16	Q.	WHAT IS YOUR RECOMMENDED RETURN ON COMMON EQUITY		
17		("ROE") FOR ATMOS ENERGY?		
18	A.	I recommend that the Kansas Corporation Commission ("Commission") authorize		
19		Atmos Energy the opportunity to earn an ROE of 10.80% on its jurisdictional rate		
20		base. The ratemaking capital structure and debt cost rates are sponsored by		
21		Company Witness Joe Christian. The overall rate of return is summarized on page		
22		1 of Exhibit DWD-1 and in Table 1 below:		

Table 1: Summary of Recommended Weighted Average Cost of Capital

Type of Capital	Ratios	Cost Rate	Weighted Cost Rate
Long-Term Debt	38.94%	4.13%	1.61%
Common Equity	<u>61.06%</u>	10.80%	<u>6.59%</u>
Total	<u>100.00%</u>		<u>8.20%</u>

II. SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY

Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR RECOMMENDED COMMON EQUITY

My recommended common equity cost rate of 10.80% is summarized on page 2 of Exhibit DWD-1. I have assessed the market-based common equity cost rates of companies of relatively similar, but not necessarily identical, risk to Atmos Energy. Using companies of relatively comparable risk as proxies is consistent with the principles of fair rate of return established in the *Hope*¹ and *Bluefield*² decisions. No proxy group can be <u>identical</u> in risk to any single company. Consequently, there must be an evaluation of relative risk between the Company and the proxy group

My recommendation results from the application of several cost of common equity models, specifically the Discounted Cash Flow ("DCF") model, the Risk Premium Model ("RPM"), and the Capital Asset Pricing Model ("CAPM"), to the market data of a proxy group of eight natural gas distribution utilities ("Utility Proxy Group") whose selection criteria will be discussed below. In addition, I applied these same models to a proxy group of 34 domestic, non-price regulated

to determine if it is appropriate to adjust the proxy group's indicated rate of return.

¹ Fed. Power Comm'n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 64 S. Ct. 281, 88 L. Ed. 333 (1944) ("Hope").

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COST RATE.

² Bluefield Waterworks & Imp. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of W. Va., 262 U.S. 679, 43 S. Ct. 675, 67 L. Ed. 1176 (1923) ("Bluefield").

companies comparable in total risk to the Utility Proxy Group ("Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group"). The results derived from each are as follows:

Table 2: Summary of Common Equity Cost Rates

Discounted Cash Flow Model	10.39%
Risk Premium Model	10.69%
Capital Asset Pricing Model	10.88%
Market Models Applied to Comparable Risk, Non-Price Regulated Companies	<u>11.32%</u>
Indicated Range of Common Equity Cost Rates Before Adjustments for Company-Specific Risk	10.39% - 11.32%
Business Risk Adjustment	0.20%
Credit Risk Adjustment	-0.06%
Flotation Cost Adjustment	0.04%
Indicated Range of Common Equity Cost Rates after Adjustment	10.57% – 11.50%
Recommended Cost of Common Equity	<u>10.80%</u>

The indicated range of common equity cost rates applicable to the Utility Proxy Group is between 10.39% and 11.32%, before any Company-specific adjustments.

To reflect Atmos Energy's specific risks, I then adjusted the indicated common equity cost rate model results to reflect the Company's smaller relative size (0.20%) and higher bond rating (-0.06%), as compared to the Utility Proxy Group. I also adjusted the indicated range of common equity cost rate upward to reflect flotation costs (0.04%).³ These adjustments resulted in a Company-specific

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³ See Section VII for a detailed discussion of my cost of common equity adjustments.

1		indicated range of common equity cost rates between 10.57% and 11.50%. From the
2		unadjusted and adjusted ranges, I recommend the Commission adopt an ROE of
3		10.80% for ratemaking purposes in this case.
4	Q.	HOW IS THE REMAINDER OF YOUR DIRECT TESTIMONY
5		ORGANIZED?
6	A.	The remainder of my Direct Testimony is organized as follows:
7		• <u>Section III</u> – Provides a summary of financial theory and regulatory principles
8		pertinent to the development of the cost of common equity;
9		• <u>Section IV</u> – Explains my selection of the Utility Proxy Group used to develop
10		my analytical results;
11		• <u>Section V</u> – Describes the analyses on which my recommendation is based;
12		• <u>Section VI</u> – Summarizes my common equity cost rate before adjustments to
13		reflect Company-specific factors;
14		• <u>Section VII</u> – Explains my adjustments to my common equity cost rate to reflect
15		Company-specific factors; and
16		• <u>Section VIII</u> – Presents my conclusions.
17		III. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
18	Q.	WHAT GENERAL PRINCIPLES HAVE YOU CONSIDERED IN
19		ARRIVING AT YOUR RECOMMENDED COMMON EQUITY COST
20		RATE OF 10.80%?
21	A.	In unregulated industries, marketplace competition is the principal determinant of
22		the price of products or services. For regulated public utilities, regulation must act
23		as a substitute for marketplace competition. Assuring that the utility can fulfill its

obligations to the public, while providing safe and reliable service at all times, requires a level of earnings sufficient to maintain the integrity of presently invested capital. Sufficient earnings also permit the attraction of needed new capital at a reasonable cost, for which the utility must compete with other firms of comparable risk, consistent with the fair rate of return standards established by the U.S. Supreme Court in the previously cited *Hope* and *Bluefield* cases.

The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the fair rate of return standards in *Hope*, when it stated:

The rate-making process under the Act, i.e., the fixing of 'just and reasonable' rates, involves a balancing of the investor and the consumer interests. Thus we stated in the Natural Gas Pipeline Co. case that 'regulation does not insure that the business shall produce net revenues.' 315 U.S. at page 590, 62 S.Ct. at page 745. But such considerations aside, the investor interest has a legitimate concern with the financial integrity of the company whose rates are being regulated. From the investor or company point of view it is important that there be enough revenue not only for operating expenses but also for the capital costs of the business. These include service on the debt and dividends on the stock. Cf. Chicago & Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345, 346 12 S.Ct. 400,402, 36 L.Ed. 176. By that standard the return to the equity owner should be commensurate with returns on investments in other enterprises having corresponding risks. That return, moreover, should be sufficient to assure confidence in the financial integrity of the enterprise, so as to maintain its credit and to attract capital.⁴

In summary, the U.S. Supreme Court has found a return that is adequate to attract capital at reasonable terms enables the utility to provide service while maintaining its financial integrity. As discussed above, and in keeping with established regulatory standards, that return should be commensurate with the returns expected elsewhere for investments of equivalent risk. The Commission's

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⁴ *Hope*, 320 U.S. at 603.

decision in this proceeding, therefore, should provide the Company with the opportunity to earn a return that is: (1) adequate to attract capital at reasonable cost and terms; (2) sufficient to ensure their financial integrity; and (3) commensurate with returns on investments in enterprises having corresponding risks.

Lastly, the required return for a regulated public utility is established on a stand-alone basis, i.e., for the utility operating company at issue in a rate case. Parent entities, like other investors, have capital constraints and must look at the attractiveness of the expected risk-adjusted return of each investment alternative in their capital budgeting process. That is, utility holding companies that own many utility operating companies or are comprised of separate divisions, have choices as to where they will invest their capital within their operating footprint. Therefore, the opportunity cost concept applies regardless of the source of the funding, public funding or corporate funding.

When funding is provided by a parent entity, the return still must be sufficient to provide an incentive to allocate equity capital to the subsidiary or business unit rather than other internal or external investment opportunities. That is, the regulated subsidiary or division must compete for capital with all the parent company's affiliates, across divisions, and with other, similarly situated utility companies. In that regard, investors value corporate entities on a sum-of-the-parts basis and expect each division within the parent company to provide an appropriate risk-adjusted return.

It therefore is important that the authorized ROE reflects the risks and prospects of the utility's operations and supports the utility's financial integrity

1		from a stand-alone perspective as measured by their combined business and
2		financial risks. Consequently, the ROE authorized in this proceeding should be
3		sufficient to support the operational (i.e., business risk) and financing (i.e., financia
4		risk) of the Company's utility operations on a stand-alone basis.
5	Q.	SHOULD THE COMMISSION EVALUATE ATMOS ENERGY'S KANSAS
6		OPERATIONS AS A STAND-ALONE COMPANY FOR COST OF
7		CAPITAL PURPOSES IN THIS CASE?
8	A.	Yes, it should. Because the overall rates of return set in this proceeding will be
9		applied to Atmos Energy's rate base, it should be evaluated as a stand-alone entity
10		To do otherwise would be discriminatory, confiscatory, and inaccurate. It is also a
11		basic financial precept that the use of the funds invested give rise to the risk of the
12		investment. As Brealey and Myers state:
13 14		The true cost of capital depends on the use to which the capital is put.
15		***
16 17 18		Each project should be evaluated at its own opportunity cost of capital; the true cost of capital depends on the use to which the capital is put. ⁵
19		Morin confirms Brealey and Myers when he states:
20 21 22 23 24 25 26		Financial theory clearly establishes that the cost of equity is the risk-adjusted opportunity cost of the investors and not the cost of the specific capital sources employed by investors. The true cost of capital depends on the use to which the capital is put and not on its source. The <i>Hope</i> and <i>Bluefield</i> doctrines have made clear that the relevant considerations in calculating a company's cost of capital are the alternatives available to investors and the returns and risks
24 25		source. The <i>Hope</i> and <i>Bluefield</i> doctrines have made clear that t relevant considerations in calculating a company's cost of capi

Fisher A. Brealey and Stewart C. Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance at 173, 198 (McGraw-Hill, 3rd ed. 1988) (italics and bold in original).

6 Roger A. Morin, Modern Regulatory Finance at 581 (Public Utility Reports, Inc., 2021) ("Morin").

The firm's cost of capital is the discount rate employed to discount the firm's average cash flow, hence obtaining the value of the firm. It is also the weighted average cost of capital, as we shall see below. The weighted average cost of capital should be employed for project evaluation . . . only in cases where the risk profile of the new project is a "carbon copy" of the risk profile of the firm.⁷

Although Levy and Sarnat discuss a project's cost of capital relative to a firm's cost of capital, these principles apply equally to the use of a proxy group-based cost of capital. Each company must be viewed on its own merits, regardless of the source of its equity capital. As *Bluefield* clearly states:

A public utility is entitled to such rates as will permit it to earn a return on the value of the property which it employs for the convenience of the public equal to that generally being made at the same time and in the same general part of the country on investments in other business undertakings which are attended by corresponding risks and uncertainties: ⁸

In other words, it is the "risks and uncertainties" surrounding the property employed for the "convenience of the public" which determines the appropriate level of rates. In this proceeding, the property employed "for the convenience of the public" is the rate base of Atmos Energy in Kansas. Thus, it is only the risk of investment in Atmos Energy's Kansas Division that is relevant to the determination of the cost of common equity to be applied to the common equity-financed portion of that rate base.

⁷ Haim Levy & Marshall Sarnat, Capital Investment and Financial Decisions at 465 (Prentice/Hall International, 1986).

⁸ Bluefield, 262 U.S. at 692, 43 S. Ct. at 678.

1 Q. WITHIN THAT BROAD FRAMEWORK, HOW IS THE COST OF 2 CAPITAL ESTIMATED IN REGULATORY PROCEEDINGS?

Regulated utilities primarily use common stock and long-term debt to finance their permanent property, plant, and equipment (i.e., rate base). The fair rate of return for a regulated utility is based on its weighted average cost of capital, in which, as noted earlier, the costs of the individual sources of capital are weighted by their respective book values.

The cost of capital is the return investors require to make an investment in a firm. Investors will provide funds to a firm only if the return that they *expect* is equal to, or greater than, the return that they *require* to accept the risk of providing funds to the firm.

The cost of capital (that is, the combination of the costs of debt and equity) is based on the economic principle of "opportunity costs." Investing in any asset (whether debt or equity securities) represents a forgone opportunity to invest in alternative assets. For any investment to be sensible, its expected return must be at least equal to the return expected on alternative, comparable risk investment opportunities. Because investments with like risks should offer similar returns, the opportunity cost of an investment should equal the return available on an investment of comparable risk.

The cost of debt is contractually defined and can be directly observed as the interest rate or yield on debt securities. However, the cost of equity is not directly observable and must be estimated based on market data and various financial models. Because the cost of equity is premised on opportunity costs, the models

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used to determine it are typically applied to a group of "comparable" or "proxy"
companies.

In the end, the estimated cost of capital should reflect the return that investors require in light of the subject company's business and financial risks, and the returns available on comparable investments.

Q. IS THE AUTHORIZED RETURN SET IN REGULATORY PROCEEDINGS

GUARANTEED?

A.

No, it is not. Consistent with the *Hope* and *Bluefield* standards, the ratemaking process should provide the utility a reasonable opportunity to recover its return of, and return on, its reasonably incurred investments, but it does not guarantee that return. While a utility may have control over some factors that affect the ability to earn its authorized return (e.g., management performance, operating and maintenance expenses, etc.), there are several factors beyond a utility's control that affect its ability to earn its authorized return. Those may include factors such as weather, the economy, and the prevalence and magnitude of regulatory lag.

A. <u>Business Risk</u>

17 Q. PLEASE DEFINE BUSINESS RISK AND EXPLAIN WHY IT IS
18 IMPORTANT FOR DETERMINING A FAIR RATE OF RETURN.

A. The investor-required ROE reflects investors' assessment of the total investment risk of the subject firm. Total investment risk is often discussed in the context of business and financial risk.⁹

⁹ As will be discussed later in this testimony, another definition of total risk is systematic risk plus unsystematic risk.

Business risk reflects the uncertainty associated with owning a company's common stock without the company's use of debt and/or preferred stock financing. One way of considering the distinction between business and financial risk is to view the former as the uncertainty of the expected earned ROE, assuming the firm is financed with no debt.

Examples of business risks generally faced by utilities include, but are not limited to, the regulatory environment, pipeline safety requirements, mandatory environmental compliance requirements, customer mix and concentration of customers, service territory economic growth, market demand, risks and uncertainties of supply, operations, capital intensity, size, the degree of operating leverage, and the like, all of which have a direct bearing on earnings.

Although analysts, including rating agencies, may categorize business risks individually, as a practical matter, such risks are interrelated and not wholly distinct from one another. When determining an appropriate ROE, the relevant issue is where investors see the subject company in relation to other similarly situated utility companies (i.e., the Utility Proxy Group). To the extent investors view a company as being exposed to higher risk, the required return will increase, and vice versa.

For regulated utilities, business risks are both long-term and near-term in nature. Whereas near-term business risks are reflected in year-to-year variability in earnings and cash flow brought about by economic or regulatory factors, long-term business risks reflect the prospect of an impaired ability of investors to obtain both a fair rate of return on, and return of, their capital. Moreover, because utilities

accept the obligation to provide safe, adequate and reliable service (in exchange for a reasonable opportunity to earn a fair return on their investment), they generally do not have the option to delay, defer, or reject capital investments. Because those investments are capital-intensive, utilities generally do not have the option to avoid raising external funds during periods of capital market distress, if necessary.

Because utilities invest in long-lived assets, long-term business risks are of paramount concern to equity investors. That is, the risk of not recovering the return on their investment extends far into the future. The timing and nature of events that may lead to losses, however, also are uncertain and, consequently, those risks and their implications for the required ROE tend to be difficult to quantify. Regulatory commissions (like investors who commit their capital) must review a variety of quantitative and qualitative data and apply their reasoned judgment to determine how long-term risks weigh in their assessment of the market-required ROE.

B. Financial Risk

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Q. PLEASE DEFINE FINANCIAL RISK AND EXPLAIN WHY IT IS IMPORTANT IN DETERMINING A FAIR RATE OF RETURN.

Financial risk is the additional risk created by the introduction of debt and preferred stock into the capital structure. The higher the proportion of debt and preferred stock in the capital structure, the higher the financial risk to common equity owners (i.e., failure to receive dividends due to default or other covenants). Therefore, consistent with the basic financial principle of risk and return, common equity investors demand higher returns as compensation for bearing higher financial risk.

- 1 Q. CAN BOND AND CREDIT RATINGS BE A PROXY FOR A FIRM'S
- 2 COMBINED BUSINESS AND FINANCIAL RISKS TO EQUITY OWNERS
- 3 (I.E., INVESTMENT RISK)?
- 4 A. Yes, similar bond ratings/issuer credit ratings reflect, and are representative of,
- 5 similar combined business and financial risks (i.e., total risk) faced by bond
- 6 investors. 10 Although specific business or financial risks may differ between
- 7 companies, the same bond/credit rating indicates that the combined risks are
- 8 roughly similar from a debtholder perspective. The caveat is that these debtholder
- 9 risk measures do not translate directly to risks for common equity.
- 10 Q. DO RATING AGENCIES ACCOUNT FOR COMPANY SIZE IN THEIR
- 11 **BOND RATINGS?**
- 12 A. No. Neither Standard & Poor's ("S&P") nor Moody's Investor Service
- 13 ("Moody's") have minimum company size requirements for any given rating level.
- This means, all else equal, a relative size analysis must be conducted for equity
- investments in companies with similar bond ratings.
- 16 IV. ATMOS ENERGY'S OPERATIONS AND THE UTILITY PROXY GROUP
- 17 Q. ARE YOU FAMILIAR WITH ATMOS ENERGY'S OPERATIONS?
- 18 A. Yes. Atmos Energy's operations serve approximately 140,000 customers in
- 19 Kansas. 11 Atmos Energy's gas operations are not publicly-traded as they comprise
- an operating division of Atmos Energy Corporation ("ATO"), which operates in

¹⁰ Risk distinctions within S&P's bond rating categories are recognized by a plus or minus, e.g., within the A category, an S&P rating can by at A+, A, or A-. Similarly, risk distinction for Moody's ratings are distinguished by numerical rating gradations, e.g., within the A category, a Moody's rating can be A1, A2 and A3.

¹¹ Atmos Energy Corporation, 2024 SEC Form 10-K, at 4.

eight states¹² and serves approximately 3.3 million gas customers¹³ and is publiclytraded under symbol ATO.

Q. WHY IS IT NECESSARY TO DEVELOP A PROXY GROUP WHEN ESTIMATING THE ROE FOR THE COMPANY?

Because Atmos Energy's Kansas Division is not publicly traded and does not have publicly traded equity securities, it is necessary to develop groups of publicly traded, comparable companies to serve as "proxies" for the Company. In addition to the analytical necessity of doing so, the use of proxy companies is consistent with the *Hope* and *Bluefield* comparable risk standards, as discussed above. I have selected two proxy groups that, in my view, are fundamentally risk-comparable to the Company: a Utility Proxy Group and a Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group, which is comparable in total risk to the Utility Proxy Group.¹⁴

Even when proxy groups are carefully selected, it is common for analytical results to vary from company to company. Despite the care taken to ensure comparability, because no two companies are identical, market expectations regarding future risks and prospects will vary within the proxy group. It therefore is common for analytical results to reflect a seemingly wide range, even for a group of similarly situated companies. At issue is how to estimate the ROE from within that range. That determination will be best informed by employing a variety of sound analyses that necessarily must consider the sort of quantitative and qualitative information discussed throughout my Direct Testimony. Additionally, a

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¹² *Id.* In addition to Kansas, ATO also serves customers in Kentucky, Louisiana, Texas, Virginia, Colorado, Mississippi, and Tennessee.

¹³ Atmos Energy Corporation, 2024 SEC Form 10-K, at 4.

¹⁴ The development of the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group is explained in more detail in Section V.

1		relativ	ve risk analysis between the Company and the Utility Proxy Group must be
2		made	to determine whether or not explicit Company-specific adjustments need to
3		be ma	de to the Utility Proxy Group's indicated results.
4	Q.	PLEA	ASE EXPLAIN HOW YOU CHOSE THE COMPANIES IN THE
5		UTIL	ITY PROXY GROUP.
6	A.	The co	ompanies selected for the Utility Proxy Group met the following criteria:
7		(i)	They were included in the Natural Gas Utility Group of Value Line's
8			Standard Edition (Value Line) (May 23, 2025);
9		(ii)	They have 60% or greater of fiscal year 2024 total operating income derived
10			from, or 60% or greater of fiscal year 2024 total assets attributable to,
11			regulated gas distribution operations;
12		(iii)	At the time of preparation of this testimony, they had not publicly
13			announced that they were involved in any major merger or acquisition
14			activity (i.e., one publicly-traded utility merging with or acquiring another);
15		(iv)	They have not cut or omitted their common dividends during the five years
16			ended 2024 or through the time of preparation of this testimony;
17		(v)	They have Value Line and Bloomberg Professional Services ("Bloomberg")
18			adjusted Beta coefficients ("beta");
19		(vi)	They have positive Value Line five-year dividends per share ("DPS")
20			growth rate projections; and
21		(vii)	They have Value Line, Zacks, or S&P Capital IQ consensus five-year
22			earnings per share ("EPS") growth rate projections.

1 The following eight companies met these criteria:

Table 3: Gas Utility Proxy Group Screening Results

Company	Ticker
Atmos Energy Corporation	ATO
Chesapeake Utilities Corp.	CPK
New Jersey Resources Corporation	NJR
NiSource Inc.	NI
Northwest Natural Holding Company	NWN
ONE Gas, Inc.	OGS
Southwest Gas Holdings, Inc.	SWX
Spire Inc.	SR

3 V. <u>COMMON EQUITY COST RATE MODELS</u>

Q. IS IT IMPORTANT THAT COST OF COMMON EQUITY MODELS BE

MARKET BASED?

A. Yes. Utility companies are consistently investing in assets to ensure safe and reliable service. Because of this, they need access to capital markets, in which they compete for capital from firms of comparable risk (including non-utilities). The cost of common equity is thus determined based on equity market expectations for the returns of those companies. If an individual investor is choosing to invest their capital among companies of comparable risk, they will choose a company providing a higher return over a company providing a lower return.

Q. ARE YOUR COST OF COMMON EQUITY MODELS MARKET BASED?

A. Yes. The DCF model uses market prices in developing the model's dividend yield component. The RPM uses bond ratings and expected bond yields that reflect the market's assessment of bond/credit risk. In addition, betas (β), which reflect the market/systematic risk component of equity risk premium, are derived from

regression analyses of market prices. The CAPM is market-based for many of the same reasons that the RPM is market-based (i.e., the use of expected bond yields and betas). Selection criteria for comparable risk non-price regulated companies are based on regression analyses of market prices and reflect the market's assessment of total risk.

6 Q. WHAT ANALYTICAL APPROACHES DID YOU USE TO DETERMINE THE COMPANY'S ROE?

As discussed earlier, I have relied on the DCF model, the RPM, and the CAPM, which I apply to the Utility Proxy Group described above. I also applied these same models to a Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group described later in this section.

I rely on these models because reasonable investors use a variety of tools and do not rely exclusively on a single source of information or single model. Moreover, the models on which I rely focus on different aspects of return requirements and provide different insights to investors' views of risk and return. The DCF model, for example, estimates the investor-required return assuming a constant expected dividend yield and growth rate in perpetuity, while Risk Premium-based methods (i.e., the RPM and CAPM approaches) provide the ability to reflect investors' views of risk, future market returns, and the relationship between interest rates and the cost of common equity. Just as the use of market data for the Utility Proxy Group adds the reliability necessary to inform expert judgment in arriving at a recommended common equity cost rate, the use of multiple generally accepted common equity cost rate models also adds reliability and accuracy when arriving at a recommended common equity cost rate.

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A. Discounted Cash Flow Model

O. WHAT IS THE THEORETICAL BASIS OF THE DCF MODEL?

- 3 A. The theory underlying the DCF model is that the present value of an expected future 4 stream of net cash flows during the investment holding period can be determined 5 by discounting those cash flows at the cost of capital, or the investors' capitalization 6 rate. DCF theory indicates that an investor buys a stock for an expected total return 7 rate, which is derived from the cash flows received from dividends and market price 8 appreciation. Mathematically, the dividend yield on market price plus a growth 9 rate equals the capitalization rate; i.e., the total common equity return rate expected 10 by investors.
- 11 $K_e = (D_0 (1+g))/P + g$
- 12 where:

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- K_e = the required Return on Common Equity;
- D_0 = the annualized Dividend Per Share;
- P =the current stock price; and
- g =the growth rate.
- 17 Q. WHICH VERSION OF THE DCF MODEL DID YOU USE?
- 18 A. I used the single-stage constant growth DCF model in my analyses.
- 19 Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE DIVIDEND YIELD YOU USED IN APPLYING
- 20 THE CONSTANT GROWTH DCF MODEL.
- 21 A. The unadjusted dividend yields are based on the proxy companies' dividends as of
- 22 May 30, 2025, divided by the average closing market price for the 60 trading days

1 ended May 30, 2025.¹⁵

O. PLEASE EXPLAIN YOUR ADJUSTMENT TO THE DIVIDEND YIELD.

A. Because dividends are paid periodically (e.g., quarterly), as opposed to continuously (daily), an adjustment must be made to the dividend yield. This is often referred to as the discrete, or the Gordon Periodic, version of the DCF model.

DCF theory calls for using the full growth rate, or D_1 , in calculating the model's dividend yield component. Since the companies in the Utility Proxy Group increase their quarterly dividends at various times during the year, a reasonable assumption is to reflect one-half the annual dividend growth rate in the dividend yield component, or $D_{1/2}$. Because the dividend should be representative of the next 12-month period, this adjustment is a conservative approach that does not overstate the dividend yield. Therefore, the actual average dividend yields in Column 1, page 1 of Exhibit DWD-2 have been adjusted upward to reflect one-half the average projected growth rate shown in Column 5.

Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE BASIS FOR THE GROWTH RATES YOU APPLY TO THE UTILITY PROXY GROUP IN YOUR CONSTANT GROWTH DCF MODEL.

A. Investors are likely to rely on widely available financial information services, such as *Value Line*, Zacks, and S&P Capital IQ. Investors realize that analysts have significant insight into the dynamics of the industries and individual companies they analyze, as well as companies' ability to effectively manage the effects of changing laws and regulations, and ever-changing economic and market conditions.

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¹⁵ See, column 1, page 1 of Exhibit DWD-2.

For these reasons, I used analysts' five-year forecasts of EPS growth in my DCF analysis.

Over the long run, there can be no growth in DPS without growth in EPS. Security analysts' earnings expectations have a more significant influence on market prices than dividend expectations. Thus, using earnings growth rates in a DCF analysis provides a better match between investors' market price appreciation expectations and the growth rate component of the DCF.

8 Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE THE CONSTANT GROWTH DCF MODEL 9 RESULTS.

10 A. The results of applying the DCF model to the Utility Proxy Groups are shown on page 1 of Exhibit DWD-2 and in Table 4 below:

Table 4: DCF Model Results for the Utility Proxy Group

Mean	10.32%
Median	10.45%
Average of Mean and Median	<u>10.39%</u>

In arriving at a conclusion for the constant growth DCF-indicated common equity cost rate for the Utility Proxy Group, I relied on an average of the mean and median results of the DCF, specifically 10.39%. This approach takes into consideration all proxy company results while mitigating high and low side outliers of those results.¹⁶

B. The Risk Premium Model

19 Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE THEORETICAL BASIS OF THE RPM.

20 A. The RPM is based on the fundamental financial principle of risk and return; namely,

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¹⁶ Excluding DCF results that are over two standard deviations from the mean.

that investors require greater returns for bearing greater risk. The RPM recognizes that common equity capital has greater investment risk than debt capital, as common equity shareholders are behind debt holders in any claim on a company's assets and earnings. As a result, investors require higher returns from common stocks than from bonds to compensate them for bearing the additional risk.

While it is possible to directly observe bond returns and yields, investors' required common equity returns cannot be directly determined or observed. According to RPM theory, one can estimate a common equity risk premium over bonds (either historically or prospectively) and use that premium to derive a cost rate of common equity. The cost of common equity equals the expected cost rate for long-term debt capital, plus a risk premium over that cost rate, to compensate common shareholders for the added risk of being unsecured and last-in-line for any claim on the corporation's assets and earnings in the event of liquidation.

Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE TOTAL MARKET APPROACH RPM.

A. The total market approach RPM adds a prospective public utility bond yield to an average of: (1) an equity risk premium that is derived from a beta-adjusted total market equity risk premium, (2) an equity risk premium based on the S&P Utilities Index, and (3) an equity risk premium based on authorized ROEs for natural gas distribution utilities.

Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE BASIS OF THE EXPECTED BOND YIELDS OF 5.77% APPLICABLE TO THE UTILITY PROXY GROUP.

A. The first step in the total market approach RPM analysis is to determine the expected bond yield. Because both ratemaking and the cost of capital, including

the common equity cost rate, are prospective in nature, a prospective yield on similarly-rated long-term debt is essential. I relied on a consensus forecast of about 50 economists of the expected yield on Aaa-rated corporate bonds for the six calendar quarters ending with the third calendar quarter of 2026, and *Blue Chip Financial Forecast's* ("*Blue Chip*") long-term projections for 2027 to 2031, and 2032 to 2036. As shown on line 1, page 1 of Exhibit DWD-3, the average expected yield on Moody's Aaa-rated corporate bonds is 5.25%. In order to adjust the expected Aaa-rated corporate bond yield to an equivalent A2-rated public utility bond yield, I made an upward adjustment of 0.46%, which represents a recent spread between Aaa-rated corporate bonds and A2-rated public utility bonds.¹⁷ Adding that recent 0.46% spread to the expected Aaa-rated corporate bond yield of 5.71%.

Since the Utility Proxy Group's average Moody's long-term issuer rating is A3, another adjustment to the expected A2 rated public utility bond yield is needed to reflect the difference in bond ratings. An upward adjustment of 0.06%, which represents one-third of a recent spread between A2 and Baa2 rated public utility bond yields, is necessary to make the A2 rated prospective bond yield applicable to an A3 rated public utility bond. Adding the 0.06% to the 5.71% prospective A2 rated public utility bond yield results in a 5.77% expected bond yield for the Utility Proxy Group.

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¹⁷ As shown on line 2 of page 1 of Exhibit DWD-3 and explained in note 2, page 1 of Exhibit DWD-3.

¹⁸ As shown on line 4 and explained in note 3, page 1 of Exhibit DWD-3. Moody's does not provide public utility bond yields for A3 rated bonds. As such, it was necessary to estimate the difference between A2 rated and A3 rated public utility bonds. Because there are three steps between Baa2 and A2 (Baa2 to Baa1, Baa1 to A3, and A3 to A2) I assumed an adjustment of one-third of the difference between the A2 rated and Baa2 rated public utility bond yield was appropriate.

Table 5: Summary of the Calculation of the Utility Proxy Group Projected

2 Bond Yield¹⁹

Prospective Yield on Moody's Aaa-Rated Corporate Bonds (<i>Blue Chip</i>)	5.25%
Adjustment to Reflect Yield Spread Between Moody's Aaa-Rated Corporate Bonds and Moody's A2-Rated Utility Bonds	0.46%
Adjustment to Reflect the Utility Proxy Group's Average Moody's Bond Rating of A3	0.06%
Prospective Bond Yield Applicable to the Utility Proxy Group	<u>5.77%</u>

3 1. The Beta-Derived Risk Premium

4 Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN HOW THE BETA-DERIVED EQUITY RISK

5 **PREMIUM IS DETERMINED.**

6 The components of the beta-derived RPM are: (1) an expected market equity risk A. 7 premium over corporate bonds, and (2) the beta. The derivation of the beta-derived 8 equity risk premium that I applied to the Utility Proxy Group is shown on lines 1 9 through 8, on page 6 of Exhibit DWD-3. The total beta-derived equity risk 10 premium I applied is based on an average of three historical market data-based 11 equity risk premiums, a Value Line-based equity risk premium, and a combined 12 Value Line, Bloomberg, and S&P Capital IQ-based equity risk premium. Each of 13 these are described below.

14 Q. HOW DID YOU DERIVE A MARKET EQUITY RISK PREMIUM BASED 15 ON LONG-TERM HISTORICAL DATA?

A. To derive a historical market equity risk premium, I used the most recent holding period returns for the large company common stocks less the average historical

¹⁹ As shown on page 1 of Exhibit DWD-3.

yield on Moody's Aaa/Aa-rated corporate bonds for the period 1928 to 2024. The use of holding period returns over a very long period of time is appropriate because it is consistent with the long-term investment horizon presumed by investing in a going concern, i.e., a company expected to operate in perpetuity.

The long-term arithmetic mean monthly total return rate on large company common stocks was 12.05% and the long-term arithmetic mean monthly yield on Moody's Aaa/Aa-rated corporate bonds was 5.95% from 1928 to 2024. As shown on line 1 of page 6 of Exhibit DWD-3, subtracting the mean monthly bond yield from the total return on large company stocks results in a long-term historical equity risk premium of 6.10%.

I used the arithmetic mean monthly total return rates for the large company stocks and yields (income returns) for the Moody's Aaa/Aa-rated corporate bonds, because they are appropriate for the purpose of estimating the cost of capital as noted in Kroll's Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation ("SBBI") Yearbook 2023 ("SBBI - 2023"). The use of the arithmetic mean return rates and yields is appropriate because historical total returns and equity risk premiums provide insight into the variance and standard deviation of returns needed by investors in estimating future risk when making a current investment. If investors relied on the geometric mean of historical equity risk premiums, they would have no insight into the potential variance of future returns because the geometric mean relates the change over many periods to a constant rate of change, thereby obviating the year-to-year fluctuations, or variance, which is critical to risk analysis.

²⁰ SBBI – 2023, at 193-194.

1 Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE DERIVATION OF THE REGRESSION-BASED

2 MARKET EQUITY RISK PREMIUM.

3 A. To derive the regression-based market equity risk premium of 6.94% shown on line 2, page 6 of Exhibit DWD-3, I used the same monthly annualized total returns on 4 5 large company common stocks relative to the monthly annualized yields on 6 Moody's Aaa/Aa-rated corporate bonds as mentioned above. I modeled the 7 relationship between interest rates and the market equity risk premium using the 8 observed monthly market equity risk premium as the dependent variable, and the 9 monthly yield on Moody's Aaa/Aa-rated corporate bonds as the independent 10 variable. I then used a linear Ordinary Least Squares ("OLS") regression, in which 11 the market equity risk premium is expressed as a function of the Moody's Aaa/Aa-12 rated corporate bond yield:

 $RP = \alpha + \beta (R_{Aaa/Aa})$

14 where:

15 RP = the market equity risk premium;

16 α = the regression intercept coefficient;

 β = the regression slope coefficient; and

18 R_{Aaa/Aa} = the Moody's Aaa/Aa rated corporate bond yield.

Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE DERIVATION OF THE PRPM EQUITY RISK

PREMIUM.

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21 A. The PRPM, published in the *Journal of Regulatory Economics*, ²¹ was developed

from the work of Robert F. Engle, who shared the Nobel Prize in Economics in

²¹ Pauline M. Ahern, Frank J. Hanley, and Richard A. Michelfelder, "A New Approach to Estimating the Cost of Common Equity Capital for Public Utilities", The Journal of Regulatory Economics (August 2011), 40:261-278.

2003 "for methods of analyzing economic time series with time-varying volatility" or ARCH.²² Engle found that volatility changes over time and is related from one period to the next, especially in financial markets. Engle discovered that volatility of prices and returns clusters over time and is, therefore, highly predictable and can be used to predict future levels of risk and risk premiums.

The PRPM estimates the risk-return relationship directly, as the predicted equity risk premium is generated by predicting volatility or risk. The PRPM is not based on an <u>estimate</u> of investor behavior, but rather on an evaluation of the results of that behavior (i.e., the variance of historical equity risk premiums).

The inputs to the model are the historical returns on large company stocks minus the historical monthly yield on Moody's Aaa/Aa-rated corporate bonds from January 1928 through May 2025. Using a generalized form of ARCH, known as GARCH, I calculated each of the projected equity risk premiums using Eviews[©] statistical software. When the GARCH model is applied to the historical return data, it produces a predicted GARCH variance series and a GARCH coefficient. Multiplying the predicted monthly variance by the GARCH coefficient and then annualizing, it produces the predicted annual equity risk premium. The resulting PRPM predicted a market equity risk premium of 7.66%.²³

Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE DERIVATION OF A PROJECTED EQUITY RISK PREMIUM BASED ON *VALUE LINE* SUMMARY & INDEX DATA FOR YOUR RPM ANALYSIS.

²² Autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity; *see also* https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/2003/engle/facts/.

²³ Shown on line 3, page 6 of Exhibit DWD-3.

As noted above, because both ratemaking and the cost of capital are prospective, a 2 prospective market equity risk premium is needed. The derivation of the forecasted 3 or prospective market equity risk premium can be found in note 1, page 2 of Exhibit DWD-4. Consistent with my calculation of the dividend yield component in my 4 DCF analysis, this prospective market equity risk premium is derived from an 5 6 average of the three-to five-year median market price appreciation potential by Value Line for the 13 weeks ended May 30, 2025, plus an average of the median 8 estimated dividend yield for the common stocks of the 1,700 firms covered in Value *Line* (Standard Edition).²⁴ 9

> The average median expected price appreciation is 58.00%, which translates to a 12.12% annual appreciation, and when added to the average of Value Line's median expected dividend yields of 2.28%, equates to a forecasted annual total return rate on the market of 14.40%. The forecasted Moody's Aaa-rated corporate bond yield of 5.25% is deducted from the total market return of 14.40%, resulting in an equity risk premium of 9.15%, as shown on line 4, page 6 of Exhibit DWD-3.

17 Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE DERIVATION OF AN EQUITY RISK PREMIUM BASED ON THE S&P 500 COMPANIES. 18

Using data from Value Line, Bloomberg, and S&P Capital IQ, I calculated an expected total return on the S&P 500 companies using expected dividend yields and long-term growth estimates as a proxy for capital appreciation. The expected total return for the S&P 500 is 15.34%. Subtracting the prospective yield on

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²⁴ As explained in detail in note 1, page 2 of Exhibit DWD-4.

Moody's Aaa-rated corporate bonds of 5.25% results in a 10.09% projected equity risk premium as shown on page 6, line 5 of Exhibit DWD-3.

3 Q. WHAT IS YOUR CONCLUSION OF A BETA-DRIVEN EQUITY RISK

4 PREMIUM FOR USE IN YOUR RPM ANALYSIS?

I gave equal weight to all five equity risk premiums—historical, *Value Line*, and Bloomberg, *Value Line* and S&P Capital IQ – in arriving at a 7.99% equity risk premium.

Table 6: Summary of the Calculation of the Equity Risk Premium Using
Total Market Returns²⁵

Historical Spread Between Total Returns of Large Stocks and Aaa and Aa-Rated Corporate Bond Yields (1928 – 2024)	6.10%
Regression Analysis on Historical Data	6.94%
PRPM Analysis on Historical Data	7.66%
Prospective Equity Risk Premium using Total Market Returns from	
Value Line Summary & Index less Projected Aaa Corporate Bond	9.15%
Yields	
Prospective Equity Risk Premium using Measures of Capital	
Appreciation and Income Returns for the S&P 500 less Projected Aaa	<u>10.09%</u>
Corporate Bond Yields	
Average	<u>7.99%</u>

After calculating the average market equity risk premium of 7.99%, I adjusted it by beta to account for the risk of the Utility Proxy Group. As discussed below, beta is a meaningful measure of prospective relative risk to the market as a whole, and is a logical way to allocate a company's, or proxy group's, share of the market's total equity risk premium relative to corporate bond yields. As shown on page 1 of Exhibit DWD-4, the average of the mean and median beta for the Utility

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²⁵ As shown on page 6 of Exhibit DWD-3.

Proxy Group is 0.67. Multiplying beta by the market equity risk premium of 7.99% results in a 5.35% beta-adjusted equity risk premium.

2. The S&P Utility Index-Derived Risk Premium

Q. HOW DID YOU DERIVE THE EQUITY RISK PREMIUM BASED ON THE S&P UTILITY INDEX AND MOODY'S A2-RATE PUBLIC UTILITY BONDS?

I estimated three equity risk premiums based on S&P Utility Index holding period returns, and one equity risk premium based on the expected returns of the S&P Utilities Index, using *Value Line*, Bloomberg data, and S&P Capital IQ. Turning first to the S&P Utility Index holding period returns, I derived a long-term monthly arithmetic mean equity risk premium between the S&P Utility Index total returns of 10.59% and monthly Moody's A2-rated public utility bond yields of 6.42% from 1928 to 2024, to arrive at an equity risk premium of 4.16%. I then used the same historical data to derive an equity risk premium of 4.82% based on a regression of the monthly equity risk premiums. The final S&P Utility Index holding period equity risk premium involved applying the PRPM using the historical monthly equity risk premiums from January 1928 to May 2025 to arrive at a PRPM-derived equity risk premium of 4.46% for the S&P Utility Index.

I then derived an expected total return on the S&P Utilities Index of 10.95% using data from *Value Line*, Bloomberg, and S&P Capital IQ, and subtracted the prospective Moody's A2-rated public utility bond yield of 5.71%.²⁷ This resulted in an equity risk premium of 5.24%. As with the market equity risk premiums, I

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²⁶ As shown on line 1, page 9 of Exhibit DWD-3.

²⁷ Derived on line 3, page 1 of Exhibit DWD-3.

averaged the four-risk premium based estimates to arrive at my utility-specific equity risk premium of 4.67%.

Table 7: Summary of the Calculation of the Equity Risk Premium Using S&P Utility Index Holding Returns²⁸

Historical Spread Between Total Returns of the S&P	
Utilities Index and A2-Rated Utility Bond Yields (1928 –	4.16%
2024)	
Regression Analysis on Historical Data	4.82%
PRPM Analysis on Historical Data	4.46%
Prospective Equity Risk Premium using Measures of	
Capital Appreciation and Income Returns for the S&P	<u>5.24%</u>
Utilities Index less Projected A2 Utility Bond Yields	
Average	<u>4.67%</u>

3. Authorized Return-Derived Equity Risk Premium

6 Q. HOW DID YOU DERIVE AN EQUITY RISK PREMIUM OF 4.74% BASED

ON AUTHORIZED ROES FOR NATURAL GAS DISTRIBUTION

8 UTILITIES?

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A. The equity risk premium of 4.74% shown on page 10 of Exhibit DWD-3 is the result of a regression analysis based on regulatory awarded ROEs related to the yields on Moody's A2-rated public utility bonds and contains the graphical results of a regression analysis of 848 rate cases for natural gas distribution utilities which were fully litigated during the period from January 1, 1980 through May 30, 2025. It shows the implicit equity risk premium relative to the yields on A2-rated public utility bonds immediately prior to the issuance of each regulatory decision. It is readily discernible that there is an inverse relationship between the yield on A2-rated public utility bonds and equity risk premiums. In other words, as interest rates decline, the equity risk premium rises and vice versa, a result consistent with

²⁸ As shown on page 9 of Exhibit DWD-3.

financial literature on the subject.²⁹ I used the regression results to estimate the equity risk premium applicable to the projected yield on Moody's A2-rated public utility bonds. Given the expected A2-rated utility bond yield of 5.71%, it can be calculated that the indicated equity risk premium applicable to that bond yield is 4.74%.

6 Q. WHAT IS YOUR CONCLUSION OF EQUITY RISK PREMIUMS FOR USE

7 IN YOUR TOTAL MARKET APPROACH RPM?

A. The equity risk premium I applied to the Utility Proxy Group is 4.92% which is the average of the beta-adjusted equity risk premium for the Utility Proxy Group, the S&P Utilities Index, and the authorized return utility equity risk premium.

Table 8: Summary of Conclusions for the Equity Risk Premium for the Utility Proxy Group³⁰

Beta-Adjusted Equity Risk Premium	5.35%
S&P Utilities Index Equity Risk Premium	4.67%
Authorized ROE Equity Risk Premium	<u>4.74%</u>
Average	<u>4.92%</u>

13 Q. WHAT IS THE INDICATED RPM COMMON EQUITY COST RATE 14 BASED ON THE TOTAL MARKET APPROACH?

A. As shown on line 7 page 1 of Exhibit DWD-3, and shown on Table 9 below, I calculated a common equity cost rate of 10.69% for the Utility Proxy Group based on the total market approach RPM.

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²⁹ See, e.g., Robert S. Harris and Felicia C. Marston, "The Market Risk Premium: Expectational Estimates Using Analysts' Forecasts," Journal of Applied Finance, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2001, at 11-12; Eugene F. Brigham, Dilip K. Shome, and Steve R. Vinson, "The Risk Premium Approach to Measuring a Utility's Cost of Equity," Financial Management, Spring 1985, at 33-45.

³⁰ As shown on page 5 of Exhibit DWD-3.

Table 9: Summary of the Total Market Return Risk Premium Model³¹

Prospective Moody's Utility Bond Yield Applicable to the Utility Proxy Group	5.77%
Prospective Equity Risk Premium	4.92%
Indicated Cost of Common Equity	10.69%

C. The Capital Asset Pricing Model

3 Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE THEORETICAL BASIS OF THE CAPM.

CAPM theory defines risk as the co-variability of a security's returns with the market's returns as measured by the beta (β). A beta less than 1.0 indicates lower variability than the market as a whole, while a beta greater than 1.0 indicates greater variability than the market.

The CAPM assumes that all other risk (i.e., all non-market or unsystematic risk) can be eliminated through diversification. The risk that cannot be eliminated through diversification is called market, or systematic, risk. In addition, the CAPM presumes that investors require compensation only for systematic risk, which is the result of macroeconomic and other events that affect the returns on all assets. The model is applied by adding a risk-free rate of return to a market risk premium, which is adjusted proportionately to reflect the systematic risk of the individual security relative to the total market as measured by beta. The traditional CAPM model is expressed as:

$$R_s = R_f + \beta (R_m - R_f)$$

Where: $R_s = \text{Return rate on the common stock}$

 $R_f = Risk-free rate of return$

 $R_{\rm m} = Return rate on the market as a whole$

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³¹ As shown on page 1 of Exhibit DWD-3.

1		β = Adjusted beta (volatility of the
2		security relative to the market as a whole)
3		Numerous tests of the CAPM have measured the extent to which security
4		returns and beta are related as predicted by the CAPM, confirming its validity. The
5		empirical CAPM ("ECAPM") reflects the reality that while the results of these tests
6		support the notion that the beta is related to security returns, the empirical Security
7		Market Line ("SML") described by the CAPM formula is not as steeply sloped as
8		the predicted SML. ³² The ECAPM reflects this empirical reality.
9	Q.	PLEASE EXPLAIN THE THEORETICAL BASIS OF THE CAPM. WHY IS
10		THE USE OF ECAPM APPROPRIATE IN DETERMINING THE ROE FOR
11		THE COMPANY?
12	A.	The ECAPM is a well-established model that has been relied on in both academic
13		and regulatory settings. Fama & French clearly state regarding their Figure 2,
14		below, that "[t]he returns on the low beta portfolios are too high, and the returns on
15		the high beta portfolios are too low."33


Morin at 223.

Morin at 223.

Eugene F. Fama and Kenneth R. French, "The Capital Asset Pricing Model: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 18, No. 3, Summer 2004 at 33 ("Fama & French").

Figure 2 http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/0895330042162430

Average Annualized Monthly Return versus Beta for Value Weight Portfolios Formed on Prior Beta, 1928–2003



In addition, Morin observes that while the results of these tests support the notion that beta is related to security returns, the empirical SML described by the CAPM formula is not as steeply sloped as the predicted SML. Morin states:

With few exceptions, the empirical studies agree that . . . low-beta securities earn returns somewhat higher than the CAPM would predict, and high-beta securities earn less than predicted. 34

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Therefore, the empirical evidence suggests that the expected return on a security is related to its risk by the following approximation:

$$K = R_F + x \beta(R_M - R_F) + (1-x) \beta(R_M - R_F)$$

where x is a fraction to be determined empirically. The value of x that best explains the observed relationship [is] Return = $0.0829 + 0.0520 \beta$ is between 0.25 and 0.30. If x = 0.25, the equation becomes:

$$K = R_F + 0.25(R_M - R_F) + 0.75 \beta(R_M - R_F)^{35}$$

Fama and French provide similar support for the ECAPM when they state:

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³⁴ Morin at 207.

³⁵ *Id.* at 221.

The early tests firmly reject the Sharpe-Lintner version of the CAPM. There is a positive relation between beta and average return, but it is too 'flat.' . . . The regressions consistently find that the intercept is greater than the average risk-free rate . . . and the coefficient on beta is less than the average excess market return. . . . This is true in the early tests . . . as well as in more recent cross-section regressions tests, like Fama and French (1992). 36

Finally, Fama and French further note:

Confirming earlier evidence, the relation between beta and average return for the ten portfolios is much flatter than the Sharpe-Linter CAPM predicts. The returns on low beta portfolios are too high, and the returns on the high beta portfolios are too low. For example, the predicted return on the portfolio with the lowest beta is 8.3 percent per year; the actual return as 11.1 percent. The predicted return on the portfolio with the t beta is 16.8 percent per year; the actual is 13.7 percent.³⁷

Clearly, the justification from Morin and Fama & French, along with their reviews of other academic research on the CAPM, validate the use of the ECAPM. In view of theory and practical research, I have applied both the traditional CAPM and the ECAPM to the companies in the Utility Proxy Groups and averaged the results.

Q. WHAT BETAS DID YOU USE IN YOUR CAPM ANALYSIS?

A. With respect to beta, I considered two methods of calculation: (1) the average of the betas of the respective proxy group companies as reported by Bloomberg, and (2) the average of the betas of the respective proxy group companies as reported by *Value Line*. While both of those services adjust their calculated (or "raw") betas to reflect the tendency of beta to regress to the market mean of 1.00, *Value Line*

³⁶ Fama & French at 32.

³⁷ *Id.* at 33.

- 1 calculates beta over a five-year period, while Bloomberg's calculation is based on
- 2 two years of data.
- 3 Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR SELECTION OF A RISK-FREE RATE OF
- 4 **RETURN.**
- 5 A. As shown in Exhibit DWD-4, the risk-free rate adopted for applications of the
- 6 CAPM is 4.56%. This risk-free rate is based on the average of the *Blue Chip*
- 7 consensus forecast of the expected yields on 30-year U.S. Treasury bonds for the
- 8 six quarters ending with the third calendar quarter of 2026, and long-term
- 9 projections for the years 2027 to 2031 and 2032 to 2036.
- 10 Q. WHY DO YOU USE THE PROJECTED 30-YEAR TREASURY YIELD IN
- 11 YOUR ANALYSES?
- 12 A. The yield on long-term U.S. Treasury bonds is almost risk-free and its term is
- consistent with the long-term cost of capital to public utilities measured by the
- 14 yields on Moody's A2-rated public utility bonds; the long-term investment horizon
- inherent in utilities' common stocks; and the long-term life of the jurisdictional rate
- base to which the allowed fair rate of return (i.e., cost of capital) will be applied.
- In contrast, short-term U.S. Treasury yields are more volatile and largely a function
- of Federal Reserve monetary policy.
- 19 Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE ESTIMATION OF THE EXPECTED RISK
- 20 PREMIUM FOR THE MARKET USED IN YOUR CAPM ANALYSES.
- 21 A. The basis of the market risk premium is explained in detail in note 1 on page 2 of
- Exhibit DWD-4. As discussed above, the market risk premium is derived from an
- 23 average of three historical data-based market risk premiums, one *Value Line* data-

based market risk premium,	and one Value	Line, Bloomberg,	and S&P	Capital IQ
data-based market risk premi	ium.			

The long-term income return on U.S. Government Securities of 4.99% was deducted from the monthly historical total market return of 12.29%, which results in an historical market equity risk premium of 7.31%.³⁸ I applied a linear OLS regression to the monthly annualized historical returns on the S&P 500 relative to historical yields on long-term U.S. Government Securities. That regression analysis yielded a market equity risk premium of 7.93%. The PRPM market equity risk premium is 8.57% and is derived using the PRPM relative to the yields on long-term U.S. Treasury securities from January 1926 through May 2025.

The *Value Line*-derived forecasted total market equity risk premium is derived by deducting the forecasted risk-free rate of 4.56%, discussed above, from the *Value Line* projected total annual market return of 14.40%, resulting in a forecasted total market equity risk premium of 9.84%.

The S&P 500 projected market equity risk premium using *Value Line*, Bloomberg and S&P Capital IQ data is derived by subtracting the projected risk-free rate of 4.56% from the projected total return of the S&P 500 of 15.34%. The resulting market equity risk premium is 10.78%.

These five market risk premiums, when averaged, result in an average total market equity risk premium of 8.88%.

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³⁸ Sources SBBI - 2023, at Appendix A-1 (1) through A-1 (3) and Appendix A-7 (19) through A-7 (21); Bloomberg Professional.

Table 10: Summary of the Calculation of the Market Risk Premium for Use in the CAPM³⁹

Historical Spread Between Total Returns of Large Stocks	
and Long-Term Government Bond Yields (1926 – 2024)	7.31%
Regression Analysis on Historical Data	7.93%
PRPM Analysis on Historical Data	8.57%
Prospective Equity Risk Premium using Total Market	
Returns from Value Line Summary & Index less Projected	
30-Year Treasury Bond Yields	9.84%
Prospective Equity Risk Premium using Measures of	
Capital Appreciation and Income Returns from for the	
S&P 500 less Projected 30-Year Treasury Bond Yields	<u>10.78%</u>
Average	<u>8.88%</u>

3 Q. WHAT ARE THE RESULTS OF YOUR APPLICATION OF THE

4 TRADITIONAL AND ECAPM TO THE UTILITY PROXY GROUP?

- 5 A. As shown on page 1 of Exhibit DWD-4, the mean result of my CAPM/ECAPM
- analyses is 10.91%, the median is 10.84%, and the average of the two is 10.88%.
- 7 Consistent with my reliance on the average of mean and median DCF results
- 8 discussed above, the indicated common equity cost rate using the CAPM/ECAPM
- 9 is 10.88%.

10 D. <u>Common Equity Cost Rates for a Proxy Group of Domestic, Non-</u> 11 Price Regulated Companies Based on the DCF, RPM, and CAPM

12 Q. WHY DO YOU ALSO CONSIDER A PROXY GROUP OF DOMESTIC,

13 **NON-PRICE REGULATED COMPANIES?**

A. Although I am not an attorney, my interpretation of the *Hope* and *Bluefield* cases is that they did not specify that comparable risk companies had to be utilities. Since the purpose of rate regulation is to be a substitute for marketplace competition, non-price regulated firms operating in the competitive marketplace make an excellent proxy if they are comparable in total risk to the utility proxy groups being used to

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³⁹ As shown on page 2 of Exhibit DWD-4.

1		estimate the	cost of common equity. The selection of such domestic, non-price
2		regulated cor	mpetitive firms theoretically and empirically results in proxy groups
3		which is con	nparable in total risk to the Utility Proxy Group, since all of these
4		companies co	ompete for capital in the exact same markets.
5	Q.	HOW DID Y	YOU SELECT NON-PRICE REGULATED COMPANIES THAT
6		ARE COM	PARABLE IN TOTAL RISK TO THE UTILITY PROXY
7		GROUP?	
8	A.	To select pro	xy groups of domestic, non-price regulated companies similar in total
9		risk to the Uti	ility Proxy Groups, I relied on betas and related statistics derived from
10		Value Line re	egression analyses of weekly market prices over the most recent 260
11		weeks (i.e., 1	Five years). As shown on Exhibit DWD-5, these selection criteria
12		resulted in a j	proxy group of 34 domestic, non-price regulated firms comparable in
13		total risk to t	the Utility Proxy Group. Total risk is the sum of non-diversifiable
14		market risk a	nd diversifiable company-specific risks. The criteria used in selecting
15		the domestic,	non-price regulated firms was:
16		(i)	They must be covered by Value Line (Standard Edition);
17		(ii)	They must be domestic, non-price regulated companies, i.e., not
18			utilities;
19		(iii)	Their unadjusted betas must lie within plus or minus two standard
20			deviations of the average unadjusted beta of the Utility Proxy
21			Group; and
22		(iv)	The residual standard errors of the Value Line regressions which
23			gave rise to the unadjusted betas must lie within plus or minus two

1		standard deviations of the average residual standard error of the
2		Utility Proxy Group.
3		Betas measure market, or systematic, risk, which is not diversifiable. The
4		residual standard errors of the regressions measure each firm's company-specific,
5		diversifiable risk. Companies that have similar betas and similar residual standard
6		errors resulting from the same regression analyses have similar total investment
7		risk.
8	Q.	DID YOU CALCULATE COMMON EQUITY COST RATES USING THE
9		DCF MODEL, THE RPM, AND THE CAPM FOR THE NON-PRICE
10		REGULATED PROXY GROUP?
11	A.	Yes. Because the DCF model, RPM, and CAPM have been applied in an identical
12		manner as described above, I will not repeat the details of the rationale and
13		application of each model. One exception is in the application of the RPM, where
14		I did not use public utility-specific equity risk premiums
15		Page 2 of Exhibit DWD-6 derives the constant growth DCF model common
16		equity cost rate. As shown, the indicated common equity cost rate, using the
17		constant growth DCF for the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group comparable in total
18		risk to the Utility Proxy Group, is 11.26%.
19		Page 3 through 5 of Exhibit DWD-6 contain the data and calculations that
20		support the 11.64% RPM common equity cost rates. As shown on line 1, page 3 of
21		Exhibit DWD-6, the consensus prospective yield on Moody's Baa2-rated corporate
22		bonds for the six quarters ending in the third quarter of 2026, and for the years 2027

to 2031 and 2032 to 2036, is 6.10%. ⁴⁰ Since the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group
has an average Moody's long-term issuer rating of A3, it is necessary to take a two-
thirds downward adjustment (0.21%) of the 0.31% spread between A2 and Baa2
corporate bond to reach an adjusted prospective bond yield of 5.89%.

When the beta-adjusted risk premium of 5.75%⁴¹ relative to the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group is added to the prospective A3-rated corporate bond yield of 5.89%, the indicated RPM common equity cost rate is 11.64%.

Page 6 of Exhibit DWD-6 contains the inputs and calculations that support my indicated CAPM/ECAPM common equity cost rates of 11.21%.

Q. WHAT IS THE COST RATE OF COMMON EQUITY BASED ON THE NON-PRICE REGULATED PROXY GROUP COMPARABLE IN TOTAL RISK TO THE UTILITY PROXY GROUP?

A. As shown on page 1 of Exhibit DWD-6, the results of the common equity models applied to the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group – which is comparable in total risk to the Utility Proxy Group – are as follows:

Table 11: Summary of Model Results Applied to the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group⁴²

Discounted Cash Flow Model	11.26%
Risk Premium Model	11.64%
Capital Asset Pricing Model	11.21%
Mean	<u>11.37%</u>
Median	<u>11.26%</u>
Average of Mean and Median	<u>11.32%</u>

The average of the mean and median of these models is 11.32%, which I used as the indicated common equity cost rates for the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group.

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⁴⁰ Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, June 2, 2025, at 2 and 14.

⁴¹ Derived on page 5 of Exhibit DWD-6.

⁴² As shown on page 1 of Exhibit DWD-6.

1	VI.	CONCLUSION OF COMMON EQUITY COST RATE BEFORE
2		ADJUSTMENTS

3 Q. WHAT ARE THE INDICATED COMMON EQUITY COST RATES

BEFORE ADJUSTMENTS?

A.

The range of indicated ROEs produced from my analysis is from 10.39% (DCF model) and 11.32% (Non-Price Regulated Market Models), which is applicable to the Utility Proxy Group as shown on Exhibit DWD-1, page 2. I used multiple cost of common equity models as primary tools in arriving at my recommended common equity cost rate, because no single model is so inherently precise that it can be relied on to the exclusion of other theoretically sound models. Using multiple models adds reliability to the estimated common equity cost rate, with the prudence of using multiple cost of common equity models supported in both the financial literature and regulatory precedent. In view of these results, I recommend a range of ROEs applicable to the Utility Proxy Group between 10.39% and 11.32%.

As will be discussed below, Atmos Energy has unique company-specific risk factors relative to the Utility Proxy Group. Because of this, the indicated range of model results based on the Utility Proxy Group must be adjusted to reflect Atmos Energy's relative risk.

1	VII. ADJUSTMENTS TO THE COMMON EQUITY COST RATE
2	A. Size Adjustment
3 Q	DOES ATMOS ENERGY'S SMALLER SIZE RELATIVE TO THE
4	UTILITY PROXY GROUP COMPANIES INCREASE ITS BUSINESS
5	RISK?
6 A	Yes. Atmos Energy's ⁴³ smaller size relative to the Utility Proxy Group companies
7	indicates greater relative business risk for the Company because, all else being
8	equal, size has a material bearing on risk.
9	Size affects business risk because smaller companies generally are less able
10	to cope with significant events that affect sales, revenues and earnings. For
11	example, smaller companies face more risk exposure to business cycles and
12	economic conditions, both nationally and locally. Additionally, the loss of revenues
13	from a few larger customers would have a greater effect on a small company than
14	on a bigger company with a larger, more diverse, customer base.
15	Investors generally demand greater returns from smaller firms to
16	compensate for less marketability and liquidity of their securities. Kroll discusses
17	the nature of the small-size phenomenon, providing an indication of the magnitude
18	of the size premium based on several measures of size. In discussing "Size as a
19	Predictor of Equity Premiums," Kroll states:
20 21 22 23 24 25 26	The size effect is based on the empirical observation that companies of smaller size are associated with greater risk and, therefore, have greater cost of capital [sic]. The "size" of a company is one of the most important risk elements to consider when developing cost of equity capital estimates for use in valuing a business simply because size has been shown to be a <i>predictor</i> of equity returns. In other words, there is a significant (negative) relationship between size and

⁴³ This discussion specifically refers to ATO's Kansas Division.

1 2	historical equity returns - as size <i>decreases</i> , returns tend to <i>increase</i> , and vice versa. (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original) ⁴⁴
3	Furthermore, in "The Capital Asset Pricing Model: Theory and Evidence,"
4	Fama and French note size is indeed a risk factor which must be reflected when
5	estimating the cost of common equity. On page 38, they note:
6	the higher average returns on small stocks and high book-to-
7	market stocks reflect unidentified state variables that produce
8	undiversifiable risks (covariances) in returns not captured by the
9	market return and are priced separately from market betas. ⁴⁵
10	Based on this evidence, Fama and French proposed their three-factor model
11	which includes a size variable in recognition of the effect size has on the cost of
12	common equity.
13	Also, it is a basic financial principle that the use of funds invested, and not
14	the source of funds, is what gives rise to the risk of any investment. ⁴⁶ Eugene
15	Brigham, a well-known authority, states:
16	A number of researchers have observed that portfolios of small-
17	firms (sic) have earned consistently higher average returns than
18	those of large-firm stocks; this is called the "small-firm effect." On
19	the surface, it would seem to be advantageous to the small firm to
20	provide average returns in the stock market that are higher than those
21	of larger firms. In reality, it is bad news for the small firm; what the
22	small-firm effect means is that the capital market demands
23	higher returns on stocks of small firms than on otherwise similar
24	stocks of the large firms. (emphasis added) ⁴⁷
25	Consistent with the financial principle of risk and return discussed above,
26	relative risk due to size must be considered in the allowed rate of return on common

(emphasis in original).

45 Fama & French at 25-43.

46 Brealey, Richard A. and Myers, Stewart C., Principles of Corporate Finance (McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1996), at 204-205, 229.

47 Brigham, Eugene F., Fundamentals of Financial Management, Fifth Edition (The Dryden Press, 1989), at

⁴⁴ Kroll, <u>Cost of Capital Navigator: U.S. Cost of Capital Module</u>, Size as a Predictor of Returns, at 1

^{623.}

equity. Therefore, the Commission's authorization of a cost rate of common equity
in this proceeding must appropriately reflect the unique risks of Atmos Energy's
Kansas operations, including its size, which is justified and supported above by
evidence in the financial literature.

Q. ARE YOU AWARE OF ACADEMIC LITERATURE RELATING TO THE

APPLICABILITY OF A SIZE PREMIUM?

A. Yes. An article by Michael A. Paschall, ASA, CFA, and George B. Hawkins ASA, CFA, "Do Smaller Companies Warrant a Higher Discount Rate for Risk?" also supports the applicability of a size premium. As the article makes clear, all else equal, size is a risk factor which must be taken into account when setting the cost of capital or capitalization (discount) rate. Paschall and Hawkins state in their conclusion as follows:

The current challenge to traditional thinking about a small stock premium is a very real and potentially troublesome issue. The challenge comes from bright and articulate people and has already been incorporated into some court cases, providing further ammunition for the IRS. Failing to consider the additional risk associated with mostsmaller companies, however, is to fail to acknowledge reality. Measured properly, small company stocks have proven to be more risky over a long period of time than have larger company stocks. This makes sense due to the various advantages that larger companies have over smaller companies. Investors looking to purchase a riskier company will require a greater return on investment to compensate for that risk. There are numerous other risks affecting a particular company, yet the use of a size premium is one way to quantify the risk associated with smaller companies. ⁴⁸

Hence, Paschall and Hawkins corroborate the need to adjust for differences in size, all else equal.

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⁴⁸ Michael A. Paschall, ASA, CFA and George B. Hawkins ASA, CFA, Do Smaller Companies Warrant a Higher Discount Rate for Risk? (CCH Business Valuation Alert, Vol. 1, Issue No. 2, December 1999).

In addition, in the Fama and French article previously cited,⁴⁹ the authors proposed that their three-factor model include the SMB (Small Minus Big) factor, which indicates that small capitalization firms are more risky than large capitalization firms, confirming that size is a risk factor which must be considered in estimating the cost of common equity.

Consistent with the financial principle of risk and return discussed previously, and the stand-alone nature of ratemaking, an upward adjustment must be applied to the indicated cost of common equity derived from the cost of equity models of the proxy groups used in this proceeding.

Q. DO CREDIT RATING AGENCIES HAVE A MINIMUM SIZE CRITERION FOR A GIVEN RATING LEVEL?

As noted previously, they do not. S&P states in its "General Corporate Methodology, Section 2: Analyzing Subfactors for Scale, Scope, and Diversity," that there is no minimum size criterion, although size often provides a measure of diversification. Size and scope of operations is important relative to those of industry peers, though not in absolute terms. While relatively smaller companies can enjoy a high degree of diversification, they will likely be, almost by definition, more concentrated in terms of product, number of customers, or geography, than their larger peers in the same industry.⁵⁰

Moody's, in its "Ratings Methodology for Regulated Electric and Gas Companies" states that size and scale of a regulated utility has generally not been a

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⁵⁰ Standard & Poors, "General Corporate Methodology, Section 2: Analyzing Subfactors for Scale, Scope, and Diversity," at 60.

⁴⁹ Fama & French at 39.

major determinant of its credit strength in the same way that it has been for most other industrial sectors. While size brings certain economies of scale that can somewhat affect the utility's cost structure and competitiveness, rates are more heavily impacted by costs related to fuel and fixed assets. Smaller utilities have sometimes been better able to focus their attention on meeting the expectations of a single regulator than their multi-state peers.

However, size can be a very important factor in our assessment of certain risks that impact ratings, including exposure to natural disasters, customer concentration (primarily to industrial customers in a single sector) and construction risks associated with large projects. While the scorecard attempts to incorporate the first two of these into Factors [diversification], for some issuers these considerations may be sufficiently important that the rating reflects a greater weight for these risks.⁵¹

The above statements by S&P and Moody's reinforce that they do not specifically take size into account (i.e., there is no minimum size criterion for any given rating) in the rating process. Given this, one must adjust for size differences between the proxy group and the target company, even when credit ratings are similar.

Q. IS THERE A WAY TO QUANTIFY A RELATIVE RISK ADJUSTMENT DUE TO ATMOS ENERGY'S SIZE RELATIVE TO THE UTILITY PROXY GROUP?

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⁵¹ Moody's, "Ratings Methodology for Regulated Electric and Gas Companies," at 26-27.

1 A. Yes. Atmos Energy's Kansas operations have a greater relative risk than the
2 average utility in the Utility Proxy Group because of its smaller size compared with
3 the utilities in that group, as measured by an estimated market capitalization of
4 common equity for Atmos Energy.

Table 12: Size as Measured by Market Capitalization for Atmos Energy and the Utility Proxy Group

		Times
	Market	Greater than
	Capitalization*	The Company
	(\$ Millions)	
Atmos Energy Kansas Operations	\$352.733	
Utility Proxy Group	\$4,520.340	12.8x
*From page 1 of Exhibit DWD-7.		

Atmos Energy's Kansas operations' estimated market capitalization was \$352.73 million as of May 30, 2025,⁵² compared with the market capitalization of the median company in the Utility Proxy Group of \$4.520 billion as of May 30, 2025. The average company in the Utility Proxy Group has a market capitalization 12.8 times the size of Atmos Energy's Kansas operations' estimated market capitalization.

As a result, it is necessary to upwardly adjust the range of indicated common equity cost rates to reflect Atmos Energy's Kansas operations greater risk due to its smaller relative size. The determination is based on the size premiums for portfolios of New York Stock Exchange, American Stock Exchange and NASDAQ listed companies ranked by deciles for the 1926 to 2024 period. The size premium for the Utility Proxy Group with a market capitalization of \$4.520 billion falls in

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⁵² \$335,277,633 (requested rate base) * 61.06% (common equity ratio) * 172.3 (market-to-book ratio of the Utility Proxy Group) as demonstrated on page 2 of Exhibit DWD-7.

the 5th decile, while the Company's estimated market capitalization of \$352.73 million places it in the 9th decile. The size premium spread between the 5th decile and the 9th decile is 0.99%. Even though a 0.99% size adjustment is indicated, I applied a size premium of 0.20% to the Company's range of indicated common equity cost rates.

B. <u>Credit Risk Adjustment</u>

7 Q. PLEASE DISCUSS YOUR PROPOSED CREDIT RISK ADJUSTMENT.

Atmos Energy's long-term issuer ratings are A2 and A- from Moody's and S&P, respectively, which are less risky than the average long-term ratings for the Utility Proxy Group of A3 and A-, respectively.⁵³ Hence, a downward credit risk adjustment is necessary to reflect the less risky credit rating, i.e., A2, of Atmos Energy relative to the A3 average Moody's bond rating of the Utility Proxy Group.⁵⁴

An indication of the magnitude of the necessary downward adjustment to reflect the lower credit risk inherent in an A2 bond rating is one-third of a recent three-month average spread between Moody's A2 and Baa2-rated public utility bond yields of 0.19%, shown on page 2 of Exhibit DWD-3, or 0.06%. 55

C. Flotation Cost Adjustment

19 Q. WHAT ARE FLOTATION COSTS?

A. Flotation costs are those costs associated with the sale of new issuances of common stock. They include market pressure and the mandatory unavoidable costs of

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⁵³ Source of Information: S&P Capital IQ, Moody's Investor Service.

⁵⁴ As shown on page 3 of Exhibit DWD-3.

 $^{^{55}}$ 1/3 * 0.19% = 0.06%

1		issuance (e.g., underwriting fees and out-of-pocket costs for printing, fegal,
2		registration, etc.). For every dollar raised through debt or equity offerings, the
3		Company receives less than one full dollar in financing.
4	Q.	WHY IS IT IMPORTANT TO RECOGNIZE FLOTATION COSTS IN
5		THE ALLOWED COMMON EQUITY COST RATE?
6	A.	It is important because there is no other mechanism in the ratemaking paradigm
7		through which such costs can be recognized and recovered. Because these costs
8		are real, necessary, and legitimate, recovery of these costs should be permitted.
9		As noted by Morin:
10 11 12 13		The costs of issuing these securities are just as real as operating and maintenance expenses or costs incurred to build utility plants, and fair regulatory treatment must permit the recovery of these costs
14 15 16		The simple fact of the matter is that common equity capital is not free[Flotation costs] must be recovered through a rate of return adjustment. ⁵⁶
17	Q.	SHOULD FLOTATION COSTS BE RECOGNIZED ONLY IF THERE WAS
18		AN ISSUANCE DURING THE TEST YEAR OR THERE IS AN IMMINENT
19		POST-TEST YEAR ISSUANCE OF ADDITIONAL COMMON STOCK?
20	A.	No. As noted above, there is no mechanism to recapture such costs in the
21		ratemaking paradigm other than an adjustment to the allowed common equity cost
22		rate. Flotation costs are charged to capital accounts and are not expensed on a
23		utility's income statement. As such, flotation costs are analogous to capital
24		investments, albeit negative, reflected on the balance sheet. Recovery of capital
25		investments relates to the expected useful lives of the investment. Since common

Morin, at 329.

equity has a very long and indefinite life (assumed to be infinity in the standard regulatory DCF model), flotation costs should be recovered through an adjustment to common equity cost rate, even when there has not been an issuance during the test year, or in the absence of an expected imminent issuance of additional shares of common stock.

Historical flotation costs are a permanent loss of investment to the utility and should be taken into account. When any company, including a utility, issues common stock, flotation costs are incurred for legal, accounting, printing fees, and the like. For each dollar of issuing market price, a small percentage is expensed and is permanently unavailable for investment in utility rate base. Since these expenses are charged to capital accounts and not expensed on the income statement, the only way to restore the full value of that dollar of issuing price with an assumed investor required return of 10% is for the net investment, \$0.95, to earn more than 10% to net back to the investor a fair return on that dollar. In other words, if a company issues stock at \$1.00 with 5% in flotation costs, it will net \$0.95 in investment. Assuming the investor in that stock requires a 10% return on their invested \$1.00 (i.e., a return of \$0.10), the company needs to earn approximately 10.5% on its invested \$0.95 to receive a \$0.10 return.

Q. DO THE COMMON EQUITY COST RATE MODELS YOU HAVE USED ALREADY REFLECT INVESTORS' ANTICIPATION OF FLOTATION COSTS?

A. No. All of these models assume no transaction costs. The literature is quite clear that these costs are not reflected in the market prices paid for common stocks. For

example, Brigham and Daves confirm this and provide the methodology utilized to calculate the flotation adjustment.⁵⁷ In addition, Morin confirms the need for such an adjustment even when no new equity issuance is imminent.⁵⁸ Consequently, it is proper to include a flotation cost adjustment when using cost of common equity models to estimate the common equity cost rate.

6 Q. HOW DID YOU CALCULATE THE FLOTATION COST ALLOWANCE?

A. I modified the DCF calculation to provide a dividend yield that would reimburse investors for issuance costs in accordance with the method cited in literature by Brigham and Daves, as well as by Morin. The flotation cost adjustment recognizes the actual costs of issuing equity that were incurred by Atmos Energy Corporation.

Based on the issuance costs shown on page 1 of Exhibit DWD-8, an adjustment of 0.04% is required to reflect the flotation costs applicable to the Utility Proxy Group.

Q. WHAT IS THE INDICATED RANGE OF ROES APPLICABLE TO ATMOS ENERGY AFTER YOUR COMPANY-SPECIFIC ADJUSTMENTS?

A. Applying the 0.20% business risk adjustment, the negative 0.06% credit risk adjustment, and the 0.04% flotation cost adjustment to the indicated range of common equity cost rates applicable to the Utility Proxy Group results in a Company-specific range of ROEs between 10.57% and 11.50%.

Eugene F. Brigham and Phillip R. Daves, Intermediate Financial Management, 9th Edition, Thomson/Southwestern, at p. 342.

⁵⁸ Morin, at 337-339.

VIII. <u>CONCLUSION</u>

- 2 Q. WHAT IS YOUR RECOMMENDED ROE FOR ATMOS ENERGY?
- 3 A. Given the indicated ROE ranges applicable to the Utility Proxy Group and
- 4 Company, I conclude that an appropriate ROE for the Company is 10.80%.
- 5 Q. IN YOUR OPINION, IS YOUR PROPOSED ROE OF 10.80% AND
- 6 REASONABLE TO ATMOS ENERGY AND ITS CUSTOMERS?
- 7 A. Yes, it is.

- 8 Q. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR DIRECT TESTIMONY?
- 9 A. Yes, it does.

VERIFICATION

STATE OF NEW JERSEY)
)
COUNTY OF CAMDEN)

Dylan W. D'Ascendis, being duly sworn upon his oath, deposes and states that he is Partner at ScottMadden, Inc.; that he has read and is familiar with the foregoing Direct Testimony filed herewith; and that the statements made therein are true to the best of his knowledge, information and belief.

Dylan W. D'Ascendis

Subscribed and sworn before me this 15 th day of 1 y , 2

Notary Public

My appointment expires: 2/1/202

Joyce E Kelly NOTARY PUBLIC State of New Jersey ID # 2416714

My Commission Expires 2/1/2027

<u>Atmos Energy Corporation</u>

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Atmos Energy Corporation Recommended Capital Structure and Cost Rates for Ratemaking Purposes

Type of Capital	Ratios(1)	Cost Rate	_	Weighted Cost Rate
Long-Term Debt Common Equity	38.94% 61.06%	4.13% 10.80%	(1) (2)	1.61% 6.59%
Total	100.00%			8.20%

Notes:

- (1) Company-provided.
- (2) From page 2 of this Exhibit.

<u>Atmos Energy Corporation</u> <u>Brief Summary of Common Equity Cost Rate</u>

Line No.		Principal Methods	Proxy Group of Eight Natural Gas Companies
		11	· ·
1.		Discounted Cash Flow Model (DCF) (1)	10.39%
2.		Risk Premium Model (RPM) (2)	10.69%
3.		Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) (3)	10.88%
4.		Market Models Applied to Comparable Risk, Non-Price Regulated Companies (4)	11.32%
5.		Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate before Adjustment for Company-specific Risk	10.39% - 11.32%
6.		Business Risk Adjustment (5)	0.20%
7.		Credit Risk Adjustment (6)	-0.06%
8.		Flotation Cost Adjustment (7)	0.04%
9.		Indicated Range of Common Equity Cost Rates after Adjustment for Company-Specific Risk	10.57% - 11.50%
10.		Recommended Common Equity Cost Rate	10.80%
Notes:	(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)	From page 1 of Exhibit DWD-2. From page 1 of Exhibit DWD-3. From page 1 of Exhibit DWD-4. From page 1 of Exhibit DWD-6. Adjustment to reflect the Company's greater business risk relations detailed in Mr. D'Ascendis' Direct Testimony. Company-specific risk adjustment to reflect Atmos' lower risk drating relative to the proxy group as detailed in Mr. D'Ascendis' From page 1 of Exhibit DWD-8.	ue to a higher long-term
	(7)	From page 1 of Exhibit DWD-0.	

Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate Using the Discounted Cash Flow Model for the Atmos Energy Corporation

Proxy Group of Eight Natural Gas Companies


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
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
- Indicated dividend at 5/30/2025 divided by the average closing price of the last 60 trading days ending 05/30/2025 for each company. (1)
- From pages 2 through 9 of this Exhibit.
- Average of columns 2 through 4 excluding negative growth rates.
- This reflects a growth rate component equal to one-half the conclusion of growth rate (from column 5) \mathbf{x} column 1 to reflect the periodic payment of dividends (Gordon Model) as opposed to the continuous payment. Thus, for Atmos Energy Corporation, $2.25\% \times (1+(1/2 \times 7.16\%)) = 2.33\%$. (4)
- Column 5 + Column 6.
- Results were excluded from the final average and median as they were more than two standard deviations from the proxy group's mean. (5)


Source of Information:

www.zacks.com Downloaded on 5/30/2025 S&P Capital IQ Value Line Investment Survey












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3.00	Cap'l Spending per sh	13.50	12.50	13.18	2.48	2.46	11.84	2.28	81.2 17.06	2.08	1.98	08.1 31.11	1.62	85.8 50.40	38.7 54.00	72.8	90.1 8.29	1.00 87.4	18.4
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69.87 13.00	Revenues per sh "Cash Flow" per sh	11.20	88.69 01.01	22.17 78.8	56.87 75.8	98.E7	16.03 84.6	88.72 78.9	27.88 9.40	15.43 41.8	53.00 8.83	51.82 9.29	52.00 59.8	19.34	42.08	77.14 E7.73	70.14 18.8	81.04 84.0	42.00 6.16
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Atmos Energy Corporation Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate Through Use of a Risk Premium Model Using an Adjusted Total Market Approach

Line No.		Proxy Group of Eight Natural Gas Companies
1.	Prospective Yield on Aaa Rated Corporate Bonds (1)	5.25 %
2.	Adjustment to Reflect Yield Spread Between Aaa Rated Corporate Bonds and A2 Rated Public	
	Utility Bonds (2)	0.46
3.	Adjusted Prospective Yield on A2 Rated Public Utility Bonds	5.71 %
4.	Adjustment to Reflect Bond Rating Difference of Proxy Group (3)	0.06
5.	Adjusted Bond Yield	5.77 %
6.	Equity Risk Premium (4)	4.92
7.	Risk Premium Derived Common Equity Cost Rate	10.69 %

Notes: (1) Consensus forecast of Moody's Aaa Rated Corporate bonds from Blue Chip Financial Forecasts (see pages 7 and 8 of this Exhibit).

- (2) The average yield spread of A2 rated public utility bonds over Aaa rated corporate bonds of 0.46% from page 2 of this Exhibit.
- (3) Adjustment to reflect the A3 Moody's LT issuer rating of the Utility Proxy Group as shown on page 3 of this Exhibit. The 0.06% upward adjustment is derived by taking 1/3 of the spread between A2 and Baa2 Public Utility Bonds (1/3 * 0.19% = 0.06%) as derived from page 2 of this Exhibit.
- (4) From page 5 of this Exhibit.

Atmos Energy Corporation Interest Rates and Bond Spreads for Moody's Corporate and Public Utility Bonds

Selected Bond Yields

[1]	[2]	[3]

	Aaa Rated Corporate Bond	A2 Rated Public Utility Bond	Baa2 Rated Public Utility Bond
May-2025 Apr-2025 Mar-2025	5.54 % 5.45 5.29	6.05 % 5.91 5.72	6.23 % 6.11 5.91
Average	5.43 %	5.89 %	6.08 %

Selected Bond Spreads

A2 Rated Public Utility Bonds Over Aaa Rated Corporate Bonds:

0.46 % (1)

Baa2 Rated Public Utility Bonds Over A2 Rated Public Utility Bonds:

0.19 % (2)

Notes:

- (1) Column [2] Column [1].
- (2) Column [3] Column [2].

Source of Information:

Bloomberg Professional Services

Atmos Energy Corporation Comparison of Long-Term Issuer Ratings for the Proxy Group of Eight Natural Gas Companies

Moody's	Standard & Poor's
Long-Term Issuer Rating	Long-Term Issuer Rating
May 2025	May 2025

Proxy Group of Eight Natural Gas Companies	Long-Term Issuer Rating (1)	Numerical Weighting (2)	Long-Term Issuer Rating (1)	Numerical Weighting (1)
Atmos Energy Corporation	A2	6.0	A-	7.0
Chesapeake Utilities Corporation	NR		NR	
New Jersey Resources Corporation	A1	5.0	NR	
NiSource Inc.	Baa1	8.0	BBB+	8.0
Northwest Natural Holding Company	Baa1	8.0	A+	5.0
ONE Gas, Inc.	A3	7.0	A-	7.0
Southwest Gas Holdings, Inc.	Baa1	8.0	BBB	9.0
Spire Inc.	A1/A2	5.5	BBB+	8.0
Average	A3	6.8	A-	7.3

Notes:

- $(1) \ \ Ratings \ are \ that \ of the \ average \ of each \ company's \ utility \ operating \ subsidiaries.$
- (2) From page 4 of this Exhibit.

Source Information: Moody's Investors Service

Standard & Poor's Global Utilities Rating Service

Numerical Assignment for Moody's and Standard & Poor's Bond Ratings

Moody's Bond Rating	Numerical Bond Weighting	Standard & Poor's Bond Rating
Aaa	1	AAA
Aa1	2	AA+
Aa2	3	AA
Aa3	4	AA-
A1	5	A+
A2	6	A
A3	7	A-
Baa1	8	BBB+
Baa2	9	BBB
Baa3	10	BBB-
Ba1	11	BB+
Ba2	12	BB
Ba3	13	BB-
B1	14	B+
B2	15	В
В3	16	B-

Atmos Energy Corporation Judgment of Equity Risk Premium for the Proxy Group of Eight Natural Gas Companies

Line No.	_	Proxy Group of Eight Natural Gas Companies
1.	Calculated equity risk premium based on the total market using the beta approach (1)	5.35 %
2.	Mean equity risk premium based on a study using the holding period returns of public utilities with A2 rated bonds (2)	4.67
3.	Predicted Equity Risk Premium based on Regression Analysis of 848 Fully-Litigated Natural Gas Cases (3)	4.74
4.	Average equity risk premium	4.92 %
Notes:	(1) From page 6 of this Exhibit.(2) From page 9 of this Exhibit.(3) From page 10 of this Exhibit.	

Atmos Energy Corporation Derivation of Equity Risk Premium Based on the Total Market Approach Using the Beta for the

Proxy Group of Eight Natural Gas Companies

Line No.	Equity Risk Premium Measure	Proxy Group of Eig Natural Gas Compa	_
1.	Kroll Equity Risk Premium (1)	6.10	%
2.	Regression on Kroll Risk Premium Data (2)	6.94	
3.	Kroll Equity Risk Premium based on PRPM (3)	7.66	
4	Equity Risk Premium Based on Value Line Summary and Index (4)	9.15	
5.	Equity Risk Premium Based on Bloomberg, Value Line, and S&P Global Market Intelligence S&P 500 Companies (5)	10.09	_
6.	Conclusion of Equity Risk Premium	7.99	%
7.	Adjusted Beta (6)	0.67	_
8.	Forecasted Equity Risk Premium	5.35	<u></u> %

Notes:

- (1) Based on the arithmetic mean historical monthly returns on large company common stocks from Kroll 2024 SBBI® Yearbook and Bloomberg Professional Services minus the arithmetic mean monthly yield of Moody's average Aaa and Aa2 corporate bonds from 1928-2024.
- (2) This equity risk premium is based on a regression of the monthly equity risk premiums of large company common stocks relative to Moody's average Aaa and Aa2 rated corporate bond yields from 1928-2024 referenced in Note 1 above. Using the equation generated from the regression, an expected equity risk premium is calculated using the average consensus forecast of Aaa corporate bonds of 5.25% (from page 1 of this Exhibit).
- (3) The Predictive Risk Premium Model (PRPM) is discussed in the accompanying direct testimony. The Ibbotson equity risk premium based on the PRPM is derived by applying the PRPM to the monthly risk premiums between Ibbotson large company common stock monthly returns and average Aaa and Aa corporate monthly bond yields, from January 1928 through May 2025.
- (4) The equity risk premium based on the Value Line Summary and Index is derived by subtracting the average consensus forecast of Aaa corporate bonds of 5.25% (from page 1 of this Exhibit) from the projected 3-5 year total annual market return of 14.40% (described fully in note 1 on page 2 of Exhibit DWD-4).
- (5) Using data from the Bloomberg Professional Services, Value Line, and S&P Global Market Intelligence for the S&P 500, an expected total return of 15.34% was derived based upon expected dividend yields as a proxy for income returns and long-term earnings growth estimates as a proxy for capital appreciation. Subtracting the average consensus forecast of Aaa corporate bonds of 5.25% results in an expected equity risk premium of 10.09%.
- (6) Average of mean and median beta from Exhibit DWD-4.


Sources of Information:

Kroll 2023 SBBI® Yearbook Industrial Manual and Mergent Bond Record Monthly Update. Value Line Summary and Index Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, June 2, 2025 S&P Capital IQ Bloomberg Professional Services

Consensus Forecasts of U.S. Interest Rates and Key Assumptions

	History						Cons	ensus l	Forecas	sts-Qua	arterly	Avg.		
	Av	erage For	Week End		Ave	erage For	Month	Latest Qtr	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q
Interest Rates	May 23	May 16	<u>May 9</u>	May 2	<u>Apr</u>	Mar	<u>Feb</u>	1Q 2025	<u>2025</u>	<u>2025</u>	<u>2025</u>	<u>2026</u>	<u>2026</u>	<u>2026</u>
Federal Funds Rate	4.33	4.33	4.33	4.33	4.33	4.33	4.33	4.33	4.3	4.2	3.9	3.7	3.5	3.4
Prime Rate	7.50	7.50	7.50	7.50	7.50	7.50	7.50	7.50	7.5	7.4	7.1	6.8	6.6	6.5
SOFR	4.27	4.30	4.30	4.38	4.35	4.33	4.34	4.33	4.3	4.2	4.0	3.7	3.5	3.3
Commercial Paper, 1-mo.	4.31	4.32	4.33	4.31	4.34	4.32	4.31	4.32	4.3	4.2	3.9	3.7	3.4	3.3
Treasury bill, 3-mo.	4.37	4.40	4.34	4.32	4.32	4.34	4.33	4.34	4.3	4.1	3.9	3.6	3.4	3.3
Treasury bill, 6-mo.	4.33	4.29	4.27	4.22	4.20	4.27	4.30	4.28	4.2	4.1	3.8	3.6	3.5	3.3
Treasury bill, 1 yr.	4.13	4.12	4.02	3.92	3.95	4.06	4.19	4.14	4.0	3.9	3.8	3.6	3.5	3.4
Treasury note, 2 yr.	3.99	4.00	3.83	3.69	3.78	3.97	4.21	4.15	3.9	3.8	3.7	3.5	3.5	3.4
Treasury note, 5 yr.	4.10	4.10	3.94	3.81	3.91	4.04	4.28	4.25	4.0	4.0	3.9	3.8	3.7	3.7
Treasury note, 10 yr.	4.51	4.47	4.33	4.23	4.28	4.28	4.45	4.45	4.4	4.3	4.3	4.2	4.2	4.2
Treasury note, 30 yr.	5.01	4.92	4.81	4.70	4.71	4.60	4.68	4.71	4.8	4.7	4.6	4.6	4.6	4.5
Corporate Aaa bond	5.73	5.66	5.63	5.52	5.56	5.38	5.39	5.44	5.4	5.4	5.3	5.3	5.2	5.2
Corporate Baa bond	6.20	6.14	6.12	6.01	6.06	5.81	5.82	5.86	6.2	6.2	6.2	6.1	6.1	6.0
State & Local bonds	4.48	4.46	4.46	4.48	4.50	4.22	4.16	4.19	4.6	4.6	4.5	4.4	4.5	4.4
Home mortgage rate	6.86	6.81	6.76	6.76	6.73	6.65	6.84	6.82	6.8	6.7	6.5	6.4	6.3	6.3
				History	y				Co	nsensu	ıs Fore	casts-(Quartei	rly
	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q
Key Assumptions	<u>2023</u>	2023	2023	<u>2024</u>	2024	2024	<u>2024</u>	<u>2025</u>	<u>2025</u>	<u>2025</u>	<u>2025</u>	<u>2026</u>	<u>2026</u>	<u>2026</u>
Fed's AFE \$ Index	114.6	115.0	116.6	115.5	117.3	114.9	117.9	119.8	115.1	114.4	113.6	113.0	112.9	113.0
Real GDP	2.4	4.4	3.2	1.6	3.0	3.1	2.4	-0.2	1.3	0.4	0.9	1.4	1.8	2.0
GDP Price Index	1.9	3.2	1.5	3.0	2.5	1.9	2.3	3.7	2.9	3.4	2.8	2.6	2.2	2.3
Consumer Price Index	3.0	3.5	2.8	3.7	2.8	1.4	3.0	3.8	2.7	3.7	3.1	2.8	2.5	2.5
PCE Price Index	2.9	2.7	1.7	3.4	2.5	1.5	2.4	3.6	2.7	3.5	2.9	2.7	2.4	2.3

Forecasts for interest rates and the Federal Reserve's Advanced Foreign Economies Index represent averages for the quarter. Forecasts for Real GDP, GDP Price Index, CPI and PCE Price Index are seasonally adjusted annual rates of change (saar). Individual panel members' forecasts are on pages 4 through 9. Historical data: Treasury rates from the Federal Reserve Board's H.15; AAA-AA and A-BBB corporate bond yields from Bank of America-Merrill Lynch and are 15+ years, yield to maturity; State and local bond yields from Bank of America-Merrill Lynch, A-rated, yield to maturity; Mortgage rates from Freddie Mac, 30-year, fixed; SOFR from the New York Fed. All interest rate data are sourced from Haver Analytics. Historical data for Fed's Major Currency Index are from FRSR H.10. Historical data for Real GDP, GDP Price Index and PCE Price Index are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Consumer Price Index history is from the Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).



Long-Range Survey:

The table below contains results of our semi-annual long-range CONSENSUS survey. There are also Top 10 and Bottom 10 averages for each variable. Shown are estimates for the years 2026 through 2031 and averages for the five-year periods 2027-2031 and 2032-2036. Apply these projections cautiously. Few economic, demographic and political forces can be evaluated accurately over such long time spans.


		Average For The Year						Five-Year Averages			
		2026	2027	2028	2029	2030	2031	2027-2031	2032-2036		
1. Federal Funds Rate	CONSENSUS	3.4	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.1	3.1	3.2	3.1		
	Top 10 Average	3.7	3.5	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.4		
	Bottom 10 Average	3.1	3.0	2.9	2.9	2.8	2.9	2.9	2.8		
2. Prime Rate	CONSENSUS	6.5	6.4	6.3	6.3	6.2	6.2	6.3	6.2		
	Top 10 Average	6.7	6.6	6.5	6.6	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.5		
	Bottom 10 Average	6.2	6.2	6.0	6.0	5.9	5.9	6.0	5.9		
3. SOFR	CONSENSUS	3.4	3.3	3.2	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.2	3.1		
	Top 10 Average	3.6	3.4	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3		
	Bottom 10 Average	3.2	3.2	3.0	2.9	2.9	2.9	3.0	2.8		
4. Commercial Paper, 1-Mo	CONSENSUS	3.4	3.3	3.2	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.2	3.1		
	Top 10 Average	3.5	3.4	3.3	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.3	3.3		
5 T. D'II ST. 11 2 M	Bottom 10 Average	3.3	3.3	3.1	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.1	2.9		
5. Treasury Bill Yield, 3-Mo	CONSENSUS	3.3	3.2	3.2	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.1		
	Top 10 Average	3.6	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.3	3.3	3.4	3.3		
6 Taranana Dill Viald 6 Ma	Bottom 10 Average	3.1	2.9	2.9	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.9	2.8		
6. Treasury Bill Yield, 6-Mo	CONSENSUS	3.3	3.2	3.2	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.2	3.1		
	Top 10 Average	3.6	3.4	3.4	3.3	3.3	3.3 2.9	3.3 3.0	3.3 2.8		
7. Treasury Bill Yield, 1-Yr	Bottom 10 Average CONSENSUS	3.1 3.3	3.0 3.3	3.0 3.3	2.9 3.2	2.9 3.2	3.2	3.0 3.2	3.2		
7. Heasury Bill Heid, 1-11	Top 10 Average	3.6	3.5	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.4		
	Bottom 10 Average	3.1	3.3	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.4		
8. Treasury Note Yield, 2-Yr	CONSENSUS	3.4	3.4	3.5	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.4		
o. Heastry Note Tield, 2-11	Top 10 Average	3.7	3.6	3.7	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6		
	Bottom 10 Average	3.1	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.1		
9. Treasury Note Yield, 5-Yr	CONSENSUS	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.7		
y. Headary Hote Hela, 5 H	Top 10 Average	3.9	3.9	3.9	3.9	3.9	3.9	3.9	4.0		
	Bottom 10 Average	3.4	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.4	3.4	3.5	3.4		
10. Treasury Note Yield, 10-Yr	CONSENSUS	4.0	4.1	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0		
•	Top 10 Average	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3		
	Bottom 10 Average	3.8	3.9	3.8	3.8	3.8	3.8	3.8	3.8		
11. Treasury Bond Yield, 30-Yr	CONSENSUS	4.5	4.4	4.4	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.4	4.3		
	Top 10 Average	4.7	4.7	4.6	4.6	4.6	4.6	4.6	4.7		
	Bottom 10 Average	4.2	4.3	4.1	4.1	4.1	4.1	4.1	4.1		
12. Corporate Aaa Bond Yield	CONSENSUS	5.2	5.2	5.2	5.1	5.1	5.1	5.1	5.1		
	Top 10 Average	5.4	5.5	5.4	5.4	5.4	5.4	5.4	5.4		
	Bottom 10 Average	5.0	5.0	4.9	4.9	4.9	4.9	4.9	4.9		
13. Corporate Baa Bond Yield	CONSENSUS	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0		
	Top 10 Average	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3		
	Bottom 10 Average	5.8	5.9	5.8	5.8	5.8	5.7	5.8	5.8		
14. State & Local Bonds Yield	CONSENSUS	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.2	4.2	4.2	4.3	4.1		
	Top 10 Average	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4		
15.77	Bottom 10 Average	4.1	4.2	4.1	4.1	4.1	4.1	4.1	3.8		
15. Home Mortgage Rate	CONSENSUS	6.2	6.2	6.1	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.1	5.9		
	Top 10 Average	6.4	6.4	6.4	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3		
A Fed's AFE Naminal \$ Index	Bottom 10 Average CONSENSUS	5.9	6.0	5.8	5.8	5.8	5.7	5.8	5.6		
A. Fed's AFE Nominal \$ Index	Top 10 Average	113.3	112.7	112.7	112.2	111.7	111.3	112.1	110.8		
	Bottom 10 Average	114.2 112.2	113.3 111.9	113.4 112.0	112.9 111.3	112.5 110.7	112.2 110.3	112.8 111.3	112.4 109.1		
	Bottom 1071 velage	112.2			ear, % Change				Averages		
		2026	2027	2028	2029	2030	2031	2027-2031	2032-2036		
B. Real GDP	CONSENSUS	1.5	1.9	2.0	2.0	1.9	2.0	2.0	1.9		
	Top 10 Average	1.9	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.1		
	Bottom 10 Average	1.1	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.8		
C. GDP Chained Price Index	CONSENSUS	2.4	2.2	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1		
	Top 10 Average	2.6	2.3	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2		
	Bottom 10 Average	2.1	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0		
D. Consumer Price Index	CONSENSUS	2.5	2.2	2.2	2.1	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.2		
	Top 10 Average	2.9	2.4	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.3		
	Bottom 10 Average	2.1	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.1		
E. PCE Price Index	CONSENSUS	2.4	2.0	2.0	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9		
	Top 10 Average	2.8	2.3	2.2	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.2	2.1		
	Bottom 10 Average	2.1	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.8		

Projected Market Appreciation of the S&P Utility Index Derivation of Mean Equity Risk Premium Based Studies Using Holding Period Returns and Projected Market Appreciation of the S&P Utility Index

<u>Line No.</u>		Implied Equity Risk Premium
1.	Historical Equity Risk Premium (1)	4.16 %
2.	Regression of Historical Equity Risk Premium (2)	4.82
3	Forecasted Equity Risk Premium Based on PRPM (3)	4.46
4.	Forecasted Equity Risk Premium based on Projected Total Return on the S&P Utilities Index (Bloomberg, Value Line, and S&P Capital IQ Data) (4)	5.24
5.	Average Equity Risk Premium (5)	4.67 %

- Notes: (1) Based on S&P Public Utility Index monthly total returns and Moody's Public Utility Bond average monthly yields from 1928-2024. Holding period returns are calculated based upon income received (dividends and interest) plus the relative change in the market value of a security over a one-year holding period.
 - (2) This equity risk premium is based on a regression of the monthly equity risk premiums of the S&P Utility Index relative to Moody's A2 rated public utility bond yields from 1928 - 2024 referenced in note 1 above. Using the equation generated from the regression, an expected equity risk premium is calculated using the prospective A2 rated public utility bond yield of 5.71% (from line 3, page 1 of this Exhibit).
 - (3) The Predictive Risk Premium Model (PRPM) is applied to the risk premium of the monthly total returns of the S&P Utility Index and the monthly yields on Moody's A2 rated public utility bonds from January 1928 through May 2025.
 - (4) Using data from Bloomberg, Value Line, and S&P Capital IQ for the S&P Utilities Index, an expected return of 10.95% was derived based on expected dividend yields as a proxy for income returns and long-term growth estimates as a proxy for market appreciation. Subtracting the expected A2 rated public utility bond yield of 5.71%, calculated on line 3 of page 1 of this Exhibit, results in an equity risk premium of 5.24%. (10.95% - 5.71% = 5.24%).
 - (5) Average of lines 1 through 4.

Atmos Energy Corporation Prediction of Equity Risk Premiums Relative to Moody's A2 Rated Utility Bond Yields - Electric Utilities



		Prospective A2 Rated	Equity Risk
Constant	Slope	Utility Bond (1)	Premium
7.4848 %	-0.4805	5.71 %	4.74 %

Notes:

(1) From line 3 of page 1 of this Exhibit.

Source of Information: Regulatory Research Associates.

Atmos Energy Corporation Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate Through Use of the Traditional Capital Asset Pricing Model (ECAPM)

[8]	Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate (3)	10.72 % 10.49	10.88	11.35	10.88	10.72	11.42	10.80	10.91 %	10.84 %	10.88 %
[7]	ECAPM Cost Rate	11.11 %	11.25	11.64	11.25	11.11	11.71	11.18	11.27 %	11.21 %	11.24 %
[9]	Traditional CAPM Cost Rate	10.33 %	10.51	11.05	10.51	10.33	11.13	10.42	10.55 %	10.47 %	10.51 %
[5]	Risk-Free Rate (2)	4.56 % 4.56	4.56	4.56	4.56	4.56	4.56	4.56			
[4]	Market Risk Premium (1)	8.88 8.88	8.88	8.88	8.88	8.88	8.88	8.88			
[3]	Average Beta	0.65	0.67	0.73	0.67	0.65	0.74	99.0	0.67	0.67	0.67
[2]	Bloomberg Adjusted Beta	0.54	0.48	09:0	0.53	0.51	89.0	0.51			
[1]	Value Line Adjusted Beta	0.75	0.85	0.85	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.80			
	Proxy Group of Eight Natural Gas Companies	Atmos Energy Corporation Chesapeake Utilities Corporation	New Jersey Resources Corporation	NiSource Inc.	Northwest Natural Holding Company	ONE Gas, Inc.	Southwest Gas Holdings, Inc.	Spire Inc.	Mean	Median	Average of Mean and Median

Notes on page 2 of this Exhibit.

Atmos Energy Corporation Notes to Accompany the Application of the CAPM and ECAPM

Notes:

(1) The market risk premium (MRP) is derived by using five different measures from four sources: Kroll, Value Line, Bloomberg, and S&P Capital IQ as illustrated below:

Measure 1: Kroll Arithmetic Mean MRP (1926-2024)

Arithmetic Mean Monthly Returns for Large Stocks 1926-2024: Arithmetic Mean Income Returns on Long-Term Government Bonds: MRP based on Kroll Historical Data:	12.29 4.99 7.31	_
Measure 2: Application of a Regression Analysis to Historical Data (1926-2024)	7.93	_%
Measure 3: Application of the PRPM to Historical Data (January 1926 through May 2025)	8.57	_%
Measure 4: Value Line Projected MRP (Thirteen weeks ending May 30, 2025)		
Total projected return on the market 3-5 years hence*: Risk-Free Rate (see note 2): MRP based on Value Line Summary & Index: *Forcasted 3-5 year capital appreciation plus expected dividend yield	14.40 4.56 9.84	% - _%
Measure 5: Bloomberg, Value Line, and S&P Capital IQ Projected Return on the Market based on the S&P 500		
Total return on the Market based on the S&P 500: Risk-Free Rate (see note 2): MRP based on Bloomberg, Value Line, and S&P Capital IQ data	15.34 4.56 10.78	% - _%
Average of all MRP Measures:	8.88	%

(2) For reasons explained in the Direct Testimony, the appropriate risk-free rate for cost of capital purposes is the average forecast of 30 year Treasury Bonds per the consensus of nearly 50 economists reported in Blue Chip Financial Forecasts. (See pages 7 and 8 of Exhibit DWD-3.) The projection of the risk-free rate is illustrated below:

Second Quarter 2025	4.80	%
Third Quarter 2025	4.70	
Fourth Quarter 2025	4.60	
First Quarter 2026	4.60	
Second Quarter 2026	4.60	
Third Quarter 2026	4.50	
2027-2031	4.40	
2032-2036	4.30	_
	4.56	%

(3) Average of Column 6 and Column 7.

Sources of Information: Value Line Summary and Index Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, June 2, 2025 Kroll 2023 SBBI® Yearbook S&P Capital IQ Bloomberg Professional Services

Atmos Energy Corporation

Basis of Selection of the Group of Non-Price Regulated Companies Comparable in Total Risk to the Proxy Group of Eight Natural Gas Companies

The criteria for selection of the proxy group of non-price regulated companies comparable in total risk to the proxy group of eight natural gas companies was that the non-price regulated companies be domestic and reported in Value Line Investment Survey (Standard Edition).

The proxy group of non-price regulated companies was selected based on the unadjusted beta range of 0.50 - 0.84 and residual standard error of the regression range of 2.6848 - 3.2020 of the proxy group of eight natural gas companies.

These ranges are based upon plus or minus two standard deviations of the unadjusted beta and standard error of the regression. Plus or minus three standard deviations captures 95.50% of the distribution of unadjusted betas and residual standard errors of the regression.

The standard deviation of the Utility Proxy Group's residual standard error of the regression is 0.1293. The standard deviation of the standard error of the regression is calculated as follows:

Standard Deviation of the Std. Err. of the Regr. = Standard Error of the Regression
$$\sqrt{2N}$$

where: N = number of observations. Since Value Line betas are derived from weekly price change observations over a period of five years, N = 259

Thus,
$$0.1293 = 2.9434 = 2.9434$$

$$\sqrt{518} = 2.9434$$

$$22.7596$$

Source of Information: Value Line Proprietary Database, March 2025.

<u>Value Line Investment Survey</u> (Standard Edition).

Atmos Energy Corporation Basis of Selection of Comparable Risk Domestic Non-Price Regulated Companies

[1] [2] [3]

Proxy Group of Eight Natural Gas Companies	Value Line Adjusted Beta	Unadjusted Beta	Residual Standard Error of the Regression	Standard Deviation of Beta
Atmos Energy Corporation	0.75	0.60	2.3930	0.0686
Chesapeake Utilities Corporation	0.75	0.61	3.1465	0.0902
New Jersey Resources Corporation	0.90	0.80	3.0205	0.0866
NiSource Inc.	0.85	0.73	2.5604	0.0734
Northwest Natural Holding Company	0.80	0.65	3.0976	0.0888
ONE Gas, Inc.	0.80	0.67	3.1532	0.0904
Southwest Gas Holdings, Inc.	0.80	0.64	3.3149	0.0951
Spire Inc.	0.80	0.66	2.8610	0.0820
Average	0.81	0.67	2.9434	0.0844
Beta Range (+/- 2 std. Devs. of Beta) 2 std. Devs. of Beta	0.50 0.17	0.84		
Residual Std. Err. Range (+/- 2 std. Devs. of the Residual Std. Err.)	2.6848	3.2020		
Std. dev. of the Res. Std. Err.	0.1293			
2 std. devs. of the Res. Std. Err.	0.2586			

Source of Information: Value

Value Line Proprietary Database, March 2025.

Atmos Energy Corporation Proxy Group of Non-Price Regulated Companies Comparable in Total Risk to the Proxy Group of Eight Natural Gas Companies

[1] [2] [3]

Proxy Group of Thirty-Four Non-Price Regulated Companies	Value Line Adjusted Beta	Unadjusted Beta	Residual Standard Error of the Regression	Standard Deviation of Beta
Abbott Laboratories	0.75	0.58	2.7801	0.0797
Allstate Corporation	0.85	0.77	2.8150	0.0807
Assurant, Inc.	0.90	0.82	2.9060	0.0833
AutoZone Inc.	0.75	0.58	2.9871	0.0857
Becton, Dickinson and Company	0.75	0.55	2.7023	0.0775
Bristol-Myers Squibb Company	0.75	0.58	3.0267	0.0868
Brown-Forman Corporation 'B'	0.80	0.65	3.0299	0.0869
Casella Waste System	0.85	0.72	2.9209	0.0838
Cencora	0.75	0.55	2.7229	0.0781
Cisco Systems, Inc.	0.85	0.75	2.6869	0.0771
Constellation Brands, Inc.	0.80	0.69	2.9242	0.0839
Costco Wholesale Corporation	0.75	0.61	2.7469	0.0788
Gilead Sciences, Inc.	0.75	0.56	2.9843	0.0856
Heartland Express, Inc.	0.85	0.74	3.1295	0.0897
Jack Henry & Associcates, Inc.	0.80	0.62	3.1114	0.0892
International Business Machines Corporation	0.85	0.72	2.9047	0.0833
L3Harris Technologies	0.85	0.75	3.0407	0.0872
Landstar System	0.85	0.75	2.7334	0.0784
Lowe's Companies, Inc.	0.90	0.83	2.9305	0.0840
Maximus, Inc.	0.90	0.80	3.0668	0.0879
McKesson Corporation	0.75	0.57	2.9235	0.0838
Microsoft Corporation	0.90	0.79	2.8958	0.0830
Monster Beverage Corporation	0.75	0.56	2.8136	0.0807
NewMarket Corporation	0.75	0.61	2.9922	0.0858
O'Reilly Automotive, Inc.	0.75	0.60	2.7811	0.0798
Philip Morris International Inc.	0.80	0.68	2.7950	0.0802
Prestige Consumer	0.75	0.62	3.1446	0.0902
The Progressive Corporation	0.75	0.55	2.9424	0.0844
RLI Corporation	0.85	0.70	2.9794	0.0854
Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc.	0.90	0.80	2.9556	0.0848
UnitedHealth Group Incorporated	0.80	0.65	3.0349	0.0870
VeriSign, Inc.	0.80	0.69	2.8280	0.0811
The Wendy's Company	0.85	0.75	3.1576	0.0905
Werner Enterprises	0.80	0.68	3.0716	0.0881
Average	0.81	0.67	2.9255	0.0839
Proxy Group of Eight Natural Gas Companies	0.81	0.67	2.9434	0.0844

Source of Information:

Value Line Proprietary Database, March 2025.

Atmos Energy Corporation

Summary of Cost of Equity Models Applied to Proxy Group of Non-Price Regulated Companies Comparable in Total Risk to the <u>Proxy Group of Eight Natural Gas Companies</u>

	Proxy Group of Thirty- Four Non-Price
Principal Methods	Regulated Companies
Discounted Cash Flow Model (DCF) (1)	11.26 %
Risk Premium Model (RPM) (2)	11.64
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) (3)	11.21
Mean	11.37 %
Median	11.26 %
Average of Mean and Median	11.32 %

Notes:

- (1) From page 2 of this Exhibit.
- (2) From page 3 of this Exhibit.
- (3) From page 6 of this Exhibit.

$\frac{Atmos\ Energy\ Corporation}{DCF\ Results\ for\ the\ Proxy\ Group\ of\ Non-Price-Regulated\ Companies\ Comparable\ in\ Total\ Risk\ to\ the\ Proxy\ Group\ of\ Eight\ Natural\ Gas\ Companies}$

[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]

Proxy Group of Thirty-Four Non-Price Regulated Companies	Average Dividend Yield	Value Line Projected Five Year Growth in EPS	Zack's Five Year Projected Growth Rate in EPS	S&P Capital IQ Projected Five Year Growth in EPS	Average Projected Five Year Growth Rate in EPS (1)	Adjusted Dividend Yield	Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate (2)
Abbott Laboratories	1.81 %	6.00 %	10.30 %	9.28 %	8.53 %	1.89 %	10.42 %
Allstate Corporation	1.99	27.50	10.60	NA	19.05	2.18	21.23
Assurant, Inc.	1.61	9.50	NA	NA	9.50	1.69	11.19
AutoZone Inc.	-	7.50	11.40	10.85	9.92	-	NA
Becton, Dickinson and Company	2.07	7.50	9.30	10.33	9.04	2.16	11.20
Bristol-Myers Squibb Company	4.70	2.50	5.00	59.80	22.43	5.23	27.66 (3)
Brown-Forman Corporation 'B'	2.63	9.50	3.30	0.10	4.30	2.69	6.99
Casella Waste System	-	6.50	25.80	NA	16.15	-	NA
Cencora	0.79	6.50	12.80	12.66	10.65	0.83	11.48
Cisco Systems, Inc.	2.74	5.50	5.40	4.63	5.18	2.81	7.99
Constellation Brands, Inc.	2.21	6.50	1.70	2.43	3.54	2.25	5.79
Costco Wholesale Corporation	0.54	10.00	9.40	9.11	9.50	0.57	10.07
Gilead Sciences, Inc.	2.96	6.50	19.50	24.79	16.93	3.21	20.14
Heartland Express, Inc.	0.91	26.00	NA	NA	26.00	1.03	27.03 (3)
Jack Henry & Associcates, Inc.	1.31	5.50	10.10	10.10	8.57	1.37	9.94
International Business Machines Corporation	2.71	3.00	4.30	6.90	4.73	2.77	7.50
L3Harris Technologies	2.20	14.50	12.00	11.99	12.83	2.34	15.17
Landstar System	1.12	6.00	NA	3.00	4.50	1.15	5.65
Lowe's Companies, Inc.	2.12	6.50	8.60	5.61	6.90	2.19	9.09
Maximus, Inc.	1.72	10.50	NA	12.50	11.50	1.82	13.32
McKesson Corporation	0.41	10.00	13.50	12.41	11.97	0.43	12.40
Microsoft Corporation	0.82	12.00	14.80	12.17	12.99	0.87	13.86
Monster Beverage Corporation	-	12.00	15.20	13.77	13.66	-	NA
NewMarket Corporation	1.88	5.50	NA	NA	5.50	1.93	7.43
O'Reilly Automotive, Inc.	-	10.50	12.50	11.90	11.63	-	NA
Philip Morris International Inc.	3.32	5.00	9.30	11.38	8.56	3.46	12.02
Prestige Consumer	-	6.00	7.00	7.67	6.89	-	NA
The Progressive Corporation	0.14	16.50	10.20	13.88	13.53	0.15	13.68
RLI Corporation	0.84	13.50	NA	NA	13.50	0.90	14.40
Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc.	0.38	6.00	8.50	7.75	7.42	0.39	7.81
UnitedHealth Group Incorporated	1.89	8.00	10.90	7.13	8.68	1.97	10.65
VeriSign, Inc.	1.19	10.50	NA	NA	10.50	1.25	11.75
The Wendy's Company	4.22	11.00	6.90	7.18	8.36	4.40	12.76
Werner Enterprises	1.99	NA	NMF	NMF	NA	NA	NA
	NA = Not Availa					Mean	11.31 %
	NMF=Not Mean	ingiul Figure				Median	11.20 %
Mater					Average of Mean a	nd Median	11.26 %

Notes:

- (1) Average of columns 2 through 4 excluding negative growth rates and extreme positive values.
- (2) The application of the DCF model to the domestic, non-price regulated comparable risk companies is identical to the application of the DCF to the Utility Proxy Groups. The dividend yield is derived by using the 60 day average price and the spot indicated dividend as of 5/30/2025. The dividend yield is then adjusted by 1/2 the average projected growth rate in EPS, which is calculated by averaging the 5 year projected growth in EPS provided by Value Line, www.zacks.com, and S&P Capital IQ (excluding any negative growth rates) and then adding that growth rate to the adjusted dividend yield.
- (3) Results were excluded from the final average and median as they were more than two standard deviations from the proxy group's mean.

Source of Information:

Value Line Investment Survey. www.zacks.com, Downloaded on 05/30/2025 S&P Capital IQ

Atmos Energy Corporation Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate Through Use of a Risk Premium Model Using an Adjusted Total Market Approach

<u>Line No.</u>		Proxy Group of Thirty-Four Non- Price Regulated Companies
1.	Prospective Yield on Baa2 Rated Corporate Bonds (1)	6.10 %
2.	Adjustment to Reflect Bond rating Difference of Non-Price Regulated Companies (2)	(0.21)
3.	Adjusted Bond Yield	5.89
4.	Equity Risk Premium (3)	5.75
5.	Risk Premium Derived Common Equity Cost Rate	11.64 %
Notes:	(1) Average forecast of Baa corporate bonds based upon the economists reported in Blue Chip Financial Forecasts da	ited June 2, 2025 (see

pages 7 and 8 of Exhibit DWD-3). The estimates are detailed below.

Second Quarter 2025	6.20 %
Third Quarter 2025	6.20
Fourth Quarter 2025	6.20
First Quarter 2026	6.10
Second Quarter 2026	6.10
Third Quarter 2026	6.00
2027-2031	6.00
2032-2036	6.00
Average	6.10 %

(2) The average yield spread of Baa2 rated corporate bonds over A2 corporate bonds for the three months ending May 2025. To reflect the A3 average rating of the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group, the yield on the Baa corporate bond must be adjusted by 2/3 of the spread between A2 and Baa2 corporate bond yields as shown below:

	A2 Corp. Bond Yield	Baa2 Corp. Bond Yield	Spread	
May-25	5.97 %	6.29 %	0.32	%
Apr-25	5.85	6.18	0.33	
Mar-25	5.65	5.93	0.28	
		Average yield spread	0.31	
		2/3 of spread	0.21	

(3) From page 5 of this Exhibit.

Atmos Energy Corporation Comparison of Long-Term Issuer Ratings for the Proxy Group of Thirty-Four Non-Price Regulated Companies

Moody's Long-Term Issuer Rating May 2025 Standard & Poor's Long-Term Issuer Rating May 2025

	May	2025	May 2025				
Proxy Group of Thirty-Four Non-Price Regulated	Long-Term	Numerical	Long-Term	Numerical			
Companies	Issuer Rating	Weighting (1)	Issuer Rating	Weighting (1)			
Abbott Laboratories	Aa3	4.0	AA-	4.0			
Allstate Corporation	A3	7.0	BBB+	8.0			
Assurant, Inc.	Baa2	9.0	BBB	9.0			
AutoZone Inc.	Baa1	8.0	BBB	9.0			
Becton, Dickinson and Company	Baa2	9.0	BBB	9.0			
Bristol-Myers Squibb Company	A2	6.0	A	6.0			
Brown-Forman Corporation 'B'	A1	5.0	A-	7.0			
Casella Waste System	NA		BB	12.0			
Cencora	Baa2	9.0	BBB+	8.0			
Cisco Systems, Inc.	A1	5.0	AA-	4.0			
Constellation Brands, Inc.	Baa2	9.0	BBB	9.0			
Costco Wholesale Corporation	Aa3	4.0	AA	3.0			
Gilead Sciences, Inc.	A3	7.0	A-	7.0			
Heartland Express, Inc.	NA		NA				
Jack Henry & Associcates, Inc.	NA		NA				
International Business Machines Corporation	A3	7.0	A-	7.0			
L3Harris Technologies	Baa2	9.0	BBB	9.0			
Landstar System	NA		NA				
Lowe's Companies, Inc.	Baa1	8.0	BBB+	8.0			
Maximus, Inc.	NA		BB+	11.0			
McKesson Corporation	A3	7.0	BBB+	8.0			
Microsoft Corporation	Aaa	1.0	AAA	1.0			
Monster Beverage Corporation	NA		NA				
NewMarket Corporation	Baa2	9.0	BBB+	8.0			
O'Reilly Automotive, Inc.	Baa1	8.0	BBB	9.0			
Philip Morris International Inc.	A2	6.0	A-	7.0			
Prestige Consumer	NA		BB	12.0			
The Progressive Corporation	A2	6.0	A	6.0			
RLI Corporation	WR		BBB	9.0			
Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc.	A3	7.0	A-	7.0			
UnitedHealth Group Incorporated	A2	6.0	A+	5.0			
VeriSign, Inc.	Baa3	10.0	BBB	9.0			
The Wendy's Company	NA		B+	14.0			
Werner Enterprises	NA		NA				
Natural Gas CEM Proxy Group Average	A3	6.9	BBB+	7.8			

Notes:

(1) From page 4 of Exhibit DWD-3.

Source of Information:

Bloomberg Professional Services.

Atmos Energy Corporation

Derivation of Equity Risk Premium Based on the Total Market Approach Using the Beta for

Non-Price Regulated Companies of Comparable risk to the <u>Proxy Group of Eight Natural Gas Companies</u>

		Proxy Group of Thirty-Four Non-
		Price Regulated
Line No.	Equity Risk Premium Measure	Companies
1.	Kroll Equity Risk Premium (1)	6.10 %
2.	Regression on Kroll Risk Premium Data (2)	6.94
3.	Kroll Equity Risk Premium based on PRPM (3)	7.66
4.	Equity Risk Premium Based on Value Line Summary and Index (4)	9.15
5.	Equity Risk Premium Based on Bloomberg, Value Line, and S&P Global Market Intelligence S&P 500 Companies (5)	10.09
6.	Conclusion of Equity Risk Premium	7.99 %
7.	Adjusted Beta (6)	0.72
8.	Forecasted Equity Risk Premium	5.75 %

Notes:

- (1) From note 1 of page 6 of Exhibit DWD-3.
- (2) From note 2 of page 6 of Exhibit DWD-3.
- (3) From note 3 of page 6 of Exhibit DWD-3.
- (4) From note 4 of page 6 of Exhibit DWD-3.
- (5) From note 5 of page 6 of Exhibit DWD-3.
- (6) Average of mean and median beta from page 6 of this Exhibit.

Sources of Information:

Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation - 2023 SBBI Yearbook, Kroll. Value Line Summary and Index.
Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, June 2, 2025
Bloomberg Professional Services.

Atmos Energy Corporation Traditional CAPM and ECAPM Results for the Proxy Groups of Non-Price-Regulated Companies Comparable in Total Risk to the Proxy Group of Eight Natural Gas Companies

[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]

Proxy Group of Thirty-Four Non-Price Regulated Companies	Value Line Adjusted Beta	Bloomberg Beta	Average Beta	Market Risk Premium (1)	Risk-Free Rate	Traditional CAPM Cost Rate	ECAPM Cost Rate	Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate (3)
Abbott Laboratories	0.75	0.58	0.66	8.88 %	4.56 %	10.42 %	11.18 %	10.80 %
Allstate Corporation	0.90	0.64	0.77	8.88	4.56	11.40	11.91	11.66
Assurant, Inc.	0.95	0.75	0.85	8.88	4.56	12.11	12.44	12.28
AutoZone Inc.	0.75	0.61	0.68	8.88	4.56	10.60	11.31	10.96
Becton, Dickinson and Company	0.75	0.57	0.66	8.88	4.56	10.42	11.18	10.80
Bristol-Myers Squibb Company	0.75	0.45	0.60	8.88	4.56	9.89	10.78	10.33
Brown-Forman Corporation 'B'	0.80	0.74	0.77	8.88	4.56	11.40	11.91	11.66
Casella Waste System	0.85	0.63	0.74	8.88	4.56	11.13	11.71	11.42
Cencora	0.70	0.44	0.57	8.88	4.56	9.62	10.58	10.10
Cisco Systems, Inc.	0.85	0.88	0.86	8.88	4.56	12.20	12.51	12.36
Constellation Brands, Inc.	0.80	0.64	0.72	8.88	4.56	10.96	11.58	11.27
Costco Wholesale Corporation	0.75	0.78	0.76	8.88	4.56	11.31	11.84	11.58
Gilead Sciences, Inc.	0.75	0.57	0.66	8.88	4.56	10.42	11.18	10.80
Heartland Express, Inc.	0.85	0.96	0.90	8.88	4.56	12.56	12.78	12.67
Jack Henry & Associcates, Inc.	0.80	0.55	0.68	8.88	4.56	10.60	11.31	10.96
International Business Machines Corporation	0.85	0.75	0.80	8.88	4.56	11.67	12.11	11.89
L3Harris Technologies	0.85	0.75	0.80	8.88	4.56	11.67	12.11	11.89
Landstar System	0.85	0.93	0.89	8.88	4.56	12.47	12.71	12.59
Lowe's Companies, Inc.	1.00	0.90	0.95	8.88	4.56	13.00	13.11	13.06 (4)
Maximus, Inc.	0.80	0.61	0.70	8.88	4.56	10.78	11.45	11.11
McKesson Corporation	0.75	0.52	0.63	8.88	4.56	10.16	10.98	10.57
Microsoft Corporation	0.90	1.01	0.96	8.88	4.56	13.09	13.18	13.13 (4)
Monster Beverage Corporation	0.75	0.58	0.67	8.88	4.56	10.51	11.25	10.88
NewMarket Corporation	0.75	0.66	0.71	8.88	4.56	10.87	11.51	11.19
O'Reilly Automotive, Inc.	0.75	0.52	0.63	8.88	4.56	10.16	10.98	10.57
Philip Morris International Inc.	0.80	0.44	0.62	8.88	4.56	10.07	10.91	10.49
Prestige Consumer	0.80	0.60	0.70	8.88	4.56	10.78	11.45	11.11
The Progressive Corporation	0.75	0.57	0.66	8.88	4.56	10.42	11.18	10.80
RLI Corporation	0.85	0.51	0.68	8.88	4.56	10.60	11.31	10.96
Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc.	0.90	0.83	0.87	8.88	4.56	12.29	12.58	12.43
UnitedHealth Group Incorporated	0.80	0.23	0.51	8.88	4.56	9.09	10.18	9.63 (4)
VeriSign, Inc.	0.80	0.64	0.72	8.88	4.56	10.96	11.58	11.27
The Wendy's Company	0.85	0.53	0.69	8.88	4.56	10.69	11.38	11.03
Werner Enterprises	0.80	0.85	0.83	8.88	4.56	11.93	12.31	12.12
		Mean	0.73			11.07 %	11.66 %	11.31 %
		Median	0.71			10.82 %	11.48 %	11.11 %
	Average of M	ean and Median	0.72			10.95 %	11.57 %	11.21 %

Notes: (1) (2) (3) (4)

- From note 1 of page 2 of Exhibit DWD-4.
 From note 2 of page 2 of Exhibit DWD-4.
 Average of CAPM and ECAPM cost rates.
 Results were excluded from the final average and median as they were more than two standard deviations from the proxy group's mean.

Kroll Associates' Size Premia for the Decile Portfolios of the NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ Derivation of Investment Risk Adjustment Based upon Atmos Energy Corporation

Line No.

	[1]		[2]	[3]	[4]
	Market Capitalization on May 30, 2025 (1)	1 on May 30, 2025	Applicable Decile of the NYSE/AMEX/ NASDAO (2)	Applicable Size Premium (3)	Spread from Applicable Size Premium (4)
	(millions)	(times larger)			
Atmos Energy Corporation	\$ 352.733		6	1.73%	
Proxy Group of Eight Natural Gas Companies	\$ 4,520.340	12.8 x	ហ	0.74%	%66:0
		[A]	[B]	[C]	[a]
			Market	Market	Size Premium (Return in
		Decile	Capitalization of Smallest Company	Capitalization of Largest Company	Excess of CAPM)*
			(millions)	(millions)	
	Largest	1	\$ 47,156.530	\$ 3,522,211.140	-0.01%
		2	20,191.220	46,949.060	0.33%
		3	9,937.940	20,178.360	0.49%
		4	6,196.710	9,937.350	0.50%
		S	3,948.050	6,181.270	0.74%
		9	2,481.780	3,946.150	1.00%
		7	1,422.890	2,464.500	1.19%
		8	731.190	1,417.450	0.88%
		6	304.620	729.920	1.73%
	Smallest	10	1.110	304.480	4.47%
		*FI	*From 2025 Kroll Cost of Capital Navigator	tal Navigator	

Notes:

From page 2 of this Exhibit.
 Gleaned from Columns [B] and [C] on the bottom of this page. The appropriate decile (Column [A]) corresponds to the market capitalization of the proxy group, which is found in Column [1].

⁽³⁾ Corresponding risk premium to the decile is provided in Column [D] on the bottom of this page.
(4) Line No. 1 Column [3] – Line No. 2 Column [3]. For example, the 0.99% in Column [4], Line No. 2 is derived as follows 0.99% = 1.73% - 0.74%.

Market Capitalization of Atmos Energy Corporation and the Proxy Group of Eight Natural Gas Companies Atmos Energy Corporation

[9]	Market Capitalization on May 30, 2025 (3) (millions)		\$ 352.733 (6)		\$ 24,015.438	2,798.029	4,564.286	18,576.781	1,647.908	4,476.394	5,156.155	4,347.395	\$ 4,520.340
[5]	Market-to- Book Ratio on May 30, 2025 (2)		172.3 (5)		197.5 %	201.3	207.4	213.9	119.0	144.2	147.1	134.5	172.3 %
[4]	Closing Stock Market Price on May 30, 2025	NA			\$ 154.680	122.190	45.890	39.540	40.970	74.760	71.830	75.280	\$ 73.295
[3]	Total Common Equity at Fiscal Year End 2024 (millions)	204.721 (4)			12,157.67	1,390.200	2,200.443	8,684.200	1,385.371	3,104.548	3,504.187	3,232.700	3,168.624
	Total (at Fi				↔								∨
[2]	Book Value per Share at Fiscal Year End 2023 (1)	NA			78.306	60.710	22.124	18.484	34.443	51.849	48.817	55.978	50.333
	Bo. Sh Ye				↔								↔
[1]	Common Stock Shares Outstanding at Fiscal Year End 2024 (millions)	NA			155.259	22.899	99.461	469.822	40.222	59.877	71.783	57.750	65.830
	Exchange				NYSE	NYSE	NYSE	NYSE	NYSE	NYSE	NYSE	NYSE	
	Company	Atmos Energy Corporation	Based upon Proxy Group of Eight Natural Gas Companies	Proxy Group of Eight Natural Gas Companies	Atmos Energy Corporation	Chesapeake Utilities Corporation	New Jersey Resources Corporation	NiSource Inc.	Northwest Natural Holding Company	ONE Gas, Inc.	Southwest Gas Holdings, Inc.	Spire Inc.	Median

NA= Not Available

Notes: (1) Column 3 / Column 1.

(2) Column 4 / Column 2.

(3) Column 1 * Column 4.

(4) Requested rate base multiplied by the requested common equity ratio.

(5) The market-to-book ratio of Atmos Energy Corporation on May 30, 2025 is assumed to be equal to the market-to-book ratio of Proxy Group of Eight Natural Gas Companies on May 30, 2025 as appropriate.

(6) Column [3] multiplied by Column [5].

Source of Information: 2024 Annual Forms 10K

Bloomberg Professional

Atmos Energy Corporation Derivation of the Flotation Cost Adjustment to the Cost of Common Equity

Equity Issuances and Flotation Costs for FY 2016 - 2025

[Column 7]	Flotation Cost Percentage (4)	0.14%	0.50%	1.44%	1.68%	2.53%	1.06%	1.18%	1.23%	1.20%	1.40%	1.28%
[Column 6]	Total Flotation Costs (3)	522,451	3,751,526	11,771,616	13,278,738	15,757,941	6,735,669	2,900,000	4,900,000	1,200,000	1,400,000	65,217,941
_	Toi	€	↔	€	€	€9	€9	↔	€	₩.	€9	₩
[Column 5]	Total Net Proceeds (1)	379,477,557	746,649,868	807,908,920	778,011,289	607,000,833	625,894,599	494,100,000	395,100,000	98,800,000	98,600,000	5,031,543,067
	Tot	₩	₩	₩.	₩.	₩.	€9	₩.	↔	₩	↔	₩.
[Column 4]	Gross Equity Issue before Costs (1)	380,000,009	750,401,394	819,680,535	791,290,027	622,758,775	632,630,269	500,000,000	400,000,000	100,000,000	100,000,000	5,096,761,008
	Gros	↔	↔	↔	↔	↔	↔	↔	↔	₩	↔	₩.
[Column 3]	Net Proceeds per Share (2)	114.9617	116.6373	111.0946	98.3843	99.0072	NA	91.6555	86.6751	75.7963	72.4597	
	N pe	€9	₩.	₩.	₩.	₩.		₩.	₩.	₩.	∨	
[Column 2]	Average Offering Price per Share	115.1200	117.2233	112.7133	100.0634	101.5775	NA	92.7500	87.7500	76.7169	73.4886	
	JO	€	₩.	€9	€9	€		₩.	€9	↔	€9	
[Column 1]	Shares Issued (1)	3,300,904	6,401,469	7,272,261	7,907,883	6,130,875	6,101,916	5,390,836	4,558,404	1,303,494	1,360,756	
	Transaction (1)	At the Market Equity Offering										
	Fiscal Year	2025	2024	2023	2022	2021	2020	2019	2018	2017	2016	

Flotation Cost Adjustment

Flotation Cost Adjustment (7)	0.04 %
DCF Cost Rate Adjusted for Flotation (6)	10.75 %
Average DCF Cost Rate Unadjusted for Flotation (5)	10.71 %
Ave C C C Adjusted Una Dividend Yield Flo	3.47 %
Average Projected EPS Growth Rate	7.24 %
Average Dividend Yield	3.35 %
	Proxy Group of Eight Natural Gas Companies

Source of Information: Atmos Energy Corporation SEC Form 10-Ks, Company-Provided Data

Notes provided on page 2 of this Exhibit

Atmos Energy Corporation Notes to Accompany the Derivation of the Flotation Cost Adjustment to the Cost of Common Equity

- (1) Atmos Energy Corporation SEC Filings, Company-provided.
- (2) Column 5 ÷ Column 1.
- (3) Column 4 Column 5.
- (4) Column 6 ÷ Column 4.
- (5) Using the average growth rate from Exhibit DWD-2.
- (6) Adjustment for flotation costs based on adjusting the average DCF constant growth cost rate in accordance with the following:

$$K = \frac{D(1+0.5g)}{P(1-F)} + g,$$

where g is the growth factor and F is the percentage of flotation costs.

(7) Flotation cost adjustment of 0.04% equals the difference between the flotation adjusted average DCF cost rate of 10.75% and the unadjusted average DCF cost rate of 10.71% of the Utility Proxy Group.