Before the State Corporation Commission of the State of Kansas

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF EVERGY KANSAS CENTRAL, INC. AND EVERGY KANSAS SOUTH, INC. FOR APPROVAL TO MAKE CERTAIN CHANGES IN THEIR CHARGES FOR ELECTRIC SERVICE PURSUANT TO K.S.A. 66-117.

EVERGY KANSAS CENTRAL, INC. AND EVERGY KANSAS SOUTH, INC.

Docket No. 25-EKCE-294-RTS

Testimony and Exhibits of

J. Randall Woolridge, Ph. D.
For the Citizens' Utility Ratepayer Board

June 6, 2025

EVERGY KANSAS CENTRAL, INC.
AND EVERGY KANSAS SOUTH, INC.

Docket No. 25-EKCE-294-RTS

Direct Testimony of
J. Randall Woolridge, Ph.D.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EVERGY KANSAS CENTRAL, INC.
AND EVERGY KANSAS SOUTH, INC.

Docket No. 25-EKCE-294-RTS

Direct Testimony of
J. Randall Woolridge, Ph.D.

LIST OF EXHIBITS

EVERGY KANSAS CENTRAL, INC.
AND EVERGY KANSAS SOUTH, INC.

Docket No. 25-EKCE-294-RTS

Direct Testimony of
J. Randall Woolridge, Ph.D.

LIST OF TABLES

EVERGY KANSAS CENTRAL, INC.
AND EVERGY KANSAS SOUTH, INC.

Docket No. 25-EKCE-294-RTS

Direct Testimony of
J. Randall Woolridge, Ph.D.

LIST OF FIGURES

I. INTRODUCTION

Q. PLEASE STATE YOUR FULL NAME, ADDRESS, AND OCCUPATION.

A. My name is J. Randall Woolridge, and my business address is 120 Haymaker Circle, State College, PA 16801. I am a Professor of Finance and the Goldman, Sachs & Co. and Frank P. Smeal Endowed University Fellow in Business Administration at the University Park Campus of the Pennsylvania State University. I am also the Director of the Smeal College Trading Room and President of the Nittany Lion Fund, LLC. I provide a summary of my educational background, research, and related business experience in Exhibit JRW-2.

Q. ON WHOSE BEHALF ARE YOU TESTIFYING?

A. I have been asked by the Citizens' Utility Ratepayer Board ("CURB") to provide an opinion as to the overall fair rate of return or cost of capital for the Kansas jurisdictional electric utility operations of Evergy Kansas Central, Inc. and Evergy Kansas South, Inc. (the "Companies" and/or "EKC"), wholly-owned subsidiaries of Evergy, Inc. ("EVRG").[1]

Q. HOW IS YOUR TESTIMONY ORGANIZED?

A. The following outlines my testimony:

- First, I summarize my cost of capital recommendation for the Companies and review CURB's primary areas of contention on the Companies' position.
- Second, I provide an assessment of capital costs in today's capital markets.
- Third, I discuss the selection of proxy groups for estimating the cost of equity capital for the Companies.

[1] In my testimony, I use the terms "rate of return" and "cost of capital" interchangeably. This is because the required rate of return of investors on a utility company's capital is the cost of capital.

- Fourth, I discuss the Companies' recommended capital structure and debt cost rates.
- Fifth, I provide an overview of the concept of the cost of equity capital and then estimate the equity cost rate for the Companies.
- Finally, I critique the Companies' rate of return analysis and testimony.

II. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Overview

Q. WHAT COMPRISES A PUBLIC UTILITY'S "RATE OF RETURN"?

A. A public utility's overall rate of return has three main components:

(1) capital structure (*i.e.*, ratios of short-term debt, long-term debt, preferred stock and common equity);

(2) cost rates for short-term debt, long-term debt, and preferred stock; and

(3) common equity cost, otherwise known as return on equity ("ROE").

Q. WHAT IS A PUBLIC UTILITY'S ROE INTENDED TO REFLECT?

A. ROE is described most simply as the allowed rate of profit for a regulated company. In a competitive market, a variety of factors determine a company's profit level, including the state of the economy, the degree of competition a company faces, the ease of entry into its markets, the existence of substitute or complementary products/services, the company's cost structure, the impact of technological changes, and the supply and demand for its services and/or products. For a regulated monopoly, the regulator determines the level of profit available to the public utility. The United States Supreme Court established the

guiding principles for determining an appropriate level of profitability for regulated public utilities in two cases: (1) *Hope* and (2) *Bluefield*.[2] In those cases, the Court recognized that the fair rate of return on equity should be:

(1) comparable to returns investors expect to earn on other investments of similar risk;

(2) sufficient to assure confidence in the Companies' financial integrity; and

(3) adequate to maintain and support the Companies' credit and to attract capital.

Accordingly, finding the appropriate ROE for a regulated utility requires determining the market-based cost of capital. The market-based cost of capital for a regulated firm represents the return investors could expect from other investments, while assuming no more and no less risk. The purpose of the economic models and formulas in cost of capital testimony, such as my testimony's Discounted Cash Flow ("DCF") Model and the Capital Asset Pricing Model ("CAPM"), is to use market data of firms with similar risk to estimate the rate of return on equity investors require for this specific risk-class of firms (*i.e.*, regulated utilities), in order to set an appropriate ROE for a regulated firm.

B. Summary of Positions

Q. PLEASE REVIEW YOUR PROPOSED RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING THE APPROPRIATE RATE OF RETURN FOR THE COMPANIES.

A. I provide the Companies' proposed capital structure and debt and equity cost rates in Table

[2] *Fed. Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co*., 320 U.S. 591 (1944) (hereinafter "*Hope*"); *Bluefield Water Works and Improvement Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of W. Va.*, 262 U.S. 679 (1923) (hereinafter "*Bluefield*").

1. The Companies' witness, Mr. Ley, has proposed a capital structure consisting of 48.03% long-term debt and 51.97% equity for EKC. Mr. Ley has proposed a long-term debt cost rate of 4.641% for EKC. Ms. Ann Bulkley proposes a ROE of 10.50% for the Companies. Based on these components, Mr. Ley has proposed an overall rate of return or cost of capital of 7.69% for EKC.

Table 1
Companies' Rate of Return Recommendations
EKC's Rate of Return Recommendation

Capital Source	Capitalization Ratio	Cost Rate	Weighted Cost Rate
Long-Term Debt	**48.03%**	**4.641%**	**2.23%**
Common Equity	**51.97%**	**10.50%**	**5.46%**
Total	**100.00%**		**7.69%**

I provide my proposed cost of capital for the Companies in Table 2. I have evaluated the Companies' proposed capital structure as well as the capital structures of EKC and EVRG. The Companies' proposed capital structure includes a higher common equity ratio and less financial risk than the averages of the two proxy groups. EVRG has $2.7 billion in debt at the holding company level. If I allocate 50% of this debt to EKC, the resulting revised capital structure includes a common equity ratio of 45.93%. While this figure is still higher than the average of the proxy groups, in the interest of conservatism I will employ a capital structure with a common equity ratio of 50.0%. I am using a blended (EKC and EVRG) cost of long-term debt of 4.65%. I have applied the DCF Model and the CAPM to a proxy group of publicly-held electric utility companies ("Electric Proxy Group") and the group developed by Ms. Bulkley ("Bulkley Proxy Group"). These results indicate that the appropriate equity cost rate for companies in the Electric and Bulkley

Proxy Groups is in the 8.85% to 9.80% range. Given that: (1) I rely primarily on the DCF model and the results for the Electric Proxy Group; (2) I have recommended a capital structure with a higher common equity ratio and lower financial risk than the two proxy groups; (3) the Companies' investment risk is slightly below the average of the proxy groups; and (4) the recent market volatility and increase in interest rates, I am using a ROE of 9.50% for the Companies. Given my proposed capital structure and capital cost rates for the Companies, I am recommending an overall fair rate of return or cost of capital of 7.07% for EKC. These are summarized in Table 2 and Exhibit JRW-1.

Table 2
CURB's Rate of Return Recommendations

	Capitalization Ratios	Cost Rate	Weighted Cost Rate
Long-Term Debt	**50.00%**	**4.650%**	**2.32%**
Common Equity	**50.00%**	**9.500%**	**4.75%**
Total Capital	**100.00%**		**7.07%**

C. Primary Rate of Return Issues in this Case

Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE PRIMARY RATE OF RETURN ISSUES IN THIS CASE.

A. The primary rate of return issues in this case are the appropriate capital structure and ROE for the Companies.

1. **The Companies' Assessment of Capital Market Conditions**: Ms. Bulkley's analyses, ROE results, and recommendations are based on assumptions of higher interest rates and capital costs. However, despite the increase in inflation and interest rates over the past two years and the financial market volatility associated

with the new administration's focus on tariffs, several factors suggest the equity cost rate for utilities has not risen significantly. To support this contention, I show that: (1) despite the higher inflation of the past two years, long-term inflation expectations are in the 2.25%–2.50% range; (2) the yield curve is once again positively sloped (which is normal) but is relatively flat suggesting that investors require similar returns for short-term and longer-term Treasuries; (3) I show that authorized ROEs have not increased or decreased as much as interest rates in recent years, and so the increases in interest rates in the last two years does not mean that authorized ROEs need to increase as much; and (4) during 2025, as President Trump has introduced new economic policies including tariffs, there has been a significant increase in inflationary fears and financial market volatility, and the stock market has declined. However, utility stocks have proved to be a safe haven for investors, for while the S&P 500 has recovered from its Trump trade down and are about even for the year, utility stocks are up to 5%.

2. **The Companies' Investment Risk is Slightly Below the Average of the Two Proxy Groups**: The S&P and Moody's credit ratings of BBB+ and Baa1 for EKC are slightly better than the averages of the proxy groups. These issuer credit ratings indicate that the Companies' investment risk is slightly below the average of the two proxy groups, who have average S&P and Moody's issuer credit ratings of BBB+ and Baa2.

3. **The Companies' Proposed Capital Structure Includes an Inflated Common Equity Ratio and Lower Financial Risk than the Two Proxy Groups**: I have

evaluated the Companies' proposed capital structure as well as the capital structures of EKC and EVRG. The Companies' proposed capital structure includes a higher common equity ratio and less financial risk than the averages of the two proxy groups. EVRG has $2.7 billion in debt at the holding company level. EKC owns about 50% of the assets of EVRG. If 50% of EVRG's debt is allocated to the capitalization of EKC, its common equity ratio would be 45.93%. However, in the interest of conservatism, I am recommending a capital structure with a common equity ratio of 50.0%. I am using a blended cost of debt of 4.65%.

4. **DCF Equity Cost Rate**: Ms. Bulkley and I both employ the traditional constant-growth DCF model. However, Ms. Bulkley overstates reported DCF results by exclusively using the overly optimistic and upwardly biased earnings per share ("EPS") growth rate forecasts of Wall Street analysts and *Value Line*. By contrast, to develop the DCF growth rate for my analysis, I reviewed 13 growth rate measures, including historical and projected growth rate measures, and have evaluated growth in dividends, book value, and EPS.

5. **CAPM Equity Cost Rate**: The CAPM approach requires an estimate of the risk-free interest rate, the beta, and the market or equity risk premium. Two problems arise from Ms. Bulkley's CAPM analysis: (1) employing the Empirical CAPM ("ECAPM") version of the CAPM results in inappropriate adjustments to the risk-free rate and the market risk premium; and (2) more significantly, computing a market risk premium of 7.54%. This 7.54% market risk premium is larger than: (1) historic stock and bond return data indicate; and (2) published studies and

surveys of the market risk premium find. In addition, I demonstrate that Ms. Bulkley bases the 7.54% market risk premium on unrealistic assumptions of future economic and earnings growth and stock returns. To compute that market risk premium, Ms. Bulkley applied the DCF model to the S&P 500 and employed an average projected EPS growth rate of 10.51% to compute an expected market return of 12.05% and market risk premium of 7.54%. First, I have conducted a study that shows Ms. Bulkley's expected stock market return of 12.05% is almost double the average annual stock return of 6.80% that investment firms tell investors to expect over the next ten years. In addition, as I demonstrate later in my testimony, the EPS growth-rate projection (10.51%) used for the S&P 500 and the resulting expected market return (12.05%) and market risk premium (7.54%) both include unrealistic assumptions regarding future economic and earnings growth and stock returns.

As I highlight in my testimony, it is common to use three approaches in estimating a market risk premium – historic returns, surveys, and expected return models. I use a market risk premium of 5.25%, which: (1) factors in all three approaches to estimate a market premium; and (2) employs the results of many studies of the market risk premium. As I noted, the 5.25% figure reflects the market risk premiums: (1) that have been determined by leading finance scholars in recent academic studies; (2) that are employed by leading investment banks and management consulting firms; and (3) that are contained in surveys of companies, financial forecasters, financial analysts, and corporate Chief Financial Officers ("CFOs").

6. **Alternative Risk Premium Model**: Ms. Bulkley also estimates an equity cost rate using an alternative risk premium model, calling it the Bond Yield Risk Premium approach. Ms. Bulkley computes this risk premium using a regression of the historical relationship between the yields on long-term Treasury bonds and authorized ROEs for electric utility companies. Ms. Bulkley computes the estimated ROE as the projected risk-free rate plus the risk premium. I discuss several issues with this approach in more depth later, but the primary problems with this approach are: (1) this particular risk premium approach is a gauge of *regulator* behavior rather than *investor* behavior; (2) this methodology produces an inflated measure of the risk premium because this approach uses historical authorized ROEs and Treasury yields, and the resulting risk premium is applied to projected Treasury yields; (3) the risk premium in this approach is inflated as a measure of investors' required risk premium, since electric utility companies have been selling at market-to-book ratios in excess of 1.0; and (4) the ROE is dependent on the authorized ROEs from state utility commissions, and the Werner and Jarvis study (2022), which is discussed below, demonstrated that authorized ROEs over the past four decades have not declined in line with capital costs and, therefore, past authorized ROEs have overstated the actual cost of equity capital.

7. **Regulatory and Business Risks**: Ms. Bulkley also considers several elements of the Companies' regulatory and business risks in arriving at her 10.50% ROE recommendation. These include the Companies' capital expenditures, elements of the Companies' regulatory risk in Kansas, nuclear generation ownership, and

wildfire risk. However, these factors are risk considerations utilized in the credit rating process. As noted above, the Companies' S&P and Moody's issuer credit ratings are a little above the average S&P and Moody's issuer credit ratings for the proxy groups, which are BBB+ and Baa2. Therefore, despite these factors, the Companies' investment risk is still a little below the average of the proxy groups.

III. CAPITAL MARKET CONDITIONS AND AUTHORIZED ROEs

A. Capital Market Conditions

Q. PLEASE REVIEW TRENDS IN UTILITY CAPITAL COSTS INDICATORS.

A. Page 1 of Exhibit JRW-2 shows the yields on A-rated public utility bonds. These yields gradually declined in the past 15 years from 7.5% to the 3.0% range. These yields bottomed out in the 3.0% range in 2020 and 2021 due to the economic fallout from the Covid-19 pandemic. These yields have increased with interest rates in general over the 2022-25 time period and now are in the 6.00% range.

Page 2 of Exhibit JRW-2 shows the average dividend yield for electric utilities. Over the past decade these yields have primarily been in the 3.0%-3.5% range. These declined over the past 13 years, bottoming out at 3.1% in 2019. They increased to almost 4.0% in 2023 but declined to 3.6% in 2024.

Page 3 of Exhibit JRW-2 shows the average earned ROE and market-to-book ratio for publicly held electric utilities. The average earned ROE has been in the 9.0% to 10.0% range over the past five years and the average market-to-book ratio has ranged between

1.5X and 2.0X. The persistence of the market-to-book ratios being above 1.0 clearly indicates that the earned ROEs for electric utilities (9.0%-10.0%) are above the equity return that investors require.

Q. PLEASE REVIEW RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ECONOMY AND CAPITAL MARKETS.

A. Figure 1, below, shows 30-year Treasury yields over the past 15 years (2010– 2025). In 2020, with the advent of the COVID-19 pandemic, 30-year Treasury yields declined to record low levels, dropping about 100 basis points to settle in the 1.25% range. They began their recovery in the summer of 2020 and increased significantly in 2022 and 2023 with the massive government spending, improving economy, and higher inflation. These yields peaked at about 5.00% in 2023, declined to the 4.0% range in 2024, and then increased again to over 5.0% after the election. In 2025, these yields have declined and now are in the 5.0% range.

Figure 1
30-Year Treasury Yields



Data source: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DGS30

Q. DID UTILITIES TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE LOWER BOND YIELDS TO RAISE CAPITAL?

A. Yes. Figure 2 shows the annual amounts of debt and equity capital raised by public utility companies over the past 13 years. Electric utility and gas distribution companies have taken advantage of the low interest rate and capital cost environment of recent years and raised record amounts of capital in the markets. In fact, in four out of the past five years, public utilities have annually raised more than $100 billion in combined debt and equity capital.

Figure 2
Debt and Equity Capital Raised by Public Utilities
2010–2023



Data Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence, S&P Cap IQ, 2024.

Q. PLEASE DISCUSS THE INCREASE IN INTEREST RATES OVER THE PAST THREE YEARS.

A. Several factors led to higher interest rates during 2022–2025. Coming out of the pandemic, real GDP growth increased 5.9% in 2021, 2.1% in 2022, 2.9% in 2023, and 2.8% in 2024, compared to a decline of -3.4% in 2020. During 2022–2024, the improving economy and business activity; supply chain shortages associated with COVID shutdowns; higher levels of business and consumer spending; and record increases in housing prices put pressure on

inflation and interest rates. As shown in Figure 3, reported year-over-year inflation has been as high as 9.20% in 2022, and has declined to the 2.5%–3.0% range since that time. Year-over-year inflation was reported to be 2.3% as of April 2025.

Figure 3
Year-Over-Year Inflation Rates
2020–2025



Source: https://www.statista.com/statistics/273418/unadjusted-monthly-inflation-rate-in-the-us/

In response to the higher inflation, the Federal Reserve ("Fed") in 2022 increased the discount rate by 25 basis points in March, 50 basis points in May, and 75 basis points in June, July, September, and November, 50 basis points in December, and 25 basis points in February, March, May, and July of 2023. The Fed held the discount rate firm at 5.50% until September 18, 2024, when it cut the rate by 50 basis points. Subsequently, the Fed cut the discount rate by 25 basis points at its November and December 2024 meetings. Investor sentiment strongly favored additional rate cuts leading into the January 2025 Fed meeting. However, the Fed did not bow to market pressure and put additional rate cuts on hold as the economy has remained strong.

Investors' inflation expectations can be seen by looking at the difference between yields on ordinary Treasuries and the yields on inflation-protected Treasuries, known as

TIPS. Figure 4 shows the expected inflation rate over the last five, ten, and thirty years. One can see the big increase in 2022, although it has fallen since mid-2022 and shows an expected inflation rate in the range of 2.25%–2.50%.

Figure 4
5-Year, 10-Year, and 30-Year Breakeven Inflation Rates



Date source: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/.

Q. PLEASE DISCUSS INTEREST RATES COMING INTO 2025.

A. As discussed above, the recovery of the economy pushed up inflation and interest rates during 2022–2024, but long-term inflationary expectations remained in the 2.25%–2.50% range. In 2024, the yield curve flattened as the Federal Reserve, which increased the discount rate eleven times in 2022–2023, began the process of normalizing interest rates by cutting the discount rate three times in 2024. After the election and coming into 2025, investors were looking for the Federal Reserve to cut rates again.

Q. PLEASE DISCUSS THE MARKETS AND THE INCREASE IN VOLATILITY SINCE PRESIDENT TRUMP TOOK OFFICE ON JANUARY 20TH.

A. Two of President Trump's priorities include significant cuts in government spending and the imposition of tariffs to offset trade deficits. These two initiatives have produced increases in inflationary fears and financial market volatility (with Wall Street's "Fear Gauge," VIX peaking at over 50.0) and about a 10% decline in the stock market. However,

several factors suggest these actions have run their course at this time: (1) the government spending cuts and the President's tariff negotiations appear to be moving along with less market impact. The stock market has recovered from its initial losses; (2) the President and Treasury Secretary have stated that they expect that the discount rate will be cut in 2025 and interest rates will decline; (3) the Administration's actions have increased the probability of a recession in 2025, which could result in lower interest rates; and (4) utility stocks have proven to be safe havens for investors during this period of economic uncertainty. Figure 5 shows the year-to-date performance of the S&P Utilities Index and the S&P 500. Year-to-date, the S&P Utilities Index has produced a 7% return, while the S&P 500 has recovered from its YTD losses and is about even for the year. Hence, investors do not see utilities being significantly impacted by the Administration's imposition of government spending cuts and tariffs.

Figure 5
The S&P Utilities Index vs. the S&P 500
2025



Data Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence, S&P Cap IQ, 2025.

B. Authorized ROEs

Q. PLEASE DISCUSS THE TREND IN AUTHORIZED ROES FOR GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANIES.

A Figure 6 shows the authorized ROEs for electric utility and gas distribution companies from 2000-2024. The authorized ROEs have trended downward with interest rates and capital costs in the past 15 years. The average annual authorized ROEs for electric and gas distribution companies have been below 10.0% for over a decade (2011). In 2020 and 2021, authorized ROEs for utilities hit an all-time low. Table 3 provides the average annual authorized ROEs for electric utility and gas distribution from 2010 to 2025.[3] In 2024 and 2025, the average annual authorized ROEs for electric and gas companies have been in the 9.70% range.

Figure 6
Authorized ROEs for Electric Utilities and Gas Distribution Companies
2000-2025



Data Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence, RRA *Regulatory Focus*, 2025.

[3] The data and numbers discussed in this section come from S&P Global Market Intelligence, RRA *Regulatory Focus*, 2025.

Table 3
Average Annual Authorized ROEs for Electric Utilities
and Gas Distribution Companies
2010–2025

	Electric	Gas		Electric	Gas
2010	10.37	10.15	2018	9.65	9.59
2011	10.29	9.92	2019	9.66	9.72
2012	10.17	9.94	2020	9.44	9.47
2013	10.03	9.68	2021	9.38	9.56
2014	9.91	9.78	2022	9.54	9.53
2015	9.78	9.6	2023	9.60	9.64
2016	9.77	9.54	2024	9.70	9.72
2017	9.74	9.72	Q1-2025	9.72	9.73

Data Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence, RRA Regulatory Focus, 2025.

Q. DID THE HIGHER INTEREST RATES IN 2022, 2023, AND 2024 MEAN THAT AUTHORIZED ROES INCREASED IN LINE WITH INTEREST RATES?

A. No. As noted above, authorized ROEs for utilities reached record low levels in 2020 and 2021 due to the record low interest rates and capital costs. However, authorized utility ROEs never declined to the same extent that interest rates declined in these two years. This implies that while utilities benefited from the low-cost environment, the benefit was not proportionally passed on to ratepayers.

In Panel A of Table 4 below, I have averaged the 2018/2019 (pre-COVID period) figures and the 2020/2021 (COVID period) figures for the Treasury yields and authorized ROEs, then compared the pre-COVID and COVID period ROEs and yields to those in 2022, 2023, and 2024 (post-COVID period). A key observation from Panel A of Table 4 is that authorized ROEs for electric utility companies, despite hitting record lows in 2020–2021, did not decline nearly as much as interest rates. The daily 30-year Treasury yield averaged 2.85% in 2018 and 2019, versus 1.81% in 2020 and 2021, a decrease of 104 basis points. However, the authorized ROE for electric utility companies averaged 9.63% in

2018 and 2019, respectively, and declined to an average of 9.41% in 2020 and 2021, respectively, a decline of only 22 basis points.

Table 4
Average Annual 30-Year Treasury Yields and Authorized ROEs for Electric Utility Companies

Panel A
2018–2021

	2018 Average	2019 Average	2018-19 Average	2020 Average	2021 Average	2020-21 Average	2020-21 Avg. Minus 2018-19 Avg.
30-Year Treasury Yield	3.11%	2.58%	2.85%	1.56%	2.06%	1.81%	-1.04%
Average Electric ROE	9.60%	9.66%	9.63%	9.44%	9.38%	9.41%	-0.22%

Panel B
2022–2024

	2022 Average	2022 Avg. Minus 2021 Avg.	2023 Average	2023 Avg. Minus 2022 Avg.	2024 Average	2024 Avg. Minus 2023 Avg.	2022-2024 Average	2022-24 Avg. Minus 2020-21 Avg.
30-Year Treasury Yield	3.11%	1.05%	4.03%	0.92%	4.41%	0.38%	3.85%	2.04%
Average Electric ROE	9.54%	0.16%	9.60%	0.06%	9.72%	0.12%	9.62%	0.21%

Data Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence, RRA Regulatory Focus, 2025.

Panel B of Table 4 provides the authorized ROE and Treasury yield data for the post-COVID years 2022, 2023, and 2024. In 2022, the average daily 30-year Treasury yield increased by 105 basis points to 3.11%, while authorized ROEs for electric utility companies increased to 9.54%, an increase of only 16 basis points. Likewise, the average daily 30-year Treasury yield increased by 92 basis points to 4.03% in 2023, while authorized ROEs for electric utility companies increased by 6 basis points to 9.60%. In 2024, the average daily 30-year Treasury yield increased by 38 basis points to 4.41%, while authorized ROEs for electric utility companies increased 12 basis points to 9.72%.

In sum, the far-right column of Panel B of Table 4 shows the average authorized ROEs and 30-year Treasury yields for the COVID period (2020–2021) and the post-COVID years (2022–2024). The figures show that whereas the average 30-year Treasury

yield has increased by 2.04% or 204 basis points in the post-COVID years (2022–2024), the authorized ROEs for electric utility companies only increased by 21 basis points. Hence, the bottom line is that since authorized ROEs never declined as much as interest rates during the COVID years, they are now not increasing at the same pace as interest rates during the post-COVID years.

Q. PLEASE DISCUSS THE TREND IN AUTHORIZED ROES FOR ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANIES IN KANSAS?

A. Table 5 shows the electric utilities and gas distribution companies in Kansas from 2010–2025. These authorized ROEs ranged between 9.10%–9.30% for the five years prior to the pandemic. Since that time, rate cases in Kansas were settlements with no specified ROE or capital structure. In the Company's last rate case in Docket No.23-EKCE-775-RTS, with an Order date of November 21, 2023, the Company entered a settlement with no specified return on equity or capital structure or common equity ratio.

Table 5
Kansas Electric and Gas Rate Cases
2010–2025

Company	TKR	Docket	Service	Type	Date	Decision	Rate Increase	ROE	CE Ratio
Evergy Kansas Central Inc.	EVRG	-09-WSEE-925-RTS (WI	Electric	Vertically Integrated	1/27/2010	Settled	8.6	10.40	50.13
Evergy Kansas South	EVRG	09-WSEE-925-RTS (KG	Electric	Vertically Integrated	1/27/2010	Settled	8.6	10.40	50.13
Evergy Metro Inc	EVRG	D-10-KCPE-415-RTS	Electric	Vertically Integrated	11/22/2010	Fully Litigated	21.8	10.00	49.66
Evergy Metro Inc	EVRG	D-12-KCPE-764-RTS	Electric	Vertically Integrated	12/13/2012	Fully Litigated	33.2	9.50	51.82
Evergy Kansas Central Inc.	EVRG	D-13-WSEE-629-RTS	Electric	Vertically Integrated	11/21/2013	Settled	30.7	10.00	52.63
Atmos Energy Corp.	ATO	D-14-ATMG-320-RTS	Gas	Distribution	9/4/2014	Settled	4.3	9.10	53.00
Evergy Metro Inc	EVRG	D-15-KCPE-116-RTS	Electric	Vertically Integrated	9/10/2015	Fully Litigated	40.1	9.30	50.48
Evergy Kansas Central Inc.	EVRG	D-18-WSEE-328-RTS	Electric	Vertically Integrated	9/27/2018	Settled	(50.3)	9.30	51.24
Evergy Metro Inc	EVRG	D-18-KCPE-480-RTS	Electric	Vertically Integrated	12/13/2018	Settled	(3.9)	9.30	49.09
Atmos Energy Corp.	ATO	D-19-ATMG-525-RTS	Gas	Distribution	2/24/2020	Fully Litigated	3.1	9.10	56.32
Black Hills Kansas Gas	BKH	D-21-BHCG-418-RTS	Natural Ga	Distribution	12/30/2021	Settled	6.6	NA	NA
Empire District Electric	AQN	D-21-EPDE-444-RTS	Electric	Vertically Integrated	5/26/2022	Settled	(0.6)	NA	NA
Atmos Energy Corp.	ATO	D-23-ATMG-359-RTS	Natural Ga	Distribution	5/9/2023	Settled	5.7	NA	NA
Evergy Kansas Central	EVRG	-EKCE-775-RTS (EKC/I	Electric	Vertically Integrated	11/21/2023	Settled	148.8	NA	NA
Evergy Metro Inc	EVRG	-23-EKCE-775-RTS (EM	Electric	Vertically Integrated	11/21/2023	Settled	(22.0)	NA	NA
Atmos Energy Corp.	ATO	D-23-ATMG-359-RTS	Natural G	Distribution	5/9/2023	Settled	5.7	NA	NA
Evergy Kansas Central Inc.	EVRG	D-23-EKCE-775-RTS (E	Electric	Vertically Integrated	11/21/2023	Settled	148.8	NA	NA
Evergy Metro Inc	EVRG	D-23-EKCE-775-RTS (E	Electric	Vertically Integrated	11/21/2023	Settled	(22.0)	NA	NA
Kansas Gas Service Co.	OGS	D-24-KGSG-610-RTS	Natural G	Distribution	10/3/2024	Settled	70.0	NA	NA

Data Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence, RRA *Regulatory Focus*, 2025.

Q. DO YOU BELIEVE THAT YOUR ROE RECOMMENDATION MEETS *HOPE* AND *BLUEFIELD* STANDARDS?

A. Yes, I do. As previously noted, according to the *Hope* and *Bluefield* decisions, returns on capital should be: (1) comparable to returns investors expect to earn on other investments of similar risk; (2) sufficient to assure confidence in the company's financial integrity; and (3) adequate to maintain and support the company's credit and to attract capital. As shown on page 1 of Exhibit JRW-3, electric utilities companies have been earning ROEs in the range of 8.0% to 10.0% in recent years. With such ROEs, electric utilities companies such as those in the proxy group have strong investment grade credit ratings, their stocks have been selling well over book value, and they have been raising large amounts of capital. While my recommendation is slightly below the average authorized ROEs for electric utilities companies, it reflects current market conditions. Therefore, I believe that my ROE recommendation meets the criteria established in the *Hope* and *Bluefield* decisions.

Q. WITH RESPECT TO THIS DISCUSSION, PLEASE DISCUSS THE *WALL STREET JOURNAL* ARTICLE ON UTILITIES' AUTHORIZED ROES.

A. The *Wall Street Journal* article, entitled "Utilities Have a High-Wire Act Ahead," discussed the issues utilities face today to meet the needs of their primary stakeholders—customers and investors.[4] The article also highlights current utility rate issues in the context of a recent study on rate of return regulation. Werner and Jarvis (2022) evaluated the authorized ROEs in 3,500 electric and gas rate case decisions in the U.S. from 1980–2021. They compared the allowed rate of return on equity to a number of capital cost

[4] Jinjoo Lee, "Utilities Have a High-Wire Act Ahead," *Wall Street Journal*, October 9, 2022, p. C1,

benchmarks (government and corporate bonds, CAPM equity cost rate estimates, and U.K. authorized ROEs) and focused on three questions: (1) To what extent are utilities being allowed to earn excess returns on equity by their regulators?; (2) How has this return on equity affected utilities' capital investment decisions?; and (3) What impact has this had on the costs paid by consumers?[5]

The authors reported the following empirical results:

(1) The real (inflation-adjusted) return regulators allow equity investors to earn has remained pretty steady over the last 40 years, while the many different cost of capital measures have been declining;

(2) The gap between the authorized ROEs and the benchmarks suggest that regulators have been approving ROEs that are from 0.50% to 5.50% above the cost of equity estimates;

(3) One potential explanation is that utilities have become riskier. However, the authors find that utility credit ratings, on average, have not changed much over the past 40 years;

(4) An extra 1.0% of allowed return on equity causes a utility's capital rate base to expand by an extra 5% on average. This supports the Averch-Johnson effect that utilities have the incentive to overinvest in capital projects if they are earning an outsized return on those investments;

(5) Both the return on equity requested by utilities and the return granted by regulators respond more quickly to rises in market measures of capital cost than to declines. The time adjustment (i.e., the time lag) for decreases is twice as long as for increases.

(6) Authorized ROEs tend to be approved at round numbers (1.0, 0.5, 0.25), with 10.0% being the most common authorized ROE;

(7) Overall, based on the gap, consumers may be paying $2-$20 billion per year more than if authorized ROEs had fallen in line with other capital market indicators; and

(8) The authors also indicated that their results are similar to those found in a previous study by Rode and Fischback (2019).[6]

[5] Karl Dunkle Werner and Stephen Jarvis, "Rate of Return Regulation Revisited," Working Paper, Energy Institute, University of California at Berkeley, 2022.

[6] David C. Rode and Paul S. Fischbeck, "Regulated Equity Returns: A Puzzle." *Energy Policy*, October, 2019.

In summary, these results indicate that, over the past four decades, authorized ROEs have not declined in line with capital costs and therefore past authorized ROEs have overstated the actual cost of equity capital. Hence, the Commission should not be concerned that my recommended ROE is below other authorized ROEs.

IV. PROXY GROUP SELECTION

Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR APPROACH TO DEVELOPING A FAIR RATE OF RETURN RECOMMENDATION FOR THE COMPANIES.

A. To develop a fair rate of return recommendation for the Companies, I evaluated the return requirements of investors on the common stock of a proxy group of publicly-held electric utility companies ("Electric Proxy Group"). I also employed the group developed by Ms. Bulkley ("Bulkley Proxy Group").

Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR PROXY GROUP OF ELECTRIC COMPANIES.

A. The selection criteria for my Electric Proxy Group include the following:

(1) Receives at least 50% of revenues from regulated electric operations as reported in its SEC Form 10-K Report;

(2) *Value Line Investment Survey* lists it as a U.S.-based electric utility;

(3) Holds an investment-grade corporate credit and bond rating;

(4) Has paid a cash dividend for the past six months, with no cuts or omissions;

(5) Is not involved in an acquisition of another utility and not the target of an acquisition; and

(6) Its analysts' long-term EPS growth rate forecasts are available from Yahoo, S&P Cap IQ, and/or Zacks.

The Electric Proxy Group includes 27 companies. Page one of Exhibit JRW-3 provides summary financial statistics for the proxy group, showing mean operating revenues and net plant among members of the Electric Proxy Group of $11.47 billion and $45.93 billion respectively. On average, the Electric Proxy Group receives 80% of its revenues from regulated electric operations, has a BBB+ bond rating from S&P's and a Baa2 rating from Moody's, has a current average common equity ratio of 38.8%, and an average earned return on common equity of 9.26%.

Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE BULKLEY PROXY GROUP.

A. Ms. Bulkley's group is smaller (17 utilities). Panel B of page one of Exhibit JRW-3 provides summary financial statistics for the Bulkley Proxy Group, showing median operating revenues and net plant of $10.66 billion and $45.01 billion respectively. On average, the Bulkley Proxy Group receives 81% of its revenues from regulated electric operations, has a BBB+ bond rating from S&P's and a Baa2 rating from Moody's, has an average common equity ratio of 39.9%, and an average earned return on common equity of 9.49%.

Q. HOW DOES THE INVESTMENT RISK OF THE COMPANIES COMPARE TO THAT OF YOUR PROXY GROUPS?

A. I believe bond ratings provide a good assessment of a company's investment risk. The Companies' S&P and Moody's credit ratings are BBB+ and Baa1 and the average S&P

and Moody's issuer credit ratings for the two proxy groups are BBB+ and Baa2.[7] This indicates that the investment risk of the Companies is a little below the average of the two proxy groups.

Q. PLEASE DISCUSS THE RISK ANALYSIS YOU PERFORMED ON PAGE TWO OF EXHIBIT JRW-3.

A. On page two of Exhibit JRW-3, I use five different risk measures to assess the riskiness of the two proxy groups: Beta (0.86 vs. 0.85), Financial Strength (A vs. A), Safety (1.9 vs. 1.8), Earnings Predictability (85 vs. 87), and Stock Price Stability (90 vs. 94). Overall, these measures suggest that the investment risk of the two groups (1) is very low and (2) is similar to each other.

V. CAPITAL STRUCTURE RATIOS AND DEBT COST RATES

Q. WHAT ARE THE COMPANIES' RECOMMENDED CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND SENIOR CAPITAL COST RATES FOR RATEMAKING PURPOSES?

A. Panel A of Exhibit JRW-4 provides the Companies' proposed capital structure and debt cost rates. Mr. Ley has proposed capital structures consisting of 48.03% long-term debt and 51.97% equity for EKC. Mr. Ley has proposed a long-term debt cost rate of 4.641%.

[7] Evergy, Inc. and its subsidiaries, including the Companies, were downgraded by S&P from A- to BBB+ after the settlement in the Companies' last KS rate case, Docket No. 23-EKCS-775-RTS. No ROE or capital structure were specified in the settlement, but the Companies were allowed to use: (1) a ROE of 9.40% on its Transmission Delivery Charge (TDC) investments; and (2) a rate of return of 6.8923% for regulatory accounting purposes. Nonetheless, S&P downgraded Evergy and its subsidiaries, citing weakened financials due to higher expenses and lower cost recovery. See "Standard & Poor's, Evergy Inc. And Subsidiaries Downgraded by One Notch on Weakening Financials; Outlook Revised to Stable," November 19, 2023.

Q. PLEASE DISCUSS THE CAPITAL STRUCTURES OF THE COMPANIES IN THE PROXY GROUPS.

A. Page 1 of Exhibit JRW-3 provides the average common equity ratios for the companies in the two proxy groups. As of December 31, 2024, the average common equity ratios for the Electric Proxy Group and Bulkley Proxy Group were 38.8% and 39.9%, respectively. As such, the average common equity ratios for the proxy group companies are much lower and represent higher financial risk than the Companies' common equity ratio. That means the Companies have proposed capital structures with more common equity and less financial risk than the proxy groups.

Q. PLEASE REVIEW THE CAPITAL STRUCTURES OF EKC AND EVRG.

A. On pages 2 and 3 of Exhibit JRW-4, I have computed the average quarterly capitalization ratios of EKC and EVRG over the 2022-24 time period. The averages ratios are presented in Panel B of Exhibit JRW-4. EKC and EVRG's average common equity ratios over this period are 48.74% and 42.92% including short-term debt and 53.04% and 48.14% excluding short-term debt. Two things stand out from these figures. First, EKC consistently uses short-term debt to finance its operations. Second, EVRG's corporate capital structure includes more debt and less equity than EKC. In fact, page 5 of Exhibit JRW-4 lists EVRG's various debt issues. Notably, EVRG's corporate capitalization includes not only the debt of its utility subsidiaries but also $2.7 billion in debt issued by EVRG.

Q. IS IT APPROPRIATE TO USE THE COMMON EQUITY RATIOS OF THE PARENT HOLDING COMPANIES RATHER THAN THE SUBSIDIARY OPERATING UTILITIES FOR COMPARISON PURPOSES WITH THE COMPANIES' PROPOSED CAPITALIZATION?

A. Yes. It is appropriate to use the common equity ratios of the utility holding companies because the *holding companies* are publicly traded, and their stocks are used in the cost of equity capital studies. The equities of the *operating utilities* are not publicly traded, and hence their stocks cannot be used to compute the cost of equity capital for the Companies.

Q. IS IT APPROPRIATE TO INCLUDE SHORT-TERM DEBT IN THE CAPITALIZATION IN COMPARING THE COMMON EQUITY RATIOS OF THE HOLDING COMPANIES WITH THE COMPANIES' PROPOSED CAPITALIZATION?

A. Yes. Debt has a higher claim on the assets and earnings of the companies than common equity and requires timely payment of interest and repayment of principal. Thus, in comparing the common equity ratios of the holding companies with the Companies' recommendation, it is appropriate to include short-term debt when computing the holding companies' common equity ratios. Additionally, the financial risk of a company is based on total debt, which includes both short-term and long-term debt.

Q. PLEASE DISCUSS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE AMOUNT OF EQUITY THAT IS INCLUDED IN A UTILITY'S CAPITAL STRUCTURE.

A. A utility's decision as to the amount of equity capital it will incorporate into its capital structure involves fundamental trade-offs relating to the amount of financial risk the firm

carries, the return on equity that investors will require, and the overall revenue requirement its customers are required to bear through the rates they pay.

Q. PLEASE DISCUSS A UTILITY'S DECISION TO USE DEBT VERSUS EQUITY TO MEET ITS CAPITAL NEEDS.

A. Utilities satisfy their capital needs through a mix of equity and debt. Because equity capital is more expensive than debt, the issuance of debt enables a utility to raise more capital for a given commitment of dollars than it could raise with just equity. Debt is, therefore, a means of "leveraging" capital dollars. However, as the amount of debt in the capital structure increases, its financial risk increases and the risk of the utility, as perceived by equity investors, also increases. Significantly for this case, the converse is also true. As the amount of debt in the capital structure decreases, the financial risk decreases. The required return on equity capital is a function of the amount of overall risk that investors perceive, including financial risk in the form of debt.

Q. WHY IS THIS RELATIONSHIP IMPORTANT TO THE UTILITY'S CUSTOMERS?

A. Just as there is a direct correlation between the utility's authorized ROE and the utility's revenue requirement (the higher the return, the greater the revenue requirement), there is a direct correlation between the amount of equity in the capital structure and the revenue requirement the customers are called on to bear. Again, equity capital is more expensive than debt. Not only does equity command a higher cost rate, but it also adds more to the income tax burden that ratepayers are required to pay through rates. As the equity ratio increases, the utility's revenue requirement increases, and the rates paid by customers

increase. If the proportion of equity is too high, rates will be higher than they need to be. For this reason, the utility's management should pursue a capital acquisition strategy that results in the proper balance in the capital structure to minimize the overall cost of capital.

Q. HOW HAVE UTILITIES TYPICALLY STRUCK THIS BALANCE?

A. Due to regulation and the essential nature of its output, a regulated utility is exposed to less business risk than other companies that are not regulated. This means that a regulated electric utility company can reasonably carry relatively more debt in its capital structure than can most unregulated companies. Thus, a utility should take appropriate advantage of its lower business risk to employ cheaper debt capital at a level that will benefit its customers through lower revenue requirements. Typically, one may see equity ratios for electric utilities range from 40% to 50%.

Q. PLEASE ALSO DISCUSS THE ISSUE OF PUBLIC UTILITY HOLDING COMPANIES SUCH AS EVRG USING DEBT TO FINANCE THE EQUITY IN SUBSIDIARIES.

A. As discussed above, the average common equity ratios for EKC and EVRG were 48.7% and 42.9% over the 2022–2024 period. Moody's published an article on the use of low-cost debt financing by public utility holding companies to increase their ROEs. The summary observations included the following about how these holding companies use "leverage" and how an increase in leverage at the parent holding company can "hurt the credit profiles of its regulated subsidiaries":

> U.S. utilities use leverage at the holding-company level to invest in other businesses, make acquisitions and earn higher returns on

> equity. In some cases, an increase in leverage at the parent can hurt the credit profiles of its regulated subsidiaries.[8]

This financial strategy is traditionally known as "double leverage." Moody's noted that, "'double leverage' results in a consolidated debt-to-capitalization ratio that is higher at the parent than at the subsidiary because of the additional debt at the parent," and defined double leverage as follows:

> Double leverage is a financial strategy whereby the parent raises debt but downstreams the proceeds to its operating subsidiary, likely in the form of an equity investment. Therefore, the subsidiary's operations are financed by debt raised at the subsidiary level and by debt financed at the holding-company level. In this way, the subsidiary's equity is leveraged twice, once with the subsidiary debt and once with the holding-company debt. In a simple operating-company/holding-company structure, this practice results in a consolidated debt-to-capitalization ratio that is higher at the parent than at the subsidiary because of the additional debt at the parent.[9]

Moody's goes on to discuss the potential risk "down the road" to utilities of this financing corporate strategy if regulators were to ascribe the debt at the parent level to the subsidiaries or adjust the authorized return on capital:

> **"Double leverage" drives returns for some utilities but could pose risks down the road.** The use of double leverage, a long-standing practice whereby a holding company takes on debt and downstreams the proceeds to an operating subsidiary as equity, could pose risks down the road if regulators were to ascribe the debt at the parent level to the subsidiaries or adjust the authorized return on capital.[10]

[8] *High Leverage at the Parent Often Hurts the Whole Family*, Moody's Investors' Service 1 (May 11, 2015).
[9] *Id.* at 5.
[10] *Id.* at 1 (emphasis added).

Q. GIVEN THAT THE COMPANIES HAVE PROPOSED AN EQUITY RATIO THAT IS HIGHER THAN THAT OF THE PROXY GROUP AND ITS PARENT, EVRG, WHAT SHOULD THE COMMISSION DO IN THIS RATEMAKING PROCEEDING?

A. When a regulated utility's actual capital structure contains a high equity ratio, the options are: (1) to impute a more reasonable capital structure that is comparable to that of the proxy group and to reflect the imputed capital structure in revenue requirements; or (2) to recognize the downward impact that an unusually high equity ratio will have on the financial risk of a utility and authorize a lower common equity cost rate than that for the proxy group.

Q. PLEASE COMMENT ON MS. BULKLEY'S CAPITAL STRUCTURE STUDY FOUND IN EXHIBIT AEB-11.

A. Ms. Bulkley claims to support the Companies' proposed capital structure in a study she performed in Exhibit AEB-11. She reports that the operating companies owned by her 17 proxy utilities have a common equity ratio of 51.85%, which is similar to the capitalizations proposed by the Companies. The error is that the operating companies are not the proxy utility companies. The proxy utilities are the holding companies that own the operating companies. As shown in Exhibit JRW-3, the average common equity ratio for the parent holding companies as of December 31, 2024, was 38.8%. Hence, her study does not support the Companies' proposed capital structures.

Q. PLEASE DISCUSS PAGE 4 OF EXHIBIT JRW-4.

A. Page 4 of Exhibit JRW-4 provides my analysis of EVRG's $2.7B in debt. In panel A, I compute the weighted average cost of this debt, which is 4.68%. In panel B, I computed a blended debt cost rate for EKC of 4.650%, which uses EKC's debt amount and cost rate and combined with 50% of EVRG's debt at the 4.68% cost rate.

Page 4 of Exhibit JRW-4 provides my modified EKC capital structure. In this analysis, I have included 50% of EVRG's $2.7 billion with EKC's debt and common equity. The adjusted capitalization ratios are 54.07% long-term debt and 45.93% common equity.

Q. GIVEN THIS DISCUSSION, WHAT CAPITALIZATION RATIOS AND CAPITAL COST RATES ARE YOU RECOMMENDING FOR THE COMPANIES?

A. My analysis indicates that, by including a portion of EVRG's holding company debt in EHC's capital structure, a capital structure with a common equity ratio of 45.93% is appropriate for EVRG. However, I believe that such a capital structure could cause credit rating issues for EKC. Hence, as a compromise, I will use a capital structure with a common equity ratio of 50.0% and I will use my blended debt cost rate of 4.650%.

VI. THE COST OF COMMON EQUITY CAPITAL

A. Overview

Q. WHY MUST AN OVERALL COST OF CAPITAL OR FAIR RATE OF RETURN BE ESTABLISHED FOR A PUBLIC UTILITY?

A. In a competitive industry, the return on a firm's common equity capital is determined through the competitive market for its goods and services. Due to the capital requirements

needed to provide utility services and the economic benefit to society from avoiding duplication of these services and the construction of utility infrastructure, most public utilities are monopolies. Because of the lack of competition and the essential nature of their services, it is not appropriate to permit monopoly utilities to set their own prices. Thus, regulation seeks to establish prices that are fair to consumers and, at the same time, sufficient to meet the operating and capital costs of the utility, *i.e.*, provide an adequate return on capital to attract investors.

Q. PLEASE PROVIDE AN OVERVIEW OF THE COST OF CAPITAL IN THE CONTEXT OF THE THEORY OF THE FIRM.

A. The total cost of operating a business includes the cost of capital. The cost of common-equity capital is the expected return on a firm's common stock that the marginal investor would deem sufficient to compensate for risk and the time value of money. In equilibrium, the expected and required rates of return on a company's common stock are equal.

Normative economic models of a company or firm, developed under very restrictive assumptions, provide insight into the relationship between a firm's performance or profitability, capital costs, and the value of the firm. Under the economist's ideal model of perfect competition — where entry and exit are costless, products are undifferentiated, and there are increasing marginal costs of production — firms produce up to the point where price equals marginal cost. Over time, a long-run equilibrium is established where the price of the firm equals average cost, including the firm's capital costs. In equilibrium, total revenues equal total costs, and because capital costs represent investors' required

return on the firm's capital, actual returns equal required returns, and the market value must equal the book value of the firm's securities.

In a competitive market, firms can achieve competitive advantage due to product-market imperfections. Most notably, companies can gain competitive advantage through product differentiation (adding real or perceived value to products) and by achieving economies of scale (decreasing marginal costs of production). Competitive advantage allows firms to price products above average cost and thereby earn accounting profits greater than those required to cover capital costs. When these profits are in excess of those required by investors, or when a firm earns an ROE in excess of its cost of equity, investors respond by valuing the firm's equity in excess of its book value.

James M. McTaggart, founder of the international management consulting firm Marakon Associates, described this essential relationship between the ROE, the cost of equity, and the market-to-book ratio in the following manner:

> Fundamentally, the value of a company is determined by the cash flow it generates over time for its owners, and the minimum acceptable rate of return required by capital investors. This "cost of equity capital" is used to discount the expected equity cash flow, converting it to a present value. The cash flow is, in turn, produced by the interaction of a company's return on equity and the annual rate of equity growth. High return on equity (ROE) companies in low-growth markets, such as Kellogg, are prodigious generators of cash flow, while low ROE companies in high-growth markets, such as Texas Instruments, barely generate enough cash flow to finance growth.
>
> A company's ROE over time, relative to its cost of equity, also determines whether it is worth more or less than its book value. If its ROE is consistently greater than the cost of equity capital (the investor's minimum acceptable return), the business is economically profitable and its market value will exceed book value. If, however, the business earns an ROE consistently less than its cost of equity, it is economically unprofitable and its market value will be less than book value. [11]

[11] James M. McTaggart, "The Ultimate Poison Pill: Closing the Value Gap," *Commentary* (Spring 1986), p. 3.

As such, the relationship between a firm's ROE, cost of equity, and market-to-book ratio is relatively straightforward. A firm that earns an ROE above its cost of equity will see its common stock sell at a price above its book value. Conversely, a firm that earns an ROE below its cost of equity will see its common stock sell at a price below its book value.

Q. PLEASE PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INSIGHTS INTO THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ROE AND MARKET-TO-BOOK RATIOS.

A. This relationship is discussed in a classic Harvard Business School case study entitled "Note on Value Drivers." On page 2 of that case study, the author describes the relationship very succinctly:

> For a given industry, more profitable firms – those able to generate higher returns per dollar of equity – should have higher market-to-book ratios. Conversely, firms which are unable to generate returns in excess of their cost of equity [(K)] should sell for less than book value. [12]

Profitability	*Value*
If ROE > K	*then Market/Book > 1*
If ROE = K	*then Market/Book =1*
If ROE < K	*then Market/Book< 1*

To assess the relationship by industry, as suggested above, I performed a regression study between estimated ROE and market-to-book ratios of the Electric Proxy Group companies. The results are presented in Figure 9. The average R-square is 0.58.[13] This demonstrates the strong positive relationship between ROEs and market-to-book ratios for public utilities. Given that the market-to-book ratios have been above 1.0 for a number of

[12] Benjamin C. Esty, *Note on Value Drivers*, HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL BACKGROUND NOTE 297-082, April 1997.

[13] R-square measures the percent of variation in one variable (e.g., market-to-book ratios) explained by another variable (e.g., expected ROE). R-squares vary between 0 and 1.0, with values closer to 1.0 indicating a higher relationship between two variables.

years, this also demonstrates that utilities have been earning ROEs above the cost of equity capital for many years.

Figure 9
The Relationship Between Expected ROE and Market-to-Book Ratios
Electric Utilities



Adjusted R-Square = 61, N=25.
Data Source: *Value Line Investment Survey.*

Q. WHAT FACTORS DETERMINE INVESTORS' EXPECTED OR REQUIRED RATE OF RETURN ON EQUITY?

A. The expected or required rate of return on common stock is a function of market-wide as well as company-specific factors. The most important market factor is the time value of money, as indicated by the level of interest rates in the economy. Common-stock investor requirements generally increase and decrease with like changes in interest rates. The perceived risk of a firm is the predominant factor that influences investor return requirements on a company-specific basis. A firm's investment risk is often separated into business risk and financial risk. Business risk encompasses all factors that affect a firm's operating revenues and expenses. Financial risk results from incurring fixed obligations in the form of debt in financing its assets.

Q. HOW DOES THE INVESTMENT RISK OF UTILITIES COMPARE WITH THAT OF OTHER INDUSTRIES?

A. Due to the essential nature of their service as well as their regulated status, public utilities are exposed to a lesser degree of business risk than other non-regulated businesses. The relatively low level of business risk allows public utilities to meet much of their capital requirements through borrowing in the financial markets, thereby incurring greater than average financial risk. Nonetheless, the overall investment risk of public utilities is below most other industries.

Table 6 provides an assessment of investment risk for 91 industries as measured by beta, which, according to modern capital market theory, is the only relevant measure of investment risk. These betas come from the *Value Line Investment Survey*. The study shows that the investment risk of utilities is low compared to other industries.[14] The average betas for electric, gas, and water utility companies are 0.96, 0.94, and .88, respectively.[15] As such, the cost of equity for utilities is among the lowest of all industries in the U.S., based on modern capital market theory.

[14] The overall stock market has a beta of 1.0. A stock whose price movement is greater than that of the market, such as a technology stock, is riskier than the market and has a beta greater than 1.0. A stock with below-average price movement, such as that of a regulated public utility, is less risky than the market and has a beta less than 1.0. However, *Value Line* betas are computed differently than betas from other sources, such as Yahoo Finance, and are generally higher than other betas. For example, as shown in Table 6, the average beta for all 1,700 companies covered by *Value Line* is 1.14 and not the market average of 1.00. This is discussed in more detail in the CAPM section of the testimony.

[15] The beta for the *Value Line* electric utilities is the simple average of *Value Line*'s Electric East (0.97), Central (0.93), and West (0.99) group betas.

Table 6
Industry Average Betas*
Value Line Investment Survey Betas**

Industry Average Betas*
Value Line Investment Survey Betas**
20-Feb-25

Rank	Industry	Beta	Rank	Industry	Beta	Rank	Industry	Beta
1	Hotel/Gaming	1.46	32	Electrical Equipment	1.21	63	Chemical (Basic)	1.07
2	Public/Private Equity	1.44	33	Computer Software	1.21	64	Human Resources	1.07
3	Advertising	1.41	34	Healthcare Information	1.21	65	Educational Services	1.07
4	Homebuilding	1.40	35	Toiletries/Cosmetics	1.20	66	Packaging & Container	1.06
5	Apparel	1.36	36	R.E.I.T.	1.19	67	Pipeline MLPs	1.06
6	Insurance (Life)	1.36	37	Machinery	1.19	68	Information Services	1.05
7	Air Transport	1.35	38	Bank	1.18	69	Retail Building Supply	1.04
8	Shoe	1.34	39	Paper/Forest Products	1.18	70	Railroad	1.04
9	Metals & Mining (Div.)	1.34	40	Med Supp Invasive	1.18	71	IT Services	1.04
10	Retail (Softlines)	1.33	41	Semiconductor	1.17	72	Retail Store	1.03
11	Auto Parts	1.32	42	Chemical (Diversified)	1.16	73	Cable TV	1.02
12	Building Materials	1.31	43	Computers/Peripherals	1.15	74	Investment Co.	0.99
13	Financial Svcs. (Div.)	1.30	44	Maritime	1.14	75	Electric Utility (West)	0.99
14	Metal Fabricating	1.30	45	Industrial Services	1.14	76	Telecom. Services	0.98
15	Oilfield Svcs/Equip.	1.29	46	E-Commerce	1.14	77	Med Supp Non-Invasive	0.98
16	Retail (Hardlines)	1.29	47	Reinsurance	1.14	78	Environmental	0.97
17	Power	1.28	48	Chemical (Specialty)	1.13	79	Electric Utility (East)	0.97
18	Furn/Home Furnishings	1.28	49	Publishing	1.13	80	Trucking	0.95
19	Restaurant	1.27	50	Entertainment	1.12	81	Natural Gas Utility	0.94
20	Entertainment Tech	1.27	51	Diversified Co.	1.11	82	Drug	0.93
21	Recreation	1.26	52	Precision Instrument	1.11	83	Electric Util. (Central)	0.93
22	Steel	1.26	53	Investment Co.(Foreign)	1.11	84	Beverage	0.92
23	Retail Automotive	1.26	54	Thrift	1.11	85	Tobacco	0.92
24	Automotive	1.25	55	Engineering & Const	1.10	86	Water Utility	0.88
25	Internet	1.25	56	Insurance (Prop/Cas.)	1.10	87	Precious Metals	0.85
26	Aerospace/Defense	1.24	57	Medical Services	1.10	88	Household Products	0.84
27	Petroleum (Producing)	1.24	58	Heavy Truck & Equip	1.10	89	Retail/Wholesale Food	0.83
28	Bank (Regional)	1.24	59	Electronics	1.09	90	Biotechnology	0.83
29	Petroleum (Integrated)	1.24	60	Telecom. Equipment	1.08	91	Food Processing	0.78
30	Semiconductor Equip	1.24	61	Natural Gas (Div.)	1.08			
31	Wireless Networking	1.22	62	Oil/Gas Distribution	1.07		Mean	1.14

* Industry averages for 91 industries using *Value Line*'s database of 1,700 companies - Updated 2-20-25.
** *Value Line* computes betas using monthly returns regressed against the New York Stock Exchange Index for five years. These betas are then adjusted as follows: *VL* Beta = [{(2/3) * Regressed Beta} + {(1/3) * (1.0)}] to account to tendency for Betas to regress toward average of 1.0. See M. Blume, "On the Assessment of Risk," *Journal of Finance*, March 1971.

Q. WHAT IS THE COST OF COMMON EQUITY CAPITAL?

A. The costs of debt and preferred stock are normally based on historical or book values and can be determined with a great degree of accuracy. The cost of common equity capital, however, cannot be determined precisely and must instead be estimated from market data and informed judgment. This return requirement of the stockholder should be commensurate with the return requirement on investments in other enterprises having comparable risks.

According to valuation principles, the present value of an asset equals the discounted value of its expected future cash flow. Investors discount these expected cash flows at their required rate of return that, as noted above, reflects the time value of money

and the perceived riskiness of the expected future cash flows. As such, the cost of common equity is the rate at which investors discount expected cash flows associated with common stock ownership.

Q. HOW CAN THE EXPECTED OR REQUIRED RATE OF RETURN ON COMMON EQUITY CAPITAL BE DETERMINED?

A. Models have been developed to ascertain the cost of common equity capital for a firm. Each model, however, has been developed using restrictive economic assumptions. Consequently, judgment is required in selecting appropriate financial valuation models to estimate a firm's cost of common equity capital, in determining the data inputs for these models, and in interpreting the models' results. All of these decisions must take into consideration the firm involved as well as current conditions in the economy and the financial markets.

Q. HOW DID YOU ESTIMATE THE COST OF EQUITY CAPITAL FOR THE COMPANIES?

A. Primarily, I rely on the DCF model to estimate the cost-of-equity capital. Given the investment-valuation process and the relative stability of the utility business, the DCF model provides the best measure of equity cost rates for public utilities. I have also performed an analysis using the CAPM; however, I give these results less weight because I believe that risk-premium studies, of which the CAPM is one form, provide a less reliable indication of equity-cost rates for public utilities.

Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN WHY YOU BELIEVE THAT THE CAPM PROVIDES A LESS RELIABLE INDICATOR OF EQUITY COST RATES.

A. I believe that the CAPM provides a less reliable measure of a utility's equity-cost rate because it requires an estimate of the market-risk premium. As discussed below, there is a wide variation in estimates of the market-risk premium found in studies by academics and investment firms, as well as in surveys of market professionals.

B. Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) Approach

Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE THEORY BEHIND THE TRADITIONAL DCF MODEL.

A. According to the DCF model, the current stock price is equal to the discounted value of all future dividends that investors expect to receive from investment in the firm. As such, stockholders' returns ultimately result from current as well as future dividends. As owners of a corporation, common stockholders are entitled to a *pro rata* share of the firm's earnings. The DCF model presumes that earnings that are not paid out in the form of dividends are reinvested in the firm to provide for future growth in earnings and dividends. The rate at which investors discount future dividends, which reflects the timing and riskiness of the expected cash flows, is interpreted as the market's expected or required return on the common stock. Therefore, this discount rate represents the cost of common equity. Algebraically, the DCF model can be expressed as:

$$P = \frac{D_1}{(1+k)^1} + \frac{D_2}{(1+k)^2} + \cdots + \frac{D_n}{(1+k)^n}$$

where P is the current stock price, D_1, D_2, D_n are the dividends in (respectively) year 1, 2, and in the future years n, and k is the cost of common equity.

Q. IS THE DCF MODEL CONSISTENT WITH VALUATION TECHNIQUES EMPLOYED BY INVESTMENT FIRMS?

A. Yes. Virtually all investment firms use some form of the DCF model as a valuation technique. One common application for investment firms is called the three-stage DCF or dividend discount model ("DDM"). The stages in a three-stage DCF model are shown in Figure 10. This model presumes that a company's dividend payout progresses initially through a growth stage, then proceeds through a transition stage, and finally assumes a maturity (or steady-state) stage. The dividend-payment stage of a firm depends on the profitability of its internal investments, which, in turn, is largely a function of the life cycle of the product or service.

Figure 10
The Three-Stage Dividend Discount Model



1. **Growth stage**: Characterized by rapidly expanding sales, high profit margins, and an abnormally high growth in earnings per share. Because of highly profitable expected investment opportunities, the payout ratio is low. Competitors are attracted by the unusually high earnings, leading to a decline in the growth rate.

2. **Transition stage**: In later years, increased competition reduces profit margins and earnings growth slows. With fewer new investment opportunities, the company begins to pay out a larger percentage of earnings.
3. **Maturity (steady-state) stage**: Eventually, the company reaches a position where its new investment opportunities offer, on average, only slightly more attractive ROEs. At that time, its earnings growth rate, payout ratio, and ROE stabilize for the remainder of its life. As I will explain below, the constant-growth DCF model is appropriate when a firm is in the maturity stage of the life cycle.[16]

In using the three-stage model to estimate a firm's cost of equity capital, dividends are projected into the future using the different growth rates in the alternative stages, and then the equity-cost rate is the discount rate that equates the present value of the future dividends to the current stock price.

Q. PLEASE BRIEFLY EXPLAIN THE CONCEPT OF "PRESENT VALUE."

A. Present value is the concept that an amount of money today is worth more than that same amount in the future. In other words, money received in the future is not worth as much as an equal amount received today. Present value tells an investor how much he or she would need in today's dollars to earn a specific amount in the future.

Q. HOW DO YOU ESTIMATE STOCKHOLDERS' EXPECTED OR REQUIRED RATE OF RETURN USING THE DCF MODEL?

A. Under certain assumptions, including a constant and infinite expected growth rate, and constant dividend/earnings and price/earnings ratios, the DCF model can be simplified to the following:

$$P = \frac{D_1}{k - g}$$

[16] William Sharpe, Gordon Alexander, and Jeffer Bailey, *Investments*, 1995, pp. 590-1.

where P is the current stock price, D_1 represents the expected dividend over the coming year, k is investor's required return on equity, and g is the expected growth rate of dividends. This is known as the constant-growth version of the DCF model. To use the constant-growth DCF model to estimate a firm's cost of equity, one solves for "k" in the above expression to obtain the following:

$$k = \frac{D_1}{P} + g$$

Q. IN YOUR OPINION, IS THE CONSTANT-GROWTH DCF MODEL APPROPRIATE FOR PUBLIC UTILITIES?

A. Yes. The economics of the public utility business indicate that the industry is in the steady-state or constant-growth stage of a three-stage DCF. The economics include the relative stability of the utility business, the maturity of the demand for public utility services, and the regulated status of public utilities (especially the fact that, as monopolies, their returns on investment are effectively set through the ratemaking process). The DCF valuation procedure for companies in this stage is the constant-growth DCF. In the constant-growth version of the DCF model, the current dividend payment and stock price are directly observable. However, the primary problem and controversy in applying the DCF model to estimate equity-cost rates entails estimating investors' expected dividend growth rate.

Q. WHAT FACTORS SHOULD ONE CONSIDER WHEN APPLYING THE DCF METHODOLOGY?

A. One should be sensitive to several factors when using the DCF model to estimate a firm's cost of equity capital. In general, one must recognize the assumptions under which the DCF model was developed in estimating its components (the dividend yield and the

expected growth rate). The dividend yield can be measured precisely at any point in time; however, it tends to vary somewhat over time. Estimation of expected growth is considerably more difficult. One must consider recent firm performance, in conjunction with current economic developments and other information available to investors, in order to accurately estimate investors' expectations.

Q. WHAT DIVIDEND YIELDS HAVE YOU REVIEWED?

A. I have calculated the dividend yields for the companies in the proxy groups using the current annual dividend and the 30-day, 90-day, and 180-day average stock prices. These dividend yields are provided in Panels A and B of page 2 of Exhibit JRW-5. I have shown the mean and median dividend yields using 30-day, 90-day, and 180-day average stock prices. For the Electric Proxy Group, the dividend yields range from 3.20% to 3.60%. I will use the midpoint of this range, 3.40%, as the dividend yield for the Electric Proxy Group.[17] For the Bulkley Proxy Group, the dividend yield results range from 3.10% to 3.50%. I will use the midpoint of this range, 3.30%, as the dividend yield for the Bulkley Proxy Group.

Q. PLEASE DISCUSS THE APPROPRIATE ADJUSTMENT TO THE SPOT DIVIDEND YIELD.

A. According to the traditional DCF model, the dividend yield term relates the dividend paid over the coming period to the current stock price. As indicated by Professor Myron Gordon, who is commonly associated with the development of the DCF model for popular use, this is obtained by: (1) multiplying the expected dividend over the coming quarter by

[17] For the dividend yields and ROEs, I round to the nearest .05%.

4, and (2) dividing this dividend by the current stock price to determine the appropriate dividend yield for a firm that pays dividends on a quarterly basis.[18]

In applying the DCF model, some analysts adjust the current dividend for growth over the coming year as opposed to the coming quarter. This can be complicated because firms tend to announce changes in dividends at different times during the year. As such, computing the dividend yield based on presumed growth over the coming quarter as opposed to the coming year can produce quite different results. Consequently, it is common for analysts to adjust the dividend yield by some fraction of the long-term expected growth rate.

Q. GIVEN THIS DISCUSSION, WHAT ADJUSTMENT FACTOR DO YOU USE FOR YOUR DIVIDEND YIELD?

A. I adjust the dividend yield by one-half (1/2) of the expected growth to reflect growth over the coming year. The DCF equity-cost rate ("K") is computed as:

$$K = \left[\left(\frac{D}{P}\right) \times (1 + 0.5g)\right] + g$$

Q. PLEASE DISCUSS THE GROWTH RATE COMPONENT OF THE DCF MODEL.

A. There is debate as to the proper methodology to employ in estimating the growth component of the DCF model. By definition, this component is investors' expectations of the long-term dividend growth rate. Presumably, investors use some combination of historical and/or projected growth rates for earnings and dividends per share and for internal or book-value growth to assess long-term potential.

[18] *Petition for Modification of Prescribed Rate of Return*, Federal Communications Commission, Docket No. 79-05, Direct Testimony of Myron J. Gordon and Lawrence I. Gould at 62 (April 1980).

Q. WHAT GROWTH DATA HAVE YOU REVIEWED FOR THE PROXY GROUPS?

A. I have analyzed a number of measures of growth for companies in the proxy groups. I reviewed *Value Line's* historical and projected growth-rate estimates for EPS, dividends per share ("DPS"), and book value per share ("BVPS"). In addition, I utilized the average EPS growth-rate forecasts of Wall Street analysts as provided by Yahoo, Zacks, and S&P Cap IQ. These services solicit five-year earnings growth-rate projections from securities analysts and compile and publish the means and medians of these forecasts. Finally, I also assessed prospective growth as measured by prospective earnings retention rates and earned returns on common equity.

Q. PLEASE DISCUSS HISTORICAL GROWTH IN EARNINGS AND DIVIDENDS, AS WELL AS INTERNAL GROWTH.

A. Historical growth rates for EPS, DPS, and BVPS are readily available to investors and are presumably an important ingredient in forming expectations concerning future growth. However, one must use historical growth numbers as measures of investors' expectations with caution. In some cases, past growth may not reflect future growth potential. Also, employing a single growth-rate number (for example, for five or ten years) is unlikely to accurately measure investors' expectations, due to the sensitivity of a single growth-rate figure to fluctuations in individual firm performance as well as overall economic fluctuations (*i.e.*, business cycles). Thus, one must appraise the context in which the growth rate is being employed. According to the conventional DCF model, the expected return on a security is equal to the sum of the dividend yield and the expected long-term growth in

dividends. Therefore, to best estimate the cost of common-equity capital using the conventional DCF model, one must look to long-term growth rate expectations.

Q. PLEASE DEFINE AND EXPLAIN THE RELEVANCE OF INTERNAL GROWTH.

A. A company's internal (or "organic") growth occurs when a business expands its own operations rather than relying on takeovers and mergers. It can come about through various means, for example, increasing the existing production capacity through investment in new capital and technology, or development and launch of new products.

Internally generated growth is a function of the percentage of earnings retained within the firm (the earnings retention rate) and the rate of return earned on those earnings (the ROE). The internal growth rate is computed as the retention rate times the ROE. Internal growth is significant in determining long-run earnings and, therefore, dividends. Investors recognize the importance of internally-generated growth and pay premiums for stocks of companies that retain earnings and earn high returns on internal investments.

Q. PLEASE DISCUSS THE SERVICES THAT PROVIDE ANALYSTS' EPS FORECASTS.

A. Analysts' EPS forecasts for companies are collected and published by several different investment information services, including Institutional Brokers Estimate System ("I/B/E/S"), Bloomberg, FactSet, S&P Cap IQ, Zacks, First Call, and Reuters, among others. Thomson Reuters publishes analysts' EPS forecasts under different product names, including I/B/E/S, First Call, and Reuters. Bloomberg, FactSet, S&P Cap IQ, and Zacks each publish their own set of analysts' EPS forecasts for companies. These services do not reveal (1) the analysts who are solicited for forecasts; or (2) the identity of the analysts who

actually provide the EPS forecasts that are used in the compilations published by the services. I/B/E/S, Bloomberg, FactSet, S&P Cap IQ, and First Call are fee-based services. These services usually provide detailed reports and other data in addition to analysts' EPS forecasts. In contrast, Thomson Reuters and Zacks provide limited EPS forecast data free-of-charge on the Internet. Yahoo finance (http://finance.yahoo.com) lists Thomson Reuters as the source of its summary EPS forecasts. Zacks (www.zacks.com) publishes its summary forecasts on its website. Zacks estimates are also available on other websites, such as MSN.Money (http://money.msn.com).

Q. ARE YOU RELYING EXCLUSIVELY ON THE EPS FORECASTS OF WALL STREET ANALYSTS IN ARRIVING AT A DCF GROWTH RATE FOR THE PROXY GROUP?

A. No. There are several issues with using the EPS growth rate forecasts of Wall Street analysts as DCF growth rates. First, the appropriate growth rate in the DCF model is the dividend growth rate, not the earnings growth rate. Nonetheless, over the very long term, dividends and earnings will have to grow at a similar rate. Therefore, consideration must be given to other indicators of growth, including prospective dividend growth, internal growth, as well as projected earnings growth. Second, a study by Lacina, Lee, and Xu (2011) has shown that analysts' three-to-five year EPS growth-rate forecasts are not more accurate at forecasting future earnings than naïve random walk forecasts of future earnings.[19] Employing data over a twenty-year period, these authors demonstrate that

[19] M. Lacina, B. Lee & Z. Xu, *Advances in Business and Management Forecasting (Vol. 8),* Kenneth D. Lawrence, Ronald K. Klimberg (ed.), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, pp. 77-101. According to random walk theory in this context, annual changes in earnings are normally distributed and are independent of each other. Therefore, the theory presumes the past movement or trend of earnings cannot be used to predict its future earnings.

using the most recent year's actual EPS figure to forecast EPS in the next three-to-five years proved to be just as accurate as using the EPS estimates from analysts' three-to-five year EPS growth-rate forecasts. In the authors' opinion, these results indicate that analysts' long-term earnings growth-rate forecasts should be used with caution as inputs for valuation and cost of capital purposes. Finally, and most significantly, it is well known that the long-term EPS growth-rate forecasts of Wall Street securities analysts are overly optimistic and upwardly biased. This has been demonstrated in a number of academic studies over the years.[20] Hence, using these growth rates as a DCF growth rate will provide an overstated equity cost rate. On this issue, a study by Easton and Sommers (2007) found that optimism in analysts' growth rate forecasts leads to an upward bias in estimates of the cost of equity capital of almost 3.0 percentage points.[21]

Q. ARE ANALYSTS' PROJECTED EPS GROWTH RATES FOR ELECTRIC UTILITIES LIKEWISE OVERLY OPTIMISTIC AND UPWARDLY BIASED?

A. Yes. I have completed a study of the accuracy of analysts' EPS growth rates for electric utilities and gas distribution companies over the 1985 to 2022 time period. In the study, I used the utilities listed in the electric utilities and gas distribution companies covered by *Value Line*. I collected the three-to-five-year projected EPS growth rate from I/B/E/S for

[20] The studies that demonstrate analysts' long-term EPS forecasts are overly-optimistic and upwardly biased include: R.D. Harris, "The Accuracy, Bias, and Efficiency of Analysts' Long Run Earnings Growth Forecasts," *Journal of Business Finance & Accounting*, pp. 725-55 (June/July 1999); P. DeChow, A. Hutton, and R. Sloan, "The Relation Between Analysts' Forecasts of Long-Term Earnings Growth and Stock Price Performance Following Equity Offerings," *Contemporary Accounting Research* (2000); K. Chan, L., Karceski, J., & Lakonishok, J., "The Level and Persistence of Growth Rates," *Journal of Finance*, pp. 643−684, (2003); M. Lacina, B. Lee, and Z. Xu, *Advances in Business and Management Forecasting (Vol. 8)*, Kenneth D. Lawrence, Ronald K. Klimberg (ed.), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, pp.77-101; and Marc H. Goedhart, Rishi Raj, and Abhishek Saxena, "Equity Analysts, Still Too Bullish," *McKinsey on Finance*, pp. 14-17, (Spring 2010).

[21] Peter D. Easton & Gregory A. Sommers, *Effect of Analysts' Optimism on Estimates of the Expected Rate of Return Implied by Earnings Forecasts*, 45 J. ACCT. RES. 983–1015 (2007).

each utility and compared that growth rate to the utility's actual subsequent three-to-five-year EPS growth rate. As shown in Figure 11, the mean forecasted EPS growth rate (depicted in the red line in Figure 11) is consistently greater than the achieved actual EPS growth rate over the time period, with the exception of a few short periods. Over the entire period, the mean forecasted EPS growth rate is over 200 basis points above the actual EPS growth rate. As such, the projected EPS growth rates for electric utilities are overly optimistic and upwardly based.

Figure 11
Mean Forecasted vs. Actual Long-Term EPS Growth Rates
Electric Utilities and Gas Distribution Companies
1985–2022



Data Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence, Capital IQ, I/B/E/S, 2023.

Q. ARE THE PROJECTED EPS GROWTH RATES OF *VALUE LINE* ALSO OVERLY OPTIMISTIC AND UPWARDLY BIASED?

A. Yes. A study by Szakmary, Conover, and Lancaster ("SCL") (2008) evaluated the accuracy of *Value Line*'s three-to-five-year EPS growth rate forecasts using companies in the Dow Jones Industrial Average over a thirty-year time period and found these forecasted

EPS growth rates to be significantly higher than the EPS growth rates that these companies subsequently achieved.[22] SCL studied the predicted versus the projected stock returns, sales, profit margins, and earnings per share made by *Value Line* over the 1969 to 2001 time period. *Value Line* projects variables from a three-year base period (e.g., 2012 to 2014) to a future three-year projected period (e.g., 2016 to 2018). SCL used the 65 stocks included in the Dow Jones Indexes (30 Industrials, 20 Transports and 15 Utilities). SCL found that the projected annual stock returns for the Dow Jones stocks were "incredibly overoptimistic" and of no predictive value. The mean annual stock return of 20% for the Dow Jones stocks' *Value Line*'s forecasts was nearly double the realized annual stock return. The authors also found that *Value Line*'s forecasts of EPS and profit margins were "strikingly overoptimistic." *Value Line*'s forecasts of annual sales were higher than achieved levels, but not statistically significant. SCL concluded that the overly optimistic projected annual stock returns were attributable to *Value Line*'s upwardly biased forecasts of EPS and profit margins.

Q. IS IT YOUR OPINION THAT STOCK PRICES REFLECT THE UPWARD BIAS IN THE EPS GROWTH RATE FORECASTS?

A. Yes, I do believe that investors are well-aware of the bias in analysts' EPS growth-rate forecasts, and therefore, stock prices reflect the upward bias.

[22] Szakmary, A., Conover, C., & Lancaster, C., *An Examination of* Value Line*'s Long-Term Projections*, J. BANKING & FIN., May 2008, at 820–33.

Q. HOW DOES THAT AFFECT THE USE OF THESE FORECASTS IN A DCF EQUITY COST RATE STUDY?

A. According to the DCF model, the equity cost rate is a function of the dividend yield and expected growth rate. Because I believe that investors are aware of the upward bias in analysts' long-term EPS growth-rate forecasts, stock prices reflect the bias. But the DCF growth rate needs to be adjusted downward from the projected EPS growth rate to reflect the upward bias in the DCF model.

Q. PLEASE DISCUSS THE HISTORICAL GROWTH OF THE COMPANIES IN THE PROXY GROUPS, AS PROVIDED BY *VALUE LINE.*

A. Page 3 of Exhibit JRW-5 provides the 5-year and 10- year historical growth rates for EPS, DPS, and BVPS for the companies in the two proxy groups, as published in the *Value Line Investment Survey.* The median historical growth measures for EPS, DPS, and BVPS for the Electric Proxy Group, as provided in Panel A, range from 3.50% to 4.80%, with an average of the medians of 4.00%. For the Bulkley Proxy Group, as shown in Panel B of page 3 of Exhibit JRW-5, the historical growth measures in EPS, DPS, and BVPS, as measured by the medians, range from 3.50% to 5.50%, with an average of the medians of 4.2%.

Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE *VALUE LINE'S* PROJECTED GROWTH RATES FOR THE COMPANIES IN THE PROXY GROUPS.

A. *Value Line's* projections of EPS, DPS, and BVPS growth for the companies in the proxy groups are shown on page 4 of Exhibit JRW-5. As stated above, due to the presence of outliers, the medians are used in the analysis. For the Electric Proxy Group, as shown in

Panel A of page 4 of Exhibit JRW-5, the medians range from 4.30% to 6.00%, with an average of the medians of 5.30%. The range of the medians for the Bulkley Proxy Group, shown in Panel B of page 4 of Exhibit JRW-5, is from 4.50% to 6.00%, with an average of the medians of 5.20%.

Also provided on page 4 of Exhibit JRW-5 are the prospective sustainable growth rates for the companies in the two proxy groups, as measured by *Value Line*'s average projected retention rate and return on shareholders' equity. As noted above, sustainable growth is a significant and a primary driver of long-run earnings growth. For the Electric Proxy Group and Bulkley Proxy Group, the median prospective sustainable growth rates are 4.30% and 3.90%, respectively.

Q. PLEASE ASSESS GROWTH FOR THE PROXY GROUPS AS MEASURED BY ANALYSTS' FORECASTS OF EXPECTED THREE-TO-FIVE YEAR EPS GROWTH.

A. Yahoo, Zacks, and S&P Cap IQ collect, summarize, and publish Wall Street analysts' three-to-five-year EPS growth-rate forecasts for the companies in the proxy groups. These forecasts are provided for the companies in the proxy groups on page 5 of Exhibit JRW-5. I have reported both the mean and median growth rates for the groups. Since there is considerable overlap in analyst coverage between the three services, and not all of the companies have forecasts from the different services, I have averaged the expected five-year EPS growth rates from the three services for each company to arrive at an expected EPS

growth rate for each company. The mean/median of analysts' projected EPS growth rates for the Electric and Bulkley Proxy Groups are 7.0%/7.1% and 7.0%/7.0%, respectively.[23]

Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR ANALYSIS OF THE HISTORICAL AND PROSPECTIVE GROWTH OF THE PROXY GROUPS.

A. Page 6 of Exhibit JRW-5 shows the summary of DCF growth rate indicators for the proxy groups.

The historical growth rate indicators for my Electric Proxy Group imply a baseline growth rate of 4.00%. The average of the projected EPS, DPS, and BVPS growth rates from *Value Line* is 5.3%, and *Value Line*'s projected sustainable growth rate is 4.3%. The projected EPS growth rates of Wall Street analysts for the Electric Proxy Group are 7.00% and 7.10% (average = 7.05%) as measured by the mean and median growth rates. The overall range for the projected growth-rate indicators (ignoring historical growth) is 4.30% to 7.05%, and the average of the three projected growth rates is 5.50% (5.3%, 4.3%, 7.05%). Giving primary weight to the projected growth rates of Wall Street analysts and *Value Line*, but recognizing the upward bias nature of these forecasts, I believe that the appropriate projected growth rate is the range of 5.50% to 7.05%. Given this range, I will use 6.20%, which is the midpoint of the range, for my DCF growth rate for the Electric Proxy Group. This growth rate figure is in the upper end of the range of historic and projected growth rates for the group.

For the Bulkley Proxy Group, the historical growth rate indicators suggest a growth rate of 4.2%. The average of the projected EPS, DPS, and BVPS growth rates from *Value*

[23] Given variation in the measures of central tendency of analysts' projected EPS growth rates proxy groups, I have considered both the means and medians figures in the growth rate analysis.

Line is 5.2%, and *Value Line*'s projected sustainable growth rate is 3.9%. The projected EPS growth rates of Wall Street analysts are both 7.00% (average = 7.00%) as measured by the mean and median growth rates. The overall range for the projected growth-rate indicators (ignoring historical growth) is 3.90% to 7.00% and the average of the three projected growth rates (5.30%, 4.3%, 7.00%) is 5.5%. Again, giving primary weight to the projected EPS growth rate of Wall Street analysts but recognizing the upward bias nature of these forecasts, I believe that the appropriate DCF growth rate range is 5.5% to 7.05%. Given this range, I will use 6.30%, which is the midpoint of the range, for my DCF growth rate for the Bulkley Proxy Group. As with the Electric Proxy Group, this growth rate figure is in the upper end of the range of historic and projected growth rates for the Bulkley Proxy Group.

Q. BASED ON THE ABOVE ANALYSIS, WHAT ARE YOUR INDICATED COMMON EQUITY COST RATES FROM THE DCF MODEL FOR THE PROXY GROUPS?

A. My DCF-derived equity cost rates for the groups are summarized on page 1 of Exhibit JRW-5 and in Table 7 below.

Table 1
DCF-Derived Equity Cost Rate/ROE

	Dividend Yield	1 + ½ Growth Adjustment	DCF Growth Rate	Equity Cost Rate
Electric Proxy Group	**3.40%**	**1.0315**	**6.30%**	**9.80%**
Bulkley Proxy Group	**3.30%**	**1.0310**	**6.20%**	**9.60%**

The result for the Electric Proxy Group is the 3.40% dividend yield, times the one and one-half growth adjustment of 1.0315, plus the DCF growth rate of 6.20%, which

results in an equity cost rate of 9.80%. The result for the Bulkley Proxy Group is 9.60%, which includes a dividend yield of 3.30%, an adjustment factor of 1.0310, and a DCF growth rate of 6.20%.

C. Capital Asset Pricing Model ("CAPM")

Q. PLEASE DISCUSS THE CAPM.

A. The CAPM is a risk premium approach to gauging a firm's cost of equity capital. According to the risk premium approach, the cost of equity is the sum of the interest rate on a risk-free bond (R_f) and a risk premium (RP), as in the following:

$$k = R_f + RP$$

The yield on long-term U.S. Treasury securities is normally used as R_f. Risk premiums are measured in different ways. The CAPM is a theory of the risk and expected returns of common stocks. In the CAPM, two types of risk are associated with a stock: firm-specific risk or unsystematic risk, and market or systematic risk, which is measured by a firm's beta. The only risk that investors receive a return for bearing is systematic risk.

According to the CAPM, the expected return on a company's stock, which is also the equity cost rate (K), is equal to:

$$K = \left(R_f\right) + \beta \times \left[E(R_m) - \left(R_f\right)\right]$$

Where:

K represents the estimated rate of return on the stock;
$E(R_m)$ represents the expected return on the overall stock market. (Frequently, the 'market' refers to the S&P 500);
(R_f) represents the risk-free rate of interest;

[E(R_m) - (R_f)] represents the expected equity or market risk premium—the excess return that an investor expects to receive above the risk-free rate for investing in risky stocks; and
Beta—(ß) is a measure of the systematic risk of an asset.

To estimate the required return or cost of equity using the CAPM requires three inputs: the risk-free rate of interest (R_f), the beta (ß), and the expected equity or market risk premium *[E(R_m) - (R_f)]*. R_f is the easiest of the inputs to measure. It is represented by the yield on long-term U.S. Treasury bonds. ß, the measure of systematic risk, is a little more difficult to measure because there are different opinions about what adjustments, if any, should be made to historical betas due to their tendency to regress to 1.0 over time. Finally, an even more difficult input to measure is the expected equity or market risk premium (*E(R_m) - (R_f)*). I will discuss each of these inputs below.

Q. PLEASE DISCUSS EXHIBIT JRW-6.

A. Exhibit JRW-6 provides the summary results for my CAPM study. Page 1 shows the results, and the following pages contain the supporting data.

Q. PLEASE DISCUSS THE RISK-FREE INTEREST RATE.

A. The yield on long-term U.S. Treasury bonds has usually been viewed as the risk-free rate of interest in the CAPM. The yield on long-term U.S. Treasury bonds, in turn, has been considered to be the yield on U.S. Treasury bonds with 30-year maturities.

Q. WHAT RISK-FREE INTEREST RATE ARE YOU USING IN YOUR CAPM?

A. As shown on page 2 of Exhibit JRW-6, the yield on 30-year U.S. Treasury bonds has been in the 1.3% to 5.00% range over 2010–2025. The current 30-year Treasury yield is in the 5.00% range which I will use as my risk-free interest rate.

Q. DOES THE 5.00% RISK-FREE INTEREST RATE TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION FORECASTS OF HIGHER INTEREST RATES?

A. No, it does not. The 5.00% risk-free interest rate takes into account the range of interest rates in the past, and effectively synchronizes the risk-free rate with the market risk premium. The risk-free rate and the market risk premium are interrelated in that the market risk premium is developed in relation to the risk-free rate. As discussed below, my market risk premium is based on the results of many studies and surveys that have been published over time.

Q. PLEASE DISCUSS BETAS IN THE CAPM.

A. Beta (ß) is a measure of the systematic risk of a stock. The market (i.e., the S&P 500) has a beta of 1.0. The ß of a stock with the same price movement as the market also has a ß of 1.0. A stock whose price movement is greater than that of the market, such as a technology stock, is riskier than the market and has a ß greater than 1.0. A stock with below average price movement, such as that of a regulated public utility, is less risky than the market and has a ß less than 1.0. Estimating a stock's ß involves running a linear regression of a stock's return on the market return. As shown on page 3 of Exhibit JRW-6, the slope of the regression line is the stock's ß. A steeper line indicates that the stock is more sensitive to the return on the overall market. This means that the stock has a higher ß and greater-than-average market risk. A less steep line indicates a lower ß and less market risk. Several online investment information services, such as Yahoo and Reuters, provide estimates of stock betas. Usually, these services report different betas for the same stock. The

differences are usually due to: (1) the time period over which ß is measured; and (2) any adjustments that are made to reflect the fact that betas tend to regress to 1.0 over time.

Q. PLEASE DISCUSS THE 2020 CHANGE IN BETAS.

A. I have traditionally used the betas as provided in the *Value Line Investment Survey*. As discussed above, the betas for utilities recently increased significantly because of the volatility of utility stocks during the stock market meltdown associated with COVID in March 2020. Utility betas as measured by *Value Line* have been in the 0.55 to 0.70 range for the past 10 years, but utility stocks were much more volatile relative to the market in March and April of 2020, and this resulted in an increase of above 0.30 to the average utility ß.

Value Line defines their computation of ß as:[24]

> Beta - A relative measure of the historical sensitivity of a stock's price to overall fluctuations in the New York Stock Exchange Composite Index. A Beta of 1.50 indicates a stock tends to rise (or fall) 50% more than the New York Stock Exchange Composite Index. The ''Beta coefficient'' is derived from a regression analysis of the relationship between weekly percentage changes in the price of a stock and weekly percentage changes in the NYSE Index over a period of five years. In the case of shorter price histories, a smaller time period is used, but two years is the minimum. The Betas are adjusted for their long-term tendency to converge toward 1.00. Value Line then adjusts these Betas to account for their long-term tendency to converge toward 1.00.

However, there are several issues with *Value Line* betas:

1. *Value Line* betas are computed using weekly returns, and the volatility of utility stocks during March 2020 was impacted by using weekly and not monthly returns. Yahoo Finance uses five years of monthly returns to compute betas, and Yahoo Finance's betas for utilities are lower than *Value Lin*e's.

[24] https://www.valueline.com/investment-education/glossary/b.

2. *Value Line* betas are computed using the New York Stock Exchange Index as the market. While about 3,000 stocks trade on the NYSE, most technology stocks are traded on the NASDAQ or over-the-counter market and not the NYSE. Technology stocks, which make up about 25 percent of the S&P 500, tend to be more volatile. If they were traded on the NYSE, they would increase the volatility of the measure of the market and thereby lower utility betas.
3. Major vendors of CAPM betas such as Merrill Lynch, *Value Line*, and Bloomberg publish adjusted betas. The so-called Blume adjustment cited by *Value Line* adjusts betas calculated using historical returns data to reflect the tendency of stock betas to regress toward 1.0 over time, which means that the betas of typical low beta stocks tend to increase toward 1.0, and the betas of typical high beta stocks tend to decrease toward 1.0.[25]

The Blume adjustment procedure is:

Regressed Beta = .67 * (Observed Beta) + 0.33

For example, suppose a company has an observed past ß of 0.50. The regressed (Blume-adjusted) beta would be:

Regressed Beta = .67 * (0.50) + 0.33 = 0.67

Blume offered two reasons for betas to regress toward 1.0. First, he suggested it may be a by-product of management's efforts to keep the level of a firm's systematic risk close to that of the market. He also speculated that it results from management's efforts to diversify through investment projects.

Q. GIVEN THIS DISCUSSION, WHAT BETAS ARE YOU USING IN YOUR CAPM?

A. In the past, I have used *Value Line* betas exclusively. However, given the discussion above, I am also using betas published by S&P Capital IQ. S&P Capital IQ computes betas over a five-year period using monthly returns and the S&P 500 as the market return. S&P Capital

[25] M. Blume, *On the Assessment of Risk*, J. OF FIN. (Mar. 1971).

IQ does not use the Blume adjustment, but I have included that adjustment in my analysis. As shown on page 3 of Exhibit JRW-6, I have averaged the *Value Line* betas and my adjusted S&P Capital IQ for the proxy groups. The median betas for the Electric and Bulkley Proxy Groups are 0.76 and 0.74.

Q. PLEASE DISCUSS THE MARKET RISK PREMIUM.

A. The market risk premium is equal to the expected return on the stock market (e.g., the expected return on the S&P 500, $E(R_m)$ minus the risk-free rate of interest (R_f)). The market risk premium is the difference in the expected total return between investing in equities and investing in "safe" fixed-income assets, such as long-term government bonds. However, while the market risk premium is easy to define conceptually, it is difficult to measure because it requires an estimate of the expected return on the market—$E(R_m)$. As I discuss below, there are different ways to measure $E(R_m)$, and studies have come up with significantly different magnitudes for $E(R_m)$. As Merton Miller, the 1990 Nobel Prize winner in economics, indicated, $E(R_m)$ is very difficult to measure and is one of the great mysteries in finance.[26]

Q. PLEASE DISCUSS THE ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO ESTIMATING THE MARKET RISK PREMIUM.

A. Page 4 of Exhibit JRW-6 highlights the primary approaches to, and issues in, estimating the expected market risk premium. The traditional way to measure the market risk premium was to use the difference between historical average stock and bond returns. In this case, historical stock and bond returns, also called *ex post* returns, were used as the measures of

[26] Merton Miller, *The History of Finance: An Eyewitness Account*, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., 3 (2000).

the market's expected return (known as the *ex ante* or forward-looking expected return). This type of historical evaluation of stock and bond returns is often called the "Ibbotson approach" after Professor Roger Ibbotson, who popularized this method of using historical financial market returns as measures of expected returns. However, this historical evaluation of returns can be a problem because: (1) *ex post* returns are not the same as *ex ante* expectations; (2) market risk premiums can change over time, increasing when investors become more risk-averse and decreasing when investors become less risk-averse; and (3) market conditions can change such that *ex post* historical returns are poor estimates of *ex ante* expectations.

The use of historical returns as market expectations has been criticized in numerous academic studies, which I discuss later. The general theme of these studies is that the large equity risk premium discovered in historical stock and bond returns cannot be justified by the fundamental data. These studies, which fall under the category "*ex ante* models and market data," compute *ex ante* expected returns using market data to arrive at an expected equity risk premium. These studies have also been called "puzzle research" after the famous study by Mehra and Prescott in which the authors first questioned the magnitude of historical equity risk premiums relative to fundamentals.[27]

In addition, there are several surveys of financial professionals regarding the market risk premium, as well as several published surveys of academics on the equity risk premium. Duke University has published a CFO Survey on a quarterly basis for over 10 years.[28] Questions regarding expected stock and bond returns are also included in the

[27] Rajnish Mehra & Edward C. Prescott, *The Equity Premium: A Puzzle*, J. MONETARY ECON. 145 (1985).

[28] *The CFO Survey*, DUKE UNIVERSITY, https://www.richmondfed.org/cfosurvey.

Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia's annual survey of financial forecasters, which is published as the *Survey of Professional Forecasters*.[29] This survey of professional economists has been published for almost 50 years. In addition, Pablo Fernandez conducts annual surveys of financial analysts and companies regarding the equity risk premiums used in their investment and financial decision making.[30]

Q. PLEASE HIGHLIGHT THE RESULTS OF THE ACADEMIC AND PROFESSIONAL STUDIES DISCUSSING THE MARKET RISK PREMIUM.

A. Derrig and Orr, Fernandez, and Song completed the most comprehensive reviews of the research on the market risk premium.[31] Derrig and Orr's study evaluated the various approaches to estimating market risk premiums, discussed the issues with the alternative approaches, and summarized the findings of the published research on the market risk premium. Fernandez examined four alternative measures of the market risk premium — historical, expected, required, and implied. He also reviewed the major studies of the market risk premium and presented the summary market risk premium results. Song provided an annotated bibliography and highlighted the alternative approaches to estimating the market risk premium.

[29] *Survey of Professional Forecasters*, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA (March 26, 2025). https://www.richmondfed.org/research/national_economy/cfo_survey/data_and_results/2025/20250326_data_and_resultsThe Survey of Professional Forecasters was formerly conducted by the American Statistical Association (ASA) and the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) and was known as the ASA/NBER survey. The survey, which began in 1968, is conducted each quarter. The Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, in cooperation with the NBER, assumed responsibility for the survey in June 1990.

[30] Pablo Fernandez, Teresa Garcia, and Pablo Acín, SURVEY: MARKET RISK PREMIUM AND RISK-FREE RATE USED FOR 80 COUNTRIES IN 2025, IESE BUSINESS SCHOOL WORKING PAPER.

[31] *See* Richard Derrig & Elisha Orr, *Equity Risk Premium: Expectations Great and Small (Version 3.0)*, Aug. 28, 2003 (https://www.casact.org/sites/default/files/database/forum_04wforum_04wf001.pdf); Pablo Fernandez, EQUITY PREMIUM: HISTORICAL, EXPECTED, REQUIRED, AND IMPLIED, IESE BUSINESS SCHOOL WORKING PAPER (2007); ZHIYI SONG, THE EQUITY RISK PREMIUM: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY (The CFA Institute Research (2007).

Page 5 of Exhibit JRW-6 provides a summary of the results of the market risk premium studies that I have reviewed. These include the results of: (1) the various studies of the historical risk premium, (2) *ex ante* market risk premium studies, (3) market risk premium surveys of CFOs, financial forecasters, analysts, companies, and academics, and (4) the building blocks approach to the market risk premium. There are results reported for over 30 studies, and the median market risk premium of these studies is 4.70%.

Q. PLEASE HIGHLIGHT THE RESULTS OF THE MORE RECENT RISK PREMIUM STUDIES AND SURVEYS.

A. The studies cited on page 5 of Exhibit JRW-6 include every market risk premium study and survey I could identify that was published over the past 20 years and that provided a market risk premium estimate. Many of these studies were published prior to the financial crisis that began in 2008. In addition, some of these studies were published in the early 2000s at the market peak. It should be noted that many of these studies (as indicated) used data over long periods of time (as long as 50 years of data) and so were not estimating a market risk premium as of a specific point in time (e.g., the year 2001). To assess the effect of the earlier studies on the market risk premium, I have reconstructed page 5 of Exhibit JRW-6 on page 6 of Exhibit JRW-6; however, I have eliminated all studies dated before January 2, 2010. The median market risk premium estimate for this subset of studies is 5.18%.

Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE THE MARKET RISK PREMIUM STUDIES AND SURVEYS.

A. As noted above, there are three approaches to estimating the market risk premium—historic stock and bond returns, *ex ante* or expected returns models, and surveys. The studies on page 6 of Exhibit JRW-6 can be summarized in the following manners:

Historic Stock and Bond Returns: Historic stock and bond returns suggest a market risk premium in the 4.40% to 7.00% range, depending on whether one uses arithmetic or geometric mean returns.

***Ex Ante* Models**: Market risk-premium studies that use expected or *ex ante* return models indicate a market risk premium in the range of 2.83% to 5.50%.

Surveys: Market risk premiums developed from surveys of analysts, companies, financial professionals, and academics are lower, with a range from 3.00% to 5.70%.

Building Block: The mean reported market risk premiums reported in studies using the building blocks approach range from 3.00% to 5.21%.

Q. PLEASE HIGHLIGHT THE *EX ANTE* MARKET RISK PREMIUM STUDIES AND SURVEYS THAT YOU BELIEVE ARE THE MOST TIMELY AND RELEVANT.

A. I will highlight several studies and surveys.

First, Pablo Fernandez conducts annual surveys of financial analysts and companies regarding the equity risk premiums used in their investment and financial decision-making.[32] His survey results are included in Exhibits JRW-6-5 and JRW-6-6. The results of his 2025 survey of academics, financial analysts, and companies indicate a mean market

[32] Pablo Fernandez, Teresa Garcia, & Pablo Acín, *Survey: Market Risk Premium and Risk-Free Rate Used for 56 Countries in 2025, IESE Business School Working Paper* (May, 2025).

risk premium employed by U.S. analysts and companies of 5.5%.[33] His estimated market risk premium for the U.S. has been in the 5.00% to 5.70% range in recent years.

Second, Professor Aswath Damodaran of New York University, a leading expert on valuation and the market risk premium, provides a monthly updated market risk premium based on projected S&P 500 EPS and stock-price level and long-term interest rates. His estimated market risk premium has been in the range of 4.0% to 6.0% since 2010. As shown in Figure 12 as of May 1, 2025, Damodaran's estimate of the equity risk premium was 4.41%.[34]

Figure 12
Damodaran Implied Market Risk Premium



Source: http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/.

Next, as explained previously, Kroll provides recommendations for the normalized risk-free interest rate and market risk premiums to be used in calculating the cost of capital data. Its recommendations over 2008–2024 are shown in Exhibit JRW-6-7 and are also depicted graphically in Figure 13 below. Over the past decade, Kroll's recommended

[33] *Id.* at 3.

[34] Aswath Damodaran, *Damodaran Online*, N.Y. Univ., http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/. (On August 12, 2023, Professor Damodaran appeared on CNBC to discuss the equity risk premium. *See* CNBC Television, *Equity Risk Premium is Core to Understanding Long-Term Market Returns, says NYU Aswath Damodaran*, YouTube https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VPkQ7_3Sf1E.

normalized risk-free interest rates have been in the 2.50% to 4.50% range and market risk premiums have been in the 5.0% to 6.0% range. Most recently, Kroll reduced its market risk premium from 6.00% to 5.50% on June 8, 2023, and to 5.00% on June 5, 2024.[35] On April 15, 2025, citing an uncertainty in the global economy, Kroll increased their equity risk premium estimate to 5.50%.[36]

Figure 13
Kroll
Normalized Risk-Free Rate and Market Risk Premium Recommendations
2007–2025



Source:https://www.kroll.com/en/insights/publications/cost-of-capital/recommended-us-equity-risk-premium-and-corresponding-risk-free-rates.

Fourth, Dr. David Kelly, the Chief Global Strategist at *J.P. Morgan Asset Management*, is one of the best-known market strategists on Wall Street. His annual publication and their monthly updates, the *JP Morgan Guide to the Markets*, is a must-read guide for stockbrokers and financial professionals. In presenting their annual expectations for the markets, JP Morgan provides details about inputs and assumptions of expected

[35] https://www.kroll.com/en/insights/publications/cost-of-capital/recommended-us-equity-risk-premium-and-corresponding-risk-free-rates.pdf.

[36] Kroll, "Cost of Capital Inputs Updated to Reflect Heightened Uncertainty in Global Economy," April 15, 2025. https://kroll.com/jssmedia/cost-of-capital/kroll-cost-of-capital-inputs-updated-to-reflect-heightened-uncertainty-in-global-economy.pdf?_ga=2.243564870.274093763.1745334856-494230604.1745334855.

market returns. In the 2025 update, JP Morgan detailed their 2025 expected long-term stock market return of 6.70%, bond yield of 3.80%, and resulting market risk premium of 3.90%.[37]

Figure 14
KPMG
Market Risk Premium Recommendations
2017–2025



https://indialogue.io/clients/reports/public/5d9da61986db2894649a7ef2/5d9da63386db2894649a7ef5

Finally, KPMG, the international accounting firm, regularly publishes an update to their market risk premium to be used in their valuation practice. KPMG's market risk premium is shown in Figure 13, which was as high as 6.75% in 2020, and was lowered to as low as 5.00% on September 30, 2021. KPMG increased its market risk premium to 6.00% on June 30, 2022, but lowered it to 5.75% on December 31, 2022, to 5.50% on March 31, 2023, to 5.25% on June 30, 2023, and to 5.00% on September 30, 2023.[38]

Q. GIVEN THESE RESULTS, WHAT MARKET RISK PREMIUM ARE YOU USING IN YOUR CAPM?

A. The studies in Exhibit JRW-6-6 and, more importantly, the more timely and relevant studies cited in the previous section, suggest that the appropriate market risk premium in

[37] JP Morgan, *2025 Long-Term Capital Market Assumptions*, 2025.

[38] *KPMG Corporate Finance & Valuations NL Recommends A MRP of 5.0% as per March 31, 2024*, KMPG (Mar. 31, 2024). https://indialogue.io/clients/reports/public/5d9da61986db2894649a7ef2/5d9da 63386db2894649a7ef5.

the U.S. is in the 4.0% to 6.0% range. I give the most weight to the market risk-premium estimates of Kroll (5.50%), KPMG (5.00%), JP Morgan (3.90%), Damodaran (4.43%), and the Fernandez (5.50%) and Duke-CFO surveys (5.20%). The average of these approaches is 4.92%. Given the recent reported market risk premiums of Kroll, Fernandez, and Duke-CFO, I believe a market risk premium in the 5.0%-5.5% is appropriate at this time. I will use the midpoint of this range, 5.25%, as my CAPM market risk premium.

Q. WHAT EQUITY COST RATE IS INDICATED BY YOUR CAPM ANALYSIS?

A. The results of my CAPM study for the proxy group are summarized on page 1 of Exhibit JRW-6 and in Table 8.

Table 8
CAPM-derived Equity Cost Rate/ROE
K = (R_f) + ß * $[E(R_m) - (R_f)]$

	Risk-Free Rate	Beta	Equity Risk Premium	Equity Cost Rate
Electric Proxy Group	**5.0%**	**0.76**	**5.25%**	**9.00%**
Bulkley Proxy Group	**5.0%**	**0.74**	**5.25%**	**8.85%**

For the Electric Proxy Group, the risk-free rate of 5.0% plus the product of the beta of 0.76 times the equity risk premium of 5.25% results in a 9.00% equity cost rate. For the Bulkley Proxy Group, the risk-free rate of 5.0% plus the product of the ß of 0.74 times the equity risk premium of 5.25% results in an 8.85% equity cost rate.

D. Equity Cost Rate Summary

Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE THE RESULTS OF YOUR EQUITY COST RATE STUDIES.

A. Table 9 provides my DCF and CAPM analyses for the proxy groups.

Table 9
ROEs Derived from DCF and CAPM Models

	DCF	CAPM
Electric Proxy Group	**9.80%**	**9.00%**
Bulkley Proxy Group	**9.60%**	**8.85%**

Q. GIVEN THESE RESULTS, WHAT IS YOUR ESTIMATED EQUITY COST RATE FOR THE GROUPS?

A. Given these results, I conclude that the appropriate equity cost rate for companies in the Electric and Bulkley Proxy Groups is in the 8.85% to 9.80% range. Given that: (1) I rely primarily on the DCF model and the results for the Electric Proxy Group; (2) I have recommended a capital structure with a higher common equity ratio and lower financial risk than the two proxy groups; (3) the Companies' investment risk is a little below the average of the proxy groups; and (4) the recent market volatility and increase in interest rates, I am using a ROE of 9.50% for the Companies. Despite EKC's investment risk and my recommended common equity ratio, I have employed a ROE above the midpoint of the 8.85%-9.80% range (9.30%) due to factor (4) the rise in market volatility and interest rates.

Q. PLEASE INDICATE WHY AN EQUITY COST RATE OF 9.50% IS APPROPRIATE FOR THE COMPANIES.

A. A number of reasons support an equity cost rate of 9.50% as appropriate and fair for the Companies:

1. The Companies' proposed capital structures have more common equity and less financial risk than the companies in the proxy groups.

2. The investment risk of the Companies is a little below the average of the proxy groups. The S&P and Moody's credit ratings of BBB+ and Baa1 for EKC are a

little better than the averages of the proxy groups, which are BBB+ and Baa2.

3. As Table 6 (page 37) shows, the electric utility industry is among the lowest risk industries in the U.S. as measured by beta. As such, according to CAPM, the cost of equity capital for this industry is among the lowest in the U.S.

4. On an annual basis, the average authorized ROEs for electric utility companies have been 9.54% in 2022, and 9.60% in 2023, 9.70% in 2024, and 9.72% in the first quarter of 2025, according to Regulatory Research Associates.[39] As I discuss above, authorized ROEs have lagged behind capital market cost rates. This observation is supported by the Werner and Jarvis (2022) study which evaluated over 3,500 authorized ROEs over the past four decades and concluded that authorized ROEs did not decline in line with capital costs and therefore past authorized ROEs have overstated the actual cost of equity capital. Accordingly, I believe my recommended ROE reflects the current capital market environment.

Q. DOES YOUR 9.50% ROE RECOMMENDATION MEET THE *HOPE* AND *BLUEFIELD* STANDARDS?

A. Yes. As I previously noted, according to the *Hope* and *Bluefield* decisions, returns on capital should be: (1) comparable to returns investors expect to earn on other investments of similar risk; (2) sufficient to assure confidence in the company's financial integrity; and (3) adequate to maintain and support the company's credit and to attract capital. As page 3 of Exhibit JRW-2 shows, electric utility companies have been earning in the 8.0% to 10.0% range in recent years, they have investment-grade bond ratings, and their stocks sell well

[39] S&P Global Market Intelligence, *RRA Regulatory Focus* (2025).

above their book values. While my recommendation is below the average authorized ROEs for electric utility companies, it reflects the downward trend in authorized and earned ROEs of utilities.

VII. CRITIQUE OF THE COMPANIES' RATE OF RETURN TESTIMONY

Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE THE COMPANIES' COST OF CAPITAL RECOMMENDATION.

A. Mr. Ley has proposed capital structures consisting of 48.03% long-term debt and 51.97% equity for EKC. Mr. Ley has proposed a long-term debt cost rate of 4.641% for EKC. Ms. Bulkley proposes a ROE of 10.50% for the Companies. Based on these components, Mr. Ley has proposed an overall rate of return or cost of capital of 7.69% for EKC. These recommendations are summarized on page 1 of Exhibit JRW-7.

Q. WHAT ARE THE AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT IN ESTIMATING THE RATE OF RETURN OR COST OF CAPITAL IN THIS PROCEEDING?

A. As I discuss above, the primary issues related to the Companies' rate of return include the following: (1) capital market conditions; (2) the capital structure; (3) the Companies' investment risk, (4) DCF Approach; (5) CAPM Approach; (6) the alternative risk premium model; and (7) business and regulatory risks.

The capital market conditions, capital structure, and the Companies' investment risk were previously discussed. I address the remaining items below.

Q. PLEASE REVIEW MS. BULKLEY'S EQUITY COST RATE APPROACHES AND RESULTS.

A. Ms. Bulkley developed a proxy group of electric utilities and employed DCF, CAPM, and an alternative risk premium model as her equity cost rate approaches. Ms. Bulkley's equity cost rate estimates for the Companies are summarized on page 2 of Exhibit JRW-7. Based on these figures, Ms. Bulkley concludes that the appropriate equity cost rate is 10.50% for the Companies' electric utility operations.

A. DCF Approach

Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE MS. BULKLEY'S DCF ESTIMATES.

A. On pages 36-42 of her testimony and in Exhibit AEB-3, Ms. Bulkley develops an equity cost rate by applying the DCF model to her proxy group. Ms. Bulkley's DCF results are summarized on page 2 of Exhibit JRW-7. In the traditional DCF approach, the equity cost rate is the sum of the dividend yield and expected growth. Ms. Bulkley uses three dividend yield measures (30, 90, and 180 days) in the DCF models conducted. In the constant-growth DCF models, Ms. Bulkley has relied on the forecasted EPS growth rates of Zacks, Yahoo Finance, and *Value Line*. Ms. Bulkley's mean and median DCF ROEs, using average growth rates, range from 9.56% to 9.80%.

Q. WHAT ARE THE ISSUES IN MS. BULKLEY'S DCF ANALYSES?

A. The primary issues in Ms. Bulkley's DCF analyses are: (1) exclusively using the overly optimistic and upwardly biased EPS growth rate forecasts of Wall Street analysts and *Value Line*; and (2) claiming that the DCF results underestimate the market-determined cost of equity capital due to high utility stock valuations and low dividend yields.

1. Analysts' EPS Growth Rate Forecasts

Q. PLEASE DISCUSS MS. BULKLEY'S EXCLUSIVE RELIANCE ON THE PROJECTED GROWTH RATES OF WALL STREET ANALYSTS AND *VALUE LINE.*

A. Ms. Bulkley's exclusive reliance on the projected growth rates published by Wall Street analysts and *Value Line* inflates her estimates of growth rates. It seems highly unlikely that investors today would rely exclusively on the EPS growth-rate forecasts of Wall Street analysts and *Value Line* and ignore other growth-rate measures in arriving at their expected growth rates for equity investments.

As I previously stated, the appropriate growth rate in the DCF model is the dividend growth rate rather than the earnings growth rate. Hence, consideration must be given to other indicators of growth, including historical prospective dividend growth, internal growth, as well as projected earnings growth.

In addition, I have provided evidence that analysts' EPS growth rate projections are overly optimistic and upwardly biased. I have provided a discussion of this issue on pages 47-50 of this testimony and report on a study I conducted in Figure 11. Using the electric utilities and gas distribution companies covered by *Value Line*, this study demonstrates that the mean forecasted EPS growth rates are consistently greater than the achieved actual EPS growth rates over the 1985-2022 time period. Over the entire period, the mean forecasted EPS growth rate is over 200 basis points above the actual EPS growth rate. As such, the projected EPS growth rates for utilities are overly optimistic and upwardly based. Hence, exclusively using these growth rates as a DCF growth rate produces an overstated equity-

cost rate. In addition, I also highlighted a study by Szakmary, Conover, and Lancaster (2008) who evaluated the accuracy of *Value Line*'s three-to-five-year EPS growth rate forecasts using companies in the Dow Jones Industrial Average over a thirty-year time period and found these forecasted EPS growth rates to be significantly higher than the EPS growth rates that these companies subsequently achieved.[40]

B. CAPM Approach

Q. PLEASE DISCUSS MS. BULKLEY'S CAPM.

A. On pages 24-8 of her testimony and in Exhibit No. AEB-3, Ms. Bulkley develops an equity cost rate by applying the CAPM model to her proxy group. Ms. Bulkley develops an equity cost rate by using not only the traditional CAPM, but also the so-called Empirical CAPM ("ECAPM") model for her proxy group. Ms. Bulkley's CAPM/ECAPM results are summarized on page 2 of Exhibit JRW-7. The ECAPM is a variant of the traditional CAPM. The CAPM/ECAPM approach requires an estimate of the risk-free interest rate, Beta, and the equity risk premium. Ms. Bulkley uses: (1) current (4.52%), near-term projected (4.42%), and long-term projected (4.30%) 30-year Treasury yields; (2) betas from *Value Line* and Bloomberg; and (3) a market risk premium of 7.54%. Based on these figures, Ms. Bulkley finds CAPM/ECAPM equity cost rates ranging from 10.15% to 11.62%.

Q. WHAT ARE THE ERRORS IN MS. BULKLEY'S CAPM ANALYSIS?

A. The primary errors with Ms. Bulkley's CAPM/ECAPM analyses are: (1) the use of the ECAPM version of the CAPM and (2) the expected market risk premium of 7.54%.

[40] Szakmary, A., Conover, C., & Lancaster, C., *An Examination of* Value Line*'s Long-Term Projections*, J. BANKING & FIN., May 2008, at 820–33.

1. The Validity of the ECAPM Approach

Q. WHAT ISSUES DO YOU HAVE WITH MS. BULKLEY'S USE OF THE ECAPM?

A. ECAPM, as popularized by rate of return consultant Dr. Roger Morin, attempts to model the well-known finding of tests of the CAPM that have indicated the Security Market Line (SML) is not as steep as predicted by CAPM. Accordingly, ECAPM is an alternative version of the CAPM. However, the ECAPM has not been theoretically or empirically validated in refereed journals. The ECAPM provides for weights that are used to adjust the risk-free rate and market risk premium in applying ECAPM. Ms. Bulkley uses 0.25 and 0.75 factors to boost the equity risk premium measure but provides no empirical justification for those figures.

Beyond the lack of any theoretical or empirical validation of ECAPM, there are two errors in Ms. Bulkley's version of ECAPM: (1) I am not aware of any tests of the CAPM that use adjusted betas such as those used by Ms. Bulkley; and (2) adjusted betas, which were previously discussed already, address the empirical issues with CAPM. Specifically, the beta adjustment (1) increases the beta and resulting expected return for low beta (beta<1.0) stocks, and (2) decreases the beta and resulting expected return for high beta (beta>1.0) stocks.

2. Overstated Market Risk Premium

Q. PLEASE ASSESS MS. BULKLEY'S MARKET RISK PREMIUM DERIVED FROM APPLYING THE DCF MODEL TO THE S&P 500 USING *VALUE LINE* EPS GROWTH RATES.

A. The most blatant error in Ms. Bulkley's CAPM analysis is the magnitude of the market (or

equity) risk premium—which is then used to produce very high ROE results, as high as 11.32%. Ms. Bulkley develops an expected market risk premium by: (1) applying the DCF model to the S&P 500 to get an expected market return; and (2) subtracting the risk-free rate of interest. As shown in Table 10, Ms. Bulkley's estimated market return of 12.05% for the S&P 500 equals the sum of the dividend yield of 1.76% and expected EPS growth rate of 10.51%. The expected EPS growth rate is the average of the expected EPS growth rates from S&P. The primary error in this approach is Ms. Bulkley's expected DCF growth rate. As previously discussed, the expected EPS growth rates of Wall Street analysts are upwardly biased. In addition, as explained below, the projected growth rate is inconsistent with actual economic and earnings growth rates in the U.S.

Table 10
Bulkley CAPM Market Risk Premium

	S&P 500
Dividend Yield	1.46%
+ Expected EPS Growth	10.51%
= Expected Market Return	12.05%
+ Risk-Free Rate	4.52%
= Market Risk Premium	7.54%

Q. PLEASE PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INSIGHTS INTO THE EXPECTED STOCK MARKET RETURN OF 12.05%.

A. Simply put, the assumption of a 12.05% expected stock market return is excessive and unrealistic. According to Damodaran, the compounded annual return in the U.S. stock market between 1928 and 2024 was about 10% (9.80%).[41] Ms. Bulkley's CAPM results assume that the return on the U.S. stock market will be about 20 percent higher in the future than it has been in the past. The high expected stock market return, and the resulting market risk premium and equity cost rate results are directly related to computing the expected stock market return as the sum of the adjusted dividend yield plus the expected EPS growth rate of 10.51%.

Q. IS MS. BULKLEY'S EXPECTED STOCK MARKET RETURN OF 12.05% REFLECTIVE OF THE STOCK MARKET RETURNS THAT INVESTMENT FIRMS TELL INVESTORS TO EXPECT?

A. No. Many investment firms provide investors with their estimates of the annual stock returns that they should expect in the future. Most publish these expected returns in documents entitled "Capital Market Assumptions" which are available at their websites. If you google "Capital Market Assumptions," you get a long list of investment firms and their base case expected annual return assumptions for stocks, bonds, and other financial assets. In my search, I found thirty investment firms that published their capital market assumptions. These are listed in Exhibit JRW-8, and include many of the largest, best-known investment firms, including J.P. Morgan, BlackRock, BNY Mellon, Fidelity

[41] Aswath Damodaran, *Damodaran Online*, N.Y. Univ., http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/.

Investments, Northern Trust, Vanguard Group, and State Street. Combined, these thirty firms manage more than $50 trillion in assets under management.

Figure 15 provides a histogram of the expected returns listed in Exhibit JRW-8. The average duration of the long-term forecasts is 10 years. The range of the forecasted U.S. annual large cap equity returns is 4.00% to 9.50%. The mean and standard deviation of these expected returns are 6.87% and 1.28%.

Figure 15
Histogram of Investment Firm Expected Large Cap Equity Annual Returns
2023



Date Source: Exhibit JRW-8.

Q. WHAT ARE YOUR OBSERVATIONS ON THE STOCK MARKET RETURNS THAT INVESTMENT FIRMS TELL INVESTORS TO EXPECT?

A. I have three comments: (1) These returns are below the historical average compounded annual stock market return of 9.64% cited above (more on this below); (2) the standard deviation of 1.28% is very low, which indicates that the expected returns provided by these firms are quite similar, especially compared to historical stock market returns; and (3) these expected returns indicate Ms. Bulkley's average expected stock market return of 12.05% is almost double the average annual return investment firms tell investors they should expect.

Q. WHY DO YOU THINK THE STOCK MARKET RETURNS THAT INVESTMENT FIRMS TELL INVESTORS TO EXPECT ARE LOWER THAN HISTORICAL STOCK RETURNS?

A. The biggest factor is that the valuation of the overall stock market is high relative to historical standards. When stock prices are high, investors have to pay higher prices to buy in, which lowers their future expected returns. Figure 16 provides Schiller's cyclically-adjusted PE ratio (CAPE) over the last 100+ years.[42] Stocks prices have remained above the mean historical CAPE level of 17.02% since 2009, with a current level of 28.80. Hence, the higher valuation of the stock market leads to lower expected returns.

Figure 16
Schiller S&P 500 CAPE Ratio
2023

The Schiller S&P 500 CAPE ratio is based on average inflation-adjusted earnings from the previous 10 years. Data Source: https://www.multpl.com/shiller-pe.

Q. HOW DO ISSUES WITH ANALYSTS' EPS GROWTH RATE FORECASTS IMPACT MS. BULKLEY'S CAPM?

A. The key point is that Ms. Bulkley's CAPM market risk premium methodology is based

[42] The S&P 500 Shiller CAPE Ratio is defined as the ratio the S&P 500's current price divided by the 10-year moving average of inflation-adjusted earnings. The metric was developed by economist Robert Shiller and is used to understand the valuation of the stock market. A higher (lower) CAPE ratio suggests lower (higher) returns in the future.

entirely on the concept that analyst projections of companies' three-to-five-year EPS growth rates reflects investors' expected *long-term* EPS growth for those companies. However, this assumption is highly unrealistic given the published research on these projections. As previously noted, numerous studies have shown that the long-term EPS growth rate forecasts of Wall Street securities analysts are overly optimistic and upwardly biased.[43] Moreover, as I discuss above, the Lacina, Lee, and Xu study showed that analysts' forecasts of EPS growth over the next three-to-five years are no more accurate than their forecasts of the next single year's EPS growth (and the single year forecasts are notoriously inaccurate). The overly optimistic inaccuracy of analysts' growth rate forecasts leads to an upward bias in equity cost estimates estimated at about 300 basis points.[44]

I have also completed studies on the accuracy of analysts' projected EPS growth rates. In Figure 11 (page 49), I demonstrated that the EPS growth rate forecasts of Wall Street analysts are upwardly biased for electric utilities and gas distribution companies. In Figure 17, I provide the results of a study I performed using all companies followed by I/B/E/S who have three-to-five-year EPS growth rate forecasts over the 1985–2022 time period.

In this study, for each company with a three-to-five-year forecast, I compared the average three-to-five-year average EPS growth rate forecasts to the actual EPS growth rates

[43] Such studies include: R.D. Harris, *The Accuracy, Bias, and Efficiency of Analysts' Long Run Earnings Growth Forecasts, J. of Business Fin. & Accounting*, 725–55 (June/July 1999); P. DeChow, A. Hutton, and R. Sloan, *The Relation Between Analysts' Forecasts of Long-Term Earnings Growth and Stock Price Performance Following Equity Offerings*, Contemporary Accounting Research (2000); K. Chan, L., Karceski, J., & Lakonishok, J., *The Level and Persistence of Growth Rates, J. of Fin.* 643−84 (2003); 8 Michael Lacina, B. Brian Lee, and Zhao Xu, *Advances in Business and Management Forecasting*, at 77–101 (Kenneth D. Lawrence, Ronald K. Klimberg, eds., Emerald Grp. Publ'g Ltd. 2011).

[44] Peter D. Easton & Gregory A. Sommers, *Effect of Analysts' Optimism on Estimates of the Expected Rate of Return Implied by Earnings Forecasts*, 45 *J. of Accounting Research*, 983–1015 (2007).

achieved over the three-to-five-year time period. In Figure 17, the mean of the projected EPS growth rates is the red line and the mean of the actual EPS growth rates is the blue line. Over the thirty-five years of the study, the mean projected three-to-five-year EPS growth rate was 12.50%, while the average actual achieved three-to-five-year EPS growth rate was 6.50%. This study demonstrates that the projected three-to-five-year EPS growth rate forecasts are upwardly biased and overly optimistic. As can be seen by comparing Figures 11 and 17, the degree of upward bias for all companies is much larger than it is for electric and gas utility companies.

Figure 17
Mean Forecasted vs. Actual Long-Term EPS Growth Rates
All Companies Covered by I/B/E/S
1985–2022



Data Source: I/B/E/S, 2023.

Q. HAVE CHANGES IN REGULATIONS IMPACTING WALL STREET ANALYSTS AND THEIR RESEARCH IMPACTED THE UPWARD BIAS IN THEIR THREE-TO-FIVE YEAR EPS GROWTH-RATE FORECASTS?

A. No. A number of the studies I have cited here demonstrate that the upward bias has continued, despite changes in regulations and reporting requirements over the past two decades. This observation is highlighted by a 2010 McKinsey study entitled "Equity

Analysts: Still Too Bullish," which involved a study of the accuracy of analysts' long-term, EPS-growth-rate forecasts. The authors conclude that after a decade of stricter regulation, analysts' long-term earnings forecasts continue to be excessively optimistic. They made the following observation:

> Alas, a recently completed update of our work only reinforces this view—despite a series of rules and regulations, dating to the last decade, that were intended to improve the quality of the analysts' long-term earnings forecasts, restore investor confidence in them, and prevent conflicts of interest. For executives, many of whom go to great lengths to satisfy Wall Street's expectations in their financial reporting and long-term strategic moves, this is a cautionary tale worth remembering. This pattern confirms our earlier findings that analysts typically lag behind events in revising their forecasts to reflect new economic conditions. When economic growth accelerates, the size of the forecast error declines; when economic growth slows, it increases. So as economic growth cycles up and down, the actual earnings S&P 500 companies report occasionally coincide with the analysts' forecasts, as they did, for example, in 1988, from 1994 to 1997, and from 2003 to 2006. *Moreover, analysts have been persistently overoptimistic for the past 25 years, with estimates ranging from 10 to 12 percent a year, compared with actual earnings growth of 6 percent. Over this time frame, actual earnings growth surpassed forecasts in only two instances, both during the earnings recovery following a recession. On average, analysts' forecasts have been almost 100 percent too high.*[45] (*Emphasis Added).*

This is the same observation made in a *Bloomberg Businessweek* article. The author concluded:

> ***The bottom line:*** *Despite reforms intended to improve Wall Street research, stock analysts seem to be promoting an overly rosy view of profit prospects.* [46]

[45] Marc H. Goedhart, Rishi Raj, and Abhishek Saxena, "Equity Analysts, Still Too Bullish," *McKinsey on Finance,* pp. 14-17, (Spring 2010) (emphasis added).

[46] Roben Farzad, "For Analysts, Things Are Always Looking Up," *Bloomberg Businessweek* (June 10, 2010), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2010-06-10/for-analysts-things-are-always-looking-up.

Q. IS MS. BULKLEY'S MARKET RISK PREMIUM OF 7.54% REFLECTIVE OF THE MARKET RISK PREMIUMS FOUND IN PUBLISHED STUDIES AND SURVEYS?

A. No. This figure is well in excess of market risk premiums: (1) found in studies of the market risk premium by leading academic scholars, (2) produced by analyses of historic stock and bond returns, and (3) found in surveys of financial professionals. Page 6 of Exhibit JRW-6 provides the results of over 30 market risk premium studies from the past 15 years.[47] Historic stock and bond returns suggest a market risk premium in the 4.40%–6.64% range, depending on whether one uses arithmetic or geometric mean returns. There have been many studies using expected return (also called *ex ante*) models, and their market risk premiums results vary from as low as 3.32% to as high as 6.0%. Finally, the market risk premiums developed from surveys of analysts, companies, financial professionals, and academics suggest even potentially lower market risk premiums, in a range from 3.15% to 5.70%. The bottom line is that there is no support in historic return data, surveys, academic studies, or reports for investment firms for a market risk premium as high as 7.54% used by Ms. Bulkley.

Q. IS THERE OTHER EVIDENCE THAT INDICATES THAT MS. BULKLEY'S MARKET RISK PREMIUM IS EXCESSIVE?

A. Yes. A long-term EPS growth rate of 10.51% is inconsistent with both historic and projected economic and earnings growth in the U.S. for several reasons: (1) long-term EPS and economic growth is about one-half of Ms. Bulkley's projected EPS growth rate of

[47] *See* Woolridge, Exh. JRW-6 at 6.

10.51%; (2) long-term EPS and GDP growth are directly linked; and (3) more recent trends in GDP growth, as well as projections of GDP growth, suggest slower economic and earnings growth in the near future, during the period when the rates from this case will be effective.

Long-Term Historic EPS and GDP Growth Have Been in the 6%–7% Range: In Exhibit JRW-9, I performed a study of the growth in nominal GDP, S&P 500 stock price appreciation, and S&P 500 EPS and DPS growth since 1960. The results are provided on page 1 of Exhibit JRW-8, and a summary is shown in Table 11.[48]

Table 11
GDP, S&P 500 Stock Price, EPS, and DPS Growth
1960-Present

Nominal GDP	**6.43%**
S&P 500 Stock Price	**7.48%**
S&P 500 EPS	**7.05%**
S&P 500 DPS	**5.81%**
Average	**6.69%**

The results show that the historical long-run growth rates for GDP, S&P EPS, and S&P DPS are in the 6% to 7% range. By comparison, Ms. Bulkley's long-run growth rate projection of 10.51% is, at best, overstated. This estimate suggests that companies in the U.S. would be expected to: (1) increase their growth rate of EPS by almost 100 percent in the future and (2) maintain that growth indefinitely in an economy that is expected to grow at about one-third of Ms. Bulkley's projected growth rates.

There is a Direct Link Between Long-Term EPS and GDP Growth: The results in Exhibit JRW-9 and Table 11 show that historically there has been a close link between

[48] *See* Woolridge, Exh. JRW-8 at 1.

long-term EPS and GDP growth rates. Brad Cornell of the California Institute of Technology published a study on GDP growth, earnings growth, and equity returns. Mr. Cornell finds that long-term EPS growth in the U.S. is directly related to GDP growth, with GDP growth providing an upward limit on EPS growth. In addition, the study finds that long-term stock returns are determined by long-term earnings growth. Cornell concludes with the following observations:[49]

> The long-run performance of equity investments is fundamentally linked to growth in earnings. Earnings growth, in turn, depends on growth in real GDP. This article demonstrates that both theoretical research and empirical research in development economics suggest relatively strict limits on future growth. In particular, real GDP growth in excess of 3 percent in the long run is highly unlikely in the developed world. In light of ongoing dilution in earnings per share, this finding implies that investors should anticipate real returns on U.S. common stocks to average no more than about 4–5 percent in real terms.

Annual Growth rates in nominal GDP are shown on page 2 of Exhibit JRW-9. Nominal GDP growth was in the four percent range over the past decade until the COVID-19 Pandemic hit in 2020. Nominal GDP fell by 2.2% in 2020, before rebounding and growing by over 10.0% in 2021 and in 2022. The components of nominal GDP growth are real GDP growth and inflation. Page 3 of Exhibit JRW-9 shows the annual real GDP growth rate between 1961 and 2022. Real GDP growth has gradually declined from the 5.0 percent to 6.0 percent range in the 1960s to the 2.0% to 3.0% range during the 2015–2019 period. Real GDP fell by 3.5% in 2020 but rebounded and grew by 5.7% in 2021 and 2.1% in 2022.

The second component of nominal GDP growth is inflation. Page 4 of Exhibit JRW-

[49] Bradford Cornell, *Economic Growth and Equity Investing*, Fin. Analysts J. at 63 (Jan.-Feb. 2010).

9 shows inflation as measured by the annual growth rate in the Consumer Price Index ("CPI") from 1961 to 2022. The large increase in prices from the late 1960s to the early 1980s is readily evident. Equally evident is the rapid decline in inflation during the 1980s as inflation declined from above ten percent to about four percent. Since that time, inflation has gradually declined and was in the 2.0% range or below from 2015 to 2020. Prices increased in 2021 and 2022 with the rebounding economy and increased by 4.7% in 2021 and 8.0% in 2022. Year-over-year inflation in 2022 jumped to 40-year highs in 2022 due to supply chain issues and the Russia-Ukraine conflict, but longer-term inflation is expected to be in the 2.0%–3.0% range.

The graphs on pages 2, 3, and 4 of Exhibit JRW-9 provide clear evidence of the decline, in recent decades, in nominal GDP as well as its components, real GDP, and inflation. To gauge the magnitude of the decline in nominal GDP growth, Table 12 provides the compounded GDP growth rates for 10-, 20-, 30-, 40- and 50- years. Whereas the 50-year compounded GDP growth rate is 6.16%, there has been a near monotonic and significant decline in nominal GDP growth over subsequent 10-year intervals. These figures strongly suggest that nominal GDP growth in recent decades has slowed and that a figure in the range of 4.0% to 5.0% is more appropriate today for the U.S. economy.

Table 12
Historical Nominal GDP Growth Rates

10-Year Average	**5.22%**
20-Year Average	**4.45%**
30-Year Average	**4.73%**
40-Year Average	**5.07%**
50-Year Average	**6.05%**

Long-Term GDP Projections also Indicate Slower GDP Growth in the Future: A lower range is also consistent with long-term GDP forecasts. There are several forecasts of annual GDP growth that are available from economists and government agencies. These are listed in Panel B of Exhibit JRW-9, at 5.

The mean 10-year nominal GDP growth forecast (as of February 2024) by economists in the recent *Survey of Financial Forecasters* is 4.24%.[50] The Energy Information Administration (EIA), in its projections used in preparing *Annual Energy Outlook*, forecasts long-term GDP growth of 4.3% for the period 2023 to 2053.[51] The Congressional Budget Office (CBO), in its forecasts for the period 2023 to 2053, projects a nominal GDP growth rate of 3.8%.[52] Finally, the Social Security Administration (SSA), in its Annual OASDI Report, provides a projection of nominal GDP from 2023 to 2100.[53] SSA's projected growth GDP growth rate over this period is 4.1%. The average projected GDP growth rate for these four forecasts is 4.15%.

The bottom line is that the trends and projections suggest a long-term GDP growth rate in the 4.0% to 4.5% range. As such, Ms. Bulkley's average projected EPS growth rate of 10.51% is more than double the projected GDP growth.

[50] Ten-year 2024 median projected real GDP growth of 2.00% and CPI inflation of 2.24%. *Survey of Professional Forecasters*, Fed. Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, https://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/real-time-center/survey-of-professional-forecasters/.

[51] *Annual Energy Outlook 2023*, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, Table: Macroeconomic Indicators.

[52] *The 2023 Long-Term Budget Outlook*, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, July 15, 2023.

[53] Social Security Administration, *2023 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) Program*, Table VI.G4, (July 1, 2023). The 4.1% growth rate is the growth in projected GDP from 2023 to 2100.

Q. WHAT FUNDAMENTAL FACTORS HAVE LED TO THE DECLINE IN PROSPECTIVE GDP GROWTH?

A. As addressed in a study by the consulting firm McKinsey & Co., two factors drive real GDP growth over time: (a) the number of workers in the economy (employment); and (2) the productivity of those workers (usually defined as output per hour).[54] According to McKinsey, population and productivity growth drove real GDP growth over the past 50 years, at compound annual rates of 1.7% and 1.8%, respectively.

However, global economic growth is projected to slow significantly in the years to come. The primary factor leading to the decline is slow growth in employment (working-age population), which results from slower population growth and longer life expectancy. McKinsey estimates that employment growth will slow to 0.3% over the next 50 years. They conclude that even if productivity remains at the rapid rate of the past 50 years of 1.8%, real GDP growth will fall by 40% to 2.1%.

Q. OVER THE MEDIUM TO LONG RUN, IS S&P 500 EPS GROWTH LIKELY TO OUTPACE GDP GROWTH?

A. No. Figure 18 shows the average annual growth rates for GDP and the S&P 500 EPS since 1960. The one very apparent difference between the two is that the S&P 500 EPS growth rates are much more volatile than the GDP growth rates, when compared using the relatively short, and somewhat arbitrary, annual conventions used in these data.[55]

[54] James Manyika, et al., *Can Long-Term Growth be Saved*?, McKinsey Global Institute. (Jan. 1, 2015), https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/employment-and-growth/can-long-term-global-growth-be-saved.

[55] Timing conventions such as years and quarters are needed for measurement and benchmarking but are somewhat arbitrary. In reality, economic growth and profit accrual occur on continuous bases. A 2014 study evaluated the timing relationship between corporate profits and nominal GDP growth. The authors found that aggregate accounting earnings growth is a leading indicator of the GDP growth with a quarter-ahead forecast horizon. *See*

Volatility aside, it is clear that over the medium to long run, S&P 500 EPS growth does not significantly outpace GDP growth.

Figure 18
Average Annual Growth Rates
GDP and S&P 500 EPS
1960-2022



Data Sources: GDPA - http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GDPA/downloaddata.
S&P EPS - http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/.

A fuller understanding of the relationship between GDP and S&P 500 EPS growth requires consideration of at least three factors, as follows.

Corporate Profits are Constrained by GDP: In a *Fortune* magazine article, Milton Friedman, the winner of the 1976 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences, warned investors and others not to expect corporate-profit growth to sustainably exceed GDP growth, stating, "Beware of predictions that earnings can grow faster than the economy for long periods. When earnings are exceptionally high, they don't just keep booming."[56] In that same article, Friedman also noted that profits must move back down to their traditional share of GDP. In Table 13, I show that the aggregate net income levels for the S&P 500 companies, using 2024 figures, represent 6.43% of nominal GDP.

Table 13

Yaniv Konchitchki and Panos N. Patatoukas, *Accounting Earnings and Gross Domestic Product*, 57 *J. of Accounting and Economics* 76–88 (2014).

[56] Shaun Tully, *Corporate Profits Are Soaring. Here's Why It Can't Last*, Fortune, Dec. 7, 2017, http://fortune.com/2017/12/07/corporate-earnings-profit-boom-end/.

S&P 500 Aggregate Net Income as a Percent of GDP

	2024 Value ($B)
Aggregate Net Income for S&P 500	$1,912,184.00
2024 Nominal U.S. GDP	29,719,684.00
Net Income/GDP (%)	6.43%

Data Sources: 2024 Net Income for S&P 500 companies
https://www.gurufocus.com/economic_indicators/5749/sp-500-net-income-ttm.
2022 Nominal GDP – https://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/.

Short-Term Factors Impact S&P 500 EPS: The growth rates in the S&P 500 EPS and GDP can diverge on a year-to-year basis due to short-term factors that impact S&P 500 EPS in a much greater way than GDP. As shown above, S&P EPS growth rates are much more volatile than GDP growth rates. The EPS growth for the S&P 500 companies has been influenced by low labor costs and interest rates, commodity prices, the recovery of different sectors such as the energy and financial sectors, and the cut in corporate tax rates. These short-term factors can make it appear that there is a disconnect between the economy and corporate profits.

The Differences Between the S&P 500 EPS and GDP: In the recent years, as the EPS for the S&P 500 has grown at a faster rate than U.S. nominal GDP, some have in the financial press have questioned the earnings and GDP relationship, and highlighted the differences between the S&P 500 and GDP.[57] These differences include: (a) corporate profits are about 2/3 manufacturing driven, while GDP is 2/3 services driven; (b) consumer discretionary spending accounts for a smaller share of S&P 500 profits (15%) than of GDP

[57] *See* the following studies: Burt White and Jeff Buchbinder, *The S&P and GDP are not the Same Thing*, LPL Fin. (Nov. 4, 2014, 11:31 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/sp-is-not-gdp-2014-11; Matt Comer, *How Do We Have 18.4% Earnings Growth In A 2.58% GDP Economy*?, Seeking Alpha (Apr. 19, 2018, 1:04 PM), https://seekingalpha.com/article/4164052-18_4-percent-earnings-growth-2_58-percent-gdp-economy; Shaun Tully, *How on Earth Can Profits Grow at 10% in a 2% Economy*?, Fortune, (July 27, 2017, 1:26 PM), http://fortune.com/2017/07/27/profits-economic-growth/.

(23%); (c) corporate profits are more international-trade driven, while exports minus imports tend to drag on GDP; and (d) S&P 500 EPS is affected not just by corporate profits but also by share buybacks on the positive side (fewer shares boost EPS), and by share dilution on the negative side (new shares dilute EPS). While these differences may seem significant, it must be remembered that the Income Approach to measure GDP includes corporate profits (in addition to employee compensation and taxes on production and imports) and therefore effectively accounts for the first three factors.[58]

The bottom line is that, despite the intertemporal short-term differences between S&P 500 EPS and nominal GDP growth, corporate profits and GDP remain inevitably linked over the long-term.

Q. PLEASE PROVIDE ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT MS. BULKLEY'S S&P 500 EPS GROWTH RATE OF 10.51% IS NOT REALISTIC.

A. Beyond my previous discussion, I have performed the following analysis of S&P 500 EPS and GDP growth in Table 14. Specifically, I started with the 2024 aggregate net income for the S&P 500 companies and 2024 nominal GDP for the U.S. As shown in Table 13, the aggregate profit for the S&P 500 companies represented 6.43% of nominal GDP in 2024. In Table 14, I then projected the aggregate net income level for the S&P 500 companies and GDP as of the year 2050. For the growth rate for the S&P 500 companies, I used Ms. Bulkley's average projected S&P 500 EPS growth rate of 10.51%. As a growth rate for nominal GDP, I used the average of the long-term projected GDP growth rates from CBO, SFF, SSA, and EIA (3.8%, 4.4%, 4.1%, and 4.3%, respectively), which is 4.15%. The

[58] The Income Approach to measuring GDP includes wages, salaries, and supplementary labor income, corporate profits, interest and miscellaneous investment income, farmers' incomes, and income from non-farm unincorporated businesses.

projected 2050 level for the aggregate net income level for the S&P 500 companies using Ms. Bulkley's 10.51% EPS growth rate is $25.70 trillion. Over the same period, GDP is expected to grow to $85.54 trillion. As such, if the aggregate net income for the S&P 500 grows in accordance with the growth rate used by Ms. Bulkley (10.51%), and if nominal GDP grows at rates projected by major government agencies (4.15%), the net income of the S&P 500 companies will represent growth from 6.43% of GDP in 2024 to 30.05% of GDP in 2050. It is totally unrealistic for the net income of the S&P 500 to become such a large component of GDP.

Table 14
Projected S&P 500 Earnings and Nominal GDP
2024–2050
S&P 500 Aggregate Net Income as a Percent of GDP

	2024 Value ($B)	Growth Rate	No. of Years	2050 Value ($B)
Aggregate Net Income for S&P 500	$1,912,184	10.51%	26	$25,702,226
2024 Nominal U.S. GDP	$29,719,684	4.15%	26	$85,543,166
Net Income/GDP (%)	6.43%			30.05%

Data Sources: 2024 Net Income for S&P 500 companies
https://www.gurufocus.com/economic_indicators/5749/sp-500-net-income-ttm.
Growth Rate - Ms. Bulkley's average projected S&P 500 EPS growth rate of 10.51%.
Nominal GDP Growth Rate – The average of the long-term projected GDP growth rates from CBO, SFF, SSA, and EIA (3.8%, 4.4%, 4.1%, and 4.3% = 4.15%).

Q. PLEASE PROVIDE A SUMMARY ASSESSMENT OF GDP AND S&P 500 EPS GROWTH RATES.

A. The long-term link between corporate profits and GDP is inevitable. The short-term differences in growth between the two indicate that corporate profits as a share of GDP tend to go far higher after periods where they are depressed and then drop sharply after they have been hovering at historically high levels. In a famous 1999 *Fortune* article,

Warren Buffet made the following observation:[59]

> You know, someone once told me that New York has more lawyers than people. I think that's the same fellow who thinks profits will become larger than GDP. When you begin to expect the growth of a component factor to forever outpace that of the aggregate, you get into certain mathematical problems. In my opinion, you have to be wildly optimistic to believe that corporate profits as a percent of GDP can, for any sustained period, hold much above 6%.

In sum, Ms. Bulkley's average long-term S&P 500 EPS growth rate of 10.51% is highly overstated and has little (if any) basis in economic reality. In the end, the question remains whether corporate profits can grow faster than GDP. Jeremy Siegel, the renowned finance professor at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, believes that going forward, earnings per share can grow about half a point faster than nominal GDP, or about five percent, due to the big gains in the technology sector. But Siegel also believes that sustained EPS growth matching analysts' near-term projections is absurd: "The idea of 8% or 10% or 12% growth is ridiculous. It will not happen."[60]

C. Alternative Risk Premium Approach

Q. PLEASE REVIEW MS. BULKLEY'S ALTERNATIVE RISK PREMIUM MODEL.

A. On pages 33-7 of her testimony and in Exhibit No. AEB-7, Ms. Bulkley estimates an equity cost rate using a risk premium model. Using the quarterly authorized ROEs for electric utility companies from Q1 1992 until Q3 2024, Ms. Bulkley develops an equity cost rate by

[59] Carol Loomis, *Mr. Buffet on the Stock Market*, Fortune (Nov. 22, 1999), https://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/1999/11/22/269071/.

[60] Shaun Tully, *Corporate Profits Are Soaring. Here's Why It Can't Last*, *Fortune* (Dec. 7, 2017, 3:30 AM), http://fortune.com/2017/12/07/corporate-earnings-profit-boom-end/.

regressing the authorized returns on equity for electric utility companies on the 30-year Treasury Yield. She then adds the risk premium established by regressing the authorized returns on equity to each of her three different 30-year Treasury yields: (a) a current yield of 4.07%, (b) a near-term projected yield of 4.02%, and (c) a long-term projected yield of 4.30%. Ms. Bulkley's risk premium results are provided on page 2 of Exhibit JRW-7. Ms. Bulkley reports risk premium equity cost rates ranging from 10.24% to 10.41%.

Q. WHAT ARE THE ERRORS IN MS. BULKLEY'S BOND YIELD PLUS RISK PREMIUM ("BYRP") ANALYSIS?

A. There are several problems with this approach for calculating the risk premium.

First, the methodology produces an inflated measure of the risk premium because it uses historic authorized ROEs and Treasury yields, and the resulting risk premium is applied to projected Treasury yields. Since Treasury yields are always forecasted to increase, the resulting risk premium would be smaller if done correctly, which would be the result using projected Treasury yields in the analysis rather than historic Treasury yields.

Second, Ms. Bulkley's risk premium approach is a gauge of *regulator* behavior and not *investor* behavior. Capital costs are determined in the marketplace through the financial decisions of investors and are reflected in such fundamental factors as dividend yields, expected growth rates, interest rates, and investors' assessment of the risk and expected return of different investments. Regulatory commissions evaluate capital market data in setting authorized ROEs, but also consider other utility- and rate case-specific information in setting ROEs. As such, Ms. Bulkley's approach and results reflect other factors such as capital structure, credit ratings and other risk measures, service territory, capital

expenditures, energy supply issues, rate design, investment and expense trackers, and other factors used by utility commissions in determining an appropriate ROE in addition to capital costs. This may especially be true when the authorized ROE data includes the results of rate cases that are settled and not fully litigated.

Third, since the stocks of electric utilities have been selling above book value for the last decade, it is obvious that the authorized ROEs of state utility commissions are above the returns that investors require.

Fourth, the ROE derived from this approach is dependent on the authorized ROEs from state utility commissions. As discussed earlier in this testimony, Werner and Jarvis (2022), demonstrated that authorized ROEs over the past four decades have not declined in line with capital costs and therefore past authorized ROEs have overstated the actual cost of equity capital.

Q. HOW DO MS. BULKLEY'S RISK PREMIUM RESULTS COMPARE TO THE CURRENT AUTHORIZED ROES FOR ELECTRIC UTILITIES?

A. Ms. Bulkley reports ROE results as high as 10.41% from her risk premium model, which is based on authorized ROEs. By comparison, the average authorized ROE for electric utility companies in 2024 was 9.70% and 9.72% in the first quarter of 2024.

VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR TESTIMONY ON THE APPROPRIATE COST OF CAPITAL FOR THE COMPANIES.

A. I demonstrate that the Companies' proposed capital structure includes a higher common equity ratio and less financial risk than the averages of the two proxy groups. I also show that EVRG has $2.7 billion in debt at the holding company level. Allocating 50% of this debt to EKC, the resulting revised capital structure includes a common equity ratio of 45.93%. While this figure is still higher than the average of the proxy groups, in the interest of conservatism I will employ a capital structure with a common equity ratio of 50.0%. I am using a blended (EKC and EVRG) cost of long-term debt of 4.65%. I have applied the DCF Model and the CAPM to my proxy group of publicly-held electric utility companies and Ms. Bulkley's proxy group. These results indicate that the appropriate equity cost rate for companies in the Electric and Bulkley Proxy Groups is in the 8.85% to 9.80% range. Given that: (1) I rely primarily on the DCF model and the results for the Electric Proxy Group; (2) I have recommended a capital structure with a higher common equity ratio and lower financial risk than the two proxy groups; (3) the Companies' investment risk is slightly below the average of the proxy groups; and (4) the recent market volatility and increase in interest rates, I am using a ROE of 9.50% for the Companies. Given my proposed capital structure and capital cost rates for the Companies, I am recommending an overall fair rate of return or cost of capital of 7.07% for EKC. These are summarized in Table 2 and Exhibit JRW-1.

Q. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR TESTIMONY?

A. Yes.

VERIFICATION

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA)
)
COUNTY OF CENTRE) ss:

I, Dr. J. Randall Woolridge, being duly sworn upon his oath, deposes and states that he is a consultant for the Citizens' Utility Ratepayer Board, that he has read and is familiar with the foregoing *Direct Testimony*, and that the statements made herein are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief.

Dr. J. Randall Woolridge

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 6 day of June, 2025.

Notary Public

My Commission expires: October 21, 2025

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania - Notary Seal
Mandy L. McGee, Notary Public
Centre County
My commission expires October 21, 2025
Commission number 1218537
Member, Pennsylvania Association of Notaries

Appendix A

Educational Background, Research, and Related Business Experience
J. Randall Woolridge

J. Randall Woolridge is a Professor of Finance and the Goldman, Sachs & Co. and Frank P. Smeal Endowed Faculty Fellow in Business Administration in the College of Business Administration of the Pennsylvania State University in University Park, PA. In addition, Professor Woolridge is Director of the Smeal College Trading Room and President and CEO of the Nittany Lion Fund, LLC.

Professor Woolridge received a Bachelor of Arts degree in Economics from the University of North Carolina, a Master of Business Administration degree from the Pennsylvania State University, and a Doctor of Philosophy degree in Business Administration (major area-finance, minor area-statistics) from the University of Iowa. He has taught Finance courses including corporation finance, commercial and investment banking, and investments at the undergraduate, graduate, and executive MBA levels.

Professor Woolridge's research has centered on empirical issues in corporation finance and financial markets. He has published over 35 articles in the best academic and professional journals in the field, including the *Journal of Finance*, the *Journal of Financial Economics*, and the *Harvard Business Review*. His research has been cited extensively in the business press. His work has been featured in the *New York Times*, *Forbes*, *Fortune*, *The Economist*, *Barron's*, *Wall Street Journal*, *Business Week*, *Investors' Business Daily*, *USA Today*, and other publications. In addition, Dr. Woolridge has appeared as a guest to discuss the implications of his research on CNN's *Money Line*, CNBC's *Morning Call* and *Business Today*, and Bloomberg's *Morning Call*.

Professor Woolridge's co-authored stock valuation book, *The StreetSmart Guide to Valuing a Stock* (McGraw-Hill, 2003), was released in its second edition. He has also co-authored *Spinoffs and Equity Carve-Outs: Achieving Faster Growth and Better Performance* (Financial Executives Research Foundation, 1999), as well as a textbook entitled *Basic Principles of Finance* (Kendall Hunt, 2011).

Professor Woolridge has also consulted with corporations, financial institutions, and government agencies. In addition, he has directed and participated in university- and company-sponsored professional development programs for executives in 25 countries in North and South America, Europe, Asia, and Africa.

Over the past 35 years Dr. Woolridge has prepared testimony and/or provided consultation services in regulatory rate cases in the rate of return area in following states: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Washington, D.C. He has also testified before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

J. Randall Woolridge

Office Address
302 Business Building
The Pennsylvania State University
University Park, PA 16802
814-865-1160

Home Address
120 Haymaker Circle
State College, PA 16801
814-238-9428

Academic Experience

Professor of Finance, the Smeal College of Business Administration, the Pennsylvania State University (July 1, 1990 to the present).

President, Nittany Lion Fund LLC, (January 1, 2005 to the present)
Director, the Smeal College Trading Room (January 1, 2001 to the present)
Goldman, Sachs & Co. and Frank P. Smeal Endowed University Fellow in Business Administration (July 1, 1987 to the present).

Associate Professor of Finance, College of Business Administration, the Pennsylvania State University (July 1, 1984 to June 30, 1990).
Assistant Professor of Finance, College of Business Administration, the Pennsylvania State University (September, 1979 to June 30, 1984).

Education

Doctor of Philosophy in Business Administration, the University of Iowa. Major field: Finance.
Master of Business Administration, the Pennsylvania State University.
Bachelor of Arts, the University of North Carolina. Major field: Economics.

Books

James A. Miles and J. Randall Woolridge, *Spinoffs and Equity Carve-Outs: Achieving Faster Growth and Better Performance* (Financial Executives Research Foundation), 1999
Patrick Cusatis, Gary Gray, and J. Randall Woolridge, *The StreetSmart Guide to Valuing a Stock* (2nd Edition, McGraw-Hill), 2003.
J. Randall Woolridge and Gary Gray, *The New Corporate Finance, Capital Markets, and Valuation: An Introductory Text* (Kendall Hunt, 2003).

Research

Dr. Woolridge has published over 35 articles in the best academic and professional journals in the field, including the *Journal of Finance,* the *Journal of Financial Economics,* and the *Harvard Business Review*.

Exhibit JRW-1

Evergy Kansas Central, Inc. and Evergy Kansas South Inc.

CURB's Cost of Capital

	Capitalization Ratios	Cost Rate	Weighted Cost Rate
Long-Term Debt	50.00%	4.650%	2.32%
Common Equity	50.00%	9.500%	4.75%
Total Capital	100.00%		7.07%

Exhibit JRW-2
Long-Term 'A' Rated Public Utility Bonds

Data Source: Mergent Bond Record

Exhibit JRW-2

Electric Group Average Dividend Yield



Data Source: ***Value Line Investment Survey.***

Exhibit JRW-2
Electric Utility Group Average Return on Equity and Market-to-Book Ratios



Data Source: *Value Line Investment Survey.*

Exhibit JRW-3
Evergy Kansas Central, Inc. and Evergy Kansas South Inc.
Summary Financial Statistics for Proxy Group

Panel A

Electric Proxy Group														
Company		Operating Revenue ($bil)	Reg Elec Revenue	Percent Reg Gas Revenue	Net Plant ($bil)	Market Cap ($bil)	S&P Issuer Credit Rating	Moody's Long Term Rating	Interest Coverage	Primary Service ABulkley	Common Equity Ratio	Return on Equity	Market to Book Ratio	Last Filing Period
Alliant Energy Corporation (NYSE-LNT)	LNT	$3.98	85%	12%	$18.70	15.97	BBB+	Baa2	2.07	WI,IA,IL,MN	0.40	10.01	2.28	12/31/2024
Ameren Corporation (NYSE-AEE)	AEE	$7.32	86%	14%	$36.38	26.22	BBB+	Baa1	2.93	IL,MO	0.39	10.01	2.16	12/31/2024
American Electric Power Co. (NYSE-AEP)	AEP	$19.24	99%	0%	$83.00	54.58	BBB+	Baa2	2.45	10 States	0.37	11.39	2.03	12/31/2024
Avista Corporation (NYSE-AVA)	AVA	$1.94	70%	30%	$6.12	3.13	BBB	Baa2	2.35	WA,OR	0.45	7.09	1.21	12/31/2024
CenterPoint Energy, Inc. (NYSE-CNP)	CNP	$8.64	53%	47%	$32.12	21.77	BBB+	Baa2	2.38	TX,IN	0.34	10.02	2.04	12/31/2024
CMS Energy Corporation (NYSE-CMS)	CMS	$7.52	67%	28%	$27.49	21.41	BBB+	Baa2	2.45	MI	0.33	11.23	2.67	12/31/2024
Consolidated Edison, Inc. (NYSE-ED)	ED	$15.26	76%	20%	$52.66	34.99	A-	Baa1	2.76	NY,NJ	0.44	8.44	1.59	12/31/2024
Dominion Resources, Inc. (NYSE-D)	D	$14.46	91%	4%	$69.45	45.75	BBB+	Baa2	2.45	VA,NC,SC	0.38	6.49	1.74	12/31/2024
DTE Energy Company (NYSE-DTE)	DTE	$12.46	51%	14%	$31.08	27.05	BBB+	Baa2	2.66	MI	0.33	12.34	2.31	12/31/2024
Duke Energy Corporation (NYSE-DUK)	DUK	$29.93	93%	7%	$122.76	89.17	BBB+	Baa2	2.38	NC,SC,IN,OH,KY	0.37	9.08	1.81	12/31/2024
Edison International (NYSE-EIX)	EIX	$17.60	100%	0%	$60.31	21.21	BBB	Baa3	2.07	CA	0.27	7.20	1.52	12/31/2024
Entergy Corporation (NYSE-ETR)	ETR	$11.81	98%	1%	$47.85	34.94	BBB+	Baa2	3.10	AR,LA,MS,TX	0.34	6.95	2.31	12/31/2024
Evergy, Inc. (NYSE-EVRG)	EVRG	$5.85	100%	0%	$24.79	15.12	BBB+	Baa2	2.60	KS,MO	0.41	9.00	1.52	12/31/2024
Eversource Energy (NYSE-ES)	ES	$11.90	76%	18%	$41.04	21.53	BBB+	Baa2	2.90	CT,MA,NH	0.34	5.55	1.43	12/31/2024
Exelon Corporation (NYSE-EXC)	EXC	$23.03	93%	8%	$78.41	43.10	A-	Baa2	2.20	PA,NJ,IL,MD	0.36	9.34	1.60	12/31/2024
FirstEnergy Corp. (NYSE-FE)	FE	$12.94	47%	0%	$41.33	22.07	BBB	Baa3	2.18	PA,OH,NJ,MDWV,NY	0.34	9.15	1.77	12/31/2024
IDACORP, Inc. (NYSE-IDA)	IDA	$1.82	100%	0%	$6.52	6.07	BBB	Baa2	2.27	ID,OR	0.52	9.27	1.82	12/31/2024
NextEra Energy, Inc. (NYSE-NEE)	NEE	$24.75	99%	0%	$140.05	144.01	A-	Baa1	3.29	FL	0.37	9.51	2.87	12/31/2024
NorthWestern Corporation (NYSE-NWE)	NWE	$1.51	79%	21%	$6.40	3.38	BBB	Baa2	2.48	MT,SD	0.48	7.94	1.18	12/31/2024
OGE Energy Corp. (NYSE-OGE)	OGE	$2.92	98%	0%	$11.54	8.87	BBB+	Baa1	2.76	OK,AR	0.46	9.65	1.91	12/31/2024
Pinnacle West Capital Corp. (NYSE-PNW)	PNW	$5.12	100%	0%	$20.11	10.81	BBB+	Baa2	2.64	AZ	0.38	9.53	1.60	12/31/2024
Portland General Electric Company (NYSE-PO	POR	$3.44	100%	0%	$10.30	4.80	BBB+	A3	2.30	OR	0.42	8.80	1.27	12/31/2024
PPL Corporation (NYSE-PPL)	PPL	$8.46	0%	0%	$33.15	25.02	A-	Baa1	2.56	PA,KY,RI	0.45	6.34	1.78	12/31/2024
Public Service Enterprise Gp. Inc. (NYSE-PEG	PEG	$10.29	74%	22%	$40.23	38.99	BBB+	A3	3.16	NJ	0.41	11.22	2.42	12/31/2024
Southern Company (NYSE-SO)	SO	$25.57	78%	14%	$105.87	97.31	A-	Baa1	2.80	GA,AL,MS	0.33	11.85	2.93	12/31/2024
WEC Energy Group (NYSE-WEC)	WEC	$8.60	57%	38%	$34.68	32.98	A-	Baa1	2.60	WI,MI,ILMN	0.38	12.25	2.66	12/31/2024
Xcel Energy Inc. (NYSE-XEL)	XEL	$13.38	83%	17%	$57.86	38.87	BBB+	Baa1	1.92	MN,WI,ND,SD,MI	0.39	10.43	1.99	12/31/2024
Mean		$11.47	80%	12%	$45.93	$33.67	BBB+	Baa2	2.55		38.8%	9.26	1.94	
Median		$10.29	85%	8%	$36.38	$25.02	BBB+	Baa2	2.48		37.9%	9.34	1.82	

Data Source: Company 2024 SEC 10-K filings, S&P Capital IQ; *Value Line Investment Survey*, 2025.

Panel B

Bulkley Proxy Group														
Company		Operating Revenue ($bil)	Percent Reg Elec Revenue	Percent Reg Gas Revenue	Net Plant ($bil)	Market Cap ($bil)	S&P Issuer Credit Rating	Moody's Long Term Rating	Pre-Tax Interest Coverage	Primary Service ABulkley	Common Equity Ratio	Return on Equity	Market to Book Ratio	Last Filing Period
Alliant Energy Corporation (NYSE-LNT)	LNT	$3.98	85%	12%	$18.70	15.97	BBB+	Baa2	2.07	WI,IA,IL,MN	0.40	10.01	2.28	12/31/2024
Ameren Corporation (NYSE-AEE)	AEE	$7.32	86%	14%	$36.38	26.22	BBB+	Baa1	2.93	IL,MO	0.39	10.01	2.16	12/31/2024
American Electric Power Co. (NYSE-AEP)	AEP	$19.24	99%	0%	$83.00	54.58	BBB+	Baa2	2.45	10 States	0.37	11.39	2.03	12/31/2024
Avista Corporation (NYSE-AVA)	AVA	$1.94	70%	30%	$6.12	3.13	BBB	Baa2	2.35	WA,OR	0.45	7.09	1.21	12/31/2024
CMS Energy Corporation (NYSE-CMS)	CMS	$7.52	67%	28%	$27.49	21.41	BBB+	Baa2	2.45	MI	0.33	11.23	2.67	12/31/2024
DTE Energy Company (NYSE-DTE)	DTE	$12.46	51%	14%	$31.08	27.05	BBB+	Baa2	2.66	MI	0.33	12.34	2.31	12/31/2024
Duke Energy Corporation (NYSE-DUK)	DUK	$29.93	93%	7%	$122.76	89.17	BBB+	Baa2	2.38	NC,SC,IN,OH,KY	0.37	9.08	1.81	12/31/2024
Entergy Corporation (NYSE-ETR)	ETR	$11.81	98%	1%	$47.85	34.94	BBB+	Baa2	3.10	AR,LA,MS,TX	0.34	6.95	2.31	12/31/2024
IDACORP, Inc. (NYSE-IDA)	IDA	$1.82	100%	0%	$6.52	6.07	BBB	Baa2	2.27	ID,OR	0.52	9.27	1.82	12/31/2024
NextEra Energy, Inc. (NYSE-NEE)	NEE	$24.75	99%	0%	$140.05	144.01	A-	Baa1	3.29	FL	0.37	9.51	2.87	12/31/2024
NorthWestern Corporation (NYSE-NWE)	NWE	$1.51	79%	21%	$6.40	3.38	BBB	Baa2	2.48	MT,SD	0.48	7.94	1.18	12/31/2024
OGE Energy Corp. (NYSE-OGE)	OGE	$2.92	98%	0%	$11.54	8.87	BBB+	Baa1	2.76	OK,AR	0.46	9.65	1.91	12/31/2024
Pinnacle West Capital Corp. (NYSE-PNW)	PNW	$5.12	100%	0%	$20.11	10.81	BBB+	Baa2	2.64	AZ	0.38	9.53	1.60	12/31/2024
Portland General Electric Company (NYSE-PO	POR	$3.44	100%	0%	$10.30	4.80	BBB+	A3	2.30	OR	0.42	8.80	1.27	12/31/2024
PPL Corporation (NYSE-PPL)	PPL	$8.46	0%	0%	$33.15	25.02	A-	Baa1	2.56	PA,KY,RI	0.45	6.34	1.78	12/31/2024
Southern Company (NYSE-SO)	SO	$25.57	78%	14%	$105.87	97.31	A-	Baa1	2.80	GA,AL,MS	0.33	11.85	2.93	12/31/2024
Xcel Energy Inc. (NYSE-XEL)	XEL	$13.38	83%	17%	$57.86	38.87	BBB+	Baa1	1.92	MN,WI,ND,SD,MI	0.39	10.43	1.99	12/31/2024
Mean		$10.66	81%	9%	$45.01	$35.98	BBB+	Baa2	2.55		39.9%	9.49	2.01	
Median		$7.52	86%	7%	$31.08	$25.02	BBB+	Baa2	2.48		39.2%	9.53	1.99	

Data Source: Company 2024 SEC 10-K filings, S&P Capital IQ; *Value Line Investment Survey*, 2025.

Exhibit JRW-3

Evergy Kansas Central, Inc. and Evergy Kansas South Inc.

***Value Line* Risk Metrics**

Panel A
Electric Proxy Group

Company	Beta	Financial Strength	Safety	Earnings Predictability	Stock Price Stability
Alliant Energy Corporation (NYSE-LNT)	0.95	A+	1	100	95
Ameren Corporation (NYSE-AEE)	0.90	A+	1	100	95
American Electric Power Co. (NYSE-AEP)	0.85	A	1	90	95
Avista Corporation (NYSE-AVA)	0.75	A	3	70	95
CenterPoint Energy, Inc. (NYSE-CNP)	1.10	A	3	60	80
CMS Energy Corporation (NYSE-CMS)	0.85	B++	2	90	95
Consolidated Edison, Inc. (NYSE-ED)	0.65	A+	1	100	100
Dominion Resources, Inc. (NYSE-D)	0.75	A	2	70	95
DTE Energy Company (NYSE-DTE)	1.00	B++	2	70	90
Duke Energy Corporation (NYSE-DUK)	0.70	A	2	100	100
Edison International (NYSE-EIX)	0.90	B+	3	15	25
Entergy Corporation (NYSE-ETR)	1.00	A+	1	70	90
Evergy, Inc. (NYSE-EVRG)	0.95	B++	2	85	90
Eversource Energy (NYSE-ES)	0.95	A	2	100	90
Exelon Corporation (NDW-EXC)	NMF	A	3	90	NMF
FirstEnergy Corp. (NYSE-FE)	0.75	B++	3	100	80
IDACORP, Inc. (NYSE-IDA)	0.75	A	1	100	100
NextEra Energy, Inc. (NYSE-NEE)	0.90	A+	2	95	75
NorthWestern Corporation (NYSE-NWE)	0.80	B++	2	95	95
OGE Energy Corp. (NYSE-OGE)	1.05	B++	3	95	85
Pinnacle West Capital Corp. (NYSE-PNW)	0.80	B++	2	85	95
Portland General Electric Company (NYSE-POR)	0.80	B++	2	90	95
PPL Corporation (NYSE-PPL)	0.90	A+	2	45	95
Public Service Enterprise Group Incorporated (NYSE	0.90	A	1	100	95
Southern Company (NYSE-SO)	0.75	A	2	90	100
WEC Energy Group (NYSE-WEC)	0.90	A+	1	100	85
Xcel Energy Inc. (NYSE-XEL)	0.75	A	2	100	100
Mean	0.86	A	1.9	85	90

Data Source: ***Value Line Investment Survey*** **, 2025.**

Panel B
Bulkley Proxy Group

Company	Beta	Financial Strength	Safety	Earnings Predictability	Stock Price Stability
Alliant Energy Corporation (NYSE-LNT)	0.95	A+	1	100	95
Ameren Corporation (NYSE-AEE)	0.90	A+	1	100	95
American Electric Power Co. (NYSE-AEP)	0.85	A	1	90	95
Avista Corporation (NYSE-AVA)	0.75	A	3	70	95
CMS Energy Corporation (NYSE-CMS)	0.85	B++	2	90	95
DTE Energy Company (NYSE-DTE)	1.00	B++	2	70	90
Duke Energy Corporation (NYSE-DUK)	0.70	A	2	100	100
Entergy Corporation (NYSE-ETR)	1.00	A+	1	70	90
IDACORP, Inc. (NYSE-IDA)	0.75	A	1	100	100
NextEra Energy, Inc. (NYSE-NEE)	0.90	A+	2	95	75
NorthWestern Corporation (NYSE-NWE)	0.80	B++	2	95	95
OGE Energy Corp. (NYSE-OGE)	1.05	B++	3	95	85
Pinnacle West Capital Corp. (NYSE-PNW)	0.80	B++	2	85	95
Portland General Electric Company (NYSE-POR)	0.80	B++	2	90	95
PPL Corporation (NYSE-PPL)	0.90	A+	2	45	95
Southern Company (NYSE-SO)	0.75	A	2	90	100
Xcel Energy Inc. (NYSE-XEL)	0.75	A	2	100	100
Mean	0.85	A	1.8	87	94

Data Source: ***Value Line Investment Survey*** **, 2025.**

Evergy Kansas Central, Inc. and Evergy Kansas South Inc.
Comparison of Long-Term Issuer Ratings for
Electric and Bulkley Proxy Groups

Electric Proxy Group	Moody's Long-Term Issuer Rating		Standard & Poor's Long-Term Issuer Rating	
	Long-Term Issuer Rating	Numerical Weighting	Long-Term Issuer Rating	Numerical Weighting
LNT	Baa2	9.0	BBB+	8.0
AEE	Baa1	8.0	BBB+	8.0
AEP	Baa2	9.0	BBB+	8.0
AVA	Baa2	9.0	BBB	9.0
CNP	Baa2	9.0	BBB+	8.0
CMS	Baa2	9.0	BBB+	8.0
ED	Baa1	8.0	A-	7.0
D	Baa2	9.0	BBB+	8.0
DTE	Baa2	9.0	BBB+	8.0
DUK	Baa2	9.0	BBB+	8.0
EIX	Baa3	10.0	BBB	9.0
ETR	Baa2	9.0	BBB+	8.0
EVRG	Baa2	9.0	BBB+	8.0
ES	Baa2	9.0	BBB+	8.0
EXC	Baa2	9.0	A-	7.0
FE	Baa3	10.0	BBB	9.0
IDA	Baa2	9.0	BBB	9.0
NEE	Baa1	8.0	A-	7.0
NWE	Baa2	9.0	BBB	9.0
OGE	Baa1	8.0	BBB+	8.0
PNW	Baa2	9.0	BBB+	8.0
POR	A3	7.0	BBB+	8.0
PPL	Baa1	8.0	A-	7.0
PEG	A3	7.0	BBB+	8.0
SO	Baa1	8.0	A-	7.0
WEC	Baa1	8.0	A-	7.0
XEL	Baa1	8.0	BBB+	8.0
Average	Baa1	8.6	BBB+	8.0
Bulkley Proxy Group				
LNT	Baa2	9.0	BBB+	8.0
AEE	Baa1	8.0	BBB+	8.0
AEP	Baa2	9.0	BBB+	8.0
AVA	Baa2	9.0	BBB	9.0
CMS	Baa2	9.0	BBB+	8.0
DTE	Baa2	9.0	BBB+	8.0
DUK	Baa2	9.0	BBB+	8.0
ETR	Baa2	9.0	BBB+	8.0
IDA	Baa2	9.0	BBB	9.0
NEE	Baa1	8.0	A-	7.0
NWE	Baa2	9.0	BBB	9.0
OGE	Baa1	8.0	BBB+	8.0
PNW	Baa2	8.0	BBB+	8.0
POR	A3	7.0	BBB+	8.0
PPL	Baa1	8.0	A-	7.0
SO	Baa1	8.0	A-	7.0
XEL	Baa1	8.0	BBB+	8.0
Average	Baa2	8.7	BBB+	7.9

Date Source: S&P Cap IQ.

Numerical Assignment for
Moody's and Standard & Poor's Bond Ratings

Moody's Bond Rating	Numerical Bond Weighting		Standard & Poor's Bond Rating	Numerical Bond Weighting
Aaa	1		AAA	1
Aa1	2		AA+	2
Aa2	3		AA	3
Aa3	4		AA-	4
A1	5		A+	5
A2	6		A	6
A3	7		A-	7
Baa1	8		BBB+	8
Baa2	9		BBB	9
Baa3	10		BBB-	10
Ba1	11		BB+	11
Ba2	12		BB	12
Ba3	13		BB-	13
B1	14		B+	14
B2	15		B	15
B3	16		B-	16

Value Line Risk Metrics

Beta

A relative measure of the historical sensitivity of a stock's price to overall fluctuations in the New York Stock Exchange Composite Index. A beta of 1.50 indicates a stock tends to rise (or fall) 50% more than the New York Stock Exchange Composite Index. The ''coefficient'' is derived from a regression analysis of the relationship between weekly percentage changes in the price of a stock and weekly percentage changes in the NYSE Index over a period of five years. In the case of shorter price histories, a smaller time period is used, but two years is the minimum. Betas are adjusted for their long-term tendency to converge toward 1.00.

Financial Strength

A relative measure of the companies reviewed by *Value Line* . The relative ratings range from A++ (strongest) down to C (weakest).

Safety Rank

A measurement of potential risk associated with individual common stocks. The Safety Rank is computed by averaging two other *Value Line* indexes the Price Stability Index and the Financial strength Rating. Safety Ranks range from 1 (Highest) to 5 (Lowest). Conservative investors should try to limit their purchases to equities ranked 1 (Highest) and 2 (Above Average) for Safety. .

Earnings Predictability

A measure of the reliability of an earnings forecast. Earnings Predictability is based upon the stability of year-to-year comparisons, with recent years being weighted more heavily than earlier ones. The most reliable forecasts tend to be those with the highest rating (100); the least reliable, the lowest (5). The earnings stability is derived from the standard deviation of percentage changes in quarterly earnings over an eight-year period. Special adjustments are made for comparisons around zero and from plus to minus.

Stock Price Stability

A measure of the stability of a stock's price. It includes sensitivity to the market (see Beta as well as the stock's inherent volatility. *Value Line's* Stability ratings range from 1 (highest) to 5 (lowest).

Source: *Value Line Investment Analyzer* .

Exhibit JRW-4
Evergy Kansas Central, Inc. and Evergy Kansas South Inc.

Panel A
EKC's Proposed Capital Structure and Debt Cost Rate

Capital Source	Capitalization Ratio	Cost Rate
Long-Term Debt	48.03%	4.641%
Common Equity	51.97%	
Total	100.00%	

Panel B
EVRG and EKC Quarterly Capital Structure Ratios
2022-24

Including Short-Term Debt		
Capital Source	EKC	EVRG
Short-Term Debt	8.1%	10.8%
Long-Term Debt	43.1%	46.3%
Common Equity	48.7%	42.9%
Total Capital	100.0%	100.0%

Excluding Short-Term Debt

Capital Source	EKC	EVRG
Long-Term Debt	46.9%	51.9%
Common Equity	53.1%	48.1%
Total Capital	100.0%	100.0%

Panel C
KC Adjusted Capital Structure and Weighted Cost of Long-Term Del

Capital Source	Capitalization Ratio	Cost Rate
Adjusted Long-Term Debt	54.07%	4.650%
Common Equity	45.93%	0.00%
Total	100.00%	

Panel D
CURB's Proposed Capital Structure and Debt Cost Rate

Capital Source	Capitalization Ratio	Cost Rate
Long-Term Debt	50.00%	4.650%
Common Equity	50.00%	
Total	100.00%	

Exhibit No. JRW-4
Evergy Kansas Central, Inc. and Evergy Kansas South Inc.
Quarterly Capital Structure Ratios

Evergy Kansas Central, Inc.

	2022 CQ1	*2022 CQ2*	*2022 CQ3*	*2022 CQ4*	*2023 CQ1*	*2023 CQ2*	*2023 CQ3*	*2023 CQ4*	*2024 CQ1*	*2024 CQ2*	*2024 CQ3*	*2024 CQ4*	
Short-Term Debt	626,300	946,500	888,200	1,007,100	558,000	985,800	860,200	396,400	443,500	764,600	906,700	1,279,000	
Long-Term Debt	3,934,900	3,885,600	3,886,300	3,886,900	4,281,400	4,281,700	4,282,400	4,580,400	4,581,000	4,581,800	4,582,700	4,404,700	
Common Equity	4,591,600	4,482,200	4,538,300	4,507,400	4,613,800	4,701,700	4,835,000	4,891,900	5,003,500	5,128,000	5,246,200	5,284,900	
Total Capital	9,152,800	9,314,300	9,312,800	9,401,400	9,453,200	9,969,200	9,977,600	9,868,700	10,028,000	10,474,400	10,735,600	10,968,600	
Total Capital (No S-T)	8,526,500	8,367,800	8,424,600	8,394,300	8,895,200	8,983,400	9,117,400	9,472,300	9,584,500	9,709,800	9,828,900	9,689,600	
	2022 CQ1	*2022 CQ2*	*2022 CQ3*	*2022 CQ4*	*2023 CQ1*	*2023 CQ2*	*2023 CQ3*	*2023 CQ4*	*2024 CQ1*	*2024 CQ2*	*2024 CQ3*	*2024 CQ4*	*Average*
Short-Term Debt	6.8%	10.2%	9.5%	10.7%	5.9%	9.9%	8.6%	4.0%	4.4%	7.3%	8.4%	11.7%	8.1%
Long-Term Debt	43.0%	41.7%	41.7%	41.3%	45.3%	42.9%	42.9%	46.4%	45.7%	43.7%	42.7%	40.2%	43.1%
Common Equity	50.2%	48.1%	48.7%	47.9%	48.8%	47.2%	48.5%	49.6%	49.9%	49.0%	48.9%	48.2%	48.7%
Total Capital	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	2022 CQ1	*2022 CQ2*	*2022 CQ3*	*2022 CQ4*	*2023 CQ1*	*2023 CQ2*	*2023 CQ3*	*2023 CQ4*	*2024 CQ1*	*2024 CQ2*	*2024 CQ3*	*2024 CQ4*	*Average*
Long-Term Debt	46.1%	46.4%	46.1%	46.3%	48.1%	47.7%	47.0%	48.4%	47.8%	47.2%	46.6%	45.5%	46.9%
Common Equity	53.9%	53.6%	53.9%	53.7%	51.9%	52.3%	53.0%	51.6%	52.2%	52.8%	53.4%	54.5%	53.1%
Total Capital	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Data Source: S&P Capital IQ.

Exhibit No. JRW-4
Evergy Kansas Central, Inc. and Evergy Kansas South Inc.
Quarterly Capital Structure Ratios

Evergy, Inc.

	2022 CQ1	*2022 CQ2*	*2022 CQ3*	*2022 CQ4*	*2023 CQ1*	*2023 CQ2*	*2023 CQ3*	*2023 CQ4*	*2024 CQ1*	*2024 CQ2*	*2024 CQ3*	*2024 CQ4*	
Short-Term Debt	2,317,500	2,725,000	2,466,800	2,130,400	2,253,200	2,807,500	3,462,800	2,093,800	1,972,200	2,118,200	2,252,600	2,288,200	
Long-Term Debt	9,247,100	9,196,700	9,197,200	9,905,700	10,097,200	10,097,100	9,297,600	11,053,300	11,658,400	11,954,600	11,571,100	11,927,300	
Common Equity	9,237,500	9,310,800	9,615,500	9,493,300	9,501,700	9,550,700	9,767,800	9,685,000	9,664,100	9,731,700	10,056,200	9,989,200	
Total Capital	20,802,100	21,232,500	21,279,500	21,529,400	21,852,100	22,455,300	22,528,200	22,832,100	23,294,700	23,804,500	23,879,900	24,204,700	
Total Capital (No S-T)	18,484,600	18,507,500	18,812,700	19,399,000	19,598,900	19,647,800	19,065,400	20,738,300	21,322,500	21,686,300	21,627,300	21,916,500	
	2022 CQ1	*2022 CQ2*	*2022 CQ3*	*2022 CQ4*	*2023 CQ1*	*2023 CQ2*	*2023 CQ3*	*2023 CQ4*	*2024 CQ1*	*2024 CQ2*	*2024 CQ3*	*2024 CQ4*	*Average*
Short-Term Debt	11.1%	12.8%	11.6%	9.9%	10.3%	12.5%	15.4%	9.2%	8.5%	8.9%	9.4%	9.5%	10.8%
Long-Term Debt	44.5%	43.3%	43.2%	46.0%	46.2%	45.0%	41.3%	48.4%	50.0%	50.2%	48.5%	49.3%	46.3%
Common Equity	44.4%	43.9%	45.2%	44.1%	43.5%	42.5%	43.4%	42.4%	41.5%	40.9%	42.1%	41.3%	42.9%
Total Capital	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	2022 CQ1	*2022 CQ2*	*2022 CQ3*	*2022 CQ4*	*2023 CQ1*	*2023 CQ2*	*2023 CQ3*	*2023 CQ4*	*2024 CQ1*	*2024 CQ2*	*2024 CQ3*	*2024 CQ4*	*Average*
Long-Term Debt	50.0%	49.7%	48.9%	51.1%	51.5%	51.4%	48.8%	53.3%	54.7%	55.1%	53.5%	54.4%	51.9%
Common Equity	50.0%	50.3%	51.1%	48.9%	48.5%	48.6%	51.2%	46.7%	45.3%	44.9%	46.5%	45.6%	48.1%
Total Capital	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Data Source: S&P Capital IQ.

Exhibit JRW-4
Evergy Debt Issues
31-Dec-24

Panel A
EVRG Debt Issues and Weighted Cost of Long-Term Debt

Bond Issue	Amount	Interest Rate	Weighted Cost
2.90% Series - Senior Notes due 2029	$800,000,000	3.77%	$30,160,000
4.50% Convertible Notes due 2027	$1,400,000,000	4.50%	$63,000,000
6.65% Junior Sub. Notes due 2055	$500,000,000	6.65%	$33,250,000
Total	$2,700,000,000		$126,410,000
Weighted Cost Rate			4.68%

Panel B
EVRG Debt Issues and Weighted Cost of Long-Term Debt

Bond Issue	Amount	Interest Rate	Weighted Cost
Long-Term Debt	$4,928,452,513	4.64%	$228,729,481
Allocated EVRG Debt	$1,350,000,000	4.68%	$63,205,000
Total Debt	$6,278,452,513		$291,934,481
Weighted Cost of Long-Term Debt			4.65%

Panel C
EKC Adjusted Capital Structure and Weighted Cost of Long-Term Debt

Capital Source	Capitalization Amount	Capitalization Ratio	Cost Rate
Adjusted Long-Term Debt	$6,278,452,513	54.07%	4.65%
Common Equity	$5,332,530,551	45.93%	
Total	$11,610,983,064		

Panel D
CURB Recommended Capital Structure

Capital Source	Capitalization Ratio	Cost Rate
Long-Term Debt	50.00%	4.65%
Common Equity	50.00%	
Total		

Exhibit JRW-4
Evergy Debt Issues
31-Dec-24

12. LONG-TERM DEBT

The Evergy Companies' long-term debt is detailed in the following tables.

December 31, 2024	Issuing Entity	Year Due	Evergy	Evergy Kansas Central	Evergy Metro
				(millions)	
Mortgage Bonds					
3.25% Series	Evergy Kansas Central, Inc.	2025	$ 250.0	$ 250.0	$ —
2.55% Series	Evergy Kansas Central, Inc.	2026	350.0	350.0	—
3.10% Series	Evergy Kansas Central, Inc.	2027	300.0	300.0	—
5.90% Series	Evergy Kansas Central, Inc.	2033	300.0	300.0	—
4.125% Series	Evergy Kansas Central, Inc.	2042	550.0	550.0	—
4.10% Series	Evergy Kansas Central, Inc.	2043	430.0	430.0	—
4.625% Series	Evergy Kansas Central, Inc.	2043	250.0	250.0	—
4.25% Series	Evergy Kansas Central, Inc.	2045	300.0	300.0	—
3.25% Series	Evergy Kansas Central, Inc.	2049	300.0	300.0	—
3.45% Series	Evergy Kansas Central, Inc.	2050	500.0	500.0	—
5.70% Series	Evergy Kansas Central, Inc.	2053	400.0	400.0	—
6.53% Series	Evergy Kansas South, Inc.	2037	175.0	175.0	—
6.64% Series	Evergy Kansas South, Inc.	2038	100.0	100.0	—
4.30% Series	Evergy Kansas South, Inc.	2044	250.0	250.0	—
2.25% Series	Evergy Metro, Inc.	2030	400.0	—	400.0
4.95% Series	Evergy Metro, Inc.	2033	300.0	—	300.0
5.40% Series	Evergy Metro, Inc.	2034	300.0	—	300.0
4.125% Series	Evergy Metro, Inc.	2049	400.0	—	400.0
5.15% Series	Evergy Missouri West, Inc.	2027	300.0	—	—
3.75% Series	Evergy Missouri West, Inc.	2032	250.0	—	—
5.65% Series	Evergy Missouri West, Inc.	2034	300.0	—	—
Pollution Control Bonds					
3.19% Series[a]	Evergy Kansas Central, Inc.	2032	45.0	45.0	—
3.19% Series[a]	Evergy Kansas Central, Inc.	2032	30.5	30.5	—
3.19% Series[a]	Evergy Kansas South, Inc.	2027	21.9	21.9	—
2.50% Series	Evergy Kansas South, Inc.	2031	50.0	50.0	—
3.19% Series[a]	Evergy Kansas South, Inc.	2032	14.5	14.5	—
3.19% Series[a]	Evergy Kansas South, Inc.	2032	10.0	10.0	—
3.45% Series 2007A and 2007B[a]	Evergy Metro, Inc.	2035	146.5	—	146.5
3.50% EIRR Bonds	Evergy Metro, Inc.	2038	23.4	—	23.4
4.30% EIRR Bonds	Evergy Metro, Inc.	2045	79.5	—	79.5
Senior Notes					
3.65% Series[b]	Evergy Metro, Inc.	2025	350.0	—	350.0
6.05% Series (5.78% rate)[b][c]	Evergy Metro, Inc.	2035	250.0	—	250.0
5.30% Series[b]	Evergy Metro, Inc.	2041	400.0	—	400.0
4.20% Series[b]	Evergy Metro, Inc.	2047	300.0	—	300.0
4.20% Series[b]	Evergy Metro, Inc.	2048	300.0	—	300.0
3.49% Series A[d]	Evergy Missouri West, Inc.	2025	36.0	—	—
4.06% Series B[d]	Evergy Missouri West, Inc.	2033	60.0	—	—
4.74% Series C[d]	Evergy Missouri West, Inc.	2043	150.0	—	—
2.86% Series A[d]	Evergy Missouri West, Inc.	2031	350.0	—	—
3.01% Series B[d]	Evergy Missouri West, Inc.	2033	75.0	—	—
3.21% Series C[d]	Evergy Missouri West, Inc.	2036	75.0	—	—
2.90% Series (3.77% rate)[c]	Evergy, Inc.	2029	800.0	—	—
Convertible Notes					
4.50% Convertible Notes	Evergy, Inc.	2027	1,400.0	—	—
Securitized Bonds					
5.10% Securitized Bonds	Evergy Missouri West Storm Funding I, LLC	2025 - 2040	319.6	—	—
Junior Subordinated Notes					
6.65% Junior Subordinated Notes	Evergy, Inc.	2055	500.0	—	—
Fair value adjustment[e]			81.7	—	—
Current maturities[f]			(651.7)	(250.0)	(350.0)
Unamortized debt discount and debt issuance costs			(112.7)	(43.4)	(26.0)
Total excluding current maturities[g]			$ 11,809.2	$ 4,333.5	$ 2,873.4

Exhibit JRW-5

Evergy Kansas Central, Inc. and Evergy Kansas South Inc.
Discounted Cash Flow Analysis

Panel A
Electric Proxy Group

Dividend Yield*	3.40%
Adjustment Factor	1.0315
Adjusted Dividend Yield	3.51%
Growth Rate**	6.30%
Equity Cost Rate	9.80%

* Page 2 of Exhibit JRW-5

** Based on data provided on pages 3, 4, 5, and 6 of Exhibit JRW-5

*** DCF ROE rounded to nearest 0.05%.

Panel B
Bulkley Proxy Group

Dividend Yield*	3.30%
Adjustment Factor	1.031
Adjusted Dividend Yield	3.40%
Growth Rate**	6.20%
Equity Cost Rate	9.60%

* Page 2 of Exhibit JRW-5

** Based on data provided on pages 3, 4, 5, and 6 of Exhibit JRW-5

*** DCF ROE rounded to nearest 0.05%.

Exhibit JRW-5

Evergy Kansas Central, Inc. and Evergy Kansas South Inc.
Monthly Dividend Yields

Panel A
Electric Proxy Group

Company		Annual Dividend	Dividend Yield 30 Day	Dividend Yield 90 Day	Dividend Yield 180 Day
Alliant Energy Corporation (NYSE-LNT)	LNT	$1.92	3.1%	3.1%	3.2%
Ameren Corporation (NYSE-AEE)	AEE	$2.68	2.7%	2.8%	2.9%
American Electric Power Co. (NYSE-AEP)	AEP	$3.52	3.3%	3.4%	3.5%
Avista Corporation (NYSE-AVA)	AVA	$1.90	4.7%	4.9%	4.9%
CenterPoint Energy, Inc. (NYSE-CNP)	CNP	$0.80	2.1%	2.3%	2.4%
CMS Energy Corporation (NYSE-CMS)	CMS	$2.06	2.9%	2.9%	2.9%
Consolidated Edison, Inc. (NYSE-ED)	ED	$3.32	3.1%	3.2%	3.3%
Dominion Resources, Inc. (NYSE-D)	D	$2.67	4.9%	4.9%	4.8%
DTE Energy Company (NYSE-DTE)	DTE	$4.08	3.0%	3.1%	3.2%
Duke Energy Corporation (NYSE-DUK)	DUK	$4.10	3.4%	3.5%	3.6%
Edison International (NYSE-EIX)	EIX	$3.12	5.5%	5.6%	4.5%
Entergy Corporation (NYSE-ETR)	ETR	$2.26	2.7%	2.7%	3.0%
Evergy, Inc. (NYSE-EVRG)	EVRG	$2.57	3.8%	3.9%	4.0%
Eversource Energy (NYSE-ES)	ES	$2.86	4.8%	4.8%	4.6%
Exelon Corporation (NYSE-EXC)	EXC	$1.52	3.3%	3.5%	3.7%
FirstEnergy Corp. (NYSE-FE)	FE	$1.70	4.1%	4.2%	4.1%
IDACORP, Inc. (NYSE-IDA)	IDA	$3.32	2.9%	2.9%	3.0%
NextEra Energy, Inc. (NYSE-NEE)	NEE	$2.06	3.0%	3.0%	2.8%
NorthWestern Corporation (NYSE-NWE)	NWE	$2.60	4.5%	4.7%	4.7%
OGE Energy Corp. (NYSE-OGE)	OGE	$1.67	3.8%	3.8%	3.9%
Pinnacle West Capital Corp. (NYSE-PNW)	PNW	$3.52	3.8%	3.9%	3.9%
Portland General Electric Company (NYSE-P	POR	$2.00	4.7%	4.7%	4.5%
PPL Corporation (NYSE-PPL)	PPL	$1.03	2.9%	3.0%	3.1%
Public Service Enterprise Gp. Inc. (NYSE-PE	PEG	$2.40	3.0%	2.9%	2.8%
Southern Company (NYSE-SO)	SO	$2.88	3.2%	3.3%	3.3%
WEC Energy Group (NYSE-WEC)	WEC	$3.34	3.1%	3.2%	3.3%
Xcel Energy Inc. (NYSE-XEL)	XEL	$2.19	3.1%	3.2%	3.2%
Mean			3.5%	3.6%	3.6%
Median			3.2%	3.3%	3.3%

Data Sources: S&P Cap IQ., May 20, 2025.

Panel B
Bulkley Proxy Group

Company		Annual Dividend	Dividend Yield 30 Day	Dividend Yield 90 Day	Dividend Yield 180 Day
Alliant Energy Corporation (NYSE-LNT)	LNT	$1.92	3.1%	3.1%	3.2%
Ameren Corporation (NYSE-AEE)	AEE	$2.68	2.7%	2.8%	2.9%
American Electric Power Co. (NYSE-AEP)	AEP	$3.52	3.3%	3.4%	3.5%
Avista Corporation (NYSE-AVA)	AVA	$1.90	4.7%	4.9%	4.9%
CMS Energy Corporation (NYSE-CMS)	CMS	$2.06	2.9%	2.9%	2.9%
DTE Energy Company (NYSE-DTE)	DTE	$4.08	3.0%	3.1%	3.2%
Duke Energy Corporation (NYSE-DUK)	DUK	$4.10	3.4%	3.5%	3.6%
Entergy Corporation (NYSE-ETR)	ETR	$2.26	2.7%	2.7%	3.0%
IDACORP, Inc. (NYSE-IDA)	IDA	$3.32	2.9%	2.9%	3.0%
NextEra Energy, Inc. (NYSE-NEE)	NEE	$2.06	3.0%	3.0%	2.8%
NorthWestern Corporation (NYSE-NWE)	NWE	$2.60	4.5%	4.7%	4.7%
OGE Energy Corp. (NYSE-OGE)	OGE	$1.67	3.8%	3.8%	3.9%
Pinnacle West Capital Corp. (NYSE-PNW)	PNW	$3.52	3.8%	3.9%	3.9%
Portland General Electric Company (NYSE-P	POR	$2.00	4.7%	4.7%	4.5%
PPL Corporation (NYSE-PPL)	PPL	$1.03	2.9%	3.0%	3.1%
Southern Company (NYSE-SO)	SO	$2.88	3.2%	3.3%	3.3%
Xcel Energy Inc. (NYSE-XEL)	XEL	$2.19	3.1%	3.2%	3.2%
Mean			3.4%	3.5%	3.5%
Median			3.1%	3.2%	3.2%

Data Sources: S&P Cap IQ., May 20, 2025.

Exhibit JRW-5

Evergy Kansas Central, Inc. and Evergy Kansas South Inc.
DCF Equity Cost Growth Rate Measures
***Value Line* Historic Growth Rates**

Panel A
Electric Proxy Group

	Company	*Value Line* Historic Growth					
		Past 10 Years			Past 5 Years		
		Earnings	Dividends	Book Value	Earnings	Dividends	Book Value
Alliant Energy Cor	Alliant Energy Corporation (NYSE-LNT)	5.5	6.5	6.0	4.5	6.0	6.0
Ameren Corporatio	Ameren Corporation (NYSE-AEE)	4.0	3.5	2.0	8.0	5.0	5.5
American Electric I	American Electric Power Co. (NYSE-AEP)	5.0	5.0	3.5	4.0	5.0	3.5
Avista Corporation	Avista Corporation (NYSE-AVA)	3.0	4.0	3.5	-1.0	4.0	3.0
CenterPoint Energy	CenterPoint Energy, Inc. (NYSE-CNP)		-1.0	4.0	3.5	-9.5	7.0
CMS Energy Corpo	CMS Energy Corporation (NYSE-CMS)	6.5	6.5	7.0	6.0	6.5	8.5
Consolidated Edisor	Consolidated Edison, Inc. (NYSE-ED)	3.0	3.0	4.0	3.0	2.5	3.0
Dominion Resource	Dominion Resources, Inc. (NYSE-D)		1.5	5.0	-5.5	-4.5	0.5
DTE Energy Compa	DTE Energy Company (NYSE-DTE)	4.0	5.5	3.0	2.5	5.5	1.5
Duke Energy Corpo	Duke Energy Corporation (NYSE-DUK)	3.5	3.0	0.5	3.5	2.5	0.5
Edison Internationa	Edison International (NYSE-EIX)	1.0	8.0	1.5	12.5	4.5	0.5
Entergy Corporatio	Entergy Corporation (NYSE-ETR)	2.5	2.5	2.0	4.0	4.0	7.0
Evergy, Inc. (NYSE	Evergy, Inc. (NYSE-EVRG)						
Eversource Energy	Eversource Energy (NYSE-ES)	6.5	6.5	3.5	6.0	6.0	3.0
Exelon Corporation	Exelon Corporation (NDW-EXC)	-0.5	-3.0	4.5	2.5	4.0	3.5
FirstEnergy Corp.	FirstEnergy Corp. (NYSE-FE)		-1.0	-4.5	-0.5	0.5	10.5
IDACORP, Inc. (N	IDACORP, Inc. (NYSE-IDA)	4.0	7.5	4.5	3.5	6.0	4.5
NextEra Energy, In	Nextera Energy, Inc. (NYSE-NEE)	9.5	11.0	8.0	12.5	11.0	5.5
NorthWestern Corp	NorthWestern Corporation (NYSE-NWE)	2.5	5.5	5.0	-1.0	3.0	3.5
OGE Energy Corp.	OGE Energy Corp. (NYSE-OGE)	3.0	7.5	4.0	4.5	8.5	1.5
Pinnacle West Capi	Pinnacle West Capital Corp. (NYSE-PNW)	2.5	4.0	4.0		4.0	3.5
Portland General E	Portland General Electric Company (NYSE-POR)	3.5	5.5	3.5	3.0	5.5	3.0
PPL Corporation (N	PPL Corporation (NYSE-PPL)	-9.0	-1.0		-17.0	-4.5	4.0
Public Service Ente	Public Service Enterprise Gp. Inc. (NYSE-PEG)	3.0	4.5	3.0	3.0	5.0	1.0
Southern Company	Southern Company (NYSE-SO)	3.0	3.5	3.0	3.0	3.5	2.5
WEC Energy Grou	WEC Energy Group (NYSE-WEC)	6.5	10.0	7.0	7.0	6.5	3.5
Xcel Energy Inc. (N	Xcel Energy Inc. (NYSE-XEL)	5.5	6.5	5.5	6.0	6.5	6.0
	Mean	3.4	4.4	3.7	3.1	3.7	3.9
	Median	3.5	4.8	4.0	3.5	4.8	3.5
	Data Source: *Value Line Investment Survey.*	Average of Median Figures =			4.0		

Panel B
Bulkley Proxy Group

	Company	*Value Line* Historic Growth					
		Past 10 Years			Past 5 Years		
		Earnings	Dividends	Book Value	Earnings	Dividends	Book Value
Alliant Energy Cor	Alliant Energy Corporation (NYSE-LNT)	5.5	6.5	6.0	4.5	6.0	6.0
Ameren Corporatio	Ameren Corporation (NYSE-AEE)	4.0	3.5	2.0	8.0	5.0	5.5
American Electric I	American Electric Power Co. (NYSE-AEP)	5.0	5.0	3.5	4.0	5.0	3.5
Avista Corporation	Avista Corporation (NYSE-AVA)	3.0	4.0	3.5	-1.0	4.0	3.0
CMS Energy Corpo	CMS Energy Corporation (NYSE-CMS)	6.5	6.5	7.0	6.0	6.5	8.5
DTE Energy Compa	DTE Energy Company (NYSE-DTE)	4.0	5.5	3.0	2.5	5.5	1.5
Duke Energy Corpo	Duke Energy Corporation (NYSE-DUK)	3.5	3.0	0.5	3.5	2.5	0.5
Entergy Corporatio	Entergy Corporation (NYSE-ETR)	2.5	2.5	2.0	4.0	4.0	7.0
IDACORP, Inc. (N	IDACORP, Inc. (NYSE-IDA)	4.0	7.5	4.5	3.5	6.0	4.5
NextEra Energy, In	Nextera Energy, Inc. (NYSE-NEE)	9.5	11.0	8.0	12.5	11.0	5.5
NorthWestern Corp	NorthWestern Corporation (NYSE-NWE)	2.5	5.5	5.0	-1.0	3.0	3.5
OGE Energy Corp.	OGE Energy Corp. (NYSE-OGE)	3.0	7.5	4.0	4.5	8.5	1.5
Pinnacle West Capi	Pinnacle West Capital Corp. (NYSE-PNW)	2.5	4.0	4.0		4.0	3.5
Portland General E	Portland General Electric Company (NYSE-POR)	3.5	5.5	3.5	3.0	5.5	3.0
PPL Corporation (N	PPL Corporation (NYSE-PPL)	-9.0	-1.0		-17.0	-4.5	4.0
Southern Company	Southern Company (NYSE-SO)	3.0	3.5	3.0	3.0	3.5	2.5
Xcel Energy Inc. (N	Xcel Energy Inc. (NYSE-XEL)	5.5	6.5	5.5	6.0	6.5	6.0
	Mean	3.4	5.1	4.1	2.9	4.8	4.1
	Median	3.5	5.5	3.8	3.8	5.0	3.5
	Data Source: *Value Line Investment Survey.*	Average of Median Figures =			4.2		

Exhibit JRW-5

Evergy Kansas Central, Inc. and Evergy Kansas South Inc.
DCF Equity Cost Growth Rate Measures
***Value Line* Projected Growth Rates**

Panel A
Electric Proxy Group

Company	*Value Line* Projected Growth Est'd. '22-'24 to '28-'30			*Value Line* Sustainable Growth		
	Earnings	Dividends	Book Value	Return on Equity	Retention Rate	Internal Growth
Alliant Energy Corporation (NYSE-LNT)	6.0	6.0	4.0	12.0%	38.0%	4.6%
Ameren Corporation (NYSE-AEE)	6.5	6.5	6.5	10.0%	40.0%	4.0%
American Electric Power Co. (NYSE-AEP)	6.5	5.5	6.0	11.0%	39.0%	4.3%
Avista Corporation (NYSE-AVA)	5.5	4.0	2.0	8.0%	24.0%	1.9%
CenterPoint Energy, Inc. (NYSE-CNP)	6.5	6.0	5.5	10.5%	51.0%	5.4%
CMS Energy Corporation (NYSE-CMS)	6.0	5.0	5.0	13.5%	40.0%	5.4%
Consolidated Edison, Inc. (NYSE-ED)	6.0	4.5	4.0	9.0%	40.0%	3.6%
Dominion Resources, Inc. (NYSE-D)	6.0	0.0	3.0	11.5%	37.0%	4.3%
DTE Energy Company (NYSE-DTE)	4.5	3.0	1.0	12.5%	38.0%	4.8%
Duke Energy Corporation (NYSE-DUK)	6.0	3.5	3.5	10.5%	37.0%	3.9%
Edison International (NYSE-EIX)	6.5	6.0	6.0	14.0%	36.0%	5.0%
Entergy Corporation (NYSE-ETR)	3.0	5.5	4.5	9.5%	39.0%	3.7%
Evergy, Inc. (NYSE-EVRG)	7.5	7.0	3.5	10.0%	37.0%	3.7%
Eversource Energy (NYSE-ES)	5.5	5.5	3.5	11.5%	37.0%	4.3%
Exelon Corporation (NDW-EXC)	nmf	nmf	nmf	10.0%	40.0%	4.0%
FirstEnergy Corp. (NYSE-FE)	4.5	4.5	5.5	12.5%	37.0%	4.6%
IDACORP, Inc. (NYSE-IDA)	6.0	5.5	4.5	9.5%	41.0%	3.9%
Nextera Energy, Inc. (NYSE-NEE)	8.5	9.5	8.0	14.0%	37.0%	5.2%
NorthWestern Corporation (NYSE-NWE)	4.5	1.5	2.5	8.0%	35.0%	2.8%
OGE Energy Corp. (NYSE-OGE)	6.5	3.0	5.5	13.0%	30.0%	3.9%
Pinnacle West Capital Corp. (NYSE-PNW)	5.0	1.5	4.0	9.0%	39.0%	3.5%
Portland General Electric Company (NYSE-POR)	6.5	5.5	4.5	9.5%	35.0%	3.3%
PPL Corporation (NYSE-PPL)	7.5	-0.5	3.0	9.5%	40.0%	3.8%
Public Service Enterprise Gp. Inc. (NYSE-PEG)	7.0	6.0	5.5	12.5%	39.0%	4.9%
Southern Company (NYSE-SO)	6.5	3.5	3.5	14.5%	33.0%	4.8%
WEC Energy Group (NYSE-WEC)	6.0	7.0	4.0	13.0%	36.0%	4.7%
Xcel Energy Inc. (NYSE-XEL)	7.0	6.5	5.5	11.0%	40.0%	4.4%
Mean	6.1	4.7	4.4	11.1%	37.6%	4.2%
Median	6.0	5.5	4.3	11.0%	38.0%	4.3%
Average of Median Figures =		5.3			Median =	4.3%

*** 'Est'd. '22-'24 to '28-'30 is the estimated growth rate from the base period 2023 to 2024 until the future period 2028 to 2030.**
Data Source: ***Value Line Investment Survey.***

Panel B
Bulkley Proxy Group

Company	*Value Line* Projected Growth Est'd. '22-'24 to '28-'30			*Value Line* Sustainable Growth		
	Earnings	Dividends	Book Value	Return on Equity	Retention Rate	Internal Growth
Alliant Energy Corporation (NYSE-LNT)	6.0	6.0	4.0	12.0%	38.0%	4.6%
Ameren Corporation (NYSE-AEE)	6.5	6.5	6.5	10.0%	40.0%	4.0%
American Electric Power Co. (NYSE-AEP)	6.5	5.5	6.0	11.0%	39.0%	4.3%
Avista Corporation (NYSE-AVA)	5.5	4.0	2.0	8.0%	24.0%	1.9%
CMS Energy Corporation (NYSE-CMS)	6.0	5.0	5.0	13.5%	40.0%	5.4%
DTE Energy Company (NYSE-DTE)	4.5	3.0	1.0	12.5%	38.0%	4.8%
Duke Energy Corporation (NYSE-DUK)	6.0	3.5	3.5	10.5%	37.0%	3.9%
Entergy Corporation (NYSE-ETR)	3.0	5.5	4.5	9.5%	39.0%	3.7%
IDACORP, Inc. (NYSE-IDA)	6.0	5.5	4.5	9.5%	41.0%	3.9%
Nextera Energy, Inc. (NYSE-NEE)	8.5	9.5	8.0	14.0%	37.0%	5.2%
NorthWestern Corporation (NYSE-NWE)	4.5	1.5	2.5	8.0%	35.0%	2.8%
OGE Energy Corp. (NYSE-OGE)	6.5	3.0	5.5	13.0%	30.0%	3.9%
Pinnacle West Capital Corp. (NYSE-PNW)	5.0	1.5	4.0	9.0%	39.0%	3.5%
Portland General Electric Company (NYSE-POR)	6.5	5.5	4.5	9.5%	35.0%	3.3%
PPL Corporation (NYSE-PPL)	7.5	-0.5	3.0	9.5%	40.0%	3.8%
Southern Company (NYSE-SO)	6.5	3.5	3.5	14.5%	33.0%	4.8%
Xcel Energy Inc. (NYSE-XEL)	7.0	6.5	5.5	11.0%	40.0%	4.4%
Mean	6.0	4.4	4.3	10.9%	36.8%	4.0%
Median	6.0	5.0	4.5	10.5%	38.0%	3.9%
Average of Median Figures =		5.2			Median =	3.9%

*** 'Est'd. '22-'24 to '28-'30 is the estimated growth rate from the base period 2023 to 2024 until the future period 2028 to 2030.**
Data Source: ***Value Line Investment Survey.***

Exhibit JRW-5

Evergy Kansas Central, Inc. and Evergy Kansas South Inc.
DCF Equity Cost Growth Rate Measures
Analysts Projected EPS Growth Rate Estimates

Panel A
Electric Proxy Group

Company		Yahoo	Zacks	S&P	Mean
Alliant Energy Corporation (NYSE-LNT)	LNT	7.8%	6.7%	6.5%	7.0%
Ameren Corporation (NYSE-AEE)	AEE	8.1%	7.0%	7.0%	7.3%
American Electric Power Co. (NYSE-AEP)	AEP	11.2%	6.4%	6.8%	8.1%
Avista Corporation (NYSE-AVA)	AVA	5.5%	6.1%	6.0%	5.9%
CenterPoint Energy, Inc. (NYSE-CNP)	CNP	10.0%	7.8%	8.0%	8.6%
CMS Energy Corporation (NYSE-CMS)	CMS	8.3%	7.8%	7.3%	7.8%
Consolidated Edison, Inc. (NYSE-ED)	ED	2.1%	5.6%	5.8%	4.5%
Dominion Resources, Inc. (NYSE-D)	D	8.4%	13.6%	11.4%	11.1%
DTE Energy Company (NYSE-DTE)	DTE	9.0%	7.6%	7.5%	8.1%
Duke Energy Corporation (NYSE-DUK)	DUK	7.2%	6.3%	6.4%	6.6%
Edison International (NYSE-EIX)	EIX	15.2%	7.0%	8.6%	10.3%
Entergy Corporation (NYSE-ETR)	ETR	2.5%	9.5%	9.1%	7.0%
Evergy, Inc. (NYSE-EVRG)	EVRG	NA	5.7%	5.7%	5.7%
Eversource Energy (NYSE-ES)	ES	6.2%	5.7%	5.6%	5.8%
Exelon Corporation (NDW-EXC)	EXC	6.5%	6.4%	6.4%	6.4%
FirstEnergy Corp. (NYSE-FE)	FE	11.5%	6.4%	6.1%	8.0%
IDACORP, Inc. (NYSE-IDA)	IDA	9.0%	8.1%	8.1%	8.4%
Nextera Energy, Inc. (NYSE-NEE)	NEE	5.3%	7.7%	7.7%	6.9%
NorthWestern Corporation (NYSE-NWE)	NWE	6.0%	6.9%	5.8%	6.2%
OGE Energy Corp. (NYSE-OGE)	OGE	4.6%	6.3%	6.5%	5.8%
Pinnacle West Capital Corp. (NYSE-PNW)	PNW	6.1%	2.1%	4.8%	4.3%
Portland General Electric Company (NYSE-I	POR	9.3%	3.4%	4.8%	5.8%
PPL Corporation (NYSE-PPL)	PPL	14.5%	7.5%	7.4%	9.8%
Public Service Enterprise Group Incorporate	PEG	2.4%	6.8%	6.6%	5.3%
Southern Company (NYSE-SO)	SO	6.9%	6.6%	6.1%	6.5%
WEC Energy Group (NYSE-WEC)	WEC	7.8%	7.0%	7.0%	7.3%
Xcel Energy Inc. (NYSE-XEL)	XEL	8.1%	7.5%	7.8%	7.8%
Mean		7.7%	6.9%	6.9%	7.1%
Median		7.8%	6.8%	6.6%	7.0%

Data Sources: www.zacks.com, http://quote.yahoo.com, S&P Cap IQ, May 20, 2025.

Panel B
Bulkley Proxy Group

Company		Yahoo	Zacks	S&P	Mean
Alliant Energy Corporation (NYSE-LNT)	LNT	7.8%	6.7%	6.5%	7.0%
Ameren Corporation (NYSE-AEE)	AEE	8.1%	7.0%	7.0%	7.3%
American Electric Power Co. (NYSE-AEP)	AEP	11.2%	6.4%	6.8%	8.1%
Avista Corporation (NYSE-AVA)	AVA	5.5%	6.1%	6.0%	5.9%
CMS Energy Corporation (NYSE-CMS)	CMS	8.3%	7.8%	7.3%	7.8%
DTE Energy Company (NYSE-DTE)	DTE	9.0%	7.6%	7.5%	8.1%
Duke Energy Corporation (NYSE-DUK)	DUK	7.2%	6.3%	6.4%	6.6%
Entergy Corporation (NYSE-ETR)	ETR	2.5%	9.5%	9.1%	7.0%
IDACORP, Inc. (NYSE-IDA)	IDA	9.0%	8.1%	8.1%	8.4%
Nextera Energy, Inc. (NYSE-NEE)	NEE	5.3%	7.7%	7.7%	6.9%
NorthWestern Corporation (NYSE-NWE)	NWE	6.0%	6.9%	5.8%	6.2%
OGE Energy Corp. (NYSE-OGE)	OGE	4.6%	6.3%	6.5%	5.8%
Pinnacle West Capital Corp. (NYSE-PNW)	PNW	6.1%	2.1%	4.8%	4.3%
Portland General Electric Company (NYSE-I	POR	9.3%	3.4%	4.8%	5.8%
PPL Corporation (NYSE-PPL)	PPL	14.5%	7.5%	7.4%	9.8%
Southern Company (NYSE-SO)	SO	6.9%	6.6%	6.1%	6.5%
Xcel Energy Inc. (NYSE-XEL)	XEL	8.1%	7.5%	7.8%	7.8%
Mean		7.6%	6.7%	6.8%	7.0%
Median		7.8%	6.9%	6.8%	7.0%

Data Sources: www.zacks.com, http://quote.yahoo.com, S&P Cap IQ, May 20, 2025.

Exhibit JRW-5

Evergy Kansas Central, Inc. and Evergy Kansas South Inc.
DCF Growth Rate Indicators

Growth Rate Indicator	Electric Proxy Group	Bulkley Proxy Group
Historic *Value Line* Growth in EPS, DPS, and BVPS	4.0%	4.2%
Projected *Value Line* Growth in EPS, DPS, and BVPS	5.3%	5.2%
Sustainable Growth ROE * Retention Rate	4.3%	3.9%
Projected EPS Growth from Yahoo, Zacks, and S&P Cap IQ - Mean/Median	7.0%/7.1%	7.0%/7.0%
DCF Growth Rate	6.30%	6.20%

DCF Growth Rate Summary

DCF Growth Rate	Electric Proxy Group	Bulkley Proxy Group
Projected *Value Line* Growth	5.3%	5.2%
Sustainable Growth	4.3%	3.9%
Projected EPS Growth	7.1%	7.0%
Projected Growth Average	5.5%	5.4%
Projected EPS Growth	7.1%	7.0%
DCF Growth Rate	6.3%	6.2%

Exhibit JRW-6

Evergy Kansas Central, Inc. and Evergy Kansas South Inc.
Capital Asset Pricing Model

Panel A
Electric Proxy Group***

Risk-Free Interest Rate	5.00%
Beta*	#NAME?
Ex Ante Market Risk Premium**	5.25%
CAPM Cost of Equity	9.00%

* See page 3 of Exhibit JRW-6

** See pages 5 and 6 of Exhibit JRW-6

*** CAPM ROE rounded to nearest 0.05%.

Panel B
Bulkley Proxy Group***

Risk-Free Interest Rate	5.00%
Beta*	0.74
Ex Ante Market Risk Premium**	5.25%
CAPM Cost of Equity	8.85%

* See page 3 of Exhibit JRW-6

** See pages 5 and 6 of Exhibit JRW-6

*** CAPM ROE rounded to nearest 0.05%.

Exhibit JRW-6

Thirty-Year U.S. Treasury Yields
2010-2025

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, FRED Database.



Panel A

Electric Proxy Group			
	V-Line	Cap IQ	Average
Company	Beta	Beta	Beta
Alliant Energy Corporation (NYSE-LNT)	0.95	0.72	0.83
Ameren Corporation (NYSE-AEE)	0.90	0.68	0.79
American Electric Power Co. (NYSE-AEP)	0.85	0.62	0.74
Avista Corporation (NYSE-AVA)	0.75	0.60	0.67
CenterPoint Energy, Inc. (NYSE-CNP)	1.10	0.74	0.92
CMS Energy Corporation (NYSE-CMS)	0.85	0.60	0.73
Consolidated Edison, Inc. (NYSE-ED)	0.65	0.51	0.58
Dominion Resources, Inc. (NYSE-D)	0.75	0.71	0.73
DTE Energy Company (NYSE-DTE)	1.00	0.64	0.82
Duke Energy Corporation (NYSE-DUK)	0.70	0.58	0.64
Edison International (NYSE-EIX)	0.90	0.85	0.87
Entergy Corporation (NYSE-ETR)	1.00	0.73	0.87
Evergy, Inc. (NYSE-EVRG)	0.95	0.67	0.81
Eversource Energy (NYSE-ES)	0.95	0.75	0.85
Exelon Corporation (NDW-EXC)	NMF	0.67	0.67
FirstEnergy Corp. (NYSE-FE)	0.75	0.60	0.67
IDACORP, Inc. (NYSE-IDA)	0.75	0.72	0.73
NextEra Energy, Inc. (NYSE-NEE)	0.90	0.79	0.84
NorthWestern Corporation (NYSE-NWE)	0.80	0.61	0.71
OGE Energy Corp. (NYSE-OGE)	1.05	0.74	0.89
Pinnacle West Capital Corp. (NYSE-PNW)	0.80	0.63	0.72
Portland General Electric Company (NYSE-POR)	0.80	0.73	0.76
PPL Corporation (NYSE-PPL)	0.90	0.81	0.86
Public Service Enterprise Group Incorporated (NYSE -	0.90	0.66	0.78
Southern Company (NYSE-SO)	0.75	0.58	0.67
WEC Energy Group (NYSE-WEC)	0.90	0.63	0.77
Xcel Energy Inc. (NYSE-XEL)	0.75	0.60	0.67
Mean	0.87	0.67	0.77
Median	0.88	0.67	0.76

Data Source: *Value Line Investment Survey*, 2025; S&P Cap IQ, 2025.

Panel B

Bulkley Proxy Group			
	V-Line	Cap IQ	Average
Company	Beta	Beta	Beta
Alliant Energy Corporation (NYSE-LNT)	0.95	0.72	0.83
Ameren Corporation (NYSE-AEE)	0.90	0.68	0.79
American Electric Power Co. (NYSE-AEP)	0.85	0.62	0.74
Avista Corporation (NYSE-AVA)	0.75	0.60	0.67
CMS Energy Corporation (NYSE-CMS)	0.85	0.60	0.73
DTE Energy Company (NYSE-DTE)	1.00	0.64	0.82
Duke Energy Corporation (NYSE-DUK)	0.70	0.58	0.64
Entergy Corporation (NYSE-ETR)	1.00	0.73	0.87
IDACORP, Inc. (NYSE-IDA)	0.75	0.72	0.73
NextEra Energy, Inc. (NYSE-NEE)	0.90	0.79	0.84
NorthWestern Corporation (NYSE-NWE)	0.80	0.61	0.71
OGE Energy Corp. (NYSE-OGE)	1.05	0.74	0.89
Pinnacle West Capital Corp. (NYSE-PNW)	0.80	0.63	0.72
Portland General Electric Company (NYSE-POR)	0.80	0.73	0.76
PPL Corporation (NYSE-PPL)	0.90	0.81	0.86
Southern Company (NYSE-SO)	0.75	0.58	0.67
Xcel Energy Inc. (NYSE-XEL)	0.75	0.60	0.67
Mean	0.86	0.65	0.76
Median	0.88	0.64	0.74

Data Source: *Value Line Investment Survey*, 2025; S&P Cap IQ, 2025.

Exhibit JRW-6
Risk Premium Approaches

	Historical Ex Post Returns	**Surveys**	**Expected Return Models and Market Data**
Means of Assessing The Market Risk Premium	Historical Average Stock Minus Bond Returns	Surveys of CFOs, Financial Forecasters, Companies, Analysts on Expected Returns and Market Risk Premiums	Use Market Prices and Market Fundamentals (such as Growth Rates) to Compute Expected Returns and Market Risk Premiums
Problems/Debated Issues	Time Variation in Required Returns, Measurement and Time Period Issues, and Biases such as Market and Company Survivorship Bias	Questions Regarding Survey Histories, Responses, and Representativeness Surveys may be Subject to Biases, such as Extrapolation	Assumptions Regarding Expectations, Especially Growth

Source: Adapted from Antti Ilmanen, Expected Returns on Stocks and Bonds," *Journal of Portfolio Management* , (Winter 2003).

CAPM Study

Market Risk Premium - 2000-2024

Category	Category	Study Authors	Publication Date	Time Period Of Study	Methodology	Return Measure	Range Low	Range High	Midpoint of Range	Mean	Median
Historical Risk	**Historical Risk Premium**										
		Ibbotson	2016	1928-2015	Historical Stock Returns - Bond Returns	Arithmetic				6.00%	
						Geometric				4.40%	
		Damodaran	2024	1928-2023	Historical Stock Returns - Bond Returns	Arithmetic				6.80%	
						Geometric				5.23%	
		Dimson, Marsh, Staunton _Credit Suisse Report	2025	1900-2024	Historical Stock Returns - Bond Returns	Geometric				5.10%	
		Bate	2008	1900-2007	Historical Stock Returns - Bond Returns	Geometric				4.50%	
		Shiller	2006	1926-2005	Historical Stock Returns - Bond Returns	Arithmetic				7.00%	
						Geometric				5.50%	
		Siegel	2005	1926-2005	Historical Stock Returns - Bond Returns	Arithmetic				6.10%	
						Geometric				4.60%	
		Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton	2006	1900-2005	Historical Stock Returns - Bond Returns	Arithmetic				5.50%	
		Goyal & Welch	2006	1872-2004	Historical Stock Returns - Bond Returns	Geometric				4.77%	
		Median									5.37%
Ex Ante Model	**Ex Ante Models (Puzzle Research)**										
		Claus Thomas	2001	1985-1998	Abnormal Earnings Model					3.00%	
		Arnott and Bernstein	2002	1810-2001	Fundamentals - Div Yld + Growth					2.40%	
		Constantinides	2002	1872-2000	Historical Returns & Fundamentals - P/D & P/E					6.90%	
		Cornell	1999	1926-1997	Historical Returns & Fundamental GDP/Earnings		3.50%	5.50%	4.50%	4.50%	
		Easton, Taylor, et al	2002	1981-1998	Residual Income Model					5.30%	
		Fama French	2002	1951-2000	Fundamental DCF with EPS and DPS Growth		2.55%	4.32%		3.44%	
		Harris & Marston	2001	1982-1998	Fundamental DCF with Analysts' EPS Growth					7.14%	
		McKinsey	2002	1962-2002	Fundamental (P/E, D/P, & Earnings Growth)		3.50%	4.00%		3.75%	
		Siegel	2005	1802-2001	Historical Earnings Yield					2.50%	
		Grabowski	2006	1926-2005	Historical and Projected		3.50%	6.00%	4.75%	4.75%	
		Maheu & McCurdy	2006	1885-2003	Historical Excess Returns, Structural Breaks,		4.02%	5.10%	4.56%	4.56%	
		Bostock	2004	1960-2002	Bond Yields, Credit Risk, and Income Volatility		3.90%	1.30%	2.60%	2.60%	
		Bakshi & Chen	2005	1982-1998	Fundamentals - Interest Rates					7.31%	
		Donaldson, Kamstra, & Kramer	2006	1952-2004	Fundamental, Dividend yld., Returns,, & Volatility		3.00%	4.00%	3.50%	3.50%	
		Campbell	2008	1982-2007	Historical & Projections (D/P & Earnings Growth)		4.10%	5.40%		4.75%	
		Best & Byrne	2001	Projection	Fundamentals - Div Yld + Growth					2.00%	
		Fernandez	2007	Projection	Required Equity Risk Premium					4.00%	
		DeLong & Magin	2008	Projection	Earnings Yield - TIPS					3.22%	
		Siegel - Rethink ERP	2011	Projection	Real Stock Returns and Components					5.50%	
		Kroll (Duff & Phelps)	2025	Projection	Normalized with 3.5% Long-Term Treasury Yield					5.50%	
		Mschchowski - VL - 2014	2014	Projection	Fundamentals - Expected Return Minus 10-Year Treasury Rate					5.50%	
		American Appraisal Quarterly ERP	2015	Projection	Fundamental Economic and Market Factors					6.00%	
		JP Morgan Asset Management	2025	Projection	Equity Return of 6.70% and Long-Term Bond of 3.80%					3.90%	
		Market Risk Premia - 3-1-25	2025	Projection	Fundamental Economic and Market Factors					2.83%	
		KPMG	2025	Projection	Fundamental Economic and Market Factors					5.00%	
		Damodaran 5-1-25	2025	Projection	Fundamentals - Implied from FCF to Equity Model (Trailing 12 month, with adjusted payout)					4.41%	
		John Campbell	2001	1860-2000	Historical & Projections (D/P & Earnings Growth)	Arithmetic	3.00%	4.00%	3.50%	3.50%	
				Projected for 75 Years		Geometric	1.50%	2.50%	2.00%	2.00%	
		Peter Diamond	2001	Projected for 75 Years	Fundamentals (D/P, GDP Growth)		3.00%	4.80%	3.90%	3.90%	
		John Shoven	2001	Projected for 75 Years	Fundamentals (D/P, P/E, GDP Growth)		3.00%	3.50%	3.25%	3.25%	
		Median									3.95%
Surveys	**Surveys**										
		New York Fed	2015	Five-Year	Survey of Wall Street Firms					5.70%	
		Survey of Financial Forecasters	2025	10-Year Projection	Median Projected Equity Return of 7.00% and Long-Term Bond of 4.00%					3.00%	
		Duke - CFO Magazine Survey	2025	10-Year Projection	Approximately 300 CFOs Expected S&P 500 Return of 9.7% and Risk-Free Rate of 4.5%					5.20%	
		Fernandez - Academics, Analysts, and Companie	2025	Long-Term	Survey of Academics, Analysts, and Companies					5.50%	
		Median									5.35%
Building Block	**Building Block**										
		Ibbotson and Chen	2015	Projection	Historical Supply Model (D/P & Earnings Growth)	Arithmetic			6.22%	5.21%	
						Geometric			4.20%		
		Chen - Rethink ERP	2010	20-Year Projection	Combination Supply Model (Historic and Projection)	Geometric				4.00%	
		Ilmanen - Rethink ERP	2010	Projection	Current Supply Model (D/P & Earnings Growth)	Geometric				3.00%	
		Grinold, Kroner, Siegel - Rethink ERP	2011	Projection	Current Supply Model (D/P & Earnings Growth)	Arithmetic			4.63%	4.12%	
						Geometric			3.60%		
		Median									4.06%
Mean	**Mean**										**4.68%**
Median	**Median**										**4.70%**

CAPM Study

Market Risk Premium Results - 2010-2024

Category	Study Authors	Publication Date	Time Period Of Study	Methodology	Return Measure	Range Low	Range High	Midpoint of Range	Mean	Median
Historical Risk Premium										
	Ibbotson	2016	1928-2015	Historical Stock Returns - Bond Returns	Arithmetic				6.00%	
					Geometric				4.40%	
	Damodaran	2025	1928-2024	Historical Stock Returns - Bond Returns	Arithmetic				7.00%	
					Geometric				5.44%	
	Dimson, Marsh, Staunton _Credit Suisse Report	2025	1900-2024	Historical Stock Returns - Bond Returns	Geometric				5.10%	
	Median									5.59%
Ex Ante Models (Puzzle Research)										
	Siegel - Rethink ERP	2011	Projection	Real Stock Returns and Components					5.50%	
	Kroll (Duff & Phelps)	2025	Projection	Normalized with 3.5% Long-Term Treasury Yield					5.50%	
	Mschchowski - VL - 2014	2014	Projection	Fundamentals - Expected Return Minus 10-Year Treasury Rate					5.50%	
	American Appraisal Quarterly ERP	2015	Projection	Fundamental Economic and Market Factors					6.00%	
	JP Morgan Asset Management	2025	Projection	Equity Return of 6.70% and Long-Term Bond of 3.80%					3.90%	
	Market Risk Premia - 3-1-25	2025	Projection	Fundamental Economic and Market Factors					2.83%	
	KPMG	2025	Projection	Fundamental Economic and Market Factors					5.00%	
	Damodaran 5-1-25	2025	Projection	Fundamentals - Implied from FCF to Equity Model (Trailing 12 month, with adjusted payout)					4.41%	
	Median									5.25%
Surveys										
	New York Fed	2015	Five-Year	Survey of Wall Street Firms					5.70%	
	Survey of Financial Forecasters	2025	10-Year Projection	Median Projected Equity Return of 7.00% and Long-Term Bond of 4.00%					3.00%	
	Duke - CFO Magazine Survey	2025	10-Year Projection	Approximately 300 CFOs Expected S&P 500 Return of 9.7% and Risk-Free Rate of 4.5%					5.20%	
	Fernandez - Academics, Analysts, and Companie	2025	Long-Term	Survey of Academics, Analysts, and Companies					5.50%	
	Median									5.35%
Building Block										
	Ibbotson and Chen	2015	Projection	Historical Supply Model (D/P & Earnings Growth)	Arithmetic			6.22%	5.21%	
					Geometric			4.20%		
	Chen - Rethink ERP	2010	20-Year Projection	Combination Supply Model (Historic and Projection)	Geometric				4.00%	
	Ilmanen - Rethink ERP	2010	Projection	Current Supply Model (D/P & Earnings Growth)	Geometric				3.00%	
	Grinold, Kroner, Siegel - Rethink ERP	2011	Projection	Current Supply Model (D/P & Earnings Growth)	Arithmetic			4.63%	4.12%	
					Geometric			3.60%		
	Median									4.06%
Mean										**5.06%**
Median										**5.30%**

CAPM Study
Kroll (Duff & Phelps) Equity Risk Premium Estimates

KROLL

Kroll Recommended U.S. Equity Risk Premium (ERP) and Corresponding Risk-free Rates (R_f); January 2008–Present

For additional information, please visit kroll.com/cost-of-capital-resource-center

Date	Risk-free Rate (R_f)	R_f (%)	Kroll Recommended U.S. ERP (%)	What Changed
Current Guidance:				
April 15, 2025 – UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE*	Normalized 20-year U.S. Treasury yield*	3.50*	5.50	*ERP*
June 5, 2024 – April 14, 2025*	Normalized 20-year U.S. Treasury yield*	3.50*	5.00	*ERP*
June 8, 2023 – June 4, 2024*	Normalized 20-year U.S. Treasury yield*	3.50*	5.50	*ERP*
October 18, 2022 – June 7, 2023*	Normalized 20-year U.S. Treasury yield*	3.50*	6.00	*ERP*
June 16, 2022 – October 17, 2022*	Normalized 20-year U.S. Treasury yield*	3.50*	5.50	*Rf*
April 7, 2022 – June 15, 2022	Normalized 20-year U.S. Treasury yield	3.00	5.50	*Rf*
December 7, 2020 – April 6, 2022	Normalized 20-year U.S. Treasury yield	2.50	5.50	*ERP*
June 30, 2020 – December 6, 2020	Normalized 20-year U.S. Treasury yield	2.50	6.00	*Rf*
March 25, 2020 – June 29, 2020	Normalized 20-year U.S. Treasury yield	3.00	6.00	*ERP*
December 19, 2019 – March 24, 2020	Normalized 20-year U.S. Treasury yield	3.00	5.00	*ERP*
September 30, 2019 – December 18, 2019	Normalized 20-year U.S. Treasury yield	3.00	5.50	R_f
December 31, 2018 – September 29, 2019	Normalized 20-year U.S. Treasury yield	3.50	5.50	*ERP*
September 5, 2017 – December 30, 2018	Normalized 20-year U.S. Treasury yield	3.50	5.00	*ERP*
November 15, 2016 – September 4, 2017	Normalized 20-year U.S. Treasury yield	3.50	5.50	R_f
January 31, 2016 – November 14, 2016	Normalized 20-year U.S. Treasury yield	4.00	5.50	*ERP*
December 31, 2015	Normalized 20-year U.S. Treasury yield	4.00	5.00	
December 31, 2014	Normalized 20-year U.S. Treasury yield	4.00	5.00	
December 31, 2013	Normalized 20-year U.S. Treasury yield	4.00	5.00	
February 28, 2013 – January 30, 2016	Normalized 20-year U.S. Treasury yield	4.00	5.00	*ERP*
December 31, 2012	Normalized 20-year U.S. Treasury yield	4.00	5.50	
January 15, 2012 – February 27, 2013	Normalized 20-year U.S. Treasury yield	4.00	5.50	*ERP*
December 31, 2011	Normalized 20-year U.S. Treasury yield	4.00	6.00	
September 30, 2011 – January 14, 2012	Normalized 20-year U.S. Treasury yield	4.00	6.00	*ERP*
July 1 2011 – September 29, 2011	Normalized 20-year U.S. Treasury yield	4.00	5.50	R_f
June 1, 2011 – June 30, 2011	Spot 20-year U.S. Treasury yield	Spot	5.50	R_f
May 1, 2011 – May 31, 2011	Normalized 20-year U.S. Treasury yield	4.00	5.50	R_f
December 31, 2010	Spot 20-year U.S. Treasury yield	Spot	5.50	
December 1, 2010 – April 30, 2011	Spot 20-year U.S. Treasury yield	Spot	5.50	R_f
June 1, 2010 – November 30, 2010	Normalized 20-year U.S. Treasury yield	4.00	5.50	R_f
December 31, 2009	Spot 20-year U.S. Treasury yield	Spot	5.50	
December 1, 2009 – May 31, 2010	Spot 20-year U.S. Treasury yield	Spot	5.50	*ERP*
June 1, 2009 – November 30, 2009	Spot 20-year U.S. Treasury yield	Spot	6.00	R_f
December 31, 2008	Normalized 20-year U.S. Treasury yield	4.50	6.00	
November 1, 2008 – May 31, 2009	Normalized 20-year U.S. Treasury yield	4.50	6.00	R_f
October 27, 2008 – October 31, 2008	Spot 20-year U.S. Treasury yield	Spot	6.00	*ERP*
January 1, 2008 – October 26, 2008	Spot 20-year U.S. Treasury yield	Spot	5.00	*Initialized*

*** We recommend using the spot 20-year U.S. Treasury yield as the proxy for the risk-free rate, if the prevailing yield as of the valuation date is higher than our U.S. normalized risk-free rate of 3.5%. This guidance is effective when developing USD-denominated discount rates as of June 16, 2022 and thereafter.**

"Normalized" in this context means that in months where the risk-free rate is deemed to be abnormally low, a proxy for a longer-term sustainable risk-free rate is used.

To learn more about cost of capital issues, and to ensure that you are using the most recent Kroll's Global Cost of Capital Inputs, visit kroll.com/cost-of-capital-resource-center.

This and other related resources can also be found in the online Cost of Capital Navigator platform. To learn more about the Cost of Capital Navigator and other Kroll valuation and industry data products, visit kroll.com/costofcapitalnavigator

Source: https://indialogue.io/clients/reports/public/5d9da61986db2894649a7ef2/5d9da63386db2894649a7ef5

Exhibit JRW-7
Evergy Kansas Central, Inc. and Evergy Kansas South Inc.'s Rate of Return Recommendation

Capital Source	Capitalization Ratio	Cost Rate	Weighted Cost Rate
Long-Term Debt	48.03%	4.64%	2.23%
Common Equity	51.97%	10.50%	5.46%
Total	100.00%		7.69%

Bulkley ROE Results

SUMMARY OF ROE ANALYSES RESULTS

	Constant Growth DCF		
	Mean Low	*Mean*	*Mean High*
30-Day Average	9.15%	10.32%	11.24%
90-Day Average	9.41%	10.59%	11.50%
180-Day Average	9.65%	10.82%	11.74%
Constant Growth Average	9.40%	10.58%	11.49%
	Median Low	*Median*	*Median High*
30-Day Average	9.49%	10.27%	10.99%
90-Day Average	9.77%	10.52%	11.26%
180-Day Average	9.98%	10.75%	11.47%
Constant Growth Average	9.74%	10.52%	11.24%
	CAPM		
	Current 30-day Average Treasury Bond Yield	Near-Term Blue Chip Forecast Yield	Long-Term Blue Chip Forecast Yield
Value Line Beta	11.58%	11.58%	11.59%
Bloomberg Beta	10.32%	10.31%	10.37%
Long-term Avg. Beta	10.15%	10.14%	10.21%
	ECAPM		
Value Line Beta	11.70%	11.69%	11.71%
Bloomberg Beta	10.75%	10.74%	10.78%
Long-term Avg. Beta	10.63%	10.62%	10.67%
	Risk Premium		
	Current 30-day Average Treasury Bond Yield	Near-Term Blue Chip Forecast Yield	Long-Term Blue Chip Forecast Yield
Risk Premium Results	10.27%	10.24%	10.41%

Investment Firms' Expected U.S. Large Cap Equity Market Annual Returns
12/31/2022

Investment Firm	AUM ($ in Bn) 12/31/2022	Duration of Forecast 5-, 10-,20- Year	Expected Return US Large Cap Equities
AQR	$100.00	5-10 Years	5.70%
Allianz	$1,782.64	10 Years	7.50%
Bar's	$468.22	10 Years	7.80%
BlackRock	$8,600.00	10 Years	7.90%
BNY Mellon	$1,800.00	10 Years	6.40%
Callan	$15.42	10 Years	7.25%
Capital Group	$2,300.00	20 Years	7.20%
Citi	$250.00	10 Years	9.50%
Cresset	$30.00	10 Years	7.00%
Fidelity	$3,876.00	20 Years	4.00%
Franklin Templeton	$1,300.00	10 Years	7.90%
Invesco	$1,409.20	10 Years	7.70%
Janney Montgomery	$2.90	10 Years	7.50%
JPMorgan	$2,760.00	10 - 15 Years	7.90%
Mackenzie	$192.20	10 Years	8.20%
Morgan Stanley	$1,300.00	7 Years	4.60%
Morningstar	$253.60	-	7.40%
Neuberger Bergman	$427.00	20 Years	5.79%
Northern Trust	$1,000.00	5 Years	6.00%
Nuveen	$1,100.00	10 Years	6.96%
PGIM	$1,200.00	10 Years	7.76%
PIMCO	$1,740.00	5 Years	6.80%
RBC	$389.00	10 Years	7.85%
RVK	$1.30	20 Years	6.75%
Schroeder	$915.53	10 Years	9.10%
Schwab	$755.00	10 Years	6.10%
State Street	$3,500.00	10 Years	6.60%
T-Rowe Price	$1,275.00	5 Years	4.90%
UBS	$3,960.00	5 Years	4.90%
Vanguard	$7,200.00	10 Years	5.30%
Voya	$321.00	10 Years	6.75%
Total	$50,224.01	10 Years	6.87%

Data Source: Company websites. Source documents provided in work papers.

GDP and S&P 500 Growth Rates

Growth Rates
GDP, S&P 500 Price, EPS, and DPS

	GDP	S&P 500	S&P 500 EPS	S&P 500 DPS	
1960	542.38	58.11	3.10	1.98	
1961	562.21	71.55	3.37	2.04	
1962	603.92	63.10	3.67	2.15	
1963	637.45	75.02	4.13	2.35	
1964	684.46	84.75	4.76	2.58	
1965	742.29	92.43	5.30	2.83	
1966	813.41	80.33	5.41	2.88	
1967	859.96	96.47	5.46	2.98	
1968	940.65	103.86	5.72	3.04	
1969	1,017.62	92.06	6.10	3.24	
1970	1,073.30	92.15	5.51	3.19	
1971	1,164.85	102.09	5.57	3.16	
1972	1,279.11	118.05	6.17	3.19	
1973	1,425.38	97.55	7.96	3.61	
1974	1,545.24	68.56	9.35	3.72	
1975	1,684.90	90.19	7.71	3.73	
1976	1,873.41	107.46	9.75	4.22	
1977	2,081.83	95.10	10.87	4.86	
1978	2,351.60	96.11	11.64	5.18	
1979	2,627.33	107.94	14.55	5.97	
1980	2,857.31	135.76	14.99	6.44	
1981	3,207.04	122.55	15.18	6.83	
1982	3,343.79	140.64	13.82	6.93	
1983	3,634.04	164.93	13.29	7.12	
1984	4,037.61	167.24	16.84	7.83	
1985	4,338.98	211.28	15.68	8.20	
1986	4,579.63	242.17	14.43	8.19	
1987	4,855.22	247.08	16.04	9.17	
1988	5,236.44	277.72	24.12	10.22	
1989	5,641.58	353.40	24.32	11.73	
1990	5,963.14	330.22	22.65	12.35	
1991	6,158.13	417.09	19.30	12.97	
1992	6,520.33	435.71	20.87	12.64	
1993	6,858.56	466.45	26.90	12.69	
1994	7,287.24	459.27	31.75	13.36	
1995	7,639.75	615.93	37.70	14.17	
1996	8,073.12	740.74	40.63	14.89	
1997	8,577.55	970.43	44.09	15.52	
1998	9,062.82	1,229.23	44.27	16.20	
1999	9,631.17	1,469.25	51.68	16.71	
2000	10,250.95	1,320.28	56.13	16.27	
2001	10,581.93	1,148.09	38.85	15.74	
2002	10,929.11	879.82	46.04	16.08	
2003	11,456.45	1,111.91	54.69	17.88	
2004	12,217.20	1,211.92	67.68	19.407	
2005	13,039.20	1,248.29	76.45	22.38	
2006	13,815.58	1,418.30	87.72	25.05	
2007	14,474.23	1,468.36	82.54	27.73	
2008	14,769.86	903.25	65.39	28.05	
2009	14,478.07	1,115.10	59.65	22.31	
2010	15,048.97	1,257.64	83.66	23.12	
2011	15,599.73	1,257.60	97.05	26.02	
2012	16,253.97	1,426.19	102.47	30.44	
2013	16,843.20	1,848.36	107.45	36.28	
2014	17,550.69	2,058.90	113.01	39.44	
2015	18,206.02	2,043.94	106.32	43.16	
2016	18,695.11	2,238.83	108.86	45.03	
2017	19,479.62	2,673.61	124.94	49.73	
2018	20,527.16	2,506.85	148.34	53.61	
2019	21,372.58	3,230.78	162.35	58.80	
2020	20,893.75	3,756.07	139.76	56.70	
2021	22,997.50	4,766.18	206.38	59.20	
2022	25,461.34	3,839.50	219.49	68.34	
2023	27,750.00	4769.83	219.70	69.69	Average
Growth Rates	6.45	7.25	7.00	5.81	6.63

Data Sources: GDPA -http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GDPA/downloaddata
DPS - http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/

Annual Nominal GDP Growth Rates



Data Sources: GDPA -https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GDPA

Bulkleyl GDP Growth Rates

Annual Average Bulkleyl GDP Growth Rates
1961-2023



Data Sources: GDPC1 - https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GDPCA

Inflation Rates

Annual CPI Inflation Rates
1961-2023



Data Sources: CPIAUCSL - https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL

Historical and Projected Nominal GDP Growth Rates

Panel A
Historic GDP Growth Rates

10-Year Average	**4.59%**
20-Year Average	**4.32%**
30-Year Average	**4.65%**
40-Year Average	**5.21%**
50-Year Average	**6.16%**

Calculated using GDP data on Page 1 of Exhibit JRW-9

Panel B
Projected GDP Growth Rates

	Time Frame	Projected Nominal GDP Growth Rate
Congressional Budget Office	**2023-2053**	**3.8%**
Survey of Financial Forecasters	**Ten Year**	**4.4%**
Social Security Administration	**2023-2100**	**4.1%**
Energy Information Administration	**2023-2050**	**4.3%**
	Average	**4.15%**

Sources:

Congressional Budget Office,The *2023 Long-Term Budget Outlook* , July 15, 2023.
U.S. Energy Information Administration, *Annual Energy Outlook 2023* , Table: Macroeconomic Indicators,
Social Security Administration, 2023 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Old-Age,
Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) Program, Table VI.G4,
The 4.1% growth rate is the growth in projected GDP from 26 trillion in 2023 to $582 trillion in 2100.
https://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/Bulkleyl-time-center/survey-of-professional-forecasters/

X

GDP and S&P 500 Growth

Cumulative Long-Term Growth of GDP, S&P 500, S&P 500 EPS, S&P 500 DPS



	GDP	S&P 500	S&P 500 EPS	S&P 500 DPS
Growth Rates	6.45	7.25	7.00	5.81

Data Sources: GDPA -http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GDPA/downloaddata
S&P 500, EPS and DPS - http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

25-EKCE-294-RTS

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document was served by electronic service on this 6th day of June, 2025, to the following:

JAMES G. FLAHERTY, ATTORNEY
ANDERSON & BYRD, L.L.P.
216 S HICKORY
PO BOX 17
OTTAWA, KS 66067-0017
jflaherty@andersonbyrd.com

ELIZABETH A. BAKER, ATTORNEY AT LAW
BAKER, STOREY, & WATSON
1603 SW 37TH STREET
TOPEKA, KS 66611
ebaker@bakerstorey.com

NICK SMITH, MANAGER OF KANSAS REGULATION
BLACK HILLS ENERGY CORPORATION
601 NORTH IOWA STREET
LAWRENCE, KS 66044
nick.smith@blackhillscorp.com

ROB DANIEL, DIRECTOR OF REGULATORY
BLACK HILLS/KANSAS GAS UTILITY COMPANY LLC D/B/A Black Hills Energy
601 NORTH IOWA STREET
LAWRENCE, KS 66044
rob.daniel@blackhillscorp.com

DOUGLAS LAW, ASSOCIATE GENERAL COUNSEL
BLACK HILLS/KANSAS GAS UTILITY COMPANY, LLC D/B/A BLACK HILLS ENERGY
1731 WINDHOEK DRIVE
LINCOLN, NE 68512
douglas.law@blackhillscorp.com

KURT J. BOEHM, ATTORNEY
BOEHM, KURTZ & LOWRY
36 E SEVENTH ST STE 1510
CINCINNATI, OH 45202
kboehm@bkllawfirm.com

JODY KYLER COHN, ATTORNEY
BOEHM, KURTZ & LOWRY
36 E SEVENTH ST STE 1510
CINCINNATI, OH 45202
jkylercohn@bkllawfirm.com

MELISSA M. BUHRIG, EXEC. VICE PRESIDENT, GEN. COUNSEL & SECRETARY
CVR REFINING CVL, LLC
2277 PLAZA DR., STE. 500
SUGAR LAND, TX 77479
mmbuhrig@CVREnergy.com

JASON T. GRAY, ATTORNEY
DUNCAN & ALLEN
1730 RHODE ISLAND AVE., NW
SUITE 700
WASHINGTON, DC 20036
jtg@duncanallen.com

JUSTIN BIEBER
ENERGY STRATEGIES, LLC
PARKSIDE TOWERS
215 S STATE ST STE 200
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111
jbieber@energystrat.com

CATHRYN J. DINGES, SR DIRECTOR & REGULATORY AFFAIRS COUNSEL
EVERGY KANSAS CENTRAL, INC
818 S KANSAS AVE
PO BOX 889
TOPEKA, KS 66601-0889
Cathy.Dinges@evergy.com

LESLIE WINES, SR. EXEC. ADMIN. ASST.
EVERGY KANSAS CENTRAL, INC
818 S KANSAS AVE
PO BOX 889
TOPEKA, KS 66601-0889
leslie.wines@evergy.com

COLE A. BAILEY, CORPORATE COUNSEL DIRECTOR
EVERGY KANSAS SOUTH, INC. D/B/A EVERGY KANSAS CENTRAL
818 S KANSAS AVE, PO Box 889
TOPEKA, KS 66601-0889
cole.bailey@evergy.com

DARRIN IVES, VP - REGULATORY AFFAIRS
EVERGY METRO, INC D/B/A EVERGY KANSAS METRO
ONE KANSAS CITY PLACE
1200 MAIN, 19TH FLOOR
KANSAS CITY, MO 64105
DARRIN.IVES@EVERGY.COM

RONALD A. KLOTE, DIRECTOR, REGULATORY AFFAIRS
EVERGY METRO, INC D/B/A EVERGY KANSAS METRO
ONE KANSAS CITY PLACE
1200 MAIN, 19TH FLOOR
KANSAS CITY, MO 64105
ronald.klote@evergy.com

DAVID BANKS, CEM, CEP
FLINT HILLS ENERGY CONSULTANT
117 S PARKRIDGE
WICHITA, KS 67209
david@fheconsultants.net

DANIEL J. BULLER, ATTORNEY
FOULSTON SIEFKIN LLP
7500 COLLEGE BOULEVARD, STE 1400
OVERLAND PARK, KS 66201-4041
dbuller@foulston.com

MOLLY E. MORGAN, ATTORNEY
FOULSTON SIEFKIN LLP
1551 N. Waterfront Parkway
SUITE 100
WICHITA, KS 67206
mmorgan@foulston.com

LEE M. SMITHYMAN, ATTORNEY
FOULSTON SIEFKIN LLP
7500 COLLEGE BOULEVARD, STE 1400
OVERLAND PARK, KS 66201-4041
lsmithyman@foulston.com

JAMES P. ZAKOURA, ATTORNEY
FOULSTON SIEFKIN LLP
7500 COLLEGE BOULEVARD, STE 1400
OVERLAND PARK, KS 66201-4041
jzakoura@foulston.com

CONSTANCE CHAN, SENIOR CATEGORY MANAGER - ELECTRICITY & BUSINESS TRAVEL
HF SINCLAIR EL DORADO REFINING LLC
2323 VICTORY AVE. STE 1400
DALLA, TX 75219
constance.chan@hfsinclair.com

JON LINDSEY, CORPORATE COUNSEL
HF SINCLAIR EL DORADO REFINING LLC
550 E. SOUTH TEMPLE
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84102
jon.lindsey@hfsinclair.com

BRIAN G. FEDOTIN, GENERAL COUNSEL
KANSAS CORPORATION COMMISSION
1500 SW ARROWHEAD RD
TOPEKA, KS 66604
Brian.Fedotin@ks.gov

PATRICK HURLEY, CHIEF LITIGATION COUNSEL
KANSAS CORPORATION COMMISSION
1500 SW ARROWHEAD RD
TOPEKA, KS 66604
Patrick.Hurley@ks.gov

CARLY MASENTHIN, LITIGATION COUNSEL
KANSAS CORPORATION COMMISSION
1500 SW ARROWHEAD RD
TOPEKA, KS 66604
Carly.Masenthin@ks.gov

LORNA EATON, MANAGER OF RATES AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS
KANSAS GAS SERVICE, A DIVISION OF ONE GAS, INC.
7421 W 129TH STREET
OVERLAND PARK, KS 66213
lorna.eaton@onegas.com

LORNA EATON, MANAGER RATES & REGULATORY - OKE01026
KANSAS GAS SERVICE, A DIVISION OF ONE GAS, INC.
7421 W 129TH STREET
OVERLAND PARK, KS 66213
invoices@onegas.com

ROBERT E. VINCENT, MANAGING ATTORNEY
KANSAS GAS SERVICE, A DIVISION OF ONE GAS, INC.
7421 W. 129TH STREET
OVERLAND PARK, KS 66213
robert.vincent@onegas.com

VALERIE SMITH, ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT
MORRIS LAING EVANS BROCK & KENNEDY
800 SW JACKSON
SUITE 1310
TOPEKA, KS 66612-1216
vsmith@morrislaing.com

TREVOR WOHLFORD, ATTORNEY
MORRIS LAING EVANS BROCK & KENNEDY
800 SW JACKSON
SUITE 1310
TOPEKA, KS 66612-1216
twohlford@morrislaing.com

GLENDA CAFER, MORRIS LAING LAW FIRM
MORRIS LAING EVANS BROCK & KENNEDY CHTD
800 SW JACKSON STE 1310
TOPEKA, KS 66612-1216
gcafer@morrislaing.com

RITA LOWE, PARALEGAL
MORRIS LAING EVANS BROCK & KENNEDY CHTD
300 N MEAD STE 200
WICHITA, KS 67202-2745
rlowe@morrislaing.com

WILL B. WOHLFORD, ATTORNEY
MORRIS LAING EVANS BROCK & KENNEDY CHTD
300 N MEAD STE 200
WICHITA, KS 67202-2745
wwohlford@morrislaing.com

TIM OPITZ
OPITZ LAW FIRM, LLC
308 E. HIGH STREET
SUITE B101
JEFFERSON CITY, MO 65101
tim.opitz@opitzlawfirm.com

ANNE E. CALLENBACH, ATTORNEY
POLSINELLI PC
900 W 48TH PLACE STE 900
KANSAS CITY, MO 64112
acallenbach@polsinelli.com

FRANK A. CARO, ATTORNEY
POLSINELLI PC
900 W 48TH PLACE STE 900
KANSAS CITY, MO 64112
fcaro@polsinelli.com

JARED R. JEVONS, ATTORNEY
POLSINELLI PC
900 W 48TH PLACE STE 900
KANSAS CITY, MO 64112
JJEVONS@POLSINELLI.COM

DANIEL LAWRENCE, GENERAL COUNSEL
USD 259
903 SOUTH EDGEMOOR, ROOM 113
WICHITA, KS 67218
dlawrence@usd259.net

GREG WRIGHT
PRIORITY POWER MGT.
12512 AUGUSTA DR
KANSAS CITY, KS 66109
gwright@prioritypower.com

KACEY S. MAYES, ATTORNEY
TRIPLETT, WOOLF & GARRETSON, LLC
2959 N ROCK RD STE 300
WICHITA, KS 67226
ksmayes@twgfirm.com

TIMOTHY E. MCKEE, ATTORNEY
TRIPLETT, WOOLF & GARRETSON, LLC
2959 N ROCK RD STE 300
WICHITA, KS 67226
TEMCKEE@TWGFIRM.COM

JOHN J. MCNUTT, General Attorney
U.S. ARMY LEGAL SERVICES AGENCY
REGULATORY LAW OFFICE
9275 GUNSTON RD., STE. 1300
FORT BELVOIR, VA 22060-5546
john.j.mcnutt.civ@army.mil

KEVIN K. LACHANCE, CONTRACT LAW ATTORNEY
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ADMIN & CIVIL LAW DIVISION
OFFICE OF STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE
FORT RILEY, KS 66442
kevin.k.lachance.civ@army.mil

Della Smith
Senior Administrative Specialist