

**BEFORE THE STATE CORPORATION COMMISSION  
OF THE STATE OF KANSAS**

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**DIRECT TESTIMONY OF**

**JOHN T. BRIDSON**

**ON BEHALF OF EVERGY KANSAS  
CENTRAL, INC. AND EVERGY KANSAS SOUTH, INC.**

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**IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF  
EVERGY KANSAS CENTRAL, INC. AND  
EVERGY KANSAS SOUTH, INC. FOR APPROVAL TO MAKE  
CERTAIN CHANGES IN THEIR CHARGES FOR ELECTRIC SERVICE  
PURSUANT TO K.S.A. 66-117.**

**Docket No. 25-EKCE-294-RTS**

**January 31, 2025**

**\*\*PUBLIC\*\***

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**I. INTRODUCTION**

**Q. Please state your name and business address.**

A. My name is John T. Bridson. My business address is 818 South Kansas Avenue, Topeka, Kansas 66612.

**Q. By whom and in what capacity are you employed?**

A. I am employed by Evergy Kansas Central, Inc. and serve as Vice President, Generation for Evergy Metro, Inc. d/b/a Evergy Kansas Metro (“EKM”), Evergy Kansas Central, Inc. and Evergy South, Inc., collectively d/b/a as Evergy Kansas Central, Evergy Metro, Inc. d/b/a as Evergy Missouri Metro (“EMM”), Evergy Missouri West, Inc. d/b/a Evergy Missouri West (“EMW”), the operating utilities of Evergy, Inc.

**Q. On whose behalf are you testifying?**

A. I am testifying on behalf of Evergy Kansas Central (“EKC” or “Company”).

**Q. Please describe your educational background and business experience.**

A. I received a B.S. in mechanical engineering from Kansas State University in 1992. I began my career with Westar Energy in January 1993 as a plant engineer at the Jeffrey Energy Center. I held several engineering and management positions at Jeffrey Energy Center before being promoted to Executive Director, Gas Plants in 2001, where I managed all of Westar’s gas fired generating plants. In 2007, I became Executive Director of the Lawrence Energy Center. I became Executive Director, Generation in May 2010, leading the management of all of Westar’s generation fleet before being promoted to Vice President, Generation in February 2011. I assumed the role of Senior Vice President, Generation and Marketing in

1 early 2015, adding the power marketing responsibilities. I became the Vice  
2 President of Generation after the merger between Westar Energy and Great Plains  
3 Energy that formed Evergy, Inc.

4 **Q. What are your responsibilities as vice president, generation?**

5 A. I am responsible for the generating plants that are owned and operated by Evergy  
6 Kansas Central (“EKC”), Evergy Metro, and Evergy Missouri West, the Evergy,  
7 Inc. operating utilities. This includes coal, gas, oil, solar and wind generation  
8 facilities. I am also responsible for two plants operated by others, which are the  
9 State Line and Dogwood combined cycle plants. State Line is co-owned with  
10 Liberty Utilities, and it is the operator. Dogwood has several owners including City  
11 of Independence, MO, Kansas Municipal Electric Association (“KMEA”), Kansas  
12 Power Pool (“KPP”), Missouri Public Utility Alliance (“MPUA”) and the Unified  
13 Government of Wyandotte County. I also serve as a board member of the Wolf  
14 Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation, overseeing the 94% interest in Wolf Creek  
15 Generating Station co-owned by EKC and Evergy Metro. I also oversee our  
16 employees who handle our participation in the Southwest Power Pool (SPP)  
17 Integrated Market, including market operations and fuel procurement, as well as  
18 wholesale contracts with other parties. Recently I have also taken on the leadership  
19 of the utility companies’ Operations Support group which covers safety, skills  
20 training, fleet services, facilities and operations analytics.

21 **Q. What is the purpose of your testimony?**

22 A. My testimony addresses EKC’s proposal to modify some of the terms for the  
23 regulation and recovery of the Western Plains Wind Farm that were adopted by the

1 Commission in Docket No. 18-WSEE-328-RTS (“18-328 Docket”).<sup>1</sup> This would  
2 include removal of the performance band applied to the asset.

3 **II. EKC’S PROPOSAL TO MODIFY THE REGULATORY TERMS FOR**  
4 **WESTERN PLAINS WIND FARM**

5  
6 **Q: What is EKC requesting from the Commission as regards the terms for**  
7 **recovery and regulation of the Western Plains Wind Farm (“Western**  
8 **Plains”)?**

9 **A:** Specifically, EKC is requesting the Commission modify the terms for Western  
10 Plains to align its regulation with the terms in place for the Persimmon Creek Wind  
11 Farm approved in EKC’s 2023 rate case in Docket No. 23-EKCE-775-RTS (“23-  
12 775 Docket”). The specific modifications requested are:

- 13 • Remove the performance band applicable to Western Plains
- 14 • Remove the transfer of the residual value of the wind farm at the end of the  
15 20-years to EKC. This would permit the wind farm asset to remain in rate  
16 base and continue operating for the benefit of EKC retail customers  
17 consistent with traditional regulatory assets.
- 18 • After twenty years, allow the levelized revenue requirement to be  
19 reevaluated to consider any maintenance capital expenditures, costs  
20 associated with life extension for the plant, or other additional costs incurred  
21 to operate and maintain the resource.

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<sup>1</sup> “In the Matter of the Joint Application of Westar Energy, Inc. and Kansas Gas and Electric Company for Approval to Make Certain Changes in their Charges for Electric Services.”

1 **Q: Will you please discuss the background of the Western Plains Wind Farm?**

2 A: Western Plains is an approximately 281 MW wind farm located in Ford County,  
3 Kansas. EKC first invested in the Western Plains through a predecessor company,  
4 Westar Energy (“Westar”), beginning in 2015. It was attractive as a lower cost  
5 wind energy asset, and also as a desirable renewable energy project to add to the  
6 generation portfolio. The wind farm went into service in February of 2017. EKC,  
7 as successor to Westar, acquired Western Plains at the time of the Great Plains-  
8 Westar merger and has owned and operated the asset since.

9 **Q: What was the origin of the performance band for Western Plains?**

10 A: The performance band on Western Plains is the result of a settlement agreement in  
11 Westar’s rate case in the 18-328 Docket (“18-328 S&A”). Staff supported the  
12 inclusion of Western Plains in Westar’s rates and supported use of the proposed  
13 levelized revenue requirement. A condition of that support, however, was the  
14 establishment of a performance mechanism. Staff essentially argued that because it  
15 was an “owned asset,” some form of performance mechanism or tracker should be  
16 used to incentivize Westar to ensure the wind farm was competitive with the  
17 alternative of a Purchased Power Agreement (“PPA”). PPA’s are ordinarily  
18 structured such that customers only pay for the wind energy they receive and wind  
19 energy that was available but not taken as a result of economic conditions. The PPA  
20 price is typically based on expected P50 performance.

21 **Q: What is P50 performance?**

22 A: P50 performance refers to the 50<sup>th</sup> percentile of a probability distribution. This  
23 means there is a 50% chance that the actual performance will be better than the P50



1 value and a 50% chance it will be worse. It's often used in forecasting and  
2 budgeting to represent a median or typical outcome. It is a common factor to  
3 evaluate the expected energy from a wind farm and is used to determine an expected  
4 energy rate (\$/mWhr).

5 **Q: Was the performance band supported by other intervenors as well?**

6 A: Yes, it was supported by some of the other parties to the docket, including the  
7 Kansas Industrial Consumers Group ("KIC") and the Citizens' Utility Ratepayer  
8 Board ("CURB").

9 **Q: Did Westar oppose imposition of the performance band in the 2018 docket?**

10 A: Yes. Westar understood that Staff was proposing to include the performance band  
11 to insulate customers from any performance risk associated with the wind farm.  
12 However, Westar believed that the performance band mechanism proposed was not  
13 an appropriate tool for this purpose. Westar's position then was that the  
14 performance band mechanism, incentivizing only production as opposed to long  
15 term availability, focuses its incentives on the wrong behaviors and metrics.  
16 Consequently, it can unfairly punish EKC for market forces that are out of its  
17 control. It also ignores the benefits to customers of the wind farm that balance  
18 against any performance risk.

19 However, Westar was confident that it would operate the wind farm  
20 effectively and efficiently and that it would produce as expected, so Westar agreed  
21 to the imposition of the performance band to allow the parties to reach settlement  
22 in the case. There were other terms of the agreement, including a provision allowing  
23 Westar to realize any residual value of the wind farm at the end of 20-years. This

1 includes any wholesale margins the wind farm may produce, and any asset or land sales  
2 related to the acquisition.<sup>2</sup>

3 **Q: Was the performance band ultimately implemented by the Commission?**

4 A: Yes, it was approved as one component of a comprehensive non-unanimous  
5 settlement agreement of all issues in the rate case.

6 **Q: What were the terms of the performance band?**

7 A: Pursuant to the approved settlement, in the event that Western Plains had a  
8 capacity factor of greater than 48.57%, producing more than 1,193,878 MWhs in  
9 any calendar year based on a rolling three-year average beginning with the three-  
10 year average period ending December 2020, the Company would be allowed to  
11 include a charge in the ACA filing to the benefit of the Company that equates to  
12 the difference between the actual production and the 1,193,878 MWhs, multiplied  
13 by \$20.70/MWh. In the event Western Plains had a capacity factor of less than  
14 44.57%, producing less than 1,095,556 MWhs in any calendar year based on a  
15 rolling three-year average beginning in 2020 and using the three-year average for  
16 2018-2020, there would be a credit in the ACA filing to return to ratepayers any  
17 shortfall in MWhs from 1,095,556 MWhs, multiplied by \$20.70/MWh. Western  
18 Plains has operated within the bounds of the performance band during every  
19 reporting period since it went into service.

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<sup>2</sup> 18-328 S&A, p. 7, ¶24. The 20 years ends on February 23, 2037.

1 **Q: Can you explain what “capacity factor” means?**

2 A: Yes. In general, it is the amount of power generated from a wind generation source  
3 compared to its maximum potential output for a given time period (typically on an  
4 annual basis) and is calculated by dividing the power output by the maximum power  
5 capability. It essentially measures how a particular generation asset is operated  
6 compared to its full capability.

7 **Q: Did the 18-328 S&A allow for modifications to be made in the future to the**  
8 **Western Plains settlement terms?**

9 A: Yes. The settlement included the following provision:

10 In the event of changes in law or regulations, or the occurrence of events  
11 outside the control of Westar that result in a material adverse impact to  
12 Westar with respect to recovery of the Western Plains revenue requirement,  
13 Westar, as applicable, may file an application with the Commission  
14 proposing methods to address the impact of the events, including adjusting  
15 the credit due to customers through the ACA described above. The other  
16 Parties to this settlement shall have the right to contest any such application,  
17 including whether the impact of the change or event is material to Westar,  
18 and whether the proposed remedy in the application is reasonable.<sup>3</sup>

19  
20 It is under this provision that EKC is requesting modification in this docket.  
21 In 2022, the federal government extended the Production Tax Credit (“PTC”) for  
22 wind farms upon which construction began before December 31, 2024, and other  
23 governmental subsidies and pro-wind policies were implemented. This was part of  
24 the federal government Inflation Reduction Act (“IRA”). These events were outside  
25 the control of EKC and in 2018 were considered unlikely to occur. If the  
26 modifications to the 18-328 S&A as set out above are not adopted, these events will

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<sup>3</sup> 18-328 Non-Unanimous Settlement Agreement filed July 17, 2018 (“18-328 S&A”), pp. 6-7, ¶23.



1 result in a material adverse impact to EKC with respect to recovery of the Western  
2 Plains revenue requirement when the 10-year PTC for Western Plains expires.

3 **Q: What are PTCs?**

4 A: PTCs are federal tax credits available for renewable energy projects, including  
5 wind farms. PTCs for renewable energy projects were initially introduced by  
6 legislation passed by Congress in 1992. At a basic level, PTCs provide tax credits  
7 to owners of generation resources in a set amount per unit of energy generated or  
8 produced. PTCs for wind farm projects have been scheduled to lapse at a number  
9 of points of time in recent decades. Western Plains will still be able to take  
10 advantage of its PTCs until approximately the end of February 2027, at which  
11 time its PTCs will expire. However, the IRA of 2022 further extended PTCs for  
12 new wind farm projects such that newly constructed wind farms may continue to  
13 be able to take advantage of PTCs beyond 2034, as long as construction was  
14 started before the end of 2024. Some wind farms in the region will likely reap  
15 PTCs beyond the end of 2034, dependent upon when they began producing  
16 energy.

17 **Q: Are PTCs advantageous to wind farm operators?**

18 A: Yes. Simply stated, they reduce the overall cost of production per unit of wind  
19 energy, reducing costs per unit to the customer in the market. Generation assets like  
20 Western Plains generally operate when selected to operate by the applicable  
21 regional transmission organization energy market -- in this case, the SPP energy  
22 market. In simple terms, SPP selects generation resources based on lowest  
23 production cost. PTCs artificially lower the cost of production, so a wind farm that

1 still has available PTCs can produce at a lower cost than one that does not. This  
2 gives it a competitive advantage in the bidding process, created only through a  
3 subsidy and not actual performance.

4 Therefore, energy produced from a wind farm with PTCs can be marketed  
5 at a lower price than energy produced at a wind farm without PTCs. Continued  
6 extension of PTCs puts existing wind farms at a disadvantage once the PTCs  
7 assigned to them expire, as the newer wind farms can take advantage of the PTCs  
8 and drive the market lower. This development will reduce production on wind  
9 farms that no longer are eligible for the PTCs. Had PTCs not been extended, the  
10 market would normalize and no wind farm would have a PTC advantage over  
11 another over time.

12 **Q: At the time of implementation of the performance band for Western Plains in**  
13 **2018, was the extension of PTCs for wind farms considered likely to happen?**

14 A: Although some extension of PTCs for wind farms may have been a possibility, the  
15 substantial policy support for wind farms exhibited by the extension of PTCs up to  
16 2034 was not expected, and the circumstances that precipitated the passage of the  
17 Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 were certainly not expected and were certainly  
18 outside of EKC's control.

19 **Q: Does the increased number of wind farms also factor into whether the Western**  
20 **Plains will be selected by SPP for production on a particular day or during a**  
21 **particular month?**

22 A: Yes. Wind farms that are located closer in proximity to the demand are likely to  
23 have less delivery constraints than those located further away, so they can deliver



1 energy at a lower overall cost. Therefore, with additional wind generation assets in  
2 the marketplace, there is greater likelihood that SPP will be able to select generation  
3 with less impact on constraints than Western Plains to satisfy portions of the overall  
4 load and at a more economic price. As more and more wind farms are added to the  
5 grid, Western Plains must compete with wind farms that may be more proximately  
6 located to the load they are serving or otherwise enjoy fewer constraints.

7 All of these factors support the conclusion that the more wind assets  
8 constructed and integrated into the SPP system, the less likely an asset like Western  
9 Plains will be selected for production on any particular day or during a particular  
10 month. EKC had no control over the PTC extension or the national political  
11 environment, and no control over other renewable generating resources that are  
12 constructed in the region.

13 **Q: In light of these events, how will continuation of the performance band**  
14 **materially impact EKC's ability to recover its Western Plains revenue**  
15 **requirement?**

16 A: As Western Plains PTCs begin to expire in 2027, it will have to compete against  
17 newer wind farms with PTC's extending as far out as 2034 or beyond. Western  
18 Plains, even when available, will also have a disadvantage in competing with the  
19 proliferation of wind farms in the region spurred by other pro-green energy  
20 governmental subsidies and policies. This places Western Plains at a substantial  
21 disadvantage as it becomes less likely it will be selected by the SPP market for  
22 operation on a regular basis, even while Western Plains would be available to  
23 produce and is still providing the same economic backstop as contemplated by the

1 original structure of the band-with provision. EKC will continue to operate Western  
2 Plains efficiently after its PTCs expire; however, continued application of the  
3 performance band will unavoidably punish EKC for curtailment of production  
4 caused by economic factors outside of EKC's control, while Western Plains  
5 provides the economic cap.

6 **Q: You mentioned above that EKC's track record of productively operating the**  
7 **wind farm supports removal of the performance band. Can you explain?**

8 A: As stated above, EKC has consistently operated the wind farm productively and  
9 well within the parameters of the performance band since 2018. The wind farm is  
10 a productive and highly performing asset, as evidenced by actual performance data  
11 and measurements since it was placed into service. The actual performance data  
12 demonstrates that EKC is dedicated to proper maintenance and upkeep of the wind  
13 farm such that it can be available for regular operation at a productive level.  
14 Historical performance is better evidence of expected future performance than a  
15 P50 model, which was used to establish the upper and lower capacity factor limits  
16 for the performance band.


17 **Q: Can you describe the historical performance data EKC has gathered for**  
18 **Western Plains since 2017, and what those data demonstrate about future**  
19 **performance of the wind farm?**

20 A: As displayed below in **Table 1**, the wind farm has been within the performance  
21 band metrics every month since operations began in 2017.



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**Table 1**



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The above graph shows the three-year rolling average rated net capacity factor for the wind farm and delineates the upper and lower parameters of the performance band for the preceding 28 months after a three-year rolling average could be established. In each instance, EKC has operated the wind farm productively and well within the metrics of the performance band.

**Q: What is EKC’s understanding of the original purposes of the performance band?**

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**A:** EKC understood the performance band was intended to incentivize desirable behavior—productive and economically efficient operation of Western Plains - and disincentivize undesirable conduct - such as failing to utilize the wind farm to produce affordable energy to be used by EKC’s customers. In the future, however,

1 because of the events described above, the incentives created by the performance  
2 band will both incentivize production of energy from a more expensive source and  
3 conversely punish the reasonable decision to curtail production when production is  
4 not economical.

5 **Q: Does the performance band fail to consider other value Western Plains brings**  
6 **to EKC's customers?**

7 A: It does. Some value must be given to the availability of an asset like Western Plains,  
8 as opposed to just focusing on productivity. EKC is able to control availability by  
9 properly maintaining the wind farm facility and keeping it available as a source for  
10 production when economically warranted. Conversely, a mechanism that solely  
11 focuses on productivity unduly encompasses economic factors that are out of  
12 EKC's control, and decisions that are made not by EKC, but instead are made by  
13 other participants in the marketplace, primarily the SPP.

14 **Q: You state that Western Plains provides substantial benefits to EKC customers**  
15 **even when it is not regularly operated. Can you elaborate?**

16 A: Yes. There are additional benefits that EKC's ownership of Western Plains offers  
17 to its customers other than the production of power. For instance, EKC's investment  
18 in Western Plains helped return some balance to its renewable portfolio. Prior to  
19 investing in Western Plains, EKC owned only 12% of its total wind resources,  
20 leaving 88% of existing wind generation purchased through PPAs. Generation  
21 diversity adds to reliability and stability for customers.

22 Further, the addition of an owned wind resource like the Western Plains  
23 reduces long-term risk, which benefits customers by avoiding over reliance on the

1 PPA market. EKC's decision to invest in the Western Plains was a prudent decision  
2 at the time it was made, and it continues to be a prudent decision today.

3 **Q: How does ownership of the wind farm reduce long-term risk by avoiding**  
4 **overreliance on the PPA market?**

5 A: Without utility ownership, premium sites for renewable resources would be  
6 controlled by out of state companies, potentially benefiting other states and  
7 depriving retail customers in Kansas of prime locally generated clean energy in the  
8 future. It is not uncommon for developers to offer projects to out-of-state utilities.

9 Without utility ownership, retail customers would be at risk for the price of  
10 replacement power when a PPA for a wind farm expires. If out-of-state entities  
11 control the best sites, the cost to replace an expiring PPA may not be the cost of  
12 continuing to operate or repowering the site with a modest return; but rather the  
13 price of the local utilities' next best option at the time, which could be a similar  
14 resource at a less attractive development site and higher cost. Additional utility  
15 ownership of renewables helps mitigate the risk of increased cost of replacement  
16 power as existing PPAs expire.

17 EKC believes a renewable asset like the Western Plains Wind Farm can last  
18 longer (e.g. through superior maintenance practices as seen with our coal assets, or  
19 through site repowering) than the 20-year term of a PPA contract. Customers then  
20 receive the residual benefit of the renewable asset's after its initial life as opposed  
21 to that benefit going to the developer. This includes the existing infrastructure,  
22 transmission interconnection, land rights, as well as the potential additional energy  
23 generated from the initial assets. Utility ownership can also provide the opportunity



1 to optimize for EKC’s customers in making decisions around repowering, adding  
2 storage, and any other augmentations which may be possible, without relying on a  
3 developer.

4 **Q: Do you believe the Western Plains Wind Farm will continue to be productive**  
5 **after the twenty-year term of the 18-328 S&A?**

6 A: Yes, because EKC intends to continue to productively and prudently operate the  
7 wind farm similar to the manner it has done since its inception.

8 **Q: But doesn’t the 18-328 S&A give EKC’s shareholders the residual rights and**  
9 **value of Western Plains at the end of 20 years?**

10 A: Presently, it does. The 18-328 S&A states, “The Parties agree that Westar is free to  
11 realize any residual value of the wind farm at the end of 20-years, which is February  
12 23, 2037. This includes any wholesale margins the wind farm may produce, and any  
13 asset or land sales related to the acquisition.<sup>4</sup>” This was a benefit granted to the  
14 Company, as explained by Staff witness, Mr. Grady:

15 Because the fixed price PPA approach described above insulates  
16 ratepayers from the risks typically associated with wind farm ownership,  
17 these risks are shifted to shareholders. Accordingly, paragraph 24 of the  
18 Settlement includes a provision which allows Westar shareholders to  
19 capitalize on any residual value of the wind farm after its expected life of  
20 20 years. This is reasonable and balanced between ratepayers and  
21 shareholders, as is required in order for rates to be just and reasonable.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> 18-328 S&A, p. 7, ¶24.

<sup>5</sup> Testimony of Justin Grady in Support of Non-Unanimous S&A, 18-328 Docket, p. 21.



1 Q: Are you proposing that this term of the 18-328 S&A be modified?

2 A: Yes, this term of the S&A is tied to the production band. Removal of the latter  
3 should be accompanied by removal of the former.

4 Q: Will EKC's customers be harmed if the performance band is removed?

5 A: No. There will still be available wind energy generated and available at a  
6 suppressed price because there will still be wind farm assets with available PTCs  
7 that can continue to bid generated energy into the market at a very low price to the  
8 customer. Therefore, customers will still be able to access energy produced from  
9 renewable wind resources at affordable prices in the marketplace. At the same time,  
10 Western Plains will continue to be available as a generation resource and will  
11 generate when market conditions warrant. From the customers' perspective,  
12 therefore, removing the performance band will not cause harm.

13 Q: If Western Plains had been achieved through a PPA instead of ownership,  
14 would customers have been responsible for paying for economic curtailment  
15 the same as they would without the performance band?

16 A: Yes. At the time Western Plains was developed, PPAs contained a standard term  
17 requiring payment for economic curtailments. If the developer had power available  
18 to sell into the SPP market but the economics at the time did not result in SPP  
19 choosing that power, the developer would still be allowed to charge the purchaser  
20 under the PPA for it. The following is an example from a PPA executed by the  
21 Company in 2015: (THE FOLLOWING IS CONFIDENTIAL)

22 \*\* [REDACTED]  
23 [REDACTED]  
24 [REDACTED]  
25 [REDACTED]

1 [REDACTED]  
2 [REDACTED]  
3 [REDACTED]  
4 [REDACTED]  
5 [REDACTED]  
6 [REDACTED]  
7 [REDACTED]  
8 [REDACTED]  
9 [REDACTED]  
10 [REDACTED]  
11 [REDACTED]  
12 [REDACTED]  
13 [REDACTED]  
14 [REDACTED]  
15 [REDACTED]  
16 [REDACTED]  
17 [REDACTED]  
18 [REDACTED]\*\*

20           Therefore, removing the performance band keeps customers on par with  
21 where they would have been under a PPA if economic conditions cause EKC to fall  
22 below the lower boundary of the performance band in the future. In contrast,  
23 leaving the performance band in place penalizes EKC in a way that would not have  
24 occurred under a PPA.

25 **Q:    Would removing the performance band for Western Plains be consistent with**  
26 **how the Commission has treated other utility-owned wind assets recently?**

27 A:    Yes. In EKC’s 2023 rate case, the Commission approved the recovery of the  
28 Persimmon Creek Wind Farm without applying a performance band. At the time,  
29 Persimmon Creek had been operating for a few years and had a proven track record  
30 of performance. That was not the case for Western Plains in 2018, but it is now.  
31 We now have an actual history for Western Plains showing that its performance  
32 over the past six years is as it was envisioned during the 2018 case. EKC has never  
33 experienced a reporting period where reporting criteria were below the performance

1 band levels. EKC has now shown it can and has operated the Western Plains Wind  
2 Farm as a productive asset, and as such the performance band is unnecessary and  
3 should be removed.

4 **Q: Would the granting of EKC's overall request in this docket allow Western**  
5 **Plains to align its regulation with the terms in place for Persimmon Creek?**

6 A: Yes. The specific modifications requested are:

- 7 • Remove the performance band applicable to Western Plains
- 8 • Remove the transfer of the residual value of the wind farm at the end of the  
9 20-years to EKC. This would permit the wind farm asset to remain in rate  
10 base and continue operating for the benefit of EKC retail customers  
11 consistent with traditional regulatory assets.
- 12 • After twenty years, allow the levelized revenue requirement to be  
13 reevaluated to consider any maintenance capital expenditures, costs  
14 associated with life extension for the plant, or other additional costs incurred  
15 to operate and maintain the resource

16 **Q: Does this conclude your testimony?**


17 A: Yes, it does.




STATE OF KANSAS                    )  
  ) ss:  
COUNTY OF SHAWNEE            )

**VERIFICATION**

John Bridson, being duly sworn upon his oath deposes and states that he is the Vice President, Generation, for Evergy, Inc., that he has read and is familiar with the foregoing Testimony, and attests that the statements contained therein are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information and belief.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
John Bridson

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 31<sup>st</sup> day of January 2025.



  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Notary Public

My Appointment Expires:

3/23/2028