

BEFORE THE STATE CORPORATION COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

In the Matter of Resolving Various Regulatory) Docket Nos. 21-CONS-3193-CPEN
Violations Associated with Haas Petroleum,) 21-CONS-3201-CPEN
LLC (Operator).) 21-CONS-3031-CPEN
) 21-CONS-3034-CPEN
)
) CONSERVATION DIVISION
) License No.: 33640

PRE-FILED TESTIMONY

OF MARK HAAS

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1 **I. BACKGROUND INFORMATION AND QUALIFICATIONS**

2 **Q: Please state your name and business address for the record.**

3 A: Mark L. Haas, P.O. Box 8396, Prairie Village, KS 66208-1936.

4 **Q: What is your relationship to Haas Petroleum, L.L.C. ("Haas Petroleum")?**

5 A: I am the sole managing member of Haas Petroleum.

6 **Q: What is the nature of Haas Petroleum's business?**

7 A: Haas Petroleum is an oil and gas operating company that is responsible for the operation, care
8 and control of oil and gas wells in Kansas.

9 **Q: Describe your experience in operating oil and gas wells?**

10 A: I am a 3rd generation oil producer. I began my oil and gas career while still in highschool
11 working for my father John L. Haas and have been active full time in the oil and gas industry
12 since that time working in every facet of the business from pumping and roustabout to drilling
13 wells. I purchased my first oil and gas lease in the late 1970's and obtained an operators license
14 from the Kansas Corporation Commission ("KCC" or "Commission"), i.e. (License No. 5935)
15 on June 30, 1985. I formed Haas Petroleum on September 24, 1998, and obtained an operators
16 license from the KCC, i.e. (License No. 33640) on July 28, 2005 for such entity.

17 **Q: How many wells does Haas Petroleum currently operate?**

18 A: Haas Petroleum currently operates approximately 1,193 oil and gas wells in Kansas.

19 **II. PREVIOUS RECORD OF COMPLIANCE WITH KCC REGULATIONS**

20 **Q: Has the Commission ever issued a penalty order against you personally?**

21 A: I do not believe so. I operated oil and gas wells on a personal basis under License No. 5935

22 from June 30, 1985 until June 30, 2005 and I do not recall ever having personally received a
23 penalty order from the Commission during my entire twenty year tenure as an operator.

24 **Q: Has the Commission ever issued a penalty order against Haas Petroleum prior to those**
25 **which are the subject of this consolidated docket?**

26 A: Since receiving its operators license from the KCC (License No. 33640) on July 28, 2005, I
27 believe Haas Petroleum has only been the subject of four very minor and isolated penalty
28 dockets. Docket 14-CONS-646-CPEN assessed a \$100 penalty for failure to timely a file pit
29 closure form. Docket 15-CONS-135-CPEN resulted in a \$1,500 penalty being paid for three
30 erroneous annual inject reports. Docket 18-CONS-3233-CPEN assessed a \$100 penalty for
31 failure to timely file a plugging report after Haas Petroleum plugged a well. Docket 20-CONS-
32 3133-CPEN assessed a \$100 penalty for failure to timely post an identification sign on a lease
33 Haas Petroleum assumed responsibility for.

34 In an ideal world an operator would not receive any penalties. However, I believe four
35 penalty orders over the course of 15 years which resulted in \$1,800 in cumulative penalties
36 demonstrates a good record of compliance with KCC rules and regulations. This is especially
37 true since Haas Petroleum has been responsible for the operation, care and control of between
38 1,500 and 2,200 wells during many of said 15 years.

39 **III. HAAS PETROLEUM, LLC'S FORMER BUSINESS PRACTICES**

40 **Q: How did Haas Petroleum grow its business so quickly?**

41 A: As a third generation oil producer, I grew up knowing the boom and bust cycles of the oil and
42 gas industry well. The oil and gas prices drive virtually everything about this industry.

43 Production costs vary to some degree during these cycles as a result of market demand and
44 availability, but they do not fluctuate nearly as wildly as the oil and gas prices themselves.
45 Thus, during times of high oil and gas prices this industry is extremely profitable for operators,
46 service providers and lease owners alike. However, when oil and gas prices fall leases that
47 were worth millions of dollars during high oil and gas prices, can become worth nothing. In
48 fact many of these leases actually operate at a loss during periods of very low oil and gas
49 prices. During these times, operators do their best to hang on and keep their head above water
50 in the hopes of retaining their leases until they once again become a valuable assets when oil
51 and gas prices rebound. When this bust cycle continues long enough many lease owners who
52 cannot afford the continuing operating loses are forced to sell, give away, or even pay buyers
53 to accept responsibility for leases that they might have paid hundreds of thousands of dollars
54 for just a few years earlier.

55 Most experienced oil and gas producers (especially those that operate their leases in-
56 house) use the bust cycles when oil and gas prices are at their lowest as an opportunity to "buy
57 low" by purchasing leases under favorable terms. The hope is that operating expenses can be
58 minimized and production improved during the remainder of the bust cycle so that the operator
59 can bring the lease to its full production potential and reap the reward during the boom cycle
60 when oil and gas prices rebound. This is exactly what Haas Petroleum did for the majority of
61 its tenure as an oil and gas operator. Specifically Haas Petroleum targeted leases during the
62 bust cycles that needed a substantial amount of work. Because Haas Petroleum conducted most
63 operations in-house it could control the operating costs and perform the necessary work in

64 order to increase lease production enough during the bust cycle to pay for most or all of the
65 leases operating costs. Then, when oil and gas prices rebounded Haas Petroleum would reap
66 the rewards of its efforts by maximizing production potential from such leases and receiving
67 substantial production revenues from the leases.

68 Since Haas Petroleum was acquiring leases to operate when most other operators were
69 only interested in selling Haas Petroleum grew rather rapidly and operated very profitably for
70 more than a decade.

71 **Q: Why are many lease owners willing to sell their leases during the bust cycles of this**
72 **industry at such a steep discount, rather than simply waiting for oil and gas prices to**
73 **rebound before selling?**

74 A: All oil and gas leases cost significant amounts of money to operate and maintain. During the
75 boom cycles it is easy to operate leases profitably, however during the bust cycles operators
76 really have to become efficient for leases to remain profitable, or even break even. Often times
77 during extended bust cycles, lease owners have depleted their cash reserves to such an extent
78 that they cannot afford to make certain repairs in order to keep their leases operating as they
79 should.

80 As an example lets assume a hypothetical lease must produce 5 bbls of oil per day just
81 to break even during a period of low oil prices and the lease is capable of making 5 bbls of oil
82 per day. While the lease is producing 5 bbls of oil per day, the owner is able to break even.
83 However, eventually wells need to be pulled, lead lines will plug or break, electrical
84 components will need to be replaced, wells will need to be repaired, etc. When these things

85 happen often times lease owners cannot afford these repairs in order to bring the lease back
86 into a break even status. At that time the lease owner must either operate the lease at a loss
87 until oil prices rebound, plug and abandon the lease, or sell/give away the lease to another
88 operator who is willing to accept responsibility for it. Because I knew these leases would
89 generate substantial profits when oil prices rebounded (i.e. a 5 bbl per day lease breaking even
90 at \$30 per bbl oil would generate \$109,500 in annual net profits at \$90 per bbl oil), Haas
91 Petroleum would assume operations for this hypothetical lease during the bust cycle and
92 perform the necessary repairs in order realize the value of the production during the boom
93 cycle.

94 **Q: How did this business strategy affect the overall type of oil and gas wells that Haas**
95 **Petroleum became responsible for?**

96 A: Because Haas Petroleum targeted leases that needed work and were not very profitable during
97 the bust cycles of the industry, Haas Petroleum became responsible for many very old wells
98 and leases that required substantial repairs, capital improvements and had significant deferred
99 maintenance. It is noteworthy that Haas Petroleum drilled a lot of new wells on these leases
100 during the boom cycles as well so Haas Petroleum is also responsible for a lot of newer wells.
101 However, due to Haas Petroleum's business strategy of acquiring older leases that were in need
102 of repairs, Haas Petroleum is responsible for a large number of older wells that were in need
103 of repairs and capital investments when Haas Petroleum accepted responsibility for them.

104 **Q: What was your overall objective in growing Haas Petroleum so rapidly?**

105 A: I have three grown children who up until the last few years worked alongside me in the oil and

106 gas industry. It was my dream and ultimate objective to have my children oversee different
107 portions of Haas Petroleum's operations and to one day turn Haas Petroleum over to my three
108 children to own and operate.

109 **Q: Could you please provide some information that would describe the size and scale of**
110 **Haas Petroleum and its operations when it reached its peak?**

111 A: In roughly 2013, Haas Petroleum was in the top ten companies in Kansas in terms of number
112 of feet drilled. At that time Haas Petroleum had between 50 and 60 full time employees and
113 was responsible for between 1,500 and 2,200 wells.

114 **IV. FACTS LEADING TO THE VIOLATIONS AT ISSUE IN THIS DOCKET**

115 **Q: Is Haas Petroleum still in the same financial situation today that it was in 2013?**


116 A: Absolutely not. In 2013 Haas Petroleum had between 50 and 60 full time employees. Today
117 Haas Petroleum has 18 full time employees, and in 2020 Haas Petroleum had only 13 full time
118 employees. In roughly 2013 Haas Petroleum was in the top ten companies in Kansas in terms
119 of number of feet drilled, whereas today Haas Petroleum has not drilled even a single well in
120 the last four or five years.

121 **Q: What caused Haas Petroleum's financial condition to change so drastically?**

122 A: It was really a perfect storm consisting of multiple events that all happened at the worst
123 possible time. The following table is helpful in understanding the fluctuation in crude oil prices
124 during the relevant time periods:

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126
127

Data 1: Kansas Crude Oil First Purchase Price (Dollars per Barrel)



128
129

**Information Reported by U.S. Energy Information Administration: Kansas Crude Oil First Purchase Price - Annually*

130

As you can see the price of oil dropped from \$91.85 per barrel in 2013 to \$43.16 in 2015 and subsequently to \$36.29 in 2020. Low oil prices are hard on all producers and operators, however we had weathered low oil prices before and Haas Petroleum was postured well to survive and even grow substantially during this bust cycle. Unfortunately, several unforeseen events transpired during this same period of time.

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First and foremost, in the middle of June 2013, my wife of 33 years filed for divorce.

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This was extremely difficult emotionally, and the financial impact of this on myself and Haas Petroleum was devastating. In pertinent part, the divorce proceeding ended with me continuing to own the oil and gas operations and making equalization payments to my now divorced wife. However, because the divorce was filed in 2013 at the peak of crude oil prices, the marital estate was valued many times higher than the total value of these oil and gas operations today.

141

As a result the amount of money that my now ex-wife was awarded for her ½ of the marital estate is nearly six times the total gross value of the actual recoverable oil reserves that Haas Petroleum operates at current oil prices. Because the price of oil fell immediately after the divorce was filed, I was not able to make the required equalization payments ordered in the divorce and my financial condition deteriorated to such an extent that I was forced to file bankruptcy on a personal basin in 2019.

146

147 In addition to my wife of 33 years filing for divorce, the financial hardships
148 experienced by myself and Haas Petroleum from 2015-2020 caused my children to become
149 disenfranchised with the boom and bust cycles of the oil and gas industry and all three of my
150 children have left Haas Petroleum as well.

151 In order for an oil and gas company to thrive in or even successfully weather a bust
152 cycle in the industry it is critical that they go into the cycle with adequate cash reserves and
153 reliable staff. Haas Petroleum was in this position in 2013, however the divorce and resulting
154 equalization payments quickly changed that and consumed all cash reserves as well as its cash
155 flow. Therefore, instead of attempting to grow its business, Haas Petroleum's focus during the
156 period from 2015 through 2020 was simply to survive and wether the storm. Haas Petroleum
157 was forced to cut about 75% of its staff, and was unable to perform needed repairs when wells
158 went down for various reasons, thus causing production volumes and correspondingly revenue
159 to drop which further compounded the problem. In addition, from 2015 to 2020 Haas
160 Petroleum completely maxed out its borrowing capacity and was forced to pledge all of its
161 assets as security for these loans in order to generate sufficient capital to stay afloat. Recently
162 Haas Petroleum has sought an increase in its available credit, however lenders are unwilling
163 to consider loaning any money to Haas Petroleum while its situation with the KCC persists.

164 In addition, during times of low oil prices lease owners often fall behind on their joint
165 interest billings by the operator. Operators typically perform critically necessary repairs and
166 "carry" these lease owners to some degree through this period of time. Haas Petroleum was not

167 in a financial condition to be able to do this for any of its lease owners during the 2015 through
168 2020 time frame.

169 As if things couldn't get any worse, in 2020 the price of oil went negative so Haas
170 Petroleum could not generate any revenue at all, and this together with the stay at home orders
171 issued as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic forced Haas Petroleum to shut many of it's wells
172 down. In addition, since the COVID-19 pandemic began it has become virtually impossible to
173 fill our staffing needs. Haas Petroleum has been unable to resume production from several
174 leases entirely because it cannot find enough pumpers to monitor and maintain them. The
175 workforce shortage is an industry wide problem, and appears to be prevalent in virtually every
176 industry. As a result service providers cannot fill their staffing needs either and lead times for
177 service work are incredibly long and the recent up-tick in oil prices has made competition for
178 these service providers fierce.

179 Through this most recent bust cycle, Haas Petroleum has not grown its business, but
180 has instead shrunk it drastically and continues to reduce its business to a size which is suitable
181 for its severely reduced workforce.

182 **Q: Has Haas Petroleum been able to perform needed repairs on its wells during recent**
183 **years?**

184 A: No it has not. Haas Petroleum has done the best it could with what it had to work with, but the
185 last several years have truly been desperate times for Haas Petroleum. Thankfully though 2021
186 is proving to be a much better year in terms of oil prices and it appears that the most recent bust
187 cycle may be coming to an end.

188 **Q: Is it Haas Petroleum's position that no penalties should be issued against it by the**
189 **Commission?**

190 A: Absolutely not. I am ashamed that the oil and gas legacy my father and grandfather worked so
191 hard to build and which I worked so hard to continue is now tarnished by these dockets. Haas
192 Petroleum was in a very bad situation and made some even worse choices. There are many
193 choices I wish Haas Petroleum would have made differently. I am simply asking for a chance
194 for Haas Petroleum to redeem itself. Haas Petroleum will need to pay a penance, and it will
195 take time and commitment to rebuild trust with Commission staff, but this opportunity is all
196 I am asking from the Commission. In essence Haas Petroleum is simply arguing against the
197 death penalty in these dockets. Haas Petroleum makes no excuses for its mistakes, but I think
198 it is important for the Commission to understand the context in which they were made.

199 **V. REMEDIAL STEPS TAKEN BY HAAS PETROLEUM TO CORRECT UNDERLYING**
200 **ISSUES LEADING TO THE VIOLATIONS AT ISSUE IN THIS DOCKET**

201 **Q: What steps has Haas Petroleum taken in order to address the underlying issues that**
202 **placed Haas Petroleum in such a desperate situation from 2015 through 2020?**

203 A: Though it is not of Haas Petroleum's doing, the increase in oil prices has helped a lot. In
204 addition, Haas Petroleum recognized during 2019-2020 that it was simply responsible for more
205 wells than its reduced workforce could adequately manage. As a result Haas Petroleum began
206 taking steps to resign as operator of certain wells, and to transfer operations of certain wells
207 to other operators. In 2019 Haas Petroleum was responsible for the care and control of 1,859
208 wells, in 2020 this number was reduced to 1,617, currently Haas Petroleum is responsible for
209 1,193 wells and an additional 63 wells will be transferred to another operator hopefully before

210 year end. Thus, Haas Petroleum has been taking steps to reduce the number of wells that it is
211 responsible for. These efforts save Haas Petroleum money and cause the workload of its
212 employees to be more manageable.

213 Second, Haas Petroleum has hired additional staff and restructured the office to better
214 focus on regulatory compliance and record keeping. I grew up in the oil business and have
215 always focused on field operations and producing oil. I personally struggle with the paperwork
216 aspect of the oil and gas industry and always have. For most of my tenure as an operator the
217 KCC has also been focused on preventing environmental issues, ensuring compliance in the
218 field, etc. and filing paperwork was only a secondary concern. However, over the last decade
219 or so this has all changed and now there is an enormous focus on filing paperwork. I am not
220 saying that this is a bad thing, I am just pointing out that the climate of the oil and gas industry
221 has changed during my tenure and that I recognize I am slower in catching up with the times
222 than I should have been. In 2013 when Haas Petroleum had between 50 and 60 employees,
223 only one of those employees was front office staff and was tasked with completing all
224 regulatory filings. Today Haas Petroleum has 18 full time employees and three of those are
225 dedicated to regulatory filings, compliance and record keeping.

226 Third, Haas Petroleum has recognized that it has not devoted the effort to building and
227 maintaining a cooperative relationship with Commission staff that it should have. Although
228 I wish we had come to this realization much earlier and under different circumstances, we
229 certainly have this message now. The situation that currently exists and Commission staff's
230 present perception of Haas Petroleum has made it difficult for us to make as much headway

231 on this front as we would like. However, I recognize that this situation is of Haas Petroleum's
232 own making and we are committed to building this relationship and trust from the ground up
233 if Haas Petroleum is allowed the opportunity to survive these dockets.

234 Finally, Haas Petroleum has taken steps to facilitate better and faster communication
235 from the field to the office in order to ensure better regulatory compliance on all issues. Haas
236 Petroleum has made a tremendous amount of headway on this front and is continuing to
237 improve. In addition, because of the manner in which many of Haas Petroleum's wells were
238 acquired, very little if any information concerning such wells was received from the prior
239 operator. Therefore, Haas Petroleum has hired a full time geologist that is currently devoted
240 entirely toward developing complete records for each of Haas Petroleum's wells and auditing
241 regulatory compliance on all wells.

242 **Q: Has Haas Petroleum plugged any of the wells it is responsible for since these dockets**
243 **began?**

244 A: Yes. Since these dockets began Haas Petroleum has plugged 48 wells at cost of \$234,900.00.
245 Plugging wells is one of the ways in which Haas Petroleum is attempting to reduce the number
246 of wells that it is responsible for. In hind sight, Haas Petroleum accepted responsibly for wells
247 it never should have agreed to operate. In addition, Haas Petroleum allowed the lease owners
248 to allocate their capital investments toward efforts to increase production rather than plugging
249 wells. These mistakes have been corrected and Haas Petroleum is now insisting that its lease
250 owners plug wells and in the future Haas Petroleum will be far more selective in the wells
251 which it agrees to become responsible for.

252 **Q: Has Haas Petroleum taken steps to work with Commission Staff to address any issues**
253 **that they may have with regard to Haas Petroleum's operations?**

254 A: We have tried, and will continue to do so but progress is slow. The Commission staff has lost
255 trust in Haas Petroleum and if allowed to survive these dockets it is Haas Petroleum's
256 responsibility to rebuild that trust.

257 As indicated earlier, prior to these consolidated dockets Haas Petroleum was the subject
258 of four penalty orders over the course of 15 years which resulted in \$1,800 in cumulative
259 penalties and I had personally never received a KCC penalty in my 20 years as an operator.
260 However, since November 2020 Haas Petroleum has received approximately 160 total notice
261 of violations from KCC staff and more seem to be coming on a continual basis. Thus far
262 district staff has denied Haas Petroleum's requests to meet, and has denied Haas Petroleum's
263 request to work together toward a compliance agreement that would satisfy KCC staff and also
264 be possible for Haas Petroleum to perform.

265 I recognize that Haas Petroleum's situation is of it's own making. However, the point
266 I wish to convey is, the only way for Haas Petroleum to actually have a chance at redemption
267 is for all issues that exist to be placed into a compliance agreement in order to stop the
268 quicksand of penalties and notice of violations that have begun. In addition, I want the
269 Commission to understand that Haas Petroleum has not responded to these issues by putting
270 its head in the sand and disregarding KCC staff. To the contrary Haas Petroleum has devoted
271 countless hours and hundreds of thousands of dollars toward complying with KCC staff's
272 demands, the issues involved in these docket represent only the items that Haas Petroleum

273 hasn't been able to remedy before the deadlines set by KCC staff.

274 Q: **Why wasn't Haas Petroleum able to address the 32 wells that are the subject of 21-**
275 **CONS-3193-CPEN; 21-CONS-3201-CPEN and 22-CONS-3031-CPEN prior to the**
276 **deadlines set by Commission staff?**

277 A: Haas Petroleum does not have the necessary equipment to perform the needed repairs/plugging
278 on the 32 wells which are the subject of these dockets and must rely upon contractors to
279 perform the necessary work. In my opinion the best companies in the area of these wells to
280 perform the required service work are Cheever Well Service, Inc., and Derek Rhodes, Leon
281 Rhodes Well Service. Haas Petroleum contracted with these two vendors to perform the
282 required work on all 32 of the subject wells, however they have not been able to complete the
283 required work due to their scheduling backlog. Haas Petroleum has been successful in getting
284 these companies to perform repair work on other wells which were the subject of KCC staff
285 notice of violation letters, they simply have not completed these wells. In fact Haas Petroleum
286 was successful in getting Cheever Well Service, Inc., to work exclusively on Haas Petroleum's
287 wells for nearly a month in the spring of 2021, however they had to leave in order to fill
288 commitments to other clients after that time.

289 We have conveyed these circumstances to Commission staff and they acknowledge
290 being aware that service companies are severely backlogged. However, some of these
291 deadlines, especially those related to failed mechanical integrity tests cannot be unilaterally
292 extended by Commission staff. Thus, it became impossible to meet the requisite deadlines in
293 order to avoid the penalties issued in these dockets.

294 In an effort to work around this problem, Haas Petroleum began negotiating with other
295 operators who do have the ability to perform the requisite work on these wells to assume
296 responsibility for such wells so that work can be completed and bring the wells into
297 compliance with KCC rules and regulations. These efforts have been more successful and to
298 date Haas Petroleum has transferred 9 of the subject wells to other operators who have the
299 ability to bring said wells into compliance with KCC rules and regulations.

300 **VI. PLANNED FUTURE REMEDIAL ACTIONS THAT WILL BE TAKEN BY HAAS**
301 **PETROLEUM TO FURTHER ENSURE THE UNDERLYING ISSUES LEADING TO**
302 **THE VIOLATIONS AT ISSUE IN THIS DOCKET WILL NOT RECUR.**

303 **Q: Has Haas Petroleum completed all of its planned actions to address the issues involved**
304 **in these dockets?**

305 **A:** Absolutely not. Several other planned actions are in the works and this list is likely to continue
306 to grow as we move into the future if Haas Petroleum is permitted to survive these dockets.

307 First, Haas Petroleum has several wells that need to be plugged. Haas Petroleum plans
308 to begin canceling injection authority for any of these wells and to allocate a monthly budget
309 for plugging these wells in a timely manner. Ideally we could get these wells placed on a well
310 plugging agreement with the Commission in order to ensure that these wells are in a status
311 satisfactory to the Commission and to allow the wells to be plugged in a time frame that is
312 possible for Haas Petroleum to accomplish.

313 Second, Haas Petroleum plans to continue to reduce the number of wells that it is
314 responsible for and to increase the size of its workforce in an effort to better match the number
315 of wells that it is responsible for, with the number of employees it has to monitor and operate

316 such wells. Negotiations have already begun for Haas Petroleum to subcontract the operation
317 of several wells which it is currently responsible for. In addition, Haas Petroleum is also
318 involved in the negotiation a fairly substantial farm-out agreement that would cause operation
319 of a large number of Haas Petroleum's wells to be transferred to another operator.

320 The above steps will reduce the overall number of wells Haas Petroleum is responsible
321 for, but just as importantly they will narrow the geographic footprint of Haas Petroleum's
322 operations. This will allow Haas Petroleum's now reduced workforce to better manage the
323 wells it is responsible for. In addition, these transfers include several wells that require a lot
324 of time to operate and manage. The overall goal being to operate fewer wells that are in such
325 locations and of such character that Haas Petroleum's employees can adequately manage the
326 company's operations without stretching its employees so thin.

327 Finally and perhaps most importantly, Haas Petroleum plans to do whatever it takes to
328 restore its working relationship with KCC staff. Although, Haas Petroleum has experienced
329 minimal success in this effort so far, I am convinced that with enough effort Haas Petroleum's
330 actions will show the KCC staff that a valuable lesson was learned and learned well by Haas
331 Petroleum through this experience.

332 **Q: Has Haas Petroleum changed the way in which it plans to evaluate wells before it accepts**
333 **responsibility for them in the future?**

334 A: Yes. Most of the wells at issue in these dockets were very old and of limited value when Haas
335 Petroleum first accepted responsibility for them. In the past Haas Petroleum focused too
336 heavily on growth and agreed to become the operator of leases that frankly it should not have
337 agreed to take on. In addition, Haas Petroleum became the operator of leases for other lease

338 owners without first ensuring that these lease owners had the ability to fulfil their financial
339 commitments to Haas Petroleum. In the future, Haas Petroleum intends to scrutinize any
340 additional wells it might accept responsibility for in light of the lessons learned through these
341 dockets.

342 **VII. FACTS LEADING TO THE 77 TEMPORARY ABANDONMENT VIOLATIONS IN**
343 **DOCKET 22 CONS 3034 CPEN**

344 **Q: At the Commission business meeting on August 3, 2021 one of the members of the**
345 **Commission indicated that he was "puzzled by" Haas Petroleum's failure to coordinate**
346 **a response to the notice of violations with the district office because the district staff is**
347 **very open to communication. Could you please speak to those comments?**

348 A: Yes I will. Ordinarily this Commissioner's assessment that district staff is very open to
349 communication is accurate. However, once an operator has earned its way onto district staff's
350 "blacklist" these statements become much less true.

351 Haas Petroleum did reach out to KCC staff regarding the notice of violations referenced
352 in this docket. Through its attorney, Haas Petroleum discussed all issues that existed with
353 Commission staff very candidly and discussed some possible avenues with KCC staff
354 regarding the resolution of all outstanding issues between Haas Petroleum and KCC district
355 staff. Haas Petroleum believed that it was waiting for KCC staff to process the information and
356 proposals, when the penalty was issued in this docket without any response or warning from
357 KCC staff. These conversations were conducted in large part via telephone, however email
358 communications documenting such conversations are attached hereto as Exhibit MH-1.

359 Once an operator is blacklisted by district staff, the historical weapon used is a

360 continual barrage of notice of violations and penalties until the operator finally succumbs to
361 the onslaught. Haas Petroleum had been warned that this was coming and once the first penalty
362 order was issued we knew we had to try to resolve all issues and find a way to bury the hatchet
363 so to speak with district staff. We thought the best way to accomplish this was through an
364 agreement covering all issues so that Haas Petroleum could prove itself through the
365 performance of whatever agreement was ultimately reached. However, district staff has been
366 unwilling to entertain any agreement terms or negotiations to resolve its issues.

367 **Q: Does Haas Petroleum feel that the penalty order issued in Docket 22 CONS 3034 CPEN**
368 **is appropriate?**

369 **A:** No. If KCC staff had simply responded to the communications from our attorney indicating
370 that Haas Petroleum needed to go ahead and comply with the notice of violation as district staff
371 was unwilling to entertain a compliance agreement, Haas Petroleum would have shifted its
372 efforts back to complying with the notice of violation within the time prescribed.

373 **VIII. RELIEF REQUESTED**

374 **Q: What exactly is Haas Petroleum requesting from the Commission?**

375 **A:** Haas Petroleum is simply seeking a way in which it can survive these dockets, pay a penance
376 and be afforded an opportunity for redemption. The cumulative penalties issued in these
377 consolidated dockets is \$151,700.00, Haas Petroleum is asking the Commission to allow Haas
378 Petroleum to prove itself and to pay a penitence which will also further the Commission's
379 statutory duties rather than impeding them. I believe Haas Petroleum is open to any possible
380 scenario which may accomplish this objective, but the three options that appear most straight
381 forward are as follows:

382 **Option 1:** Order Haas Petroleum spend \$144,000.00 over the course of the
383 next year to plug or reinstate production from wells that are on Haas
384 Petroleum's well inventory. This would force Haas Petroleum to incur
385 substantial out of pocket expenses equal to the penalties assessed, but would
386 allow Haas Petroleum to incur these expenses over time, and would also reduce
387 the number of wells that Haas Petroleum is ultimately responsible for. In
388 addition the Commission should direct Commission staff to negotiate in good
389 faith with Haas Petroleum to reach an agreement that would both fulfill the
390 Commission's statutory duties and create an achievable time line for Haas
391 Petroleum to address the wells at issue in these dockets and any further issues
392 that Commission staff has identified through its lease inspections.

393 **Option 2:** Order Haas Petroleum to pay penalties in the amount of
394 \$32,000.00 (i.e. the penalty prescribed by K.A.R. 82-3-407(g) for each of the
395 32 mechanical integrity test violations) now and hold the remainder of the
396 penalties in abeyance for one year to ensure Haas Petroleum follows through
397 with its commitment to ongoing compliance with KCC rules and regulations.
398 Haas Petroleum would be required to pay the remaining \$112,000.00 only if it
399 is found to have violated a KCC rule or regulation by overt action taken within
400 the one year period following the Commission's order entered in this docket.
401 Such order should further direct Commission staff to negotiate in good faith
402 with Haas Petroleum to reach an agreement that would both fulfill the
403 Commission's statutory duties and create an achievable time line for Haas
404 Petroleum to address the wells at issue in these dockets and any further issues
405 that Commission staff has identified through its lease inspections.

406 **Option 3:** Reduce the penalties assessed in this docket to \$64,000.00 and
407 order Haas Petroleum to pay such penalty in twelve equal monthly installments
408 beginning on the month following the issuance of the order in this consolidated
409 docket, and direct Commission staff to negotiate in good faith with Haas
410 Petroleum to reach an agreement that would both fulfill the Commission's
411 statutory duties and create an achievable time line for Haas Petroleum to
412 address the wells at issue in these dockets and any further issues that
413 Commission staff has identified through its lease inspections. This penalty
414 amount is exactly double the penalty amount prescribed by K.A.R. 82-3-407(g),
415 thus providing substantial punishment to Haas Petroleum as a result of the
416 nature of the violations described in these consolidated dockets.

417 **Q: Do you believe it is in the Commission's best interest to affirm the penalties originally**
418 **ordered in these consolidated dockets?**

419 **A: No I do not. Though it may initially seem appealing to put a blacklisted operator out of**

420 business, this would cause more wells to be needlessly added to the state well plugging list.
421 When an operator is forced out of business it affords other operators the opportunity to cherry
422 pick through the now abandoned wells. All wells that are considered assets are eventually
423 assumed by other operators, but the wells that are determined to have no value end up on the
424 state's well plugging list. This does not aid Haas Petroleum, the Commission or the state of
425 Kansas. Similarly, assessing very large penalties simply removes resources from the industry
426 that could otherwise be used to prevent waste, protect fresh and usable water and protect
427 correlative rights, and places those moneys into the state general fund. By relying on penalties
428 alone the Commission is missing the opportunity to achieve two objectives at once. Why not
429 exact its pound of flesh while at the same time fulfilling rather than contravening the
430 Commission's statutory duties? This is the thought process behind Option 1 above. Staff will
431 likely respond that this option requires Haas Petroleum to do something it is already obligated
432 to. However, being obligated to do something and being able to do it are two very different
433 things. The issue boils down to two simple questions, 1) is an operator "punished" by being
434 forced to spend an exceptionally large amount of money to plug wells on an expedited basis,
435 and 2) does the Commission and State receive an additional benefit by getting wells plugged
436 on an expedited basis? The answer to both of these questions is obviously a resounding yes,
437 the fact that it would also benefit Haas Petroleum doesn't detract at all from the benefits this
438 option affords the Commission.

439 **Q: Is an agreement between Haas Petroleum and the Commission an integral part of all**
440 **three Options above?**

441 **A:** Yes it is. As indicated earlier this situation can only be resolved by an agreement which

442 addresses all issues that are outstanding. In order to truly resolve the situation we need to be
443 proactive and address any other issues that Commission staff has identified through its
444 inspection of all of Haas Petroleum's wells and also provide an achievable time line for Haas
445 Petroleum to address such issues as well as the issues involved in these dockets.

446 **Q: Does this complete your testimony to the Commission?**

447 A: Yes.

VERIFICATION OF MARK HAAS


STATE OF MISSOURI)
) ss:
COUNTY OF JACKSON)

Mark Haas, being duly sworn, upon his oath states that he has read the document title "Pre-filed Testimony of Mark Haas" to which this Verification is attached, that he is aware of its contents, and declares that the statements contained in said document are true and correct.




Mark Haas

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on this 10th day of December, 2021.



NOTARY PUBLIC

My Commission expires: 11/18/24



CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a copy of the above and foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid, this 10th day of December, 2021, addressed to:

Kelcey Marsh, k.marsh@kcc.ks.gov
John Almond, j.almond@kcc.ks.gov
Tristan Kimbrell, t.kimbrell@kcc.ks.gov
Jonathan R. Myers, j.myers@kcc.ks.gov
Rene Stucky, r.stucky@kcc.ks.gov
Troy Russell, t.russell@kcc.ks.gov

/s/ Keith A. Brock
Keith A. Brock

Keith Brock

From: Kelcey Marsh <k.marsh@kcc.ks.gov>
Sent: Thursday, July 15, 2021 10:52 AM
To: Keith Brock
Subject: RE: 21 CONS 168 CPEN

Good Morning Keith,

I appreciate you bringing this to my attention. I believe that my May 28, 2021, email states that I would visit with my client regarding potential violations recommended by Staff to see how my client wanted to handle those potential violations and if they were amendable to them being included in any agreement. After the additional penalty recommendations came in from District Staff, my client decided to pursue the assessment of those additional penalties.

Sincerely,

Kelcey Marsh
Litigation Counsel



Conservation Division
Kansas Corporation Commission
266 N. Main, Suite 220 | Wichita, KS | 67202-1513
Phone (316) 337-6200 | Fax (316) 337-6211 | <http://kcc.ks.gov/>

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From: Keith Brock <KBrock@andersonbyrd.com>
Sent: Wednesday, July 14, 2021 10:31 AM
To: Kelcey Marsh <k.marsh@kcc.ks.gov>
Subject: RE: 21 CONS 168 CPEN

This is an EXTERNAL EMAIL. Think before clicking a link or opening attachments.

Kelcey,

I just wanted to forward the email string below where we were discussing including additional wells in the compliance agreement. I don't feel that assessment of additional penalties is in the spirit of these discussions.

Keith Brock
Anderson & Byrd, LLP
216 S. Hickory, P.O. Box 17
Ottawa, KS 66067
Phone: (785) 242-1234
Fax : (785) 242-1279

From: Kelcey Marsh [<mailto:k.marsh@kcc.ks.gov>]
Sent: Friday, May 28, 2021 2:48 PM
To: Keith Brock
Subject: RE: 21 CONS 168 CPEN

Keith,

To answer your first question, I believe Haas can fill out a Notice Of Injection Commencement or Termination (Form U-5) and mail it in to our office. Here is a link to the form on our website: [u5.pdf \(ks.gov\)](#).

As far as the second question goes, I don't believe that there have been any penalty recommendations sent to us yet for and violations of K.A.R. 82-3-111. I will visit with my clients and see how they want to handle those potential violations, and if they are amendable to them also being included in an agreement.

Sincerely,

Kelcey Marsh
Litigation Counsel



Conservation Division
Kansas Corporation Commission
266 N. Main, Suite 220 | Wichita, KS | 67202-1513
Phone (316) 337-6200 | Fax (316) 337-6211 | <http://kcc.ks.gov/>

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From: Keith Brock <KBrock@andersonbyrd.com>
Sent: Friday, May 28, 2021 2:32 PM
To: Kelcey Marsh <k.marsh@kcc.ks.gov>
Subject: RE: 21 CONS 168 CPEN

This is an EXTERNAL EMAIL. Think before clicking a link or opening attachments.

Kelcey,

I just wanted to touch base with you on this matter. I am having my client go through their entire well inventory to identify: 1) injection wells for which they can cancel their injection authority, and 2) wells that are currently shut in that need to be TA'd and subentry returned to service or plugged.

With that I am hoping I can put some meat on our discussion regarding the terms of the compliance agreement. Essentially my fear is that if we do not address all wells, this operator will find itself in a situation of being non-compliant again six months from now due to the number of wells they have and their inability to find employees to fill their open positions.

There are a few pressing issues though that need to be addressed in order to avoid another penalty and I am not certain what forms to tell them to file. They have MIT's due on 5/30/21 for the following wells, which my client would like to have the injection authority canceled, as they plan to plug these wells.

Riser B 1H-2inj
Bob Edwards #8
Burke A7
Harder #3

To avoid confusion I would note that my client has other wells which have MIT's due on 5/30/21 as well and those wells either have been or will be tested on time, it is only the above referenced 4 wells that we are needing to cancel injection authority on right now. Could you please let me know how to go about canceling the injection authority on these wells so that they do not require MIT's? It is my intention to have these four wells included in the plugging portion of the compliance agreement you and I are working on.

Also, my clients have received several other notices re: TA applications from district Staff. My client is working on those, but I would like to have deadlines for my client to get all inactive wells TA'd in their compliance agreement. Thus is there a way we can ensure that additional penalties are not assessed while you and I are working through this?

Keith Brock

Anderson & Byrd, LLP
216 S. Hickory, P.O. Box 17
Ottawa, KS 66067
Phone: (785) 242-1234
Fax : (785) 242-1279

From: Kelcey Marsh [<mailto:k.marsh@kcc.ks.gov>]
Sent: Wednesday, April 28, 2021 1:46 PM
To: Keith Brock
Subject: RE: 21 CONS 168 CPEN

Certainly. My calendar is pretty well open throughout the afternoon, so feel free to give me a call when you are available. My direct line is 316-337-6219.

Sincerely,

Kelcey Marsh
Litigation Counsel



Conservation Division
Kansas Corporation Commission
266 N. Main, Suite 220 | Wichita, KS | 67202-1513
Phone (316) 337-6200 | Fax (316) 337-6211 | <http://kcc.ks.gov/>

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From: Keith Brock <KBrock@andersonbyrd.com>
Sent: Wednesday, April 28, 2021 12:14 PM
To: Kelcey Marsh <k.marsh@kcc.ks.gov>
Subject: 21 CONS 168 CPEN

This is an EXTERNAL EMAIL. Think before clicking a link or opening attachments.

Kelcey,

Do you have some time for a quick phone call this afternoon regarding the above referenced docket?

Keith Brock

Anderson & Byrd, LLP
216 S. Hickory, P.O. Box 17
Ottawa, KS 66067
Phone: (785) 242-1234
Fax : (785) 242-1279